Updates on previous entry with current changes

docs/_sidebar.md

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 - **Study Group**
 - [EPFsg overview](/eps/intro.md)
 - Schedule
+
   - [Week 0](/eps/week0.md)
   - [Week 1](/eps/week1.md)
   - [Week 2](/eps/week2.md)
@@ -57,9 +58,9 @@
     - Sharding
     - Statelessness
     - Purge
-  - MEV
+  - [MEV](/wiki/research/PBS/mev.md)
     - [PBS](/wiki/research/PBS/pbs.md)
-    - Censorship
+    - [MEV-boost](/wiki/research/PBS/mev-boost.md)
   - Proof of Stake
     - [Upgrades](/docs/wiki/research/Beacon%20Chain%20Upgrades.md)
     - SSF

docs/wiki/research/PBS/mev-boost.md

@@ -23,6 +23,19 @@ Here's how mev-boost works:
    Validators running mev-boost software act as proposers. They receive blocks from relays and choose the best one based on predefined criteria, typically the block that offers the highest reward.
    The proposer then proposes the selected block to the network for validation and inclusion in the blockchain.
 
+## PBS Block Creation
+
+The process of block creation through PBS works as follows:
+
+### Block Construction
+
+- Builders continuously monitor the transaction pool (mempool) for new transactions. They assess these transactions based on potential MEV opportunities. They select the transactions that best align with their MEV optimization criteria. Also, block builders can take transaction bundles from private orderflows, or from MEV searchers, just as miners did in PoW Ethereum with the original Flashbots auctions. In the latter case, builders accept sealed-price bids from searchers and include their bundles in the block.
+- Once the transactions are selected, builders assemble them into a block ensuring that the block adheres to the Ethereum protocol's rules, e. g., txs are valid, the gas limit is not surpassed.
+
+### Block Auction
+
+Instead of builders directly offering their assembled blocks to validators with a specified price, the standard practice is to use relays. Relays validate the transaction bundles before passing them onto the proposer (validator). Also, implementations can introduce escrows responsible for providing data availability by storing blocks sent by builders and commitments sent by validators. The auction process works as follows:
+
 ### Benefits of mev-boost:
 
 - **Increased validator rewards:** By outsourcing block building to specialized searchers, validators can potentially earn higher rewards through optimized transaction ordering and MEV extraction.
@@ -41,7 +54,3 @@ Ongoing research and development are focused on addressing these challenges and
 
 It's important to note that mev-boost is just one implementation of PBS. Other implementations with different designs and features are also being developed and explored.
 Overall, mev-boost represents a significant step towards realizing the potential benefits of PBS in Ethereum. However, continuous research and development are crucial to address the challenges and ensure a secure, decentralized, and efficient implementation.
-
-### Challenges and Solutions
-
-PBS presents several challenges, including potential security vulnerabilities and the risk of centralization. Ongoing research focuses on addressing these concerns through innovations such as enhanced PBS (ePBS), inclusion lists, and the Proposal Eligibility Proposals Committee (PEPC).

docs/wiki/research/PBS/mev.md

@@ -1,4 +1,19 @@
 <!-- @format -->
 
-Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to the profit miners or validators can earn by strategically ordering, including, or excluding transactions in a block. In Ethereum, MEV has gained greater attention as validators extract increasingly more value, especially in DeFi (Decentralized Finance) applications. This can lead to negative consequences, such as frontrunning, increased transaction fees, and unfair advantages for large-scale miners or validators.
-Proposer-builder separation can change the dynamics of MEV extraction in that there could be a redistribution of MEV between the two roles, potentially changing the incentives and rewards associated with each. Since block builders are responsible for transaction ordering and inclusion, they may develop new strategies or promote increased competition that could result in more efficiency and fairer distribution of MEV across the network.
+# Maximal Extractable Value (previously Miner Extractable Value)
+
+Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to the the maximum value that can be extracted from block production beyond the standard block reward and gas fees by strategically ordering, including, or excluding transactions in a block.
+
+In Ethereum, MEV has gained greater attention as validators extract increasingly more value, especially in DeFi (Decentralized Finance) applications. This can lead to negative consequences, such as frontrunning, increased transaction fees, and unfair advantages for large-scale miners or validators.
+
+[Proposer-builder separation (PBS)](/wiki/research/PBS/pbs.md) can change the dynamics of MEV extraction in that there could be a redistribution of MEV between the two roles, potentially changing the incentives and rewards associated with each. Since block builders are responsible for transaction ordering and inclusion, they may develop new strategies or promote increased competition that could result in more efficiency and fairer distribution of MEV across the network.
+
+## Evolution of MEV
+
+Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) originated during the proof-of-work Era, where it was known as "Miner Extractable Value." This terminology reflected the miners' ability to influence transaction processes, including their inclusion, exclusion, and sequencing. Following Ethereum's transition to proof-of-stake with The Merge, validators have taken over these critical functions, rendering mining obsolete within the protocol. Despite these changes, the mechanisms for value extraction remain in place, leading to the adoption of the term "Maximal Extractable Value" to address these activities.
+
+Although MEV has been possible since the inception of Ethereum, it gained significant attention with the rise of DeFi and arbitrage tooling like Flashloans. In the early days, MEV opportunities were primarily seized by outbidding rivals in the public mempool, marking the era known as Priority Gas Auction or PGA. Details about this chaotic era is captured in [Flashboys 2.0](https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.05234).
+
+In the Post-Merge world, the concept of Miners ceased to exist. Validators were now the entities responsible to add blocks to the chain. Anticipating the changes after The Merge, Flashbots, alongwith the client teams and the Ethereum Foundation commenced the development of [mev-boost](/wiki/research/PBS/mev-boost.md). mev-boost is an out-of-protocol implementation of Proposer-builder Seperation.
+
+See the [Next Section](/wiki/research/PBS/pbs.md).

docs/wiki/research/PBS/pbs.md

@@ -145,4 +145,4 @@ Below are some further readings regarding PBS and related topics:
 - [Vitalik on pbs censorship](https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/pbs_censorship_resistance)
 - [Payload timeliness committee(PTC) design for ePBS](https://ethresear.ch/t/payload-timeliness-committee-ptc-an-epbs-design/16054)
 - [2-slot PBS](https://ethresear.ch/t/two-slot-proposer-builder-separation/10980)
-- [Foward Inclusion Lists](https://notes.ethereum.org/@fradamt/forward-inclusion-lists)
+- [Foward Inclusion Lists](https://notes.ethereum.org/@fradamt/forward-inclusion-lists)