Update dependency requests to v2.32.2 [SECURITY] #27
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This PR contains the following updates:
==2.28.1
->==2.32.2
==2.31.0
->==2.32.2
Warning
Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2023-32681
Impact
Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking
Proxy-Authorization
headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of howrebuild_proxies
is used to recompute and reattach theProxy-Authorization
header to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has only been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g.https://username:password@proxy:8080
).Current vulnerable behavior(s):
For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the
Proxy-Authorization
header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials.The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the
Proxy-Authorization
header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py withproxy_manager_for
. This will compute the required proxy headers inproxy_headers
and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage.Patches
Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager.
For users with custom adapters, this may be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of
rebuild_proxies
doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.Workarounds
For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround.
You may disable redirects by setting
allow_redirects
toFalse
on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination.Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals.
Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/)
Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@gmail.com)
CVE-2024-35195
When making requests through a Requests
Session
, if the first request is made withverify=False
to disable cert verification, all subsequent requests to the same origin will continue to ignore cert verification regardless of changes to the value ofverify
. This behavior will continue for the lifecycle of the connection in the connection pool.Remediation
Any of these options can be used to remediate the current issue, we highly recommend upgrading as the preferred mitigation.
requests>=2.32.0
.requests<2.32.0
, avoid settingverify=False
for the first request to a host while using a Requests Session.requests<2.32.0
, callclose()
onSession
objects to clear existing connections ifverify=False
is used.Related Links
Release Notes
psf/requests (requests)
v2.32.2
Compare Source
Deprecations
To provide a more stable migration for custom HTTPAdapters impacted
by the CVE changes in 2.32.0, we've renamed
_get_connection
toa new public API,
get_connection_with_tls_context
. Existing customHTTPAdapters will need to migrate their code to use this new API.
get_connection
is considered deprecated in all versions of Requests>=2.32.0.A minimal (2-line) example has been provided in the linked PR to ease
migration, but we strongly urge users to evaluate if their custom adapter
is subject to the same issue described in CVE-2024-35195. (#6710)
v2.32.1
Compare Source
Bugfixes
v2.32.0
Compare Source
Security
verify=False
on the first request from aSession will cause subsequent requests to the same origin to also ignore
cert verification, regardless of the value of
verify
.(GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56)
Improvements
verify=True
now reuses a global SSLContext which should improverequest time variance between first and subsequent requests. It should
also minimize certificate load time on Windows systems when using a Python
version built with OpenSSL 3.x. (#6667)
(
chardet
orcharset_normalizer
) when repackaged or vendored.This enables
pip
and other projects to minimize their vendoringsurface area. The
Response.text()
andapparent_encoding
APIswill default to
utf-8
if neither library is present. (#6702)Bugfixes
calculated in the request content-length. (#6589)
/
(path separator) could leadurllib3 to unnecessarily reparse the request URI. (#6644)
Deprecations
Documentation
Packaging
The source files for the projects (formerly
requests
) is now locatedin
src/requests
in the Requests sdist. (#6506)using
hatchling
. This should not impact the average user, but extremely oldversions of packaging utilities may have issues with the new packaging format.
v2.31.0
Compare Source
Security
Versions of Requests between v2.3.0 and v2.30.0 are vulnerable to potential
forwarding of
Proxy-Authorization
headers to destination servers whenfollowing HTTPS redirects.
When proxies are defined with user info (
https://user:pass@proxy:8080
), Requestswill construct a
Proxy-Authorization
header that is attached to the request toauthenticate with the proxy.
In cases where Requests receives a redirect response, it previously reattached
the
Proxy-Authorization
header incorrectly, resulting in the value beingsent through the tunneled connection to the destination server. Users who rely on
defining their proxy credentials in the URL are strongly encouraged to upgrade
to Requests 2.31.0+ to prevent unintentional leakage and rotate their proxy
credentials once the change has been fully deployed.
Users who do not use a proxy or do not supply their proxy credentials through
the user information portion of their proxy URL are not subject to this
vulnerability.
Full details can be read in our Github Security Advisory
and CVE-2023-32681.
v2.30.0
Compare Source
Dependencies
This may contain minor breaking changes so we advise careful testing and
reviewing https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/v2-migration-guide.html
prior to upgrading.
Users who wish to stay on urllib3 1.x can pin to
urllib3<2
.v2.29.0
Compare Source
Improvements
standardization. (#6226)
v2.28.2
Compare Source
Dependencies
Bugfixes
Configuration
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