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bpf, verifier: Improve precision of BPF_MUL #8125

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Commits on Nov 29, 2024

  1. bpf, verifier: Improve precision of BPF_MUL

    This patch improves (or maintains) the precision of register value tracking
    in BPF_MUL across all possible inputs. It also simplifies
    scalar32_min_max_mul() and scalar_min_max_mul().
    
    As it stands, BPF_MUL is composed of three functions:
    
    case BPF_MUL:
      tnum_mul();
      scalar32_min_max_mul();
      scalar_min_max_mul();
    
    The current implementation of scalar_min_max_mul() restricts the u64 input
    ranges of dst_reg and src_reg to be within [0, U32_MAX]:
    
        /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
         * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
         */
        if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
            /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
            __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
            return;
        }
    
    This restriction is done to avoid unsigned overflow, which could otherwise
    wrap the result around 0, and leave an unsound output where umin > umax. We
    also observe that limiting these u64 input ranges to [0, U32_MAX] leads to
    a loss of precision. Consider the case where the u64 bounds of dst_reg are
    [0, 2^34] and the u64 bounds of src_reg are [0, 2^2]. While the
    multiplication of these two bounds doesn't overflow and is sound [0, 2^36],
    the current scalar_min_max_mul() would set the entire register state to
    unbounded.
    
    The key idea of our patch is that if there’s no possibility of overflow, we
    can multiply the unsigned bounds; otherwise, we set the 64-bit bounds to
    [0, U64_MAX], marking them as unbounded.
    
    if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->umax_value, dst_umax) ||
           (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->umin_value, dst_umin))) {
            /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
            dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
            dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
        }
      ...
    
    Now, to update the signed bounds based on the unsigned bounds, we need to
    ensure that the unsigned bounds don't cross the signed boundary (i.e., if
    ((s64)reg->umin_value <= (s64)reg->umax_value)). We observe that this is
    done anyway by __reg_deduce_bounds later, so we can just set signed bounds
    to unbounded [S64_MIN, S64_MAX]. Deferring the assignment of s64 bounds to
    reg_bounds_sync removes the current redundancy in scalar_min_max_mul(),
    which currently sets the s64 bounds based on the u64 bounds only in the
    case where umin <= umax <= 2^(63)-1.
    
    Below, we provide an example BPF program (below) that exhibits the
    imprecision in the current BPF_MUL, where the outputs are all unbounded. In
    contrast, the updated BPF_MUL produces a bounded register state:
    
    BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_1, 11),
    BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, 4503599627370624),
    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_2, 0),
    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_2, 0),
    BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2),
    BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, 809591906117232263),
    BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1),
    BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
    BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
    
    Verifier log using the old BPF_MUL:
    
    func#0 @0
    0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
    0: (18) r1 = 0xb                      ; R1_w=11
    2: (18) r2 = 0x10000000000080         ; R2_w=0x10000000000080
    4: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=scalar()
    5: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=scalar()
    6: (5f) r1 &= r2                      ; R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=11,var_off=(0x0; 0xb)) R2_w=scalar()
    7: (18) r3 = 0xb3c3f8c99262687        ; R3_w=0xb3c3f8c99262687
    9: (2f) r3 *= r1                      ; R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=11,var_off=(0x0; 0xb)) R3_w=scalar()
    ...
    
    Verifier using the new updated BPF_MUL (more precise bounds at label 9)
    
    func#0 @0
    0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
    0: (18) r1 = 0xb                      ; R1_w=11
    2: (18) r2 = 0x10000000000080         ; R2_w=0x10000000000080
    4: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=scalar()
    5: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=scalar()
    6: (5f) r1 &= r2                      ; R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=11,var_off=(0x0; 0xb)) R2_w=scalar()
    7: (18) r3 = 0xb3c3f8c99262687        ; R3_w=0xb3c3f8c99262687
    9: (2f) r3 *= r1                      ; R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=11,var_off=(0x0; 0xb)) R3_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0x7b96bb0a94a3a7cd,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff))
    ...
    
    Finally, we proved the soundness of the new scalar_min_max_mul() and
    scalar32_min_max_mul() functions. Typically, multiplication operations are
    expensive to check with bitvector-based solvers. We were able to prove the
    soundness of these functions using Non-Linear Integer Arithmetic (NIA)
    theory. Additionally, using Agni [2,3], we obtained the encodings for
    scalar32_min_max_mul() and scalar_min_max_mul() in bitvector theory, and
    were able to prove their soundness using 16-bit bitvectors (instead of
    64-bit bitvectors that the functions actually use).
    
    In conclusion, with this patch,
    
    1. We were able to show that we can improve the overall precision of
       BPF_MUL. We proved (using an SMT solver) that this new version of
       BPF_MUL is at least as precise as the current version for all inputs.
    
    2. We are able to prove the soundness of the new scalar_min_max_mul() and
       scalar32_min_max_mul(). By leveraging the existing proof of tnum_mul
       [1], we can say that the composition of these three functions within
       BPF_MUL is sound.
    
    [1] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9741267
    [2] https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-37709-9_12
    [3] https://people.cs.rutgers.edu/~sn349/papers/sas24-preprint.pdf
    
    Co-developed-by: Harishankar Vishwanathan <[email protected]>
    Signed-off-by: Harishankar Vishwanathan <[email protected]>
    Co-developed-by: Srinivas Narayana <[email protected]>
    Signed-off-by: Srinivas Narayana <[email protected]>
    Co-developed-by: Santosh Nagarakatte <[email protected]>
    Signed-off-by: Santosh Nagarakatte <[email protected]>
    Signed-off-by: Matan Shachnai <[email protected]>
    mshachnai authored and Kernel Patches Daemon committed Nov 29, 2024
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