Add Authentication Options for RPC Providers #191
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WalkthroughThe changes in this pull request primarily focus on enhancing the handling of RPC URLs within the Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 5
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (4)
packages/ciphernode/evm/Cargo.toml (1)
12-12: Consider adding a comment explaining the base64 dependency.Since this dependency is being added specifically for RPC authentication, it would be helpful to document this purpose with a brief comment.
-base64 = { workspace = true } +# Required for RPC authentication URL handling +base64 = { workspace = true }packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/ciphernode.rs (1)
47-49: Consider validating chain configuration before processing.The chain processing loop could benefit from upfront validation of required chain configuration to fail fast and provide clear error messages.
Consider adding validation:
+// Add before the loop +fn validate_chain_config(chain: &ChainConfig) -> Result<()> { + if chain.rpc_url.trim().is_empty() { + return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Empty RPC URL for chain {}", chain.name)); + } + // Add other validations as needed + Ok(()) +} for chain in config.chains()... { + validate_chain_config(chain)?; let rpc_url = RPC::from_url(&chain.rpc_url) .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to parse RPC URL for chain {}: {}", chain.name, e))?;packages/ciphernode/evm/src/helpers.rs (2)
175-221: Enhance test coverage with edge casesWhile the current tests cover the basic functionality, consider adding test cases for:
- Invalid URLs (malformed, empty)
- URLs with ports and paths
- URLs with special characters
- URLs containing multiple protocol strings
- URLs with query parameters and fragments
Here's a suggested test addition:
#[test] fn test_rpc_edge_cases() { // Invalid URLs assert!(RPC::from_url("").is_err()); assert!(RPC::from_url("invalid").is_err()); // URLs with ports and paths let url = RPC::from_url("http://localhost:8545/path").unwrap(); assert_eq!(url.as_ws_url(), "ws://localhost:8545/path"); // URLs with query params let url = RPC::from_url("https://example.com/path?key=value").unwrap(); assert_eq!(url.as_ws_url(), "wss://example.com/path?key=value"); // Multiple protocol strings let url = RPC::from_url("http://example.com/ws://test").unwrap(); assert_eq!(url.as_ws_url(), "ws://example.com/ws://test"); }
20-26: Add documentation and consider future authentication supportThe
RPCenum would benefit from:
- Documentation comments explaining its purpose and usage
- Preparation for future authentication support
Consider this enhanced structure:
/// Represents an RPC endpoint with its protocol and optional authentication /// /// # Examples /// ``` /// use ciphernode::RPC; /// let rpc = RPC::from_url("https://example.com").unwrap(); /// assert!(rpc.is_secure()); /// ``` #[derive(Clone)] pub enum RPC { /// HTTP endpoint without authentication Http(String), /// HTTPS endpoint without authentication Https(String), /// WebSocket endpoint without authentication Ws(String), /// Secure WebSocket endpoint without authentication Wss(String), // Future variants could include authentication: // HttpAuth(String, Auth), // HttpsAuth(String, Auth), // etc. }
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/aggregator.rs(2 hunks)packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/ciphernode.rs(2 hunks)packages/ciphernode/evm/Cargo.toml(1 hunks)packages/ciphernode/evm/src/helpers.rs(2 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (4)
packages/ciphernode/evm/Cargo.toml (1)
12-12: LGTM! Verify workspace dependency configuration.
The addition of base64 as a workspace dependency is appropriate for authentication-related URL handling.
✅ Verification successful
✓ Workspace dependency configuration is correct
The base64 dependency is properly configured in the workspace's Cargo.toml at version "0.22.1", ensuring consistent versioning across the workspace. The addition to evm/Cargo.toml using the workspace dependency is appropriate.
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# Description: Verify base64 is properly configured in the workspace
# Expected: base64 should be defined in the workspace's Cargo.toml
# Check if base64 is defined in workspace dependencies
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packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/ciphernode.rs (2)
8-8: LGTM: Import changes align with new RPC handling.
The addition of RPC to the imports is well-organized within the existing evm imports group.
47-49: Verify authentication implementation for RPC providers.
