Add hard limits for number of TSA entries, Tlog entries, and attestat…

…ion subjects/digests (#286)

* Merge commit from fork

This reduces the capability of an adversary to craft a malicious bundle containing large numbers of these data, which can result in a target verifier process consuming high CPU and memory resources, resulting in an "endless data attack", a type of DoS attack.

Fixes GHSA-cq38-jh5f-37mq

Signed-off-by: Cody Soyland <[email protected]>

* nolint in tests

Signed-off-by: Cody Soyland <[email protected]>

---------

Signed-off-by: Cody Soyland <[email protected]>

pkg/verify/signature.go

@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ import (
 	"github.com/sigstore/sigstore/pkg/signature/options"
 )
 
+const maxAllowedSubjects = 1024
+const maxAllowedSubjectDigests = 32
+
 var ErrDSSEInvalidSignatureCount = errors.New("exactly one signature is required")
 
 func VerifySignature(sigContent SignatureContent, verificationContent VerificationContent, trustedMaterial root.TrustedMaterial) error { // nolint: revive
@@ -179,8 +182,17 @@ func verifyEnvelopeWithArtifact(verifier signature.Verifier, envelope EnvelopeCo
 	}
 	artifactDigest = hasher.Sum(nil)
 
+	// limit the number of subjects to prevent DoS
+	if len(statement.Subject) > maxAllowedSubjects {
+		return fmt.Errorf("too many subjects: %d > %d", len(statement.Subject), maxAllowedSubjects)
+	}
+
 	// Look for artifact digest in statement
 	for _, subject := range statement.Subject {
+		// limit the number of digests to prevent DoS
+		if len(subject.Digest) > maxAllowedSubjectDigests {
+			return fmt.Errorf("too many digests: %d > %d", len(subject.Digest), maxAllowedSubjectDigests)
+		}
 		for alg, digest := range subject.Digest {
 			hexdigest, err := hex.DecodeString(digest)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -203,7 +215,17 @@ func verifyEnvelopeWithArtifactDigest(verifier signature.Verifier, envelope Enve
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("could not verify artifact: unable to extract statement from envelope: %w", err)
 	}
+
+	// limit the number of subjects to prevent DoS
+	if len(statement.Subject) > maxAllowedSubjects {
+		return fmt.Errorf("too many subjects: %d > %d", len(statement.Subject), maxAllowedSubjects)
+	}
+
 	for _, subject := range statement.Subject {
+		// limit the number of digests to prevent DoS
+		if len(subject.Digest) > maxAllowedSubjectDigests {
+			return fmt.Errorf("too many digests: %d > %d", len(subject.Digest), maxAllowedSubjectDigests)
+		}
 		for alg, digest := range subject.Digest {
 			if alg == artifactDigestAlgorithm {
 				hexdigest, err := hex.DecodeString(digest)

pkg/verify/signature_test.go

@@ -18,9 +18,12 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"testing"
 
+	"github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang/in_toto"
+	"github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang/in_toto/slsa_provenance/common"
 	"github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/pkg/testing/ca"
 	"github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/pkg/verify"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -94,7 +97,7 @@ func TestSignatureVerifierMessageSignature(t *testing.T) {
 	virtualSigstore, err := ca.NewVirtualSigstore()
 	assert.NoError(t, err)
 
-	artifact := "Hi, I am an artifact!"
+	artifact := "Hi, I am an artifact!" //nolint:goconst
 	entity, err := virtualSigstore.Sign("[email protected]", "issuer", []byte(artifact))
 	assert.NoError(t, err)
 
@@ -113,3 +116,61 @@ func TestSignatureVerifierMessageSignature(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Nil(t, result)
 }
+
+func TestTooManySubjects(t *testing.T) {
+	virtualSigstore, err := ca.NewVirtualSigstore()
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	tooManySubjectsStatement := in_toto.Statement{}
+	for i := 0; i < 1025; i++ {
+		tooManySubjectsStatement.Subject = append(tooManySubjectsStatement.Subject, in_toto.Subject{
+			Name: fmt.Sprintf("subject-%d", i),
+			Digest: map[string]string{
+				"sha256": "", // actual content of digest does not matter for this test
+			},
+		})
+	}
+
+	tooManySubjectsStatementBytes, err := json.Marshal(tooManySubjectsStatement)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	tooManySubjectsEntity, err := virtualSigstore.Attest("[email protected]", "issuer", tooManySubjectsStatementBytes)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	verifier, err := verify.NewSignedEntityVerifier(virtualSigstore, verify.WithTransparencyLog(1), verify.WithObserverTimestamps(1))
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	artifact := "Hi, I am an artifact!" //nolint:goconst
+	_, err = verifier.Verify(tooManySubjectsEntity, verify.NewPolicy(verify.WithArtifact(bytes.NewBufferString(artifact)), verify.WithoutIdentitiesUnsafe()))
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "too many subjects")
+}
+
+func TestTooManyDigests(t *testing.T) {
+	virtualSigstore, err := ca.NewVirtualSigstore()
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	tooManyDigestsStatement := in_toto.Statement{}
+	tooManyDigestsStatement.Subject = []in_toto.Subject{
+		{
+			Name:   fmt.Sprintf("subject"),
+			Digest: make(common.DigestSet),
+		},
+	}
+	tooManyDigestsStatement.Subject[0].Digest["sha512"] = "" // verifier requires that at least one known hash algorithm is present in the digest map
+	for i := 0; i < 32; i++ {
+		tooManyDigestsStatement.Subject[0].Digest[fmt.Sprintf("digest-%d", i)] = ""
+	}
+
+	tooManySubjectsStatementBytes, err := json.Marshal(tooManyDigestsStatement)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	tooManySubjectsEntity, err := virtualSigstore.Attest("[email protected]", "issuer", tooManySubjectsStatementBytes)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	verifier, err := verify.NewSignedEntityVerifier(virtualSigstore, verify.WithTransparencyLog(1), verify.WithObserverTimestamps(1))
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	artifact := "Hi, I am an artifact!" //nolint:goconst
+	_, err = verifier.Verify(tooManySubjectsEntity, verify.NewPolicy(verify.WithArtifact(bytes.NewBufferString(artifact)), verify.WithoutIdentitiesUnsafe()))
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "too many digests")
+}

