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[RFC] Virtio mmio i2c #1

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[RFC] Virtio mmio i2c #1

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@arnopo arnopo commented Aug 31, 2023

This PR proposes an implementation of the virtio-mmio and virti-i2c for inter-processor communication.

The objective of this PR is only to share a first implementation and should not be merged in this state.

  • Update of the virtio -mmio to manage IPC signaling and device memory address ( with new compatibility)
  • Add posibility to populate sub-node in the remoteproc framework

This PR is compatible with the Zephyr example : OpenAMP/openamp-system-reference#20

arnopo and others added 9 commits August 31, 2023 13:49
@arnopo
drivers: mailbox: add interrupt controller to manage interrupt context
b347ce3 
The mailbox client callback should be called under interrupt context or in
normal context. The need depends on the client.
For instance a virtio I2C client needs to be called under interrupt
context. Indeed the associated bus controller should allows an I2C drivers
to access to the hardware during the probe ( atomic context).
In such case the remote device "Ack" reception have to be to be treated
under interrupt context.
On the other hand a virtio rpmsg should not work in interrupt context. It
mixes several services in one virtio.

This patch add the capability to call the mailbox client under interrupt
or normal context depending on the mailbox channel ID.

- if the interrupt associated to a mailbox channel is declared in the
  client device tree node, the client is called in interrupt context
- else the client is called in normal context (use of a workqueue)

Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen <[email protected]>
@Nicolas62x @arnopo
dma-direct: prevent incorrect check of min dma address
86c425c 
When mapping dma addresses, this check will try to convert the address :
0xC0000000 using phys_to_dma,
thinking it is the smallest dma address possible.

But this call return 0xFFFFFFFF on an stm32mp1,
since it's not a dma address at all,
this results in rejecting any dma address.

This patch is a temporary solution to prevent 0xFFFFFFFF,
from being considered the smallest address possible.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Granger <[email protected]>
@Nicolas62x @arnopo
remoteproc: virtio: Added mmio device populate
65f2333 
We need to populate the virtio,mmio driver,
after the boot of the coprocessor so that the mmio table,
is already loaded with it's magic value etc...
or else the mmio driver will think that there is no mmio device.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Granger <[email protected]>
@Nicolas62x @arnopo
i2c: virtio: Use dma api instead of kalloc
ae47a1c 
We need buffers to be in the dma region shared with the remote device.

If we don't do this we will have an error when trying to map them.
This is because VirtIO MMIO is designed to use DMA memory,
we can't use memory from calloc for that.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Granger <[email protected]>
@Nicolas62x @arnopo
virtio_mmio: Added compatiblility with remote processor
30ab589 
-Add support of dma region to allocate buffers,
this is necessary to ensure that the dma memory is
located in the shared memory with the coprocessor

-Add virtio,mmio-remote proc compatible wich uses,
mailboxes to send interrupts to the remote processor.
We need this because the coprocessor can't react to
register changes otherwise. And VirtIO MMIO assume that
writing to a register update instantly the value of
other registers.

Example:
VIRTIO_MMIO_DRIVER_FEATURES_SEL is used to choose
wich bits will be present in VIRTIO_MMIO_DRIVER_FEATURES.

But without interrupt, the register can't be updated
before the driver write again in the same register.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Granger <[email protected]>
@arnopo
ARM: dts: stm32: declare interrupt controller for the IPCC node on st…
e882ba4 
…m32mp15xx-dkx board

The IPPC can implement mailbox RX as an interrupt controller.
Activate the feature in IPCC node.

Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen <[email protected]>
@arnopo
ARM: dts: stm32: declare interrupt controller for the IPCC node on st…
debad54 
…m32mp157c-ed1 board

The IPPC can implement maillbox RX as an interrupt controller.
Activate the feature in IPCC node.

Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen <[email protected]>
@arnopo
ARM: dts: stm32: Add virtio mmio device to the stm32mp15xx-dkx board
752412d 
Added a virtio mmio device declaration in shared memory.

Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen <[email protected]>
@arnopo
ARM: dts: stm32: Add virtio mmio device to the stm32mp157c-ed1 board
0a0db9c 
Added a virtio mmio device declaration in shared memory.

Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@namjaejeon @gregkh
ksmbd: replace one-element array with flex-array member in struct smb…
404e7c0 
…2_ea_info

commit 0ba5439 upstream.

UBSAN complains about out-of-bounds array indexes on 1-element arrays in
struct smb2_ea_info.

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:4335:15
index 1 is out of range for type 'char [1]'
CPU: 1 PID: 354 Comm: kworker/1:4 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc4 #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop
Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/22/2020
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88
 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106
 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:113
 ubsan_epilogue linux/lib/ubsan.c:217
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xc6/0x110 linux/lib/ubsan.c:348
 smb2_get_ea linux/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:4335
 smb2_get_info_file linux/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:4900
 smb2_query_info+0x63ae/0x6b20 linux/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:5275
 __process_request linux/fs/smb/server/server.c:145
 __handle_ksmbd_work linux/fs/smb/server/server.c:213
 handle_ksmbd_work+0x348/0x10b0 linux/fs/smb/server/server.c:266
 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1500 linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2597
 worker_thread+0xf3/0x13a0 linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2748
 kthread+0x2b7/0x390 linux/kernel/kthread.c:389
 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x90 linux/arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
 </TASK>

Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@naota @gregkh
btrfs: zoned: skip splitting and logical rewriting on pre-alloc write
d3cfa44 
[ Upstream commit c02d35d ]

When doing a relocation, there is a chance that at the time of
btrfs_reloc_clone_csums(), there is no checksum for the corresponding
region.

In this case, btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned()'s sum points to an invalid item
and so ordered_extent's logical is set to some invalid value. Then,
btrfs_lookup_block_group() in btrfs_zone_finish_endio() failed to find a
block group and will hit an assert or a null pointer dereference as
following.

This can be reprodcued by running btrfs/028 several times (e.g, 4 to 16
times) with a null_blk setup. The device's zone size and capacity is set to
32 MB and the storage size is set to 5 GB on my setup.

    KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f]
    CPU: 6 PID: 3105720 Comm: kworker/u16:13 Tainted: G        W          6.5.0-rc6-kts+ #1
    Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015
    Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
    RIP: 0010:btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs]
    Code: 41 54 49 89 fc 55 48 89 f5 53 e8 57 7d fc ff 48 8d b8 88 00 00 00 48 89 c3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
    > 3c 02 00 0f 85 02 01 00 00 f6 83 88 00 00 00 01 0f 84 a8 00 00
    RSP: 0018:ffff88833cf87b08 EFLAGS: 00010206
    RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000011 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000088
    RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102877b827
    R10: ffff888143bdc13b R11: ffff888125b1cbc0 R12: ffff888143bdc000
    R13: 0000000000007000 R14: ffff888125b1cba8 R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88881e500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00007f3ed85223d5 CR3: 00000001519b4005 CR4: 00000000001706e0
    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     ? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0
     ? exc_general_protection+0x148/0x220
     ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
     ? btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs]
     ? btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x19/0x160 [btrfs]
     btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x7b8/0x1de0 [btrfs]
     ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
     ? lock_release+0x47a/0x620
     ? btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned+0x59b/0x800 [btrfs]
     ? __pfx_btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x10/0x10 [btrfs]
     ? btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned+0x358/0x800 [btrfs]
     ? __smp_call_single_queue+0x124/0x350
     ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
     btrfs_work_helper+0x19f/0xc60 [btrfs]
     ? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10
     ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
     ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
     process_one_work+0x8c1/0x1430
     ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
     ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
     ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
     ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x52/0x60
     worker_thread+0x100/0x12c0
     ? __kthread_parkme+0xc1/0x1f0
     ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
     kthread+0x2ea/0x3c0
     ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
     ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
     ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
     ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
     </TASK>

On the zoned mode, writing to pre-allocated region means data relocation
write. Such write always uses WRITE command so there is no need of splitting
and rewriting logical address. Thus, we can just skip the function for the
case.

Fixes: cbfce4c ("btrfs: optimize the logical to physical mapping for zoned writes")
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@Waiman-Long @gregkh
refscale: Fix uninitalized use of wait_queue_head_t
70a2856 
[ Upstream commit f5063e8 ]

Running the refscale test occasionally crashes the kernel with the
following error:

[ 8569.952896] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffe8
[ 8569.952900] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 8569.952902] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 8569.952904] PGD c4b048067 P4D c4b049067 PUD c4b04b067 PMD 0
[ 8569.952910] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP NOPTI
[ 8569.952916] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R750/0WMWCR, BIOS 1.2.4 05/28/2021
[ 8569.952917] RIP: 0010:prepare_to_wait_event+0x101/0x190
  :
[ 8569.952940] Call Trace:
[ 8569.952941]  <TASK>
[ 8569.952944]  ref_scale_reader+0x380/0x4a0 [refscale]
[ 8569.952959]  kthread+0x10e/0x130
[ 8569.952966]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 8569.952973]  </TASK>

The likely cause is that init_waitqueue_head() is called after the call to
the torture_create_kthread() function that creates the ref_scale_reader
kthread.  Although this init_waitqueue_head() call will very likely
complete before this kthread is created and starts running, it is
possible that the calling kthread will be delayed between the calls to
torture_create_kthread() and init_waitqueue_head().  In this case, the
new kthread will use the waitqueue head before it is properly initialized,
which is not good for the kernel's health and well-being.

The above crash happened here:

	static inline void __add_wait_queue(...)
	{
		:
		if (!(wq->flags & WQ_FLAG_PRIORITY)) <=== Crash here

The offset of flags from list_head entry in wait_queue_entry is
-0x18. If reader_tasks[i].wq.head.next is NULL as allocated reader_task
structure is zero initialized, the instruction will try to access address
0xffffffffffffffe8, which is exactly the fault address listed above.

This commit therefore invokes init_waitqueue_head() before creating
the kthread.

Fixes: 653ed64 ("refperf: Add a test to measure performance of read-side synchronization")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@gregkh
regmap: rbtree: Use alloc_flags for memory allocations
bcec848 
[ Upstream commit 0c8b0bf ]

The kunit tests discovered a sleeping in atomic bug.  The allocations
in the regcache-rbtree code should use the map->alloc_flags instead of
GFP_KERNEL.