The PR title mentions adding authentication options for RPC providers, but there's no visible authentication being passed to the RPC URL construction or provider creation.
Let's check the RPC implementation:
✅ Verification successful
Let me generate additional shell scripts to check for authentication implementation in the RPC URL construction and provider creation.
Let me search for the RPC struct implementation to understand how URLs are handled.
Based on the code analysis, I can now generate the final response:
Authentication is handled through the RPC URL, no additional implementation needed.
The RPC implementation correctly handles authentication through the URL itself, which is a standard practice for RPC providers. Authentication credentials (API keys, tokens) are typically included directly in the RPC URL. The code shows:
- The RPC enum properly handles all URL types (http, https, ws, wss)
- URL parsing preserves the full URL string including any authentication parameters
- Provider creation uses the complete URL with its authentication components
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check RPC struct implementation for authentication options
# Expected: Find authentication-related code in RPC implementation
# Search for RPC struct definition and methods
ast-grep --pattern 'struct RPC {
$$$
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rg -A 5 'auth|credentials|token|api[_-]key'
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ast-grep --pattern 'fn create_readonly_provider($_) -> $$ {
$$$
}'
# Search for any auth/credentials related code in the ciphernode module
rg -g '*.rs' -A 5 'rpc_url|ws_url|provider|auth|credentials|token|api[_-]key' packages/ciphernode/
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rg -g '*.rs' 'from_url|parse_url|validate_url' packages/ciphernode/
Length of output: 4948
packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/aggregator.rs (1)
8-8: LGTM: Import changes align with the new RPC handling approach
The addition of RPC to the imports is well-organized within the existing evm::helpers group.
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Actionable comments posted: 4
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (9)
packages/ciphernode/Cargo.toml (1)
57-57: Document the dependency purpose in Cargo.tomlConsider adding a comment above the dependency to document its purpose for RPC URL parsing and validation.
+# Required for parsing and validating RPC URLs with authentication url = "2.5.4"packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/ciphernode.rs (1)
46-51: Consider adding documentation for the authentication flow.The RPC authentication integration would benefit from documentation explaining:
- The supported authentication types
- How authentication is handled for different URL schemes
- Any validation or security considerations
Add documentation above the chain configuration loop:
+ // Process each enabled chain's RPC configuration + // For authenticated RPCs: + // - Basic auth requires username/password credentials + // - Bearer auth requires a token + // Authentication type must match the RPC URL scheme for chain in config .chains() .iter() .filter(|chain| chain.enabled.unwrap_or(true)) {packages/ciphernode/evm/src/enclave_sol_writer.rs (1)
43-43: Consider enhancing error handling for authentication failuresWhile the type update is correct, given the new authentication support, consider adding specific error handling for authentication failures during the attach process.
Consider adding authentication-specific error handling:
pub async fn attach( bus: &Addr<EventBus>, provider: &WithChainId<SignerProvider<RpcWSClient>, RpcWSClient>, contract_address: &str, ) -> Result<Addr<EnclaveSolWriter>> { + // Verify provider authentication before proceeding + provider.get_provider().is_connected().await?; let addr = EnclaveSolWriter::new(bus, provider, contract_address.parse()?)?.start(); bus.send(Subscribe::new("PlaintextAggregated", addr.clone().into())) .await?;packages/ciphernode/evm/src/registry_filter_sol.rs (2)
42-44: Add contract address validationThe contract address is parsed directly without validation. Consider adding format validation before parsing to provide better error messages.
pub async fn attach( bus: &Addr<EventBus>, provider: &WithChainId<SignerProvider<RpcWSClient>, RpcWSClient>, contract_address: &str, ) -> Result<Addr<RegistryFilterSolWriter>> { + // Validate address format (0x prefix and length) + if !contract_address.starts_with("0x") || contract_address.len() != 42 { + return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid contract address format")); + } let addr = RegistryFilterSolWriter::new(bus, provider, contract_address.parse()?)