pkg/verify/tlog.go

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/pkg/util"
 )
 
+const maxAllowedTlogEntries = 32
+
 // VerifyArtifactTransparencyLog verifies that the given entity has been logged
 // in the transparency log and that the log entry is valid.
 //
@@ -47,6 +49,11 @@ func VerifyArtifactTransparencyLog(entity SignedEntity, trustedMaterial root.Tru
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
+	// limit the number of tlog entries to prevent DoS
+	if len(entries) > maxAllowedTlogEntries {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("too many tlog entries: %d > %d", len(entries), maxAllowedTlogEntries)
+	}
+
 	// disallow duplicate entries, as a malicious actor could use duplicates to bypass the threshold
 	for i := 0; i < len(entries); i++ {
 		for j := i + 1; j < len(entries); j++ {

pkg/verify/tlog_test.go

@@ -191,5 +191,33 @@ func TestDuplicateTlogEntries(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.NoError(t, err)
 
 	_, err = verify.VerifyArtifactTransparencyLog(&dupTlogEntity{entity}, virtualSigstore, 1, true, false)
-	assert.Error(t, err) // duplicate tlog entries should fail to verify
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "duplicate tlog entries found") // duplicate tlog entries should fail to verify
+}
+
+type tooManyTlogEntriesEntity struct {
+	*ca.TestEntity
+}
+
+func (e *tooManyTlogEntriesEntity) TlogEntries() ([]*tlog.Entry, error) {
+	entries, err := e.TestEntity.TlogEntries()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 32; i++ {
+		entries = append(entries, entries[0])
+	}
+
+	return entries, nil
+}
+
+func TestMaxAllowedTlogEntries(t *testing.T) {
+	virtualSigstore, err := ca.NewVirtualSigstore()
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	statement := []byte(`{"_type":"https://in-toto.io/Statement/v0.1","predicateType":"customFoo","subject":[{"name":"subject","digest":{"sha256":"deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef"}}],"predicate":{}}`)
+	entity, err := virtualSigstore.Attest("[email protected]", "issuer", statement)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = verify.VerifyArtifactTransparencyLog(&tooManyTlogEntriesEntity{entity}, virtualSigstore, 1, true, false)
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "too many tlog entries") // too many tlog entries should fail to verify
 }

pkg/verify/tsa.go

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/pkg/root"
 )
 
+const maxAllowedTimestamps = 32
+
 // VerifyTimestampAuthority verifies that the given entity has been timestamped
 // by a trusted timestamp authority and that the timestamp is valid.
 func VerifyTimestampAuthority(entity SignedEntity, trustedMaterial root.TrustedMaterial) ([]time.Time, error) { //nolint:revive
@@ -34,6 +36,11 @@ func VerifyTimestampAuthority(entity SignedEntity, trustedMaterial root.TrustedM
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
+	// limit the number of timestamps to prevent DoS
+	if len(signedTimestamps) > maxAllowedTimestamps {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("too many signed timestamps: %d > %d", len(signedTimestamps), maxAllowedTimestamps)
+	}
+
 	// disallow duplicate timestamps, as a malicious actor could use duplicates to bypass the threshold
 	for i := 0; i < len(signedTimestamps); i++ {
 		for j := i + 1; j < len(signedTimestamps); j++ {

pkg/verify/tsa_test.go

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func TestDuplicateTimestamps(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.NoError(t, err)
 
 	_, err = verify.VerifyTimestampAuthorityWithThreshold(&dupTimestampEntity{entity}, virtualSigstore, 1)
-	assert.Error(t, err) // duplicate timestamps should fail to verify
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "duplicate timestamps found")
 }
 
 type badTSASignatureEntity struct {
@@ -223,3 +223,31 @@ func TestBadTSACertificateChainOutsideValidityPeriod(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+type tooManyTimestampsEntity struct {
+	*ca.TestEntity
+}
+
+func (e *tooManyTimestampsEntity) Timestamps() ([][]byte, error) {
+	timestamps, err := e.TestEntity.Timestamps()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < 32; i++ {
+		timestamps = append(timestamps, timestamps[0])
+	}
+
+	return timestamps, nil
+}
+
+func TestTooManyTimestamps(t *testing.T) {
+	virtualSigstore, err := ca.NewVirtualSigstore()
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	entity, err := virtualSigstore.Attest("[email protected]", "issuer", []byte("statement"))
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = verify.VerifyTimestampAuthorityWithThreshold(&tooManyTimestampsEntity{entity}, virtualSigstore, 1)
+	assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "too many signed timestamps")
+}