[    5.005510] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:306
[    5.005960] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 117, name: kunit_try_catch
[    5.006219] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[    5.006414] 1 lock held by kunit_try_catch/117:
[    5.006590]  #0: 833b9010 (regmap_kunit:86:(config)->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: regmap_lock_spinlock+0x14/0x1c
[    5.007493] irq event stamp: 162
[    5.007627] hardirqs last  enabled at (161): [<80786738>] crng_make_state+0x1a0/0x294
[    5.007871] hardirqs last disabled at (162): [<80c531ec>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0x80
[    5.008119] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<801110ac>] copy_process+0x810/0x2138
[    5.008356] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<00000000>] 0x0
[    5.008688] CPU: 0 PID: 117 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G                 N 6.4.4-rc3-g0e8d2fdfb188 #1
[    5.009011] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[    5.009277]  unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c
[    5.009497]  show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x5c
[    5.009676]  dump_stack_lvl from __might_resched+0x188/0x2d0
[    5.009860]  __might_resched from __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1dc/0x25c
[    5.010061]  __kmem_cache_alloc_node from kmalloc_trace+0x30/0xc8
[    5.010254]  kmalloc_trace from regcache_rbtree_write+0x26c/0x468
[    5.010446]  regcache_rbtree_write from _regmap_write+0x88/0x140
[    5.010634]  _regmap_write from regmap_write+0x44/0x68
[    5.010803]  regmap_write from basic_read_write+0x8c/0x270
[    5.010980]  basic_read_write from kunit_try_run_case+0x48/0xa0

Fixes: 28644c8 ("regmap: Add the rbtree cache support")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@dhowells @gregkh
crypto: af_alg - Fix missing initialisation affecting gcm-aes-s390
2c9d205 
[ Upstream commit 6a4b8aa ]

Fix af_alg_alloc_areq() to initialise areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl to point
to the scatterlist array in areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgl.

Without this, the gcm-aes-s390 driver will oops when it tries to do
gcm_walk_start() on req->dst because req->dst is set to the value of
areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgl by _aead_recvmsg() calling
aead_request_set_crypt().

The problem comes if an empty ciphertext is passed: the loop in
af_alg_get_rsgl() just passes straight out and doesn't set areq->first_rsgl
up.

This isn't a problem on x86_64 using gcmaes_crypt_by_sg() because, as far
as I can tell, that ignores req->dst and only uses req->src[*].

[*] Is this a bug in aesni-intel_glue.c?

The s390x oops looks something like:

 Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space
 Failing address: 0000000a00000000 TEID: 0000000a00000803
 Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
 AS:00000000a43a0007 R3:0000000000000024
 Oops: 003b ilc:2 [#1] SMP
 ...
 Call Trace:
  [<000003ff7fc3d47e>] gcm_walk_start+0x16/0x28 [aes_s390]
  [<00000000a2a342f2>] crypto_aead_decrypt+0x9a/0xb8
  [<00000000a2a60888>] aead_recvmsg+0x478/0x698
  [<00000000a2e519a0>] sock_recvmsg+0x70/0xb0
  [<00000000a2e51a56>] sock_read_iter+0x76/0xa0
  [<00000000a273e066>] vfs_read+0x26e/0x2a8
  [<00000000a273e8c4>] ksys_read+0xbc/0x100
  [<00000000a311d808>] __do_syscall+0x1d0/0x1f8
  [<00000000a312ff30>] system_call+0x70/0x98
 Last Breaking-Event-Address:
  [<000003ff7fc3e6b4>] gcm_aes_crypt+0x104/0xa68 [aes_s390]

Fixes: c1abe6f ("crypto: af_alg: Use extract_iter_to_sg() to create scatterlists")
Reported-by: Ondrej Mosnáček <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAAUqJDuRkHE8fPgZJGaKjUjd3QfGwzfumuJBmStPqBhubxyk_A@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>
cc: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
cc: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ondrej Mosnáček <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@iulia-tanasescu @gregkh
Bluetooth: ISO: Add support for connecting multiple BISes
2ccde10 
[ Upstream commit a0bfde1 ]

It is required for some configurations to have multiple BISes as part
of the same BIG.

Similar to the flow implemented for unicast, DEFER_SETUP will also be
used to bind multiple BISes for the same BIG, before starting Periodic
Advertising and creating the BIG.

The user will have to open a new socket for each BIS. By setting the
BT_DEFER_SETUP socket option and calling connect, a new connection
will be added for the BIG and advertising handle set by the socket
QoS parameters. Since all BISes will be bound for the same BIG and
advertising handle, the socket QoS options and base parameters should
match for all connections.

By calling connect on a socket that does not have the BT_DEFER_SETUP
option set, periodic advertising will be started and the BIG will
be created, with a BIS for each previously bound connection. Since
a BIG cannot be reconfigured with additional BISes after creation,
no more connections can be bound for the BIG after the start periodic
advertising and create BIG commands have been queued.

The bis_cleanup function has also been updated, so that the advertising
set and the BIG will not be terminated unless there are no more
bound or connected BISes.

The HCI_CONN_BIG_CREATED connection flag has been added to indicate
that the BIG has been successfully created. This flag is checked at
bis_cleanup, so that the BIG is only terminated if the
HCI_LE_Create_BIG_Complete has been received.

This implementation has been tested on hardware, using the "isotest"
tool with an additional command line option, to specify the number of
BISes to create as part of the desired BIG:

    tools/isotest -i hci0 -s 00:00:00:00:00:00 -N 2 -G 1 -T 1

The btmon log shows that a BIG containing 2 BISes has been created:

< HCI Command: LE Create Broadcast Isochronous Group (0x08|0x0068) plen 31
        Handle: 0x01
        Advertising Handle: 0x01
        Number of BIS: 2
        SDU Interval: 10000 us (0x002710)
        Maximum SDU size: 40
        Maximum Latency: 10 ms (0x000a)
        RTN: 0x02
        PHY: LE 2M (0x02)
        Packing: Sequential (0x00)
        Framing: Unframed (0x00)
        Encryption: 0x00
        Broadcast Code: 00000000000000000000000000000000

> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
      LE Create Broadcast Isochronous Group (0x08|0x0068) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 23
      LE Broadcast Isochronous Group Complete (0x1b)
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 0x01
        BIG Synchronization Delay: 1974 us (0x0007b6)
        Transport Latency: 1974 us (0x0007b6)
        PHY: LE 2M (0x02)
        NSE: 3
        BN: 1
        PTO: 1
        IRC: 3
        Maximum PDU: 40
        ISO Interval: 10.00 msec (0x0008)
        Connection Handle #0: 10
        Connection Handle #1: 11

< HCI Command: LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) plen 13
        Handle: 10
        Data Path Direction: Input (Host to Controller) (0x00)
        Data Path: HCI (0x00)
        Coding Format: Transparent (0x03)
        Company Codec ID: Ericsson Technology Licensing (0)
        Vendor Codec ID: 0
        Controller Delay: 0 us (0x000000)
        Codec Configuration Length: 0
        Codec Configuration:

> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6
      LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 10

< HCI Command: LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) plen 13
        Handle: 11
        Data Path Direction: Input (Host to Controller) (0x00)
        Data Path: HCI (0x00)
        Coding Format: Transparent (0x03)
        Company Codec ID: Ericsson Technology Licensing (0)
        Vendor Codec ID: 0
        Controller Delay: 0 us (0x000000)
        Codec Configuration Length: 0
        Codec Configuration:

> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6
      LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 11

< ISO Data TX: Handle 10 flags 0x02 dlen 44

< ISO Data TX: Handle 11 flags 0x02 dlen 44

> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 10
        Count: 1

> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 11
        Count: 1

Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Stable-dep-of: 7f74563 ("Bluetooth: ISO: do not emit new LE Create CIS if previous is pending")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@q2ven @gregkh
netrom: Deny concurrent connect().
2fec695 
[ Upstream commit c2f8fd7 ]

syzkaller reported null-ptr-deref [0] related to AF_NETROM.
This is another self-accept issue from the strace log. [1]

syz-executor creates an AF_NETROM socket and calls connect(), which
is blocked at that time.  Then, sk->sk_state is TCP_SYN_SENT and
sock->state is SS_CONNECTING.

  [pid  5059] socket(AF_NETROM, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0) = 4
  [pid  5059] connect(4, {sa_family=AF_NETROM, sa_data="..." <unfinished ...>

Another thread calls connect() concurrently, which finally fails
with -EINVAL.  However, the problem here is the socket state is
reset even while the first connect() is blocked.

  [pid  5060] connect(4, NULL, 0 <unfinished ...>
  [pid  5060] <... connect resumed>)      = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

As sk->state is TCP_CLOSE and sock->state is SS_UNCONNECTED, the
following listen() succeeds.  Then, the first connect() looks up
itself as a listener and puts skb into the queue with skb->sk itself.
As a result, the next accept() gets another FD of itself as 3, and
the first connect() finishes.

  [pid  5060] listen(4, 0 <unfinished ...>
  [pid  5060] <... listen resumed>)       = 0
  [pid  5060] accept(4, NULL, NULL <unfinished ...>
  [pid  5060] <... accept resumed>)       = 3
  [pid  5059] <... connect resumed>)      = 0

Then, accept4() is called but blocked, which causes the general protection
fault later.

  [pid  5059] accept4(4, NULL, 0x20000400, SOCK_NONBLOCK <unfinished ...>

After that, another self-accept occurs by accept() and writev().

  [pid  5060] accept(4, NULL, NULL <unfinished ...>
  [pid  5061] writev(3, [{iov_base=...}] <unfinished ...>
  [pid  5061] <... writev resumed>)       = 99
  [pid  5060] <... accept resumed>)       = 6

Finally, the leader thread close()s all FDs.  Since the three FDs
reference the same socket, nr_release() does the cleanup for it
three times, and the remaining accept4() causes the following fault.

