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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/1.3' into merge_13_14_21
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@jpfr
jpfr committed Nov 24, 2024
2 parents 7e4e0db + 3eed1a6 commit b6961b2
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Showing 2 changed files with 101 additions and 43 deletions.
93 changes: 63 additions & 30 deletions plugins/crypto/mbedtls/ua_pki_mbedtls.c
View file
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@

#include <open62541/util.h>
#include <open62541/plugin/pki_default.h>
#include <open62541/plugin/log_stdout.h>

#ifdef UA_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION_MBEDTLS

Expand All @@ -22,6 +21,9 @@
#include <mbedtls/version.h>
#include <string.h>

#define UA_MBEDTLS_MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH 10
#define UA_MBEDTLS_MAX_DN_LENGTH 256

/* Find binary substring. Taken and adjusted from
* http://tungchingkai.blogspot.com/2011/07/binary-strstr.html */

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -83,6 +85,8 @@ static UA_ByteString copyDataFormatAware(const UA_ByteString *data)
}

typedef struct {
UA_CertificateVerification *cv;

/* If the folders are defined, we use them to reload the certificates during
* runtime */
UA_String trustListFolder;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -229,17 +233,11 @@ reloadCertificates(const UA_CertificateVerification *cv, CertInfo *ci) {
}
}

if(internalErrorFlag) {
retval = UA_STATUSCODE_BADINTERNALERROR;
}
return retval;
return (internalErrorFlag) ? UA_STATUSCODE_BADINTERNALERROR : retval;
}

#endif

#define UA_MBEDTLS_MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH 10
#define UA_MBEDTLS_MAX_DN_LENGTH 256

/* We need to access some private fields below */
#ifndef MBEDTLS_PRIVATE
#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(x) x
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -272,6 +270,13 @@ mbedtlsSameName(UA_String name, const mbedtls_x509_name *name2) {
return UA_String_equal(&name, &nameString);
}

static UA_Boolean
mbedtlsSameBuf(mbedtls_x509_buf *a, mbedtls_x509_buf *b) {
if(a->len != b->len)
return false;
return (memcmp(a->p, b->p, a->len) == 0);
}

/* Return the first matching issuer candidate AFTER prev.
* This can return the cert itself if self-signed. */
static mbedtls_x509_crt *
Expand All @@ -295,27 +300,47 @@ mbedtlsFindNextIssuer(CertInfo *ci, mbedtls_x509_crt *stack,
mbedtls_pk_can_do(&i->pk, cert->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk)))
return i;
}
/* Switch from the stack that came with the cert to the ctx->skIssue list */
stack = (stack != &ci->certificateIssuerList) ? &ci->certificateIssuerList : NULL;

/* Switch from the stack that came with the cert to the issuer list and
* then to the trust list. */
if(stack == &ci->certificateTrustList)
stack = NULL;
else if(stack == &ci->certificateIssuerList)
stack = &ci->certificateTrustList;
else
stack = &ci->certificateIssuerList;
} while(stack);
return NULL;
}

static UA_Boolean
static UA_StatusCode
mbedtlsCheckRevoked(CertInfo *ci, mbedtls_x509_crt *cert) {
/* Parse the Issuer Name */
char inbuf[UA_MBEDTLS_MAX_DN_LENGTH];
int nameLen = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(inbuf, UA_MBEDTLS_MAX_DN_LENGTH, &cert->issuer);
if(nameLen < 0)
return true;
return UA_STATUSCODE_BADINTERNALERROR;
UA_String issuerName = {(size_t)nameLen, (UA_Byte*)inbuf};

if(ci->certificateRevocationList.raw.len == 0) {
UA_LOG_WARNING(ci->cv->logging, UA_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITYPOLICY,
"Zero revocation lists have been loaded. "
"This seems intentional - omitting the check.");
return UA_STATUSCODE_GOOD;
}

