fix punctuation error in info chapter

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-  <meta name="dcterms.date" content="2024-04-01" />
+  <meta name="dcterms.date" content="2024-04-02" />
   <title>Thesis - Abhijith Prakash</title>
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@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ <h1 class="title">Balance of Power</h1>
 <p class="author">
       Abhijith Prakash
   </p>
-<p class="date before-toc"><time datetime="April 1, 2024">April 1, 2024</time></p>
+<p class="date before-toc"><time datetime="April 2, 2024">April 2, 2024</time></p>
 </blockquote>
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@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ <h2 data-number="8.6" id="sec:info-discussion"><span class="header-section-numbe
 <p>MPs need not solely rely on centralised knowledge processes given that they can generate either their own point forecasts for use in deterministic scheduling methods, or forecasted distributions of prices (or price errors) for use in stochastic or robust scheduling methods (discussed in Section 6.4.2.1.3). However, in markets with blind auctions, producing private forecasts requires using historical data that likely reflect past market dynamics <span class="citation" data-cites="lagoForecastingDayaheadElectricity2021">(<a href="#ref-lagoForecastingDayaheadElectricity2021" role="doc-biblioref">Lago et al., 2021a</a>)</span>. In contrast, pre-dispatch is <em>mechanistic</em> – the best-available forward-looking information, which includes forecasted demand and constraints and the latest set of sealed bids and offers, is used in a modified copy of the market clearing engine <span class="citation" data-cites="trebbienUnderstandingElectricityPrices2023">(<a href="#ref-trebbienUnderstandingElectricityPrices2023" role="doc-biblioref">Trebbien et al., 2023</a>)</span>. MPs desiring a balanced solution would ideally use both private and pre-dispatch forecasts in their decision-making, as the former may be more robust to “noisy” market processes whilst the latter better reflects contemporaneous market dynamics and system constraints. Beyond improving price forecast accuracy, MPs should consider two scheduling changes that could improve market revenues. Firstly, scheduling algorithm modifications (e.g. as suggested in Section 6.5.2.2, longer lookaheads and the tested forecast discounting methods for ESRs with short storage durations) may deliver material improvements whilst being simple to implement. Secondly, rather than pursuing all-or-nothing (Section 6.5.2.1.4) or hockey-stick bidding strategies, MPs could appropriately structure their price-quantity bands to reflect costs and manage price risk. However, doing so would require MPs to partially divulge otherwise private information to the broader market and, for ESRs, could lead to increased cycling.</p>
 <p>Though there are risks associated with “analytical monocultures” in which the “wisdom of the crowd” is replaced by shared beliefs and thus correlated actions <span class="citation" data-cites="bronkHayekWisdomPrices2013 bowlesRetrospectivesFriedrichHayek2017">(<a href="#ref-bowlesRetrospectivesFriedrichHayek2017" role="doc-biblioref">Bowles et al., 2017</a>; <a href="#ref-bronkHayekWisdomPrices2013" role="doc-biblioref">Bronk, 2013</a>)</span>, improving the scheduling decision support offered by centralised knowledge processes may be necessary to address existing information and power asymmetries, and could become essential should policy-makers pursue two-sided or hierarchical market architectures that enable smaller consumer-owned energy resources to participate in real-time markets <span class="citation" data-cites="kristovTaleTwoVisions2016 hoganMarketDesignPractices2019">(<a href="#ref-hoganMarketDesignPractices2019" role="doc-biblioref">Hogan, 2019</a>; <a href="#ref-kristovTaleTwoVisions2016" role="doc-biblioref">Kristov et al., 2016</a>)</span>. One approach to improving decision support is to provide more information to MPs. This could not only involve publishing additional metrics (e.g. forecast uncertainty measures or the regional aggregate energy availability of energy-constrained resources) <span class="citation" data-cites="australianenergymarketcommissionOperatingReserveMarket2023">(<a href="#ref-australianenergymarketcommissionOperatingReserveMarket2023" role="doc-biblioref">Australian Energy Market Commission, 2023c</a>)</span> but also implementing probabilistic or interactive pre-dispatch engines that provide MPs with a broader perspective of possible market outcomes than the pre-dispatch sensitivities discussed in Section 6.4.1.2. Notwithstanding the transparency benefits, the costs of increased information provision could exceed its benefits if it has little effect on MP decision-making due to greater complexity (e.g. if pre-dispatch deviates from the real-time market clearing algorithm) or the additional information is not immediately decision-relevant. It could even have deleterious effects should it provide information that reveals opportunities for gaming or collusion to MPs <span class="citation" data-cites="vonderfehrTransparencyElectricityMarkets2013 creativeenergyconsultingptyltdSchedulingAheadMarkets2020">(<a href="#ref-creativeenergyconsultingptyltdSchedulingAheadMarkets2020" role="doc-biblioref">Creative Energy Consulting Pty Ltd, 2020</a>; <a href="#ref-vonderfehrTransparencyElectricityMarkets2013" role="doc-biblioref">Von Der Fehr, 2013</a>)</span>.</p>
