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<pre> | ||
BIP: ? | ||
Layer: Application | ||
Title: Ephemeral Anchors | ||
Author: Gregory Sanders <[email protected]> | ||
Comments-URI: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/wiki/Comments:BIP-? | ||
Status: Draft | ||
Type: Informational | ||
Created: 2023-01-11 | ||
License: CC0 1.0 Universal | ||
Requires: 431 | ||
</pre> | ||
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==Introduction== | ||
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===Abstract=== | ||
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Ephemeral Anchors are a mempool policy carve-out that allows dust UTXOs, | ||
even 0-value, to be created, provided they are also spent in the mempool. | ||
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===Motivation=== | ||
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Relay dust limits have been in place in most implementations of the Bitcoin | ||
protocol to discourage the creation of UTXOs that are never spent in the future, | ||
bloat the UTXO set, and increase the validation burden for validating | ||
nodes. | ||
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With [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0431.mediawiki TRUC] transactions | ||
and basic package relay, users can generate and propogate 0-fee transactions provided | ||
a descendant transaction includes the proper fee for the package. In many cases | ||
these fees can be directly sourced from a freely spendable output, with the resulting | ||
change output being decremented by the required fee amount. | ||
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In some cases however there are no freely spendable outputs to source this fee value | ||
from, and in these cases an "anchor" is employed. | ||
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[https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#to_local_anchor-and-to_remote_anchor-output-option_anchors LN] | ||
allows a small amount of contract value to be given to an output to allow network relay | ||
by passing dust checks, but not as the primary source of fee funds. Instead the child transaction | ||
spending the anchor is responsibile for providing the funds. | ||
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In this and similar abstractions it would be cleaner if the anchor itself could be 0-value | ||
instead of requiring anchors to exceed dust amounts. | ||
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===Typical Configurations=== | ||
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For anchors using TRUC transactions, it's expected that they would take two output script forms: | ||
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1. Keyed anchor: A key, possibly shared by multiple privileged parties, is used to encumber the anchor. This could also be `tr()`, `p2wsh()` or any | ||
output type that allows key material. | ||
1. Un-keyed anchor: `P2SH(OP_TRUE)` or `P2WSH(OP_TRUE)`, depending on the the user's need for lack of txid malleability. Further policy | ||
extensions could allow output templates such as the output script <code>OP_1 <0x4e73></code> or a bare `OP_TRUE`. | ||
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===Example Use Cases=== | ||
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* Batched payments with segregated fee pools: Batched payments that can be fee bumped without access to customer deposit-related key material | ||
* Simplified watchtowers/accelerators: No requirement to equip watchtowers with privileged key material, and no value to steal by those watchtowers | ||
* Multiparty smart contracts: LN BOLTs can be revamped to remove value-sapping anchors. | ||
* LN-Symmetry: During the contest period, no anchor value can be sourced endogenously. | ||
* [https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/100537/what-is-spacechain Spacechains] | ||
* Ark transactions | ||
* Timeout Trees | ||
===Related Work=== | ||
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[https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-January/021334.html SIGHASH_GROUP] style proposals are an alternative method of bringing funds to a transaction without involving CPFP by enacting a softfork. Making these pin-resistant may require follow-on policy work, or [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-May/020458.html more general covenants] to directly stop pins we want to avoid. The drawback of these are the necessity of a softfork. | ||
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[https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-September/018168.html Transaction Sponsors] is a softfork proposal to allow transactions to | ||
sponsor transactions with no explicit relationship in the classical UTXO | ||
model. Ephemeral Anchors can be viewed as a type of opt-in transaction sponsors implemented | ||
purely in policy. | ||
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Using a 0-value CPFP anchor is not a new idea, see: | ||
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* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-May/015931.html LN-dev discussion on 0-value anchors] | ||
The discussion lacked a solution to the issue of the dust entering into the utxo set | ||
causing negative externalities. | ||
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==Definitions== | ||
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Ephemeral anchor: An output with dust value which is immediately spent by a child transaction. | ||
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Ephemeral anchor transaction: A transaction that has an ephemeral anchor | ||
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==Specification== | ||
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When received by a peer for inclusion to the mempool an ephemeral anchor transaction MUST: | ||
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* Be an otherwise valid [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0431.mediawiki TRUC] transaction adhering to the corresponding topological constraints | ||
* Be 0-fee | ||
* Have only one dust value output (output values which would normally cause rejection) | ||
* Have its ephemeral anchor spent in the same TRUC cluster | ||
or will be rejected by policy. All other policy checks are left in place. | ||
These constraints apply only to mempool policy. Blocks are not | ||
invalidated by breaking these policy-only rules as they have no bearing on consensus. | ||
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==Rationale== | ||
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To incentivize the mining of the spends of ephemeral anchors we require three things to be true: | ||
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1. The ephemeral anchor transaciton should be 0-fee itself | ||
2. The transaction should only have a single child | ||
3. The ephemeral anchor must be spent | ||
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With these restrictions in place, the only endogenous incentives to mine the ephemeral | ||
anchor transaction is to mine the transaction along with the child transaction | ||
spending the acnhor. TRUC transaction restrictions inherently follow the single | ||
child rule, though it's not strictly necessary. Further standards can relax | ||
the TRUC transaction requirement in favor of just the necessary requirements. | ||
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== Backward compatibility == | ||
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Ephemeral anchor spends were previously non-standard, so there are no known conflicts | ||
with previous usage. | ||
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==Implementation== | ||
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https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/30239 | ||
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==Acknowledgements== | ||
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Thank you to all those listed for foundational work | ||
and insightful feedback (ordered by last name): | ||
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* Richard Myers | ||
* James O'Beirne | ||
* Antoine Poinsot | ||
* Antoine Riard | ||
* Jeremy Rubin | ||
* Bastien Teinturier | ||
* Anthony Towns | ||
* Gloria Zhao | ||
==Copyright== | ||
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This document is licensed under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal license. |