Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Update dependency requests to v2.32.2 [SECURITY] #27

Open
wants to merge 1 commit into
base: master
Choose a base branch
from

Conversation

renovate[bot]
Copy link
Contributor

@renovate renovate bot commented Sep 27, 2024

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
requests (source, changelog) ==2.28.1 -> ==2.32.2 age adoption passing confidence
requests (source, changelog) ==2.31.0 -> ==2.32.2 age adoption passing confidence

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-32681

Impact

Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how rebuild_proxies is used to recompute and reattach the Proxy-Authorization header to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has only been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. https://username:password@proxy:8080).

Current vulnerable behavior(s):

  1. HTTP → HTTPS: leak
  2. HTTPS → HTTP: no leak
  3. HTTPS → HTTPS: leak
  4. HTTP → HTTP: no leak

For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the Proxy-Authorization header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials.

The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the Proxy-Authorization header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with proxy_manager_for. This will compute the required proxy headers in proxy_headers and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage.

Patches

Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager.

For users with custom adapters, this may be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of rebuild_proxies doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.

Workarounds

For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround.

You may disable redirects by setting allow_redirects to False on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination.

import requests
r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False)

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals.

Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/)
Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@​gmail.com)

CVE-2024-35195

When making requests through a Requests Session, if the first request is made with verify=False to disable cert verification, all subsequent requests to the same origin will continue to ignore cert verification regardless of changes to the value of verify. This behavior will continue for the lifecycle of the connection in the connection pool.

Remediation

Any of these options can be used to remediate the current issue, we highly recommend upgrading as the preferred mitigation.

  • Upgrade to requests>=2.32.0.
  • For requests<2.32.0, avoid setting verify=False for the first request to a host while using a Requests Session.
  • For requests<2.32.0, call close() on Session objects to clear existing connections if verify=False is used.

Related Links


Release Notes

psf/requests (requests)

v2.32.2

Compare Source

Deprecations

  • To provide a more stable migration for custom HTTPAdapters impacted
    by the CVE changes in 2.32.0, we've renamed _get_connection to
    a new public API, get_connection_with_tls_context. Existing custom
    HTTPAdapters will need to migrate their code to use this new API.
    get_connection is considered deprecated in all versions of Requests>=2.32.0.

    A minimal (2-line) example has been provided in the linked PR to ease
    migration, but we strongly urge users to evaluate if their custom adapter
    is subject to the same issue described in CVE-2024-35195. (#​6710)

v2.32.1

Compare Source

Bugfixes

  • Add missing test certs to the sdist distributed on PyPI.

v2.32.0

Compare Source

Security

  • Fixed an issue where setting verify=False on the first request from a
    Session will cause subsequent requests to the same origin to also ignore
    cert verification, regardless of the value of verify.
    (GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56)

Improvements

  • verify=True now reuses a global SSLContext which should improve
    request time variance between first and subsequent requests. It should
    also minimize certificate load time on Windows systems when using a Python
    version built with OpenSSL 3.x. (#​6667)
  • Requests now supports optional use of character detection
    (chardet or charset_normalizer) when repackaged or vendored.
    This enables pip and other projects to minimize their vendoring
    surface area. The Response.text() and apparent_encoding APIs
    will default to utf-8 if neither library is present. (#​6702)

Bugfixes

  • Fixed bug in length detection where emoji length was incorrectly
    calculated in the request content-length. (#​6589)
  • Fixed deserialization bug in JSONDecodeError. (#​6629)
  • Fixed bug where an extra leading / (path separator) could lead
    urllib3 to unnecessarily reparse the request URI. (#​6644)

Deprecations

  • Requests has officially added support for CPython 3.12 (#​6503)
  • Requests has officially added support for PyPy 3.9 and 3.10 (#​6641)
  • Requests has officially dropped support for CPython 3.7 (#​6642)
  • Requests has officially dropped support for PyPy 3.7 and 3.8 (#​6641)

Documentation

  • Various typo fixes and doc improvements.

Packaging

  • Requests has started adopting some modern packaging practices.
    The source files for the projects (formerly requests) is now located
    in src/requests in the Requests sdist. (#​6506)
  • Starting in Requests 2.33.0, Requests will migrate to a PEP 517 build system
    using hatchling. This should not impact the average user, but extremely old
    versions of packaging utilities may have issues with the new packaging format.

v2.31.0

Compare Source

Security

  • Versions of Requests between v2.3.0 and v2.30.0 are vulnerable to potential
    forwarding of Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers when
    following HTTPS redirects.

    When proxies are defined with user info (https://user:pass@proxy:8080), Requests
    will construct a Proxy-Authorization header that is attached to the request to
    authenticate with the proxy.

    In cases where Requests receives a redirect response, it previously reattached
    the Proxy-Authorization header incorrectly, resulting in the value being
    sent through the tunneled connection to the destination server. Users who rely on
    defining their proxy credentials in the URL are strongly encouraged to upgrade
    to Requests 2.31.0+ to prevent unintentional leakage and rotate their proxy
    credentials once the change has been fully deployed.

    Users who do not use a proxy or do not supply their proxy credentials through
    the user information portion of their proxy URL are not subject to this
    vulnerability.

    Full details can be read in our Github Security Advisory
    and CVE-2023-32681.

v2.30.0

Compare Source

Dependencies

v2.29.0

Compare Source

Improvements

  • Requests now defers chunked requests to the urllib3 implementation to improve
    standardization. (#​6226)
  • Requests relaxes header component requirements to support bytes/str subclasses. (#​6356)

v2.28.2

Compare Source

Dependencies

  • Requests now supports charset_normalizer 3.x. (#​6261)

Bugfixes

  • Updated MissingSchema exception to suggest https scheme rather than http. (#​6188)

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-requests-vulnerability branch from c50e7d2 to 1ddbcd1 Compare October 3, 2024 21:48
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

0 participants