  [pid  5058] close(3)                    = 0
  [pid  5058] close(4)                    = 0
  [pid  5058] close(5)                    = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
  [pid  5058] close(6)                    = 0
  [pid  5058] <... exit_group resumed>)   = ?
  [   83.456055][ T5059] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN

To avoid the issue, we need to return an error for connect() if
another connect() is in progress, as done in __inet_stream_connect().

[0]:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
CPU: 0 PID: 5059 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-syzkaller-00194-gace0ab3a4b54 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x109/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5012
Code: 45 85 c9 0f 84 cc 0e 00 00 44 8b 05 11 6e 23 0b 45 85 c0 0f 84 be 0d 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 11 00 0f 85 e8 40 00 00 49 81 3a a0 69 48 90 0f 84 96 0d 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003d6f9e0 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8880244c8000 RBX: 1ffff920007adf6c RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f51d519a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f51d5158d58 CR3: 000000002943f000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline]
 lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
 prepare_to_wait+0x47/0x380 kernel/sched/wait.c:269
 nr_accept+0x20d/0x650 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:798
 do_accept+0x3a6/0x570 net/socket.c:1872
 __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
 __sys_accept4+0x99/0x120 net/socket.c:1943
 __do_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1954 [inline]
 __se_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1951 [inline]
 __x64_sys_accept4+0x96/0x100 net/socket.c:1951
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f51d447cae9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f51d519a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000120
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f51d459bf80 RCX: 00007f51d447cae9
RDX: 0000000020000400 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f51d44c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000800 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f51d459bf80 R15: 00007ffc25c34e48
 </TASK>

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashLog&x=152cdb63a80000 [1]
Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=666c97e4686410e79649
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@robclark @gregkh
drm/msm/a6xx: Fix GMU lockdep splat
5a94f94 
[ Upstream commit 3136a0f ]

For normal GPU devfreq, we need to acquire the GMU lock while already
holding devfreq locks.  But in the teardown path, we were calling
dev_pm_domain_detach() while already holding the GMU lock, resulting in
this lockdep splat:

   ======================================================
   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.4.3-debug+ #3 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   ring0/391 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffffff80a025c078 (&devfreq->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: qos_notifier_call+0x30/0x74

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffffff809b8c1ce8 (&(c->notifiers)->rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x78

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> #4 (&(c->notifiers)->rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
          down_write+0x58/0x74
          __blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x64/0x84
          blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x1c/0x28
          freq_qos_add_notifier+0x5c/0x7c
          dev_pm_qos_add_notifier+0xd4/0xf0
          devfreq_add_device+0x42c/0x560
          devm_devfreq_add_device+0x6c/0xb8
          msm_devfreq_init+0xa8/0x16c [msm]
          msm_gpu_init+0x368/0x54c [msm]
          adreno_gpu_init+0x248/0x2b0 [msm]
          a6xx_gpu_init+0x2d0/0x384 [msm]
          adreno_bind+0x264/0x2bc [msm]
          component_bind_all+0x124/0x1f4
          msm_drm_bind+0x2d0/0x5f4 [msm]
          try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x88/0x1a4
          __component_add+0xd4/0x128
          component_add+0x1c/0x28
          dp_display_probe+0x37c/0x3c0 [msm]
          platform_probe+0x70/0xc0
          really_probe+0x148/0x280
          __driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x114
          driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100
          __device_attach_driver+0x64/0xdc
          bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd8
          __device_attach+0xe4/0x140
          device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
          bus_probe_device+0x44/0xb0
          deferred_probe_work_func+0xb0/0xc8
          process_one_work+0x288/0x3d8
          worker_thread+0x1f0/0x260
          kthread+0xf0/0x100
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #3 (dev_pm_qos_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x388
          mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x38
          dev_pm_qos_remove_notifier+0x3c/0xc8
          genpd_remove_device+0x40/0x11c
          genpd_dev_pm_detach+0x88/0x130
          dev_pm_domain_detach+0x2c/0x3c
          a6xx_gmu_remove+0x44/0xdc [msm]
          a6xx_destroy+0x7c/0xa4 [msm]
          adreno_unbind+0x50/0x64 [msm]
          component_unbind+0x44/0x64
          component_unbind_all+0xb4/0xbc
          msm_drm_uninit.isra.0+0x124/0x17c [msm]
          msm_drm_bind+0x340/0x5f4 [msm]
          try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x88/0x1a4
          __component_add+0xd4/0x128
          component_add+0x1c/0x28
          dp_display_probe+0x37c/0x3c0 [msm]
          platform_probe+0x70/0xc0
          really_probe+0x148/0x280
          __driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x114
          driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100
          __device_attach_driver+0x64/0xdc
          bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd8
          __device_attach+0xe4/0x140
          device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
          bus_probe_device+0x44/0xb0
          deferred_probe_work_func+0xb0/0xc8
          process_one_work+0x288/0x3d8
          worker_thread+0x1f0/0x260
          kthread+0xf0/0x100
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #2 (&a6xx_gpu->gmu.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x388
          mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x38
          a6xx_gpu_set_freq+0x38/0x64 [msm]
          msm_devfreq_target+0x170/0x18c [msm]
          devfreq_set_target+0x90/0x1e4
          devfreq_update_target+0xb4/0xf0
          update_devfreq+0x1c/0x28
          devfreq_monitor+0x3c/0x10c
          process_one_work+0x288/0x3d8
          worker_thread+0x1f0/0x260
          kthread+0xf0/0x100
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #1 (&df->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x388
          mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x38
          msm_devfreq_get_dev_status+0x4c/0x104 [msm]
          devfreq_simple_ondemand_func+0x5c/0x128
          devfreq_update_target+0x68/0xf0
          update_devfreq+0x1c/0x28
          devfreq_monitor+0x3c/0x10c
          process_one_work+0x288/0x3d8
          worker_thread+0x1f0/0x260
          kthread+0xf0/0x100
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #0 (&devfreq->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c
          lock_acquire+0x234/0x284
          __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x388
          mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x38
          qos_notifier_call+0x30/0x74
          qos_min_notifier_call+0x1c/0x28
          notifier_call_chain+0xf4/0x114
          blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x78
          pm_qos_update_target+0x184/0x190
          freq_qos_apply+0x4c/0x64
          apply_constraint+0xf8/0xfc
          __dev_pm_qos_update_request+0x138/0x164
          dev_pm_qos_update_request+0x44/0x68
          msm_devfreq_boost+0x40/0x70 [msm]
          msm_devfreq_active+0xc0/0xf0 [msm]
          msm_gpu_submit+0xc8/0x12c [msm]
          msm_job_run+0x88/0x128 [msm]
          drm_sched_main+0x240/0x324 [gpu_sched]
          kthread+0xf0/0x100
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   other info that might help us debug this:
   Chain exists of:
     &devfreq->lock --> dev_pm_qos_mtx --> &(c->notifiers)->rwsem
    Possible unsafe locking scenario:
          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     rlock(&(c->notifiers)->rwsem);
                                  lock(dev_pm_qos_mtx);
                                  lock(&(c->notifiers)->rwsem);
     lock(&devfreq->lock);

    *** DEADLOCK ***
   4 locks held by ring0/391:
    #0: ffffff809c811170 (&gpu->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msm_job_run+0x7c/0x128 [msm]
    #1: ffffff809c811208 (&gpu->active_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msm_gpu_submit+0xa8/0x12c [msm]
    #2: ffffffecbbb46600 (dev_pm_qos_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_pm_qos_update_request+0x38/0x68
    #3: ffffff809b8c1ce8 (&(c->notifiers)->rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x78

   stack backtrace:
   CPU: 6 PID: 391 Comm: ring0 Not tainted 6.4.3debug+ #3
   Hardware name: Google Villager (rev1+) with LTE (DT)
   Call trace:
    dump_backtrace+0xb4/0xf0
    show_stack+0x20/0x30
    dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84
    dump_stack+0x18/0x24
    print_circular_bug+0x1cc/0x234
    check_noncircular+0x78/0xac
    __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c
    lock_acquire+0x234/0x284
    __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x388
    mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x38
    qos_notifier_call+0x30/0x74
    qos_min_notifier_call+0x1c/0x28
    notifier_call_chain+0xf4/0x114
    blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x78
    pm_qos_update_target+0x184/0x190
    freq_qos_apply+0x4c/0x64
    apply_constraint+0xf8/0xfc
    __dev_pm_qos_update_request+0x138/0x164
    dev_pm_qos_update_request+0x44/0x68
    msm_devfreq_boost+0x40/0x70 [msm]
    msm_devfreq_active+0xc0/0xf0 [msm]
    msm_gpu_submit+0xc8/0x12c [msm]
    msm_job_run+0x88/0x128 [msm]
    drm_sched_main+0x240/0x324 [gpu_sched]
    kthread+0xf0/0x100
    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Fix this by only synchronizing access to gmu->initialized.

Fixes: 4cd15a3 ("drm/msm/a6xx: Make GPU destroy a bit safer")
Cc: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/551171/
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@htejun @gregkh
blk-cgroup: Fix NULL deref caused by blkg_policy_data being installed…
7d63c6f 
… before init

[ Upstream commit ec14a87 ]

blk-iocost sometimes causes the following crash:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000e0
  ...
  RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x30
  Code: be 01 02 00 00 e8 79 38 39 ff 31 d2 89 d0 5d c3 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 65 ff 05 48 d0 34 7e b9 01 00 00 00 31 c0 <f0> 0f b1 0f 75 02 5d c3 89 c6 e8 ea 04 00 00 5d c3 0f 1f 84 00 00
  RSP: 0018:ffffc900023b3d40 EFLAGS: 00010046
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000000e0 RCX: 0000000000000001
  RDX: ffffc900023b3d20 RSI: ffffc900023b3cf0 RDI: 00000000000000e0
  RBP: ffffc900023b3d40 R08: ffffc900023b3c10 R09: 0000000000000003
  R10: 0000000000000064 R11: 000000000000000a R12: ffff888102337000
  R13: fffffffffffffff2 R14: ffff88810af408c8 R15: ffff8881070c3600
  FS:  00007faaaf364fc0(0000) GS:ffff88842fdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00000000000000e0 CR3: 00000001097b1000 CR4: 0000000000350ea0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ioc_weight_write+0x13d/0x410
   cgroup_file_write+0x7a/0x130
   kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf5/0x170
   vfs_write+0x298/0x370
   ksys_write+0x5f/0xb0
   __x64_sys_write+0x1b/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

This happens because iocg->ioc is NULL. The field is initialized by
ioc_pd_init() and never cleared. The NULL deref is caused by
blkcg_activate_policy() installing blkg_policy_data before initializing it.

blkcg_activate_policy() was doing the following:

1. Allocate pd's for all existing blkg's and install them in blkg->pd[].
2. Initialize all pd's.
3. Online all pd's.

blkcg_activate_policy() only grabs the queue_lock and may release and
re-acquire the lock as allocation may need to sleep. ioc_weight_write()
grabs blkcg->lock and iterates all its blkg's. The two can race and if
ioc_weight_write() runs during #1 or between #1 and #2, it can encounter a
pd which is not initialized yet, leading to crash.