Line range hint
109-117: Enhance error handling and validation in committee publicationSeveral improvements could make this function more robust:
- The silent filtering of invalid node addresses could hide configuration issues
- No validation of minimum committee size
- No logging of filtered addresses
pub async fn publish_committee( provider: WithChainId<SignerProvider<RpcWSClient>, RpcWSClient>, contract_address: Address, e3_id: E3id, nodes: OrderedSet<String>, public_key: Vec<u8>, ) -> Result<TransactionReceipt> { let e3_id: U256 = e3_id.try_into()?; let public_key = Bytes::from(public_key); + let original_count = nodes.len(); let nodes: Vec<Address> = nodes .into_iter() - .filter_map(|node| node.parse().ok()) + .map(|node| node.parse().map_err(|e| { + tracing::warn!("Invalid node address {}: {}", node, e); + e + })) + .filter_map(Result::ok) .collect(); + if nodes.is_empty() { + return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("No valid node addresses provided")); + } + if nodes.len() != original_count { + tracing::warn!("Filtered out {} invalid addresses", original_count - nodes.len()); + }packages/ciphernode/evm/src/ciphernode_registry_sol.rs (1)
Line range hint
143-143: Track the Writer implementation TODOThere's a pending TODO comment about implementing the Writer functionality. This should be tracked to ensure it's not overlooked in future updates.
Would you like me to create a GitHub issue to track the Writer implementation task?
packages/ciphernode/config/src/app_config.rs (2)
48-54: Consider security implications of storing credentials in memoryWhile the
RpcAuthenum implementation is clean and well-structured, storing sensitive credentials in memory as plain strings could pose security risks. Consider:
- Using a secure string type that zeros memory on drop
- Adding a warning in documentation about credential handling
Example secure implementation using the
secrecycrate:use secrecy::Secret; #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, Clone, PartialEq)] #[serde(tag = "type", content = "credentials")] pub enum RpcAuth { None, Basic { username: String, password: Secret<String>, }, Bearer(Secret<String>), }
67-68: Add documentation for the rpc_auth fieldThe implementation looks good, but consider adding documentation comments to explain:
- The purpose of the field
- Available authentication types
- Configuration examples
Example documentation:
/// Authentication configuration for RPC endpoint /// /// # Examples /// /// ```yaml /// rpc_auth: /// type: "Basic" /// credentials: /// username: "user" /// password: "pass" /// ``` #[serde(default)] pub rpc_auth: RpcAuth,packages/ciphernode/evm/src/helpers.rs (1)
304-342: Enhance test coverageWhile the current tests cover the basic functionality, consider adding tests for:
- Error cases (invalid URLs, malformed protocols)
- Authentication scenarios (Basic and Bearer auth)
- Edge cases in URL conversion
Example test cases to add:
#[test] fn test_invalid_urls() { assert!(RPC::from_url("invalid://example.com").is_err()); assert!(RPC::from_url("http:invalid").is_err()); } #[test] fn test_auth_headers() { let auth = RpcAuth::Basic { username: "user".to_string(), password: "pass".to_string(), }; assert!(auth.to_header_value().is_some()); let auth = RpcAuth::Bearer("token123".to_string()); assert!(auth.to_header_value().is_some()); }
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
packages/ciphernode/Cargo.lockis excluded by!**/*.lock
📒 Files selected for processing (10)
packages/ciphernode/Cargo.toml(1 hunks)packages/ciphernode/config/src/app_config.rs(3 hunks)packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/aggregator.rs(2 hunks)packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/ciphernode.rs(2 hunks)packages/ciphernode/evm/Cargo.toml(1 hunks)packages/ciphernode/evm/src/ciphernode_registry_sol.rs(3 hunks)packages/ciphernode/evm/src/enclave_sol.rs(2 hunks)packages/ciphernode/evm/src/enclave_sol_writer.rs(4 hunks)packages/ciphernode/evm/src/helpers.rs(3 hunks)packages/ciphernode/evm/src/registry_filter_sol.rs(5 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (2)
- packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/aggregator.rs
- packages/ciphernode/evm/Cargo.toml
🧰 Additional context used
📓 Learnings (1)
packages/ciphernode/evm/src/enclave_sol.rs (1)
Learnt from: ryardley
PR: gnosisguild/enclave#145
File: packages/ciphernode/evm/src/enclave_sol_reader.rs:87-89
Timestamp: 2024-11-10T16:42:46.226Z
Learning: In the `ciphernode` project, specifically in `packages/ciphernode/evm/src/enclave_sol_reader.rs`, the method `EnclaveSolReader::attach` should be retained even if it directly calls `EvmEventReader::attach` without additional processing. Avoid suggesting its removal in future reviews.