/* Loop over the crl and match the Issuer Name */
UA_StatusCode res = UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOCATIONUNKNOWN;
for(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl = &ci->certificateRevocationList; crl; crl = crl->next) {
/* Is the CRL for certificates from the cert issuer?
* Is the serial number of the certificate contained in the CRL? */
if(mbedtlsSameName(issuerName, &crl->issuer) &&
mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(cert, crl) != 0)
return true;
if(mbedtlsSameName(issuerName, &crl->issuer)) {
if(mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(cert, crl) != 0)
return UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOKED;
res = UA_STATUSCODE_GOOD; /* There was at least one crl that did not revoke (so far) */
}
}
return false;
return res;
}

/* Verify that the public key of the issuer was used to sign the certificate */
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -354,11 +379,6 @@ mbedtlsVerifyChain(CertInfo *ci, mbedtls_x509_crt *stack, mbedtls_x509_crt **old
return (depth == 0) ? UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATETIMEINVALID :
UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEISSUERTIMEINVALID;

/* Verification Step: Revocation Check */
if(mbedtlsCheckRevoked(ci, cert))
return (depth == 0) ? UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOKED :
UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEISSUERREVOKED;

/* Return the most specific error code. BADCERTIFICATECHAININCOMPLETE is
* returned only if all possible chains are incomplete. */
mbedtls_x509_crt *issuer = NULL;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -388,16 +408,28 @@ mbedtlsVerifyChain(CertInfo *ci, mbedtls_x509_crt *stack, mbedtls_x509_crt **old
* chain. We check whether the certificate is trusted below. This is the
* only place where we return UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEUNTRUSTED.
* This signals that the chain is complete (but can be still
* untrusted). */
if(issuer == cert || (cert->tbs.len == issuer->tbs.len &&
memcmp(cert->tbs.p, issuer->tbs.p, cert->tbs.len) == 0)) {
* untrusted).
*
* Break here as we have reached the end of the chain. Omit the
* Revocation Check for self-signed certificates. */
if(issuer == cert || mbedtlsSameBuf(&cert->tbs, &issuer->tbs)) {
ret = UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEUNTRUSTED;
continue;
break;
}

/* Detect (endless) loops of issuers. The last one can be skipped by the
* check for self-signed just before. */
for(int i = 0; i < depth - 1; i++) {
/* Verification Step: Revocation Check */
ret = mbedtlsCheckRevoked(ci, cert);
if(depth > 0) {
if(ret == UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOKED)
ret = UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEISSUERREVOKED;
if(ret == UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOCATIONUNKNOWN)
ret = UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEISSUERREVOCATIONUNKNOWN;
}
if(ret != UA_STATUSCODE_GOOD)
continue;

/* Detect (endless) loops of issuers */
for(int i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
if(old_issuers[i] == issuer)
return UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATECHAININCOMPLETE;
}
Expand All @@ -412,8 +444,7 @@ mbedtlsVerifyChain(CertInfo *ci, mbedtls_x509_crt *stack, mbedtls_x509_crt **old
* certificate "on the way down". Can we trust this certificate? */
if(ret == UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEUNTRUSTED) {
for(mbedtls_x509_crt *t = &ci->certificateTrustList; t; t = t->next) {
if(cert->tbs.len == t->tbs.len &&
memcmp(cert->tbs.p, t->tbs.p, cert->tbs.len) == 0)
if(mbedtlsSameBuf(&cert->tbs, &t->tbs))
return UA_STATUSCODE_GOOD;
}
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -619,6 +650,7 @@ UA_CertificateVerification_Trustlist(UA_CertificateVerification *cv,
if(!ci)
return UA_STATUSCODE_BADOUTOFMEMORY;
memset(ci, 0, sizeof(CertInfo));
ci->cv = cv;
mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&ci->certificateTrustList);
mbedtls_x509_crl_init(&ci->certificateRevocationList);
mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&ci->certificateIssuerList);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -700,6 +732,7 @@ UA_CertificateVerification_CertFolders(UA_CertificateVerification *cv,
if(!ci)
return UA_STATUSCODE_BADOUTOFMEMORY;
memset(ci, 0, sizeof(CertInfo));
ci->cv = cv;
mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&ci->certificateTrustList);
mbedtls_x509_crl_init(&ci->certificateRevocationList);
mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&ci->certificateIssuerList);
Expand Down
51 changes: 38 additions & 13 deletions plugins/crypto/openssl/ua_pki_openssl.c
View file
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@