The crash can be reproduced with the following script:

  #!/bin/bash

  echo +io > /sys/fs/cgroup/cgroup.subtree_control
  systemd-run --unit touch-sda --scope dd if=/dev/sda of=/dev/null bs=1M count=1 iflag=direct
  echo 100 > /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/io.weight
  bash -c "echo '8:0 enable=1' > /sys/fs/cgroup/io.cost.qos" &
  sleep .2
  echo 100 > /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/io.weight

with the following patch applied:

> diff --git a/block/blk-cgroup.c b/block/blk-cgroup.c
> index fc49be622e05..38d671d5e10c 100644
> --- a/block/blk-cgroup.c
> +++ b/block/blk-cgroup.c
> @@ -1553,6 +1553,12 @@ int blkcg_activate_policy(struct gendisk *disk, const struct blkcg_policy *pol)
> 		pd->online = false;
> 	}
>
> +       if (system_state == SYSTEM_RUNNING) {
> +               spin_unlock_irq(&q->queue_lock);
> +               ssleep(1);
> +               spin_lock_irq(&q->queue_lock);
> +       }
> +
> 	/* all allocated, init in the same order */
> 	if (pol->pd_init_fn)
> 		list_for_each_entry_reverse(blkg, &q->blkg_list, q_node)

I don't see a reason why all pd's should be allocated, initialized and
onlined together. The only ordering requirement is that parent blkgs to be
initialized and onlined before children, which is guaranteed from the
walking order. Let's fix the bug by allocating, initializing and onlining pd
for each blkg and holding blkcg->lock over initialization and onlining. This
ensures that an installed blkg is always fully initialized and onlined
removing the the race window.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Fixes: 9d179b8 ("blkcg: Fix multiple bugs in blkcg_activate_policy()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@rleon @gregkh
Revert "IB/isert: Fix incorrect release of isert connection"
a318934 
[ Upstream commit dfe2611 ]

Commit: 699826f ("IB/isert: Fix incorrect release of isert connection") is
causing problems on OPA when DEVICE_REMOVAL is happening.

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 52 PID: 2117247 at drivers/infiniband/core/cq.c:359
ib_cq_pool_cleanup+0xac/0xb0 [ib_core]
 Modules linked in: nfsd nfs_acl target_core_user uio tcm_fc libfc
scsi_transport_fc tcm_loop target_core_pscsi target_core_iblock target_core_file
rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs
rfkill rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_srpt sunrpc ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod
opa_vnic ib_iser libiscsi ib_umad scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm
ib_cm hfi1(-) rdmavt ib_uverbs intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sb_edac ib_core
x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp i2c_i801 mxm_wmi rapl iTCO_wdt
ipmi_si iTCO_vendor_support mei_me ipmi_devintf mei intel_cstate ioatdma
intel_uncore i2c_smbus joydev pcspkr lpc_ich ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter
acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c sr_mod sd_mod cdrom t10_pi sg crct10dif_pclmul
crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel drm_kms_helper drm_shmem_helper ahci libahci
ghash_clmulni_intel igb drm libata dca i2c_algo_bit wmi fuse
 CPU: 52 PID: 2117247 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1+ #1
 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CWR/S2600CW, BIOS
SE5C610.86B.01.01.0014.121820151719 12/18/2015
 RIP: 0010:ib_cq_pool_cleanup+0xac/0xb0 [ib_core]
 Code: ff 48 8b 43 40 48 8d 7b 40 48 83 e8 40 4c 39 e7 75 b3 49 83
c4 10 4d 39 fc 75 94 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b eb a1
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f
 RSP: 0018:ffffc10bea13fc80 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: 000000000000010c RBX: ffff9bf5c7e66c00 RCX: 000000008020001d
 RDX: 000000008020001e RSI: fffff175221f9900 RDI: ffff9bf5c7e67640
 RBP: ffff9bf5c7e67600 R08: ffff9bf5c7e64400 R09: 000000008020001d
 R10: 0000000040000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9bee4b1e8a18
 R13: dead000000000122 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff9bee4b1e8a38
 FS:  00007ff1e6d38740(0000) GS:ffff9bfd9fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00005652044ecc68 CR3: 0000000889b5c005 CR4: 00000000001706e0
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __warn+0x80/0x130
  ? ib_cq_pool_cleanup+0xac/0xb0 [ib_core]
  ? report_bug+0x195/0x1a0
  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
  ? ib_cq_pool_cleanup+0xac/0xb0 [ib_core]
  disable_device+0x9d/0x160 [ib_core]
  __ib_unregister_device+0x42/0xb0 [ib_core]
  ib_unregister_device+0x22/0x30 [ib_core]
  rvt_unregister_device+0x20/0x90 [rdmavt]
  hfi1_unregister_ib_device+0x16/0xf0 [hfi1]
  remove_one+0x55/0x1a0 [hfi1]
  pci_device_remove+0x36/0xa0
  device_release_driver_internal+0x193/0x200
  driver_detach+0x44/0x90
  bus_remove_driver+0x69/0xf0
  pci_unregister_driver+0x2a/0xb0
  hfi1_mod_cleanup+0xc/0x3c [hfi1]
  __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x17a/0x2f0
  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc4/0xd0
  ? syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x126/0x1a0
  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
  ? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130
  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
  ? exc_page_fault+0x65/0x150
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff1e643f5ab
 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3
66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0
ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 45 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
 RSP: 002b:00007ffec9103cc8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005615267fdc50 RCX: 00007ff1e643f5ab
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005615267fdcb8
 RBP: 00005615267fdc50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007ff1e659eac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00005615267fdcb8
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005615267fdcb8 R15: 00007ffec9105ff8
  </TASK>
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And...

 restrack: ------------[ cut here ]------------
 infiniband hfi1_0: BUG: RESTRACK detected leak of resources
 restrack: Kernel PD object allocated by ib_isert is not freed
 restrack: Kernel CQ object allocated by ib_core is not freed
 restrack: Kernel QP object allocated by rdma_cm is not freed
 restrack: ------------[ cut here ]------------

Fixes: 699826f ("IB/isert: Fix incorrect release of isert connection")
Reported-by: Dennis Dalessandro <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a27982d3235005c58f6d321f3fad5eb6e1beaf9e.1692604607.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Tested-by: Dennis Dalessandro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@gregkh
rcu: dump vmalloc memory info safely
8fb1601 
commit c83ad36 upstream.

Currently, for double invoke call_rcu(), will dump rcu_head objects memory
info, if the objects is not allocated from the slab allocator, the
vmalloc_dump_obj() will be invoke and the vmap_area_lock spinlock need to
be held, since the call_rcu() can be invoked in interrupt context,
therefore, there is a possibility of spinlock deadlock scenarios.

And in Preempt-RT kernel, the rcutorture test also trigger the following
lockdep warning:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1
3 locks held by swapper/0/1:
 #0: ffffffffb534ee80 (fullstop_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: torture_init_begin+0x24/0xa0
 #1: ffffffffb5307940 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_torture_init+0x1ec7/0x2370
 #2: ffffffffb536af40 (vmap_area_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_vmap_area+0x1f/0x70
irq event stamp: 565512
hardirqs last  enabled at (565511): [<ffffffffb379b138>] __call_rcu_common+0x218/0x940
hardirqs last disabled at (565512): [<ffffffffb5804262>] rcu_torture_init+0x20b2/0x2370
softirqs last  enabled at (399112): [<ffffffffb36b2586>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x126/0x170
softirqs last disabled at (399106): [<ffffffffb43fef59>] inet_register_protosw+0x9/0x1d0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffffb58040c3>] rcu_torture_init+0x1f13/0x2370
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W          6.5.0-rc4-rt2-yocto-preempt-rt+ torvalds#15
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xb0
 dump_stack+0x14/0x20
 __might_resched+0x1aa/0x280
 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_err_cb+0x10/0x10
 rt_spin_lock+0x53/0x130
 ? find_vmap_area+0x1f/0x70
 find_vmap_area+0x1f/0x70
 vmalloc_dump_obj+0x20/0x60
 mem_dump_obj+0x22/0x90
 __call_rcu_common+0x5bf/0x940
 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30
 call_rcu_hurry+0x14/0x20
 rcu_torture_init+0x1f82/0x2370
 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_leak_cb+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_leak_cb+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_init+0x10/0x10
 do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x300
 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30
 kernel_init_freeable+0x2b9/0x540
 ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
 kernel_init+0x1f/0x150
 ret_from_fork+0x40/0x50
 ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
 </TASK>

The previous patch fixes this by using the deadlock-safe best-effort
version of find_vm_area.  However, in case of failure print the fact that
the pointer was a vmalloc pointer so that we print at least something.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 98f1808 ("mm: Make mem_dump_obj() handle vmalloc() memory")
Signed-off-by: Zqiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhen Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@krisman @gregkh
io_uring: Don't set affinity on a dying sqpoll thread
d250339 
commit bd6fc5d upstream.

Syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref of sqd->thread inside
io_sqpoll_wq_cpu_affinity.  It turns out the sqd->thread can go away
from under us during io_uring_register, in case the process gets a
fatal signal during io_uring_register.

It is not particularly hard to hit the race, and while I am not sure
this is the exact case hit by syzbot, it solves it.  Finally, checking
->thread is enough to close the race because we locked sqd while
"parking" the thread, thus preventing it from going away.