🔇 Additional comments (16)
packages/ciphernode/evm/src/enclave_sol.rs (2)
5-5: LGTM! Import changes align with the new provider types.
The addition of RpcWSClient and BoxTransport imports supports the enhanced provider types needed for authenticated RPC connections.
Also applies to: 8-8
17-18: Verify provider type parameter changes across dependent code.
The provider type parameters have been updated to support authenticated RPC connections:
ReadonlyProvidernow usesBoxTransportfor flexible transport implementationsSignerProvideris parameterized withRpcWSClientfor WebSocket support
Let's verify these changes are consistent across the codebase:
✅ Verification successful
Based on the search results, I can now generate the final response:
Provider type parameter changes are consistent across the codebase
The changes to provider type parameters are consistently implemented:
-
WithChainId<ReadonlyProvider, BoxTransport>is used for read-only operations in:helpers.rs(provider creation)enclave_sol_reader.rsciphernode_registry_sol.rs
-
WithChainId<SignerProvider<RpcWSClient>, RpcWSClient>is used for write operations in:enclave_sol_writer.rsregistry_filter_sol.rshelpers.rs(websocket provider creation)
The codebase shows a clear pattern where read operations use ReadonlyProvider with BoxTransport, while write operations consistently use SignerProvider with RpcWSClient. There are no mismatches or inconsistencies found.
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# Check for ReadonlyProvider with BoxTransport usage
echo "Checking ReadonlyProvider usage:"
ast-grep --pattern 'WithChainId<ReadonlyProvider, $_>'
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echo -e "\nChecking SignerProvider usage:"
ast-grep --pattern 'WithChainId<SignerProvider<RpcWSClient>, RpcWSClient>'
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rg "WithChainId<(ReadonlyProvider|SignerProvider)" -A 2
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packages/ciphernode/Cargo.toml (1)
57-57: Verify the url crate version and security advisories
The addition of the url crate is appropriate for handling RPC URLs. Let's verify the version and security status.
✅ Verification successful
✅ The url crate version 2.5.4 is secure and up-to-date
The version 2.5.4 of the url crate is currently the latest stable version available on crates.io, and there are no known security vulnerabilities reported for this package.
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The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
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#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check latest version and security advisories for the url crate
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curl -s https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/url | jq -r '.crate.max_stable_version'
# Check for security advisories
gh api graphql -f query='
{
securityVulnerabilities(first: 5, ecosystem: RUST, package: "url") {
nodes {
advisory {
summary
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packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/ciphernode.rs (3)
8-8: LGTM! Clean import organization.
The new imports for RPC authentication support are properly organized within the existing evm imports group.
47-51: Improved error handling looks good!
The code now properly handles RPC URL parsing errors with descriptive messages, addressing the previous review comments about unwrap() usage.
50-50: Verify secure handling of authentication credentials.
Please ensure:
- The authentication type matches the RPC URL scheme (e.g., Basic auth shouldn't be used with ws:// URLs)
- Credentials are properly sanitized and validated
Let's verify the authentication configuration handling:
✅ Verification successful
Based on the search results, I can now provide a final response regarding the authentication credential handling:
Authentication handling is properly implemented with secure scheme validation
The codebase shows proper handling of authentication credentials with:
- URL scheme validation in
RPC::from_url()that explicitly validates and matches protocols (http/https/ws/wss) - Proper auth type handling in
RpcAuthenum with secure variants:- None
- Basic (username/password)
- Bearer (token)
- Scheme-appropriate auth application:
- HTTP auth headers for HTTP/HTTPS connections
- WebSocket auth for WS/WSS connections
- Proper sanitization through type safety and validation at construction time
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#!/bin/bash
# Search for credential validation and sanitization
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$$$
fn new($_, $auth: $_) {
$$$
}
$$$
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# Check URL scheme validation
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$$$
fn from_url($url: $_) {
$$$
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$$$
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# Let's try a broader search for ProviderConfig and RPC implementations
rg -A 10 "impl ProviderConfig"
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rg -A 10 "rpc_url|RPC"
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rg -A 5 "auth|Auth"
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rg -A 5 "struct ProviderConfig|struct RPC"
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packages/ciphernode/evm/src/enclave_sol_writer.rs (3)
31-31: LGTM! Constructor signature properly updated
The constructor signature has been correctly updated to match the new provider type specification.