#include <open62541/util.h>
#include <open62541/plugin/pki_default.h>
#include <open62541/plugin/log_stdout.h>

#include "securitypolicy_openssl_common.h"

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -478,8 +477,14 @@ openSSLFindNextIssuer(CertContext *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *stack, X509 *x509, X509
if(X509_check_issued(candidate, x509) == 0)
return candidate;
}
/* Switch to search in the ctx->skIssue list */
stack = (stack != ctx->skIssue) ? ctx->skIssue : NULL;
/* Switch from the stack that came with the cert to the issuer list and
* then to the trust list. */
if(stack == ctx->skTrusted)
stack = NULL;
else if(stack == ctx->skIssue)
stack = ctx->skTrusted;
else
stack = ctx->skIssue;
} while(stack);
return NULL;
}
Expand All @@ -504,11 +509,21 @@ openSSLCheckCA(X509 *cert) {
return true;
}

static UA_Boolean
static UA_StatusCode
openSSLCheckRevoked(CertContext *ctx, X509 *cert) {
const ASN1_INTEGER *sn = X509_get0_serialNumber(cert);
const X509_NAME *in = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
int size = sk_X509_CRL_num(ctx->skCrls);

if(size == 0) {
UA_LOG_WARNING(ctx->cv->logging, UA_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITYPOLICY,
"Zero revocation lists have been loaded. "
"This seems intentional - omitting the check.");
return UA_STATUSCODE_GOOD;
}

/* Loop over the crl and match the Issuer Name */
UA_StatusCode res = UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOCATIONUNKNOWN;
for(int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
/* The crl contains a list of serial numbers from the same issuer */
X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(ctx->skCrls, i);
Expand All @@ -519,10 +534,11 @@ openSSLCheckRevoked(CertContext *ctx, X509 *cert) {
for(int j = 0; j < rsize; j++) {
X509_REVOKED *r = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(rs, j);
if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(sn, X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(r)) == 0)
return true;
return UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOKED;
}
res = UA_STATUSCODE_GOOD; /* There was at least one crl that did not revoke (so far) */
}
return false;
return res;
}

#define UA_OPENSSL_MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH 10
Expand All @@ -541,11 +557,6 @@ openSSL_verifyChain(CertContext *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *stack, X509 **old_issuers,
return (depth == 0) ? UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATETIMEINVALID :
UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEISSUERTIMEINVALID;

/* Verification Step: Revocation Check */
if(openSSLCheckRevoked(ctx, cert))
return (depth == 0) ? UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOKED :
UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEISSUERREVOKED;

/* Return the most specific error code. BADCERTIFICATECHAININCOMPLETE is
* returned only if all possible chains are incomplete. */
X509 *issuer = NULL;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -577,12 +588,26 @@ openSSL_verifyChain(CertContext *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *stack, X509 **old_issuers,
* chain. We check whether the certificate is trusted below. This is the
* only place where we return UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEUNTRUSTED.
* This signals that the chain is complete (but can be still
* untrusted). */
* untrusted).
*
* Break here as we have reached the end of the chain. Omit the
* Revocation Check for self-signed certificates. */
if(cert == issuer || X509_cmp(cert, issuer) == 0) {
ret = UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEUNTRUSTED;
continue;
break;
}

/* Verification Step: Revocation Check */
ret = openSSLCheckRevoked(ctx, cert);
if(depth > 0) {
if(ret == UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOKED)
ret = UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEISSUERREVOKED;
if(ret == UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEREVOCATIONUNKNOWN)
ret = UA_STATUSCODE_BADCERTIFICATEISSUERREVOCATIONUNKNOWN;
}
if(ret != UA_STATUSCODE_GOOD)
continue;

/* Detect (endless) loops of issuers. The last one can be skipped by the
* check for self-signed just before. */
for(int i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
Expand Down

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