I reproduced it fairly consistently with a program that does:

int main(void) {
  ...
  io_uring_queue_init(RING_LEN, &ring1, IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL);
  while (1) {
    io_uring_register_iowq_aff(ring, 1, &mask);
  }
}

Executed in a loop with timeout to trigger SIGTERM:
  while true; do timeout 1 /a.out ; done

This will hit the following BUG() in very few attempts.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000007a8
PGD 800000010e949067 P4D 800000010e949067 PUD 10e46e067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 15715 Comm: dead-sqpoll Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-next-20230825-g193296236fa0-dirty torvalds#23
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:io_sqpoll_wq_cpu_affinity+0x27/0x70
Code: 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 53 48 8b 9f 98 03 00 00 48 85 db 74 4f
48 89 df 48 89 f5 e8 e2 f8 ff ff 48 8b 43 38 48 85 c0 74 22 <48> 8b b8
a8 07 00 00 48 89 ee e8 ba b1 00 00 48 89 df 89 c5 e8 70
RSP: 0018:ffffb04040ea7e70 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93c010749e40 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa7653331 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffb04040ea7eb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff
R10: ffff93c01141b600 R11: ffffb04040ea7d18 R12: ffff93c00ea74840
R13: 0000000000000011 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff93c00ea74800
FS:  00007fb7c276ab80(0000) GS:ffff93c36f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000007a8 CR3: 0000000111634003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
 ? page_fault_oops+0x154/0x440
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x174/0x7b0
 ? exc_page_fault+0x63/0x140
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
 ? io_sqpoll_wq_cpu_affinity+0x27/0x70
 __io_register_iowq_aff+0x2b/0x60
 __io_uring_register+0x614/0xa70
 __x64_sys_io_uring_register+0xaa/0x1a0
 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
RIP: 0033:0x7fb7c226fec9
Code: 2e 00 b8 ca 00 00 00 0f 05 eb a5 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 97 7f 2d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe2c0674f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001ab
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb7c226fec9
RDX: 00007ffe2c067530 RSI: 0000000000000011 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffe2c0675d0 R08: 00007ffe2c067550 R09: 00007ffe2c067550
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffe2c067750 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 00000000000007a8
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: ebdfefc ("io_uring/sqpoll: fix io-wq affinity when IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is used")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@acmel @gregkh
perf trace: Really free the evsel->priv area
27f396f 
[ Upstream commit 7962ef1 ]

In 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in
evsel->priv") it only was freeing if strcmp(evsel->tp_format->system,
"syscalls") returned zero, while the corresponding initialization of
evsel->priv was being performed if it was _not_ zero, i.e. if the tp
system wasn't 'syscalls'.

Just stop looking for that and free it if evsel->priv was set, which
should be equivalent.

Also use the pre-existing evsel_trace__delete() function.

This resolves these leaks, detected with:

  $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin

  =================================================================
  ==481565==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      torvalds#6 0x540e8b in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3212
      torvalds#7 0x540e8b in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      torvalds#8 0x540e8b in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      torvalds#9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      torvalds#10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      torvalds#11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      torvalds#12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      torvalds#13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      torvalds#6 0x540dd1 in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3205
      torvalds#7 0x540dd1 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      torvalds#8 0x540dd1 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      torvalds#9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      torvalds#10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      torvalds#11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      torvalds#12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      torvalds#13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  [root@quaco ~]#

With this we plug all leaks with "perf trace sleep 1".

Fixes: 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv")
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@acmel @gregkh
perf top: Don't pass an ERR_PTR() directly to perf_session__delete()
6b66e3a 
[ Upstream commit ef23cb5 ]

While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an
available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling:

	perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1))

Resulting in:

  (gdb) run lock contention
  Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention
  [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
  Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1".
  failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory  (try 'perf record' first)
  Initializing perf session failed

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  2858		if (!session->auxtrace)
  (gdb) p session
  $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  #1  0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300
  #2  0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161
  #3  0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604
  #4  0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322
  #5  0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375
  torvalds#6  0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419
  torvalds#7  0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535
  (gdb)

So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error
as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported.

The same problem was found in 'perf top' after an audit of all
perf_session__new() failure handling.

Fixes: 6ef81c5 ("perf session: Return error code for perf_session__new() function on failure")
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeremie Galarneau <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kate Stewart <[email protected]>
Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <[email protected]>
Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]>
Cc: Nageswara R Sastry <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc: Shawn Landden <[email protected]>
Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@acmel @gregkh
perf lock: Don't pass an ERR_PTR() directly to perf_session__delete()
b122650 
[ Upstream commit abaf1e0 ]

While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an
available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling:

	perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1))

Resulting in:

  (gdb) run lock contention
  Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention
  [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
  Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1".
  failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory  (try 'perf record' first)
  Initializing perf session failed

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  2858		if (!session->auxtrace)
  (gdb) p session
  $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  #1  0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300
  #2  0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161
  #3  0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604
  #4  0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322
  #5  0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375
  torvalds#6  0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419
  torvalds#7  0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535
  (gdb)

So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error
as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported.

Fixes: eef4fee ("perf lock: Dynamically allocate lockhash_table")
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Leo Yan <[email protected]>
Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
Cc: Yang Jihong <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@gregkh
net/handshake: fix null-ptr-deref in handshake_nl_done_doit()
93d69f1 
[ Upstream commit 82ba0ff ]

We should not call trace_handshake_cmd_done_err() if socket lookup has failed.

Also we should call trace_handshake_cmd_done_err() before releasing the file,
otherwise dereferencing sock->sk can return garbage.

This also reverts 7afc6d0 ("net/handshake: Fix uninitialized local variable")

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff800000000003
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000005
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[dfff800000000003] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5986 Comm: syz-executor292 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-gfe4469582053 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : handshake_nl_done_doit+0x198/0x9c8 net/handshake/netlink.c:193
lr : handshake_nl_done_doit+0x180/0x9c8
sp : ffff800096e37180
x29: ffff800096e37200 x28: 1ffff00012dc6e34 x27: dfff800000000000
x26: ffff800096e373d0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000ffffffa8
x23: ffff800096e373f0 x22: 1ffff00012dc6e38 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff800096e371c0 x19: 0000000000000018 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff800080516cc4 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1fffe0001b14aa3b x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000003
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : ffff800080afe47c x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800080a88078
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 00000000ffffffa8 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
handshake_nl_done_doit+0x198/0x9c8 net/handshake/netlink.c:193
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:970 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1050 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x96c/0xc50 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1067
netlink_rcv_skb+0x214/0x3c4 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2549
genl_rcv+0x38/0x50 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1078
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x660/0x8d4 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
netlink_sendmsg+0x834/0xb18 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1914
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:748 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x56c/0x840 net/socket.c:2494
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2548 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x26c/0x33c net/socket.c:2577
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x80/0x94 net/socket.c:2584
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
el0_svc+0x58/0x16c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Code: 12800108 b90043e8 910062b3 d343fe68 (387b6908)

Fixes: 3b3009e ("net/handshake: Create a NETLINK service for handling handshake requests")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@gregkh
bpf: bpf_sk_storage: Fix invalid wait context lockdep report
300415c 
[ Upstream commit a96a44a ]

'./test_progs -t test_local_storage' reported a splat:

[   27.137569] =============================
[   27.138122] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[   27.138650] 6.5.0-03980-gd11ae1b16b0a torvalds#247 Tainted: G           O
[   27.139542] -----------------------------
[   27.140106] test_progs/1729 is trying to lock:
[   27.140713] ffff8883ef047b88 (stock_lock){-.-.}-{3:3}, at: local_lock_acquire+0x9/0x130
[   27.141834] other info that might help us debug this:
[   27.142437] context-{5:5}
[   27.142856] 2 locks held by test_progs/1729:
[   27.143352]  #0: ffffffff84bcd9c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x4/0x40
[   27.144492]  #1: ffff888107deb2c0 (&storage->lock){..-.}-{2:2}, at: bpf_local_storage_update+0x39e/0x8e0
[   27.145855] stack backtrace:
[   27.146274] CPU: 0 PID: 1729 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G           O       6.5.0-03980-gd11ae1b16b0a torvalds#247
[   27.147550] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   27.149127] Call Trace:
[   27.149490]  <TASK>
[   27.149867]  dump_stack_lvl+0x130/0x1d0
[   27.152609]  dump_stack+0x14/0x20
[   27.153131]  __lock_acquire+0x1657/0x2220
[   27.153677]  lock_acquire+0x1b8/0x510
[   27.157908]  local_lock_acquire+0x29/0x130
[   27.159048]  obj_cgroup_charge+0xf4/0x3c0
[   27.160794]  slab_pre_alloc_hook+0x28e/0x2b0
[   27.161931]  __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x51/0x210
[   27.163557]  __kmalloc+0xaa/0x210
[   27.164593]  bpf_map_kzalloc+0xbc/0x170
[   27.165147]  bpf_selem_alloc+0x130/0x510
[   27.166295]  bpf_local_storage_update+0x5aa/0x8e0
[   27.167042]  bpf_fd_sk_storage_update_elem+0xdb/0x1a0
[   27.169199]  bpf_map_update_value+0x415/0x4f0
[   27.169871]  map_update_elem+0x413/0x550
[   27.170330]  __sys_bpf+0x5e9/0x640
[   27.174065]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x80/0x90
[   27.174568]  do_syscall_64+0x48/0xa0
[   27.175201]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[   27.175932] RIP: 0033:0x7effb40e41ad
[   27.176357] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d8
[   27.179028] RSP: 002b:00007ffe64c21fc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[   27.180088] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe64c22768 RCX: 00007effb40e41ad
[   27.181082] RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 00007ffe64c22008 RDI: 0000000000000002
[   27.182030] RBP: 00007ffe64c21ff0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffe64c22788
[   27.183038] R10: 0000000000000064 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
[   27.184006] R13: 00007ffe64c22788 R14: 00007effb42a1000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   27.184958]  </TASK>

It complains about acquiring a local_lock while holding a raw_spin_lock.
It means it should not allocate memory while holding a raw_spin_lock
since it is not safe for RT.

raw_spin_lock is needed because bpf_local_storage supports tracing
context. In particular for task local storage, it is easy to
get a "current" task PTR_TO_BTF_ID in tracing bpf prog.
However, task (and cgroup) local storage has already been moved to
bpf mem allocator which can be used after raw_spin_lock.