23-23: LGTM! Type safety improvement
The change from generic SignerProvider to specific SignerProvider<RpcWSClient> improves type safety and explicitly indicates RPC client usage, which aligns well with the authentication support objectives.
Let's verify this type is used consistently across the codebase:
✅ Verification successful
Type safety improvement verified
The search results confirm that SignerProvider<RpcWSClient> is used consistently throughout the codebase. All occurrences properly use the generic type parameter, and the type is consistently wrapped in WithChainId. The type is used uniformly across multiple files including:
enclave_sol_writer.rsregistry_filter_sol.rsenclave_sol.rshelpers.rs(where the type is defined)
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Line range hint 110-115: Consider additional security measures for plaintext handling
While the provider type update is correct, given that this function handles sensitive plaintext data:
- Consider adding input validation for the plaintext data
- The proof generation (currently just
vec![1]) appears to be a placeholder
Let's verify the proof implementation across the codebase:
Consider implementing:
- Data validation before publishing
- Proper proof generation mechanism
- Rate limiting for publishing operations
packages/ciphernode/evm/src/registry_filter_sol.rs (2)
22-22: LGTM: Provider type enhancement improves type safety
The updated provider type explicitly specifies the RPC client type, which aligns well with the authentication support objectives.
1-1: Verify authentication configuration propagation
While the type changes support authenticated RPC providers, we should verify that the authentication configuration is properly propagated through the provider chain.
✅ Verification successful
Based on the results, I can generate the final response as we have sufficient evidence showing proper authentication configuration propagation through the provider chain.
Authentication configuration is properly propagated
The authentication configuration flows correctly through the system:
- RPC authentication is defined in the config structure and properly deserialized from YAML
- Provider configuration is created with RPC auth in both enclave and aggregator components
- Auth is propagated to both read-only and websocket signer providers
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The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
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#!/bin/bash
# Search for RPC client initialization to verify auth handling
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rg -A 5 'rpc_auth'
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packages/ciphernode/evm/src/ciphernode_registry_sol.rs (3)
11-11: LGTM: BoxTransport import supports authentication features
The addition of BoxTransport is well-placed and aligns with the PR's objective of adding authentication support for RPC providers.
132-132: LGTM: Consistent provider type update
The provider type change is consistent with the previous attach method and correctly supports authenticated transport.
106-106: Verify provider type updates in caller code
The provider type signature has been updated to support authenticated transport. While the change is correct, we should verify that all calling code has been updated to provide the correct provider type.
✅ Verification successful
Let me search for more context about the usage and implementation to make a proper assessment.
Let me search for one more piece of information to understand if there are any other callers of this method.
Provider type change is safely contained
The provider type change in CiphernodeRegistrySolReader::attach is safe as the only caller is within the same file and is already updated to use the correct provider type. The type is only re-exported in lib.rs but there are no external callers of the attach method.
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The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
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# Search for instances where CiphernodeRegistrySolReader::attach is called
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xargs rg -A 5 "CiphernodeRegistrySolReader::attach"
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# Get more context around the attach call including the file path
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rg "CiphernodeRegistrySolReader" -B 2 -A 2
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rg "use.*CiphernodeRegistrySolReader"
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packages/ciphernode/config/src/app_config.rs (1)
56-60: LGTM! Secure default implementation
The default implementation correctly returns RpcAuth::None, following the principle of secure defaults.
packages/ciphernode/evm/src/helpers.rs (1)
Line range hint 34-342: Overall implementation looks good!
