This webhook is a companion to the vault-dynamic-configuration-operator but it can be deployed indepentendly as a Kubernetes Mutating Webhook, that can modify Pods to automatically inject a Vault agent sidecar, including a rendered configuration template taken from a ConfigMap corresponding to the service's identity, as well as modify the environment variables on all containers in the Pod to inject a VAULT_ADDR environment variable that points to the sidecar agent. To do this, annotate your workload (Deployment, StatefulSet, DaemonSet, etc.) with vault.patoarvizu.dev/agent-auto-inject: sidecar to have the webhook modify the generated Pods as they are created.
The webhook can be run as a Deployment on the same cluster, as long as it's exposed as a Service, and accepts TLS connections. More details on how to deploy mutating webhooks in Kubernetes can be found on the link above, but this section will cover high-level details.
Your Deployment and Service will look like those of any other service you run in your cluster. One important difference is that this service has to serve TLS, so the -tls-cert-file, and -tls-key-file parameters have to be supplied. Your Deployment manifest will look something like this:
kind: Deployment
...
containers:
- name: vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook
image: patoarvizu/vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook:latest
command:
- /vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook
- -tls-cert-file
- /tls/tls.crt
- -tls-key-file
- /tls/tls.key
ports:
- name: https
containerPort: 4443
volumeMounts:
- name: tls
mountPath: /tls
volumes:
- name: tls
secret:
secretName: vault-agent-auto-inject-webhookThis assumes that there is a Secret called vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook that contains the tls.crt and tls.key files that can be mounted on the container and passed to the webhook. The cert-manager project makes it really easy to generate certificates as Kubernetes Secrets to be used for cases like this.
The other important piece is deploying the MutatingWebhookConfiguration itself, which would look like this:
apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: MutatingWebhookConfiguration
metadata:
name: vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook
labels:
app: vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook
webhooks:
- name: vault.patoarvizu.dev
rules:
- apiGroups:
- ""
apiVersions:
- v1
operations:
- CREATE
- UPDATE
resources:
- pods
failurePolicy: Ignore
clientConfig:
caBundle: ${CA_BUNDLE}
service:
name: vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook
namespace: default
path: /The clientConfig map field should match the Service that sits in front of your Deployment from above. Notice that the caBundle field only contains the ${CA_BUNDLE} placeholder. The actual value of this should be the base64-encoded public CA certificate that signed the tls.crt that your webhook is running with, which will depend on how those certificates were generated.
TIP: If you created the webhook certificates above using cert-manager, you can use the cert-manager.io/inject-ca-from annotation on the MutatingWebhookConfiguration and cert-manager will automatically inject the corresponding CA cert into the object.
| Flag | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
-tls-cert-file |
TLS certificate file | |
-tls-key-file |
TLS key file | |
-annotation-prefix |
Prefix of the annotations the webhook will process | vault.patoarvizu.dev |
-target-vault-address |
Address of remote Vault API | https://vault:8200 |
-gomplate-image |
The full name (repository and tag) of the gomplate image for the init container | hairyhenderson/gomplate:v3 |
-kubernetes-auth-path |
Path to Vault Kubernetes auth endpoint | auth/kubernetes |
-vault-image-version |
Tag on the 'vault' Docker image to inject with the sidecar | 1.3.0 |
-default-config-map-name |
The name of the ConfigMap to be used for the Vault agent configuration by default, unless overwritten by annotation | vault-agent-config |
-mount-ca-cert-secret |
Indicate if the Secret indicated by the -ca-cert-secret-name flag should be mounted on the Vault agent container | false |
-ca-cert-secret-name |
The name of the secret in the target namespace to mount and use as a CA cert | vault-tls |
-cpu-request |
The amount of CPU units to request for the Vault agent sidecar") | 50m |
-cpu-limit |
The amount of CPU units to limit to on the Vault agent sidecar") | 100m |
-memory-request |
The amount of memory units to request for the Vault agent sidecar") | 128Mi |
-memory-limit |
The amount of memory units to limit to on the Vault agent sidecar") | 256Mi |
-listen-addr |
The address to start the server | :4443 |
-metrics-addr |
The address where the Prometheus-style metrics are published | :8081 |
The webhook expects that a ConfigMap named vault-agent-config (or something else, if the -default-config-map-name was passed to the server) will exist in the same namespace as the target Pod (NOT in the same namespace as the webhook itself), that will contain only one key, called vault-agent-config.hcl, which will contain a Go template that will be rendered into the Vault agent configuration using gomplate, and will have the following environment variables available to be discovered with the getenv function:
| Environment variable | Value |
|---|---|
SERVICE |
The name of the ServiceAccount attached to the pod |
TARGET_VAULT_ADDRESS |
The value of the -target-vault-address parameter (or its default) |
KUBERNETES_AUTH_PATH |
The value of the -kubernetes-auth-path parameter (or its default) |
If enabled with the -mount-ca-cert-secret flag, the webhook can automatically create a volume from the secret indicated by the -ca-cert-secret-name flag. The volume will then be mounted at /opt/vault/certs/ on the Vault agent container only, so the vault-agent-config.hcl file can use the ca_cert field in the vault stanza, instead of skipping verification with tls_skip_verify = true.