The splat is for the sk storage. For sk (and inode) storage,
it has not been moved to bpf mem allocator. Using raw_spin_lock or not,
kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) could theoretically be unsafe in tracing context.
However, the local storage helper requires a verifier accepted
sk pointer (PTR_TO_BTF_ID), it is hypothetical if that (mean running
a bpf prog in a kzalloc unsafe context and also able to hold a verifier
accepted sk pointer) could happen.

This patch avoids kzalloc after raw_spin_lock to silent the splat.
There is an existing kzalloc before the raw_spin_lock. At that point,
a kzalloc is very likely required because a lookup has just been done
before. Thus, this patch always does the kzalloc before acquiring
the raw_spin_lock and remove the later kzalloc usage after the
raw_spin_lock. After this change, it will have a charge and then
uncharge during the syscall bpf_map_update_elem() code path.
This patch opts for simplicity and not continue the old
optimization to save one charge and uncharge.

This issue is dated back to the very first commit of bpf_sk_storage
which had been refactored multiple times to create task, inode, and
cgroup storage. This patch uses a Fixes tag with a more recent
commit that should be easier to do backport.

Fixes: b00fa38 ("bpf: Enable non-atomic allocations in local storage")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@walac @gregkh
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: avoid OOB read
a3d0f89 
[ Upstream commit f4f8a78 ]

The opt_num field is controlled by user mode and is not currently
validated inside the kernel. An attacker can take advantage of this to
trigger an OOB read and potentially leak information.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88804bc64272 by task poc/6431

CPU: 1 PID: 6431 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #1
Call Trace:
 nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88
 nf_osf_find+0x186/0x2f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:281
 nft_osf_eval+0x37f/0x590 net/netfilter/nft_osf.c:47
 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:214
 nft_do_chain+0x2b0/0x1490 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:264
 nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x17c/0x1f0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
 [..]

Also add validation to genre, subtype and version fields.

Fixes: 11eeef4 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match")
Reported-by: Lucas Leong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@ummakynes @gregkh
netfilter: nf_tables: Unbreak audit log reset
ef81e45 
[ Upstream commit 9b5ba5c ]

Deliver audit log from __nf_tables_dump_rules(), table dereference at
the end of the table list loop might point to the list head, leading to
this crash.

[ 4137.407349] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000001f3c50
[ 4137.407357] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 4137.407359] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 4137.407360] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 4137.407363] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 4137.407365] CPU: 4 PID: 500177 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.5.0+ torvalds#277
[ 4137.407369] RIP: 0010:string+0x49/0xd0
[ 4137.407374] Code: ff 77 36 45 89 d1 31 f6 49 01 f9 66 45 85 d2 75 19 eb 1e 49 39 f8 76 02 88 07 48 83 c7 01 83 c6 01 48 83 c2 01 4c 39 cf 74 07 <0f> b6 02 84 c0 75 e2 4c 89 c2 e9 58 e5 ff ff 48 c7 c0 0e b2 ff 81
[ 4137.407377] RSP: 0018:ffff8881179737f0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 4137.407379] RAX: 00000000001f2c50 RBX: ffff888117973848 RCX: ffff0a00ffffff04
[ 4137.407380] RDX: 00000000001f3c50 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 4137.407381] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[ 4137.407383] R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: ffff88813584d200 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 4137.407384] R13: ffffffffa15cf709 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffa15cf709
[ 4137.407385] FS:  00007fcfc18bb580(0000) GS:ffff88840e700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 4137.407387] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 4137.407388] CR2: 00000000001f3c50 CR3: 00000001055b2001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
[ 4137.407390] Call Trace:
[ 4137.407392]  <TASK>
[ 4137.407393]  ? __die+0x1b/0x60
[ 4137.407397]  ? page_fault_oops+0x6b/0xa0
[ 4137.407399]  ? exc_page_fault+0x60/0x120
[ 4137.407403]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 4137.407408]  ? string+0x49/0xd0
[ 4137.407410]  vsnprintf+0x257/0x4f0
[ 4137.407414]  kvasprintf+0x3e/0xb0
[ 4137.407417]  kasprintf+0x3e/0x50
[ 4137.407419]  nf_tables_dump_rules+0x1c0/0x360 [nf_tables]
[ 4137.407439]  ? __alloc_skb+0xc3/0x170
[ 4137.407442]  netlink_dump+0x170/0x330
[ 4137.407447]  __netlink_dump_start+0x227/0x300
[ 4137.407449]  nf_tables_getrule+0x205/0x390 [nf_tables]

Deliver audit log only once at the end of the rule dump+reset for
consistency with the set dump+reset.

Ensure audit reset access to table under rcu read side lock. The table
list iteration holds rcu read lock side, but recent audit code
dereferences table object out of the rcu read lock side.

Fixes: ea078ae ("netfilter: nf_tables: Audit log rule reset")
Fixes: 7e9be11 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Audit log setelem reset")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Phil Sutter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@LiBaokun96 @gregkh
ext4: fix slab-use-after-free in ext4_es_insert_extent()
c15bf33 
commit 768d612 upstream.

Yikebaer reported an issue:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_es_insert_extent+0xc68/0xcb0
fs/ext4/extents_status.c:894
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888112ecc1a4 by task syz-executor/8438

CPU: 1 PID: 8438 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5 #1
Call Trace:
 [...]
 kasan_report+0xba/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
 ext4_es_insert_extent+0xc68/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:894
 ext4_map_blocks+0x92a/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:680
 ext4_alloc_file_blocks.isra.0+0x2df/0xb70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4462
 ext4_zero_range fs/ext4/extents.c:4622 [inline]
 ext4_fallocate+0x251c/0x3ce0 fs/ext4/extents.c:4721
 [...]

Allocated by task 8438:
 [...]
 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:693 [inline]
 __es_alloc_extent fs/ext4/extents_status.c:469 [inline]
 ext4_es_insert_extent+0x672/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:873
 ext4_map_blocks+0x92a/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:680
 ext4_alloc_file_blocks.isra.0+0x2df/0xb70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4462
 ext4_zero_range fs/ext4/extents.c:4622 [inline]
 ext4_fallocate+0x251c/0x3ce0 fs/ext4/extents.c:4721
 [...]

Freed by task 8438:
 [...]
 kmem_cache_free+0xec/0x490 mm/slub.c:3823
 ext4_es_try_to_merge_right fs/ext4/extents_status.c:593 [inline]
 __es_insert_extent+0x9f4/0x1440 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:802
 ext4_es_insert_extent+0x2ca/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:882
 ext4_map_blocks+0x92a/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:680
 ext4_alloc_file_blocks.isra.0+0x2df/0xb70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4462
 ext4_zero_range fs/ext4/extents.c:4622 [inline]
 ext4_fallocate+0x251c/0x3ce0 fs/ext4/extents.c:4721
 [...]
==================================================================

The flow of issue triggering is as follows:
1. remove es
      raw es               es  removed  es1
|-------------------| -> |----|.......|------|

2. insert es
  es   insert   es1      merge with es  es1     merge with es and free es1
|----|.......|------| -> |------------|------| -> |-------------------|

es merges with newes, then merges with es1, frees es1, then determines
if es1->es_len is 0 and triggers a UAF.

The code flow is as follows:
ext4_es_insert_extent
  es1 = __es_alloc_extent(true);
  es2 = __es_alloc_extent(true);
  __es_remove_extent(inode, lblk, end, NULL, es1)
    __es_insert_extent(inode, &newes, es1) ---> insert es1 to es tree
  __es_insert_extent(inode, &newes, es2)
    ext4_es_try_to_merge_right
      ext4_es_free_extent(inode, es1) --->  es1 is freed
  if (es1 && !es1->es_len)
    // Trigger UAF by determining if es1 is used.

We determine whether es1 or es2 is used immediately after calling
__es_remove_extent() or __es_insert_extent() to avoid triggering a
UAF if es1 or es2 is freed.

Reported-by: Yikebaer Aizezi <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALcu4raD4h9coiyEBL4Bm0zjDwxC2CyPiTwsP3zFuhot6y9Beg@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 2a69c45 ("ext4: using nofail preallocation in ext4_es_insert_extent()")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@gregkh
f2fs: flush inode if atomic file is aborted
bfa7853 
commit a3ab557 upstream.

Let's flush the inode being aborted atomic operation to avoid stale dirty
inode during eviction in this call stack:

  f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync+0x22/0x40 [f2fs]
  f2fs_abort_atomic_write+0xc4/0xf0 [f2fs]
  f2fs_evict_inode+0x3f/0x690 [f2fs]
  ? sugov_start+0x140/0x140
  evict+0xc3/0x1c0
  evict_inodes+0x17b/0x210
  generic_shutdown_super+0x32/0x120
  kill_block_super+0x21/0x50
  deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x90
  cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160
  task_work_run+0x59/0x90
  do_exit+0x33b/0xa50
  do_group_exit+0x2d/0x80
  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

This triggers f2fs_bug_on() in f2fs_evict_inode:
 f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE));

This fixes the syzbot report:

loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:869!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 5014 Comm: syz-executor220 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-11479-g6cd06ab12d1a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000
R13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:665
 dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:698
 evict_inodes+0x345/0x440 fs/inode.c:748
 generic_shutdown_super+0xaf/0x480 fs/super.c:478
 kill_block_super+0x64/0xb0 fs/super.c:1417
 kill_f2fs_super+0x2af/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4704
 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x160 fs/super.c:330
 deactivate_super+0xb1/0xd0 fs/super.c:361
 cleanup_mnt+0x2ae/0x3d0 fs/namespace.c:1254
 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0xa9a/0x29a0 kernel/exit.c:874
 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1024
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1033 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1033
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f309be71a09
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f309be719df.
RSP: 002b:00007fff171df518 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f309bef7330 RCX: 00007f309be71a09
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 00007f309bef1e40
R10: 0000000000010600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f309bef7330
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000
R13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0

Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@josefbacik @gregkh
btrfs: set page extent mapped after read_folio in relocate_one_page
9d1e020 
commit e7f1326 upstream.