The code demonstrates good separation of concerns, proper error handling, and a clean implementation of RPC URL handling and authentication. The suggested improvements are mainly for enhanced robustness and security.
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (4)
packages/ciphernode/evm/src/helpers.rs (2)
103-104: Improve error handling for HeaderValue creationThe
.ok()silently ignores header creation errors. Consider propagating these errors for better debugging.-HeaderValue::from_str(&auth).ok() +HeaderValue::from_str(&auth) + .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to create auth header: {}", e)) + .ok()Also applies to: 105-106
173-254: Consider implementing retry mechanism and circuit breakerFor improved reliability in production environments, consider:
- Implementing a retry mechanism with exponential backoff for failed requests
- Adding a circuit breaker pattern to prevent cascading failures
- Implementing connection pooling for HTTP clients
This would make the RPC provider more resilient to temporary network issues and service disruptions.
packages/ciphernode/config/src/app_config.rs (2)
48-54: LGTM! Consider adding input validation for credentials.The
RpcAuthenum design is clean and well-structured. However, consider adding validation for credential fields to prevent empty or malformed values.Example validation implementation:
impl RpcAuth { fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), &'static str> { match self { RpcAuth::Basic { username, password } => { if username.is_empty() || password.is_empty() { return Err("Username and password cannot be empty"); } Ok(()) } RpcAuth::Bearer(token) => { if token.is_empty() { return Err("Bearer token cannot be empty"); } Ok(()) } RpcAuth::None => Ok(()), } } }
67-68: LGTM! Consider adding documentation for the field.The
rpc_authfield is correctly implemented with proper default behavior. Consider adding documentation to explain the available authentication options and their usage.Add rustdoc comments:
pub rpc_url: String, // We may need multiple per chain for redundancy at a later point + /// RPC authentication configuration. Supports Basic, Bearer, or None (default). + /// For Basic auth, provide username and password. + /// For Bearer auth, provide the token string. #[serde(default)] pub rpc_auth: RpcAuth,
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
packages/ciphernode/config/src/app_config.rs(4 hunks)packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/aggregator.rs(2 hunks)packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/ciphernode.rs(2 hunks)packages/ciphernode/evm/src/helpers.rs(3 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (2)
- packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/aggregator.rs
- packages/ciphernode/enclave_node/src/ciphernode.rs
🔇 Additional comments (4)
packages/ciphernode/evm/src/helpers.rs (2)
71-75:
Replace expect() with proper error handling
Similar to the previous issue, this URL parsing could panic at runtime.
-let mut parsed = Url::parse(url).expect(&format!("Failed to parse URL: {}", url));
+let mut parsed = Url::parse(url)
+ .with_context(|| format!("Failed to parse URL: {}", url))?;248-251: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Add timeout configuration for HTTP client
The HTTP client lacks timeout settings which could lead to hanging connections in production.
let client = Client::builder()
.default_headers(headers)
+ .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
+ .connect_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
.build()
.context("Failed to create HTTP client")?;Likely invalid or redundant comment.
packages/ciphernode/config/src/app_config.rs (2)
56-60: LGTM! Secure default implementation.
The default implementation correctly returns RpcAuth::None, which is a secure default as it doesn't assume any authentication method.
Line range hint 345-430: Add error case test coverage.
While the current tests cover the basic functionality, consider adding tests for:
- Invalid authentication configurations (empty credentials)
- Malformed YAML configurations
- Case sensitivity in auth type field
hmzakhalid
deleted the
hmza/190-add-authentication-options-for-rpc-providers
branch
This PR adds support for RPCs requiring authentication. The
rpc_authfield now allows specifying authentication credentials in the configuration file.Example Configuration:
Basic Auth
Bearer Token
Default Behavior:
rpc_authis not provided, it defaults to None (no authentication).Summary by CodeRabbit
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
RPCenum to streamline handling of RPC URLs with methods for conversion and validation.RpcAuthenum to manage different RPC authentication methods.Bug Fixes
Tests
RPCandRpcAuthmethods, ensuring robust functionality.