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Add ephemeral anchor BIP proposal
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<pre>
BIP: ?
Layer: Application
Title: Ephemeral Anchors
Author: Gregory Sanders <[email protected]>
Comments-URI: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/wiki/Comments:BIP-?
Status: Draft
Type: Informational
Created: 2023-01-11
License: CC0 1.0 Universal
</pre>

==Introduction==

===Abstract===

Ephemeral Anchors are a mempool policy carve-out that allows any value utxos,
even 0-value dust, to be created, provided it is also spent within the same
mempool package.

===Motivation===

Relay dust limits have been in place in most implementations of the Bitcoin
protocol to discourage the creation of UTXOs that are never spent in the future,
bloating the UTXO set and increasing the validation burden for validating
nodes.

With [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0431.mediawiki TRUC] transactions
and basic package relay, users can generate and propogate 0-fee transactions provided
a descendant transaction includes the proper fee for the package. In many cases
these fees can be directly sourced from a freely spendable output, with the resulting
change output being decremented by the required fee amount.

In some cases however there are no freely spendable outputs to source this fee value
from, and in these cases an "anchor" is employed.

[https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#to_local_anchor-and-to_remote_anchor-output-option_anchors LN]
allows a small amount of contract value to be given to an output to merely allow network relay
by avoiding dust checks, but not as the primary source of fee funds. Instead the child transaction
spending the anchor is given the responsibility of bringing funds.

It is cleaner for this abstraction and others if instead of requiring
dust values in anchors, the anchor itself can be 0 value.

===Typical Configurations===

For anchors using TRUC transactions, it's expected that they would take two output script forms:

1. Keyed anchor: A key, shared by possibly multiple privileged parties, is used to encumber the anchor. This could also be `tr()`, `p2wsh()` or any
output type that allows key material.
1. Un-keyed anchor: `P2SH(OP_TRUE)` or `P2WSH(OP_TRUE)`, depending on the the user's need for lack of txid malleability. Further policy
extensions could allow output templates such as the output script <code>OP_1 <0x4e73></code> or a bare `OP_TRUE`.

===Example Use Cases===

* Batched payments with segregated fee pools: Batched payments that can be fee bumped without access to customer deposit-related key material
* Simplified watchtowers/accelerators: No requirement for watchtowers to be registered with privileged key material, and no value to steal by those watchtowers
* Multiparty smart contracts: LN BOLTs can be revamped to remove value-sapping anchors.
* LN-Symmetry: During the contest period, no anchor value can be sourced endogenously.
* [https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/100537/what-is-spacechain Spacechains]
* Ark transactions
* Timeout Trees
===Related Work===

[https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-January/021334.html SIGHASH_GROUP] style proposals are an alternative method of bringing funds to a transaction without involving CPFP by enacting a softfork. Making these pin-resistant may require follow-on policy work, or [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-May/020458.html more general covenants] to directly stop pins we want to avoid. The drawbacks of these are the necessity of a softfork.

[https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-September/018168.html Transaction Sponsors] is a softfork proposal to allow transactions to
indirectly sponsor transactions with no explicit relationship in the classical utxo
model. Ephemeral Anchors can be viewed as a type of opt-in transaction sponsors implemented
purely in policy.

Using a 0-value CPFP anchor is not a new idea, see:

* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-May/015931.html LN-dev discussion on 0-value anchors]
The discussion lacked a solution to the issue of the dust entering into the utxo set
causing negative externalities.

==Definitions==

Ephemeral anchor: An output with dust value which is immediately spent by a child transaction.

Ephemeral anchor transaction: A transaction that has an ephemeral anchor

==Specification==

When received by a peer for inclusion to the mempool an ephemeral anchor transaction MUST:

* Be an otherwise valid [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0431.mediawiki TRUC] transaction which enforces topology constraints
* Be 0-fee
* Have only one dust value output
* Have the dust value spent in the same TRUC cluster
or will be rejected by policy. All other policy checks are left in place.
If included in an otherwise valid block, these additional constraints do not apply
as this is a policy-only change.

== Backward compatibility ==

Ephemeral anchor spends were previously non-standard, so there are no known conflicts
with previous usage.

==Implementation==

https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/30239

==Acknowledgements==

Thank you to all those listed for foundational work
and insightful feedback(in last name order):

* Richard Myers
* James O'Beirne
* Antoine Poinsot
* Antoine Riard
* Jeremy Rubin
* Bastien Teinturier
* Anthony Towns
* Gloria Zhao
=Copyright==

This document is licensed as Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal.

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