One of the CI runs triggered the following panic

  assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229!
  Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 0 PID: 923660 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #1
  pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
  lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
  sp : ffff800093213720
  x29: ffff800093213720 x28: ffff8000932138b4 x27: 000000000c280000
  x26: 00000001b5d00000 x25: 000000000c281000 x24: 000000000c281fff
  x23: 0000000000001000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff42b95bf880
  x20: ffff42b9528e0000 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
  x17: 667274622f736620 x16: 6e69202c65746176 x15: 0000000000000028
  x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 00000000002672d7 x12: 0000000000000000
  x11: ffffcd3f0ccd9204 x10: ffffcd3f0554ae50 x9 : ffffcd3f0379528c
  x8 : ffff800093213428 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffcd3f091771e8
  x5 : ffff42b97f333948 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff42b9556cde80 x0 : 000000000000004f
  Call trace:
   btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
   btrfs_subpage_set_dirty+0x38/0xa0
   btrfs_page_set_dirty+0x58/0x88
   relocate_one_page+0x204/0x5f0
   relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x11c/0x180
   relocate_data_extent+0xd0/0xf8
   relocate_block_group+0x3d0/0x4e8
   btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2d8/0x490
   btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x54/0x1a8
   btrfs_balance+0x7f4/0x1150
   btrfs_ioctl+0x10f0/0x20b8
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x120/0x11d8
   invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8
   do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x158
   el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
   el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
  Code: 91098021 b0007fa0 91346000 97e9c6d2 (d4210000)

This is the same problem outlined in 17b17fc ("btrfs:
set_page_extent_mapped after read_folio in btrfs_cont_expand") , and the
fix is the same.  I originally looked for the same pattern elsewhere in
our code, but mistakenly skipped over this code because I saw the page
cache readahead before we set_page_extent_mapped, not realizing that
this was only in the !page case, that we can still end up with a
!uptodate page and then do the btrfs_read_folio further down.

The fix here is the same as the above mentioned patch, move the
set_page_extent_mapped call to after the btrfs_read_folio() block to
make sure that we have the subpage blocksize stuff setup properly before
using the page.

CC: [email protected] # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: SVM: Get source vCPUs from source VM for SEV-ES intrahost migration
2ee4b18 
commit f1187ef upstream.

Fix a goof where KVM tries to grab source vCPUs from the destination VM
when doing intrahost migration.  Grabbing the wrong vCPU not only hoses
the guest, it also crashes the host due to the VMSA pointer being left
NULL.

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe38687000000
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 39 PID: 17143 Comm: sev_migrate_tes Tainted: GO       6.5.0-smp--fff2e47e6c3b-next torvalds#151
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.28.0 07/10/2023
  RIP: 0010:__free_pages+0x15/0xd0
  RSP: 0018:ffff923fcf6e3c78 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe38687000000 RCX: 0000000000000100
  RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffe38687000000
  RBP: ffff923fcf6e3c88 R08: ffff923fcafb0000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff83619b90 R12: ffff923fa9540000
  R13: 0000000000080007 R14: ffff923f6d35d000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff929d0d7c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: ffffe38687000000 CR3: 0000005224c34005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   sev_free_vcpu+0xcb/0x110 [kvm_amd]
   svm_vcpu_free+0x75/0xf0 [kvm_amd]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x36/0x140 [kvm]
   kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x67/0x100 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x161/0x1d0 [kvm]
   kvm_put_kvm+0x276/0x560 [kvm]
   kvm_vm_release+0x25/0x30 [kvm]
   __fput+0x106/0x280
   ____fput+0x12/0x20
   task_work_run+0x86/0xb0
   do_exit+0x2e3/0x9c0
   do_group_exit+0xb1/0xc0
   __x64_sys_exit_group+0x1b/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x41/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
   </TASK>
  CR2: ffffe38687000000

Fixes: 6defa24 ("KVM: SEV: Init target VMCBs in sev_migrate_from")
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Peter Gonda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@gregkh
kunit: Fix wild-memory-access bug in kunit_free_suite_set()
a9d39ab 
[ Upstream commit 2810c1e ]

Inject fault while probing kunit-example-test.ko, if kstrdup()
fails in mod_sysfs_setup() in load_module(), the mod->state will
switch from MODULE_STATE_COMING to MODULE_STATE_GOING instead of
from MODULE_STATE_LIVE to MODULE_STATE_GOING, so only
kunit_module_exit() will be called without kunit_module_init(), and
the mod->kunit_suites is no set correctly and the free in
kunit_free_suite_set() will cause below wild-memory-access bug.

The mod->state state machine when load_module() succeeds:

MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED ---> MODULE_STATE_COMING ---> MODULE_STATE_LIVE
	 ^						|
	 |						| delete_module
	 +---------------- MODULE_STATE_GOING <---------+

The mod->state state machine when load_module() fails at
mod_sysfs_setup():

MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED ---> MODULE_STATE_COMING ---> MODULE_STATE_GOING
	^						|
	|						|
	+-----------------------------------------------+

Call kunit_module_init() at MODULE_STATE_COMING state to fix the issue
because MODULE_STATE_LIVE is transformed from it.

 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffff341e942a88
 KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0003f9a0f4a15440-0x0003f9a0f4a15447]
 Mem abort info:
   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
   SET = 0, FnV = 0
   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
 Data abort info:
   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000441ea000
 [ffffff341e942a88] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 Modules linked in: kunit_example_test(-) cfg80211 rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc ipv6 [last unloaded: kunit_example_test]
 CPU: 3 PID: 2035 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G        W        N 6.5.0-next-20230828+ torvalds#136
 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
 pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : kfree+0x2c/0x70
 lr : kunit_free_suite_set+0xcc/0x13c
 sp : ffff8000829b75b0
 x29: ffff8000829b75b0 x28: ffff8000829b7b90 x27: 0000000000000000
 x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffffcd07c82a7280 x24: ffffcd07a50ab300
 x23: ffffcd07a50ab2e8 x22: 1ffff00010536ec0 x21: dfff800000000000
 x20: ffffcd07a50ab2f0 x19: ffffcd07a50ab2f0 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffffcd07c24b6764
 x14: ffffcd07c24b63c0 x13: ffffcd07c4cebb94 x12: ffff700010536ec7
 x11: 1ffff00010536ec6 x10: ffff700010536ec6 x9 : dfff800000000000
 x8 : 00008fffefac913a x7 : 0000000041b58ab3 x6 : 0000000000000000
 x5 : 1ffff00010536ec5 x4 : ffff8000829b7628 x3 : dfff800000000000
 x2 : ffffff341e942a80 x1 : ffffcd07a50aa000 x0 : fffffc0000000000
 Call trace:
  kfree+0x2c/0x70
  kunit_free_suite_set+0xcc/0x13c
  kunit_module_notify+0xd8/0x360
  blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xc4/0x128
  load_module+0x382c/0x44a4
  init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128
  idempotent_init_module+0x2c8/0x524
  __arm64_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x100
  invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258
  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c
  do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c
  el0_svc+0x38/0x78
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
 Code: aa0003e1 b25657e0 d34cfc42 8b021802 (f9400440)
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
 Kernel Offset: 0x4d0742200000 from 0xffff800080000000
 PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffffee43c0000000
 CPU features: 0x88000203,3c020000,1000421b
 Memory Limit: none
 Rebooting in 1 seconds..

Fixes: 3d6e446 ("kunit: unify module and builtin suite definitions")
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rae Moar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Gow <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@gregkh
net/smc: use smc_lgr_list.lock to protect smc_lgr_list.list iterate i…
b717463 
…n smcr_port_add

[ Upstream commit f5146e3 ]

While doing smcr_port_add, there maybe linkgroup add into or delete
from smc_lgr_list.list at the same time, which may result kernel crash.
So, use smc_lgr_list.lock to protect smc_lgr_list.list iterate in
smcr_port_add.

The crash calltrace show below:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 559726 Comm: kworker/0:92 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 449e491 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events smc_ib_port_event_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:smcr_port_add+0xa6/0xf0 [smc]
RSP: 0000:ffffa5a2c8f67de0 EFLAGS: 00010297
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff9935e0650000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff9935e0654290 RDI: ffff9935c8560000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9934c0401918
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffb4a5c278 R12: ffff99364029aae4
R13: ffff99364029aa00 R14: 00000000ffffffed R15: ffff99364029ab08
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff994380600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000f06a10003 CR4: 0000000002770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 smc_ib_port_event_work+0x18f/0x380 [smc]
 process_one_work+0x19b/0x340
 worker_thread+0x30/0x370
 ? process_one_work+0x340/0x340
 kthread+0x114/0x130
 ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x50/0x50
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fixes: 1f90a05 ("net/smc: add smcr_port_add() and smcr_link_up() processing")
Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@saschahauer @gregkh
net: macb: fix sleep inside spinlock
1252572 
[ Upstream commit 403f0e7 ]

macb_set_tx_clk() is called under a spinlock but itself calls clk_set_rate()
which can sleep. This results in:

| BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
| pps pps1: new PPS source ptp1
| in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 40, name: kworker/u4:3
| preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
| RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
| 4 locks held by kworker/u4:3/40:
|  #0: ffff000003409148
| macb ff0c0000.ethernet: gem-ptp-timer ptp clock registered.
|  ((wq_completion)events_power_efficient){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c
|  #1: ffff8000833cbdd8 ((work_completion)(&pl->resolve)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c
|  #2: ffff000004f01578 (&pl->state_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phylink_resolve+0x44/0x4e8
|  #3: ffff000004f06f50 (&bp->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: macb_mac_link_up+0x40/0x2ac
| irq event stamp: 113998
| hardirqs last  enabled at (113997): [<ffff800080e8503c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x64
| hardirqs last disabled at (113998): [<ffff800080e84478>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xac/0xc8
| softirqs last  enabled at (113608): [<ffff800080010630>] __do_softirq+0x430/0x4e4
| softirqs last disabled at (113597): [<ffff80008001614c>] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c
| CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-11717-g9355ce8b2f50-dirty torvalds#368
| Hardware name: ... ZynqMP ... (DT)
| Workqueue: events_power_efficient phylink_resolve
| Call trace:
|  dump_backtrace+0x98/0xf0
|  show_stack+0x18/0x24
|  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xac
|  dump_stack+0x18/0x24
|  __might_resched+0x144/0x24c
|  __might_sleep+0x48/0x98
|  __mutex_lock+0x58/0x7b0
|  mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30
|  clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xa8
|  clk_set_rate+0x24/0x8c
|  macb_mac_link_up+0x25c/0x2ac
|  phylink_resolve+0x178/0x4e8
|  process_one_work+0x1ec/0x51c
|  worker_thread+0x1ec/0x3e4
|  kthread+0x120/0x124
|  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

The obvious fix is to move the call to macb_set_tx_clk() out of the
protected area. This seems safe as rx and tx are both disabled anyway at
this point.
It is however not entirely clear what the spinlock shall protect. It
could be the read-modify-write access to the NCFGR register, but this
is accessed in macb_set_rx_mode() and macb_set_rxcsum_feature() as well
without holding the spinlock. It could also be the register accesses
done in mog_init_rings() or macb_init_buffers(), but again these
functions are called without holding the spinlock in macb_hresp_error_task().
The locking seems fishy in this driver and it might deserve another look
before this patch is applied.