 <p>Another approach to improving the decision support offered by centralised knowledge processes is to promote schedule and price convergence. One low-regret option that might assist with convergence is increasing the frequency at which pre-dispatch and PASA are published. More frequent information provision may be particularly effective for a future NEM that will likely consist of many flexible resources that can rapidly respond to changing market conditions. However, this change’s feasibility is limited by the minimum solution times for these processes and, more importantly, it does not reduce the likelihood of sudden and extreme price forecast swings (Section 6.5.1). Addressing these swings may require restricting rebidding since the freedom to readily shift participation preferences frequently, dramatically and within seconds of delivery is enabling the use of all-or-nothing and hockey-stick bidding strategies that contribute to their occurrence. Policy-makers could consider rebid count/frequency restrictions or a “soft” gate closure, which would only allow rebids after a gate closure time close to delivery (e.g. 5 minutes ahead) if there are sudden changes in a resource’s technical status (e.g. forced outage). These sorts of rebidding restrictions might better incentivise MPs to submit a well-structured final rebid that not only reflects their costs and tolerance for price risk, but also hedges against changes from the time of the final rebid to delivery (e.g. demand errors, forced outages). This is also a low-regret option; even if it fails to elicit changes in bidding behaviour, restricted rebidding will at least improve transparency and reduce rebid volumes, thus assisting the market regulator with their assessment of rebid compliance.</p>
-<p>Other options could prove to be more effective at improving ESR scheduling outcomes but are challenging to implement as they constitute drastic changes to market design and structure. Several of these options not only increase technical or decision-making complexity, but could also be politically infeasible as they are incongruous with norms in the NEM and the values enshrined in it its rules (e.g. minimising the confiscation of MP property rights) <span class="citation" data-cites="conejoRethinkingRestructuredElectricity2018">(<a href="#ref-conejoRethinkingRestructuredElectricity2018" role="doc-biblioref">Conejo and Sioshansi, 2018</a>)</span>.:</p>
+<p>Other options could prove to be more effective at improving ESR scheduling outcomes but are challenging to implement as they constitute drastic changes to market design and structure. Several of these options not only increase technical or decision-making complexity, but could also be politically infeasible as they are incongruous with norms in the NEM and the values enshrined in it its rules (e.g. minimising the confiscation of MP property rights) <span class="citation" data-cites="conejoRethinkingRestructuredElectricity2018">(<a href="#ref-conejoRethinkingRestructuredElectricity2018" role="doc-biblioref">Conejo and Sioshansi, 2018</a>)</span>:</p>
 <ul>
 <li>Whilst a binding ahead market can provide a degree of schedule and revenue certainty for ESRs, they impose constraints upon flexible systems <span class="citation" data-cites="nelsonInvestigatingEconomicValue2018">(<a href="#ref-nelsonInvestigatingEconomicValue2018" role="doc-biblioref">Nelson et al., 2018</a>)</span>, require mechanisms to reconcile ahead and real-time prices <span class="citation" data-cites="hoganVirtualBiddingElectricity2016a elaWholesaleElectricityMarket2016">(<a href="#ref-elaWholesaleElectricityMarket2016" role="doc-biblioref">Ela et al., 2016</a>; <a href="#ref-hoganVirtualBiddingElectricity2016a" role="doc-biblioref">Hogan, 2016</a>)</span> and have thus far been rejected in reform processes by both stakeholders and rule-makers in favour of augmenting the NEM’s single platform design <span class="citation" data-cites="energysecurityboardPost2025MarketDesign2021 australianenergymarketcommissionImprovingSecurityFrameworks2023">(<a href="#ref-australianenergymarketcommissionImprovingSecurityFrameworks2023" role="doc-biblioref">Australian Energy Market Commission, 2023d</a>; <a href="#ref-energysecurityboardPost2025MarketDesign2021" role="doc-biblioref">Energy Security Board, 2021b</a>)</span>.</li>
 <li>Alternative ESR participation models, such as those implemented in US markets <span class="citation" data-cites="singhalIncorporatingElectricStorage2019 elaIntegrationElectricStorage2021">(<a href="#ref-elaIntegrationElectricStorage2021" role="doc-biblioref">Ela, 2021</a>; <a href="#ref-singhalIncorporatingElectricStorage2019" role="doc-biblioref">Singhal and Ela, 2019</a>)</span>, could provide AEMO with a greater degree of control over ESR operation to minimise any detrimental outcomes arising from the MP participation choices and preferences discussed in Section 6.4.2.1. However, these participation models would require multi-part bid formats and significant modifications to market participation rules and the NEM dispatch engine to enable centralised resource scheduling and multi-period optimisation, respectively <span class="citation" data-cites="herreroEvolvingBiddingFormats2020 billimoriaContractDesignStorage2023a">(<a href="#ref-billimoriaContractDesignStorage2023a" role="doc-biblioref">Billimoria and Simshauser, 2023</a>; <a href="#ref-herreroEvolvingBiddingFormats2020" role="doc-biblioref">Herrero et al., 2020</a>)</span>.</li>

output/thesis.tex

@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@
 
         \normalsize
         UNSW Sydney, Australia\\
-        April 1, 2024
+        April 2, 2024
 
         % Except where otherwise noted, content in this thesis is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Copyright 2015,Tom Pollard.
 