Alternatively, the webhook can inject the Vault agent as an init container instead of a sidecar, which is useful for short-lived workloads, like Jobs and CronJobs. In that case, the init container should use a configuration that has exit_after_auth = true so the init container exists after authenticating and doesn't remain long-lived. Doing so, would cause the container to never exit past the init container phase. The config file should also contain at least one file sink. The webhook will also modify the containers to mount an additional volume on /vault-agent that can be used as a file sink.
To do this, annotate your workload with vault.patoarvizu.dev/agent-auto-inject: init-container.
Usually, a given config file will only be suitable for either long-lived sidecars or short-lived init containers. If the default config map (vault-agent-config by default, or the overwrite if -default-config-map-name was provided) is not suitable for a specific application, it can be overwritten with the vault.patoarvizu.dev/agent-config-map annotation. If set, the value should be the name of a ConfigMap in the same namespace that that the webhook should use to inject, instead of the default one.
The webhook will also expose Prometheus-style metrics on port HTTP/8081 (unless overwritten with -metrics-addr), ready to be scraped. The metrics are provided by the underlying slok/kubewebhook framework and include admission_reviews_total, admission_review_errors_total, and admission_review_duration_seconds.
The server performs a hot reload if the underlying TLS certificate (indicated by the -tls-cert-file flag) on disk is modified. This is helpful when using automatic certificate provisioners like cert-manager that will do automatic rotation of the certificates but can't control the lifecycle of the workloads using the certificate.
The way this is achieved is by initially loading the certificate and keeping it in a local cache, then using the radovskyb/watcher library to watch for changes on the file and updating the cached version if the file changes.
NOTE: Due to technical issues with the Notary client, starting on January 4th 2023 and until further notice new images will NOT be signed. The images will still be built for multi-architecture, and will include the Git and GPG metadata, but they won't pass Docker Content Trust validation if you have it enabled.
The Notary project is a CNCF incubating project that aims to provide trust and security to software distribution. Docker Hub runs a Notary server at https://notary.docker.io for the repositories it hosts.
Docker Content Trust is the mechanism used to verify digital signatures and enforce security by adding a validating layer.
You can inspect the signed tags for this project by doing docker trust inspect --pretty docker.io/patoarvizu/vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook, or (if you already have notary installed) notary -d ~/.docker/trust/ -s https://notary.docker.io list docker.io/patoarvizu/vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook.
If you run docker pull with DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1, the Docker client will only pull images that come from registries that have a Notary server attached (like Docker Hub).
In addition to the digital validation done by Docker on the image itself, you can do your own human validation by making sure the image's content matches the Git commit information (including tags if there are any) and that the GPG signature on the commit matches the key on the commit on github.com.
For example, if you run docker pull patoarvizu/vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook:c1201e30e90d9d8fd2f2f65f2552236013cdcbe8 to pull the image tagged with that commit id, then run docker inspect patoarvizu/vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook:c1201e30e90d9d8fd2f2f65f2552236013cdcbe8 | jq -r '.[0].ContainerConfig.Labels' (assuming you have jq installed) you should see that the GIT_COMMIT label matches the tag on the image. Furthermore, if you go to https://github.com/patoarvizu/vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook/commit/c1201e30e90d9d8fd2f2f65f2552236013cdcbe8 (notice the matching commit id), and click on the Verified button, you should be able to confirm that the GPG key ID used to match this commit matches the value of the SIGNATURE_KEY label, and that the key belongs to the AUTHOR_EMAIL label. When an image belongs to a commit that was tagged, it'll also include a GIT_TAG label, to further validate that the image matches the content.
Keep in mind that this isn't tamper-proof. A malicious actor with access to publish images can create one with malicious content but with values for the labels matching those of a valid commit id. However, when combined with Docker Content Trust, the certainty of using a legitimate image is increased because the chances of a bad actor having both the credentials for publishing images, as well as Notary signing credentials are significantly lower and even in that scenario, compromised signing keys can be revoked or rotated.
Here's the list of included Docker labels:
AUTHOR_EMAILCOMMIT_TIMESTAMPGIT_COMMITGIT_TAGSIGNATURE_KEY
Manifests published with the semver tag (e.g. patoarvizu/vault-agent-auto-inject-webhook:v0.5.0), as well as latest are multi-architecture manifest lists. In addition to those, there are architecture-specific tags that correspond to an image manifest directly, tagged with the corresponding architecture as a suffix, e.g. v0.15.0-amd64. Both types (image manifests or manifest lists) are signed with Notary as described above.
Here's the list of architectures the images are being built for, and their corresponding suffixes for images:
linux/amd64,-amd64linux/arm64,-arm64linux/arm/v7,-arm7
All Issues or PRs on this repo are welcome, even if it's for a typo or an open-ended question.