@@ -7913,7 +7913,7 @@ \section{Options for improving scheduling}\label{sec:info-discussion}}
 NEM and the values enshrined in it its rules (e.g.~minimising the
 confiscation of MP property rights)
 (\protect\hyperlink{ref-conejoRethinkingRestructuredElectricity2018}{Conejo
-and Sioshansi, 2018}).:
+and Sioshansi, 2018}):
 
 \begin{itemize}
 \tightlist

source/14_information.md

@@ -254,13 +254,13 @@ Though there are risks associated with "analytical monocultures" in which the "w
 
 Another approach to improving the decision support offered by centralised knowledge processes is to promote schedule and price convergence. One low-regret option that might assist with convergence is increasing the frequency at which pre-dispatch and PASA are published. More frequent information provision may be particularly effective for a future NEM that will likely consist of many flexible resources that can rapidly respond to changing market conditions. However, this change's feasibility is limited by the minimum solution times for these processes and, more importantly, it does not reduce the likelihood of sudden and extreme price forecast swings (@sec:info-case_study-price_forecast_errors). Addressing these swings may require restricting rebidding since the freedom to readily shift participation preferences frequently, dramatically and within seconds of delivery is enabling the use of all-or-nothing and hockey-stick bidding strategies that contribute to their occurrence. Policy-makers could consider rebid count/frequency restrictions or a "soft" gate closure, which would only allow rebids after a gate closure time close to delivery (e.g. 5 minutes ahead) if there are sudden changes in a resource's technical status (e.g. forced outage). These sorts of rebidding restrictions might better incentivise MPs to submit a well-structured final rebid that not only reflects their costs and tolerance for price risk, but also hedges against changes from the time of the final rebid to delivery (e.g. demand errors, forced outages). This is also a low-regret option; even if it fails to elicit changes in bidding behaviour, restricted rebidding will at least improve transparency and reduce rebid volumes, thus assisting the market regulator with their assessment of rebid compliance.
 
-Other options could prove to be more effective at improving ESR scheduling outcomes but are challenging to implement as they constitute drastic changes to market design and structure. Several of these options not only increase technical or decision-making complexity, but could also be politically infeasible as they are incongruous with norms in the NEM and the values enshrined in it its rules (e.g. minimising the confiscation of MP property rights) [@conejoRethinkingRestructuredElectricity2018].:
+Other options could prove to be more effective at improving ESR scheduling outcomes but are challenging to implement as they constitute drastic changes to market design and structure. Several of these options not only increase technical or decision-making complexity, but could also be politically infeasible as they are incongruous with norms in the NEM and the values enshrined in it its rules (e.g. minimising the confiscation of MP property rights) [@conejoRethinkingRestructuredElectricity2018]:
 
   - Whilst a binding ahead market can provide a degree of schedule and revenue certainty for ESRs, they impose constraints upon flexible systems [@nelsonInvestigatingEconomicValue2018], require mechanisms to reconcile ahead and real-time prices [@hoganVirtualBiddingElectricity2016a; @elaWholesaleElectricityMarket2016] and have thus far been rejected in reform processes by both stakeholders and rule-makers in favour of augmenting the NEM's single platform design [@energysecurityboardPost2025MarketDesign2021; @australianenergymarketcommissionImprovingSecurityFrameworks2023]. 
   - Alternative ESR participation models, such as those implemented in US markets [@singhalIncorporatingElectricStorage2019; @elaIntegrationElectricStorage2021], could provide AEMO with a greater degree of control over ESR operation to minimise any detrimental outcomes arising from the MP participation choices and preferences discussed in @sec:info-context-esr-operation. However, these participation models would require multi-part bid formats and significant modifications to market participation rules and the NEM dispatch engine to enable centralised resource scheduling and multi-period optimisation, respectively [@herreroEvolvingBiddingFormats2020; @billimoriaContractDesignStorage2023a].
   - Scheduled demand-side participation could improve price convergence and mitigate hockey-stick pricing, but may require significant structural and market design changes beyond the more incremental market rules that have been adopted [@australianenergymarketcommissionWholesaleDemandResponse2020] or proposed [@australianenergymarketcommissionIntegratingPriceresponsiveResources2023].
 
-## Conclusion and policy implications {#sec:info-conclusion}
+## Conclusion {#sec:info-conclusion}
 
 With growing deployments of flexible yet potentially energy-constrained VRE and ESRs and increasingly active demand-side resources, policy-makers worldwide are looking towards granular, faster and more flexible electricity markets to effectively and efficiently operate decarbonised power systems. However, achieving good operational outcomes is contingent upon scheduling coordination delivered through sound MP practices, appropriate market participation rules and purpose-fit knowledge process configurations.