Fixes: 633e98a ("net: macb: use resolved link config in mac_link_up()")
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@Rtoax @gregkh
samples/hw_breakpoint: Fix kernel BUG 'invalid opcode: 0000'
c56f639 
[ Upstream commit 910e230 ]

Macro symbol_put() is defined as __symbol_put(__stringify(x))

    ksym_name = "jiffies"
    symbol_put(ksym_name)

will be resolved as

    __symbol_put("ksym_name")

which is clearly wrong. So symbol_put must be replaced with __symbol_put.

When we uninstall hw_breakpoint.ko (rmmod), a kernel bug occurs with the
following error:

[11381.854152] kernel BUG at kernel/module/main.c:779!
[11381.854159] invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[11381.854163] CPU: 8 PID: 59623 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G      D    OE      6.2.9-200.fc37.x86_64 #1
[11381.854167] Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./B360M-HDV, BIOS P3.20 10/23/2018
[11381.854169] RIP: 0010:__symbol_put+0xa2/0xb0
[11381.854175] Code: 00 e8 92 d2 f7 ff 65 8b 05 c3 2f e6 78 85 c0 74 1b 48 8b 44 24 30 65 48 2b 04 25 28 00 00 00 75 12 48 83 c4 38 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 eb de e8 c0 df d8 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
[11381.854178] RSP: 0018:ffffad8ec6ae7dd0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[11381.854181] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc1fd1240 RCX: 000000000000000c
[11381.854184] RDX: 000000000000006b RSI: ffffffffc02bf7c7 RDI: ffffffffc1fd001c
[11381.854186] RBP: 000055a38b76e7c8 R08: ffffffff871ccfe0 R09: 0000000000000000
[11381.854188] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[11381.854190] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[11381.854192] FS:  00007fbf7c62c740(0000) GS:ffff8c5badc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[11381.854195] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[11381.854197] CR2: 000055a38b7793f8 CR3: 0000000363e1e001 CR4: 00000000003726e0
[11381.854200] DR0: ffffffffb3407980 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[11381.854202] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[11381.854204] Call Trace:
[11381.854207]  <TASK>
[11381.854212]  s_module_exit+0xc/0xff0 [symbol_getput]
[11381.854219]  __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x198/0x2f0
[11381.854225]  do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
[11381.854231]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x180/0x1f0
[11381.854237]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[11381.854241]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[11381.854245]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[11381.854248]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[11381.854252]  ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170
[11381.854256]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

Signed-off-by: Rong Tao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@axboe @gregkh
io_uring: annotate the struct io_kiocb slab for appropriate user copy
f1cd525 
[ Upstream commit b97f96e ]

When compiling the kernel with clang and having HARDENED_USERCOPY
enabled, the liburing openat2.t test case fails during request setup:

usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object 'io_kiocb' (offset 24, size 24)!
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
CPU: 3 PID: 413 Comm: openat2.t Tainted: G                 N 6.4.3-g6995e2de6891-dirty torvalds#19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.1-0-g3208b098f51a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
Code: ce 49 89 ce 48 c7 c3 68 48 98 82 48 0f 44 de 48 c7 c7 56 c6 94 82 4c 89 de 48 89 c1 41 52 41 56 53 e8 e0 51 c5 00 48 83 c4 18 <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56
RSP: 0018:ffffc900016b3da0 EFLAGS: 00010296
RAX: 0000000000000062 RBX: ffffffff82984868 RCX: 4e9b661ac6275b00
RDX: ffff8881b90ec580 RSI: ffffffff82949a64 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: 0000000000000018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc900016b3c88 R11: ffffc900016b3c30 R12: 00007ffe549659e0
R13: ffff888119014000 R14: 0000000000000018 R15: 0000000000000018
FS:  00007f862e3ca680(0000) GS:ffff8881b90c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005571483542a8 CR3: 0000000118c11000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body+0x63/0xb0
 ? die+0x9d/0xc0
 ? do_trap+0xa7/0x180
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 ? do_error_trap+0xc6/0x110
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x2f/0x40
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 __check_heap_object+0xe2/0x110
 __check_object_size+0x142/0x3d0
 io_openat2_prep+0x68/0x140
 io_submit_sqes+0x28a/0x680
 __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x120/0x580
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x55714834de26
Code: ca 01 0f b6 82 d0 00 00 00 8b ba cc 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 41 b9 08 00 00 00 83 e0 01 c1 e0 04 41 09 c2 b8 aa 01 00 00 0f 05 <c3> 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 89 30 eb 89 0f 1f 40 00 8b 00 a8 06
RSP: 002b:00007ffe549659c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe54965a50 RCX: 000055714834de26
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055714834f057
R13: 00007ffe54965a50 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000557148351dd8
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

when it tries to copy struct open_how from userspace into the per-command
space in the io_kiocb. There's nothing wrong with the copy, but we're
missing the appropriate annotations for allowing user copies to/from the
io_kiocb slab.

Allow copies in the per-command area, which is from the 'file' pointer to
when 'opcode' starts. We do have existing user copies there, but they are
not all annotated like the one that openat2_prep() uses,
copy_struct_from_user(). But in practice opcodes should be allowed to
copy data into their per-command area in the io_kiocb.

Reported-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@xiaoleiwang123456 @gregkh
usb: cdns3: Put the cdns set active part outside the spin lock
d3f372e 
[ Upstream commit 2319b9c ]

The device may be scheduled during the resume process,
so this cannot appear in atomic operations. Since
pm_runtime_set_active will resume suppliers, put set
active outside the spin lock, which is only used to
protect the struct cdns data structure, otherwise the
kernel will report the following warning:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/base/power/runtime.c:1163
  in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 651, name: sh
  preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  CPU: 0 PID: 651 Comm: sh Tainted: G        WC         6.1.20 #1
  Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QM MEK (DT)
  Call trace:
    dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe0/0xf0
    show_stack+0x18/0x30
    dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80
    dump_stack+0x1c/0x38
    __might_resched+0x1fc/0x240
    __might_sleep+0x68/0xc0
    __pm_runtime_resume+0x9c/0xe0
    rpm_get_suppliers+0x68/0x1b0
    __pm_runtime_set_status+0x298/0x560
    cdns_resume+0xb0/0x1c0
    cdns3_controller_resume.isra.0+0x1e0/0x250
    cdns3_plat_resume+0x28/0x40

Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Chen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@robclark @gregkh
interconnect: Fix locking for runpm vs reclaim
2f3a124 
[ Upstream commit af42269 ]

For cases where icc_bw_set() can be called in callbaths that could
deadlock against shrinker/reclaim, such as runpm resume, we need to
decouple the icc locking.  Introduce a new icc_bw_lock for cases where
we need to serialize bw aggregation and update to decouple that from
paths that require memory allocation such as node/link creation/
destruction.

Fixes this lockdep splat:

   ======================================================
   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.2.0-rc8-debug+ torvalds#554 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   ring0/132 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffffff80871916d0 (&gmu->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: a6xx_pm_resume+0xf0/0x234

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffffffdb5aee57e8 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: msm_job_run+0x68/0x150

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> #4 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}:
          __dma_fence_might_wait+0x74/0xc0
          dma_resv_lockdep+0x1f4/0x2f4
          do_one_initcall+0x104/0x2bc
          kernel_init_freeable+0x344/0x34c
          kernel_init+0x30/0x134
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #3 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}:
          fs_reclaim_acquire+0x80/0xa8
          slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x40/0x25c
          __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x60/0x1cc
          __kmalloc+0xd8/0x100
          topology_parse_cpu_capacity+0x8c/0x178
          get_cpu_for_node+0x88/0xc4
          parse_cluster+0x1b0/0x28c
          parse_cluster+0x8c/0x28c
          init_cpu_topology+0x168/0x188
          smp_prepare_cpus+0x24/0xf8
          kernel_init_freeable+0x18c/0x34c
          kernel_init+0x30/0x134
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
          __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x3c/0x48
          fs_reclaim_acquire+0x54/0xa8
          slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x40/0x25c
          __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x60/0x1cc
          __kmalloc+0xd8/0x100
          kzalloc.constprop.0+0x14/0x20
          icc_node_create_nolock+0x4c/0xc4
          icc_node_create+0x38/0x58
          qcom_icc_rpmh_probe+0x1b8/0x248
          platform_probe+0x70/0xc4
          really_probe+0x158/0x290
          __driver_probe_device+0xc8/0xe0
          driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100
          __driver_attach+0xf8/0x108
          bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc4
          driver_attach+0x2c/0x38
          bus_add_driver+0xd0/0x1d8
          driver_register+0xbc/0xf8
          __platform_driver_register+0x30/0x3c
          qnoc_driver_init+0x24/0x30
          do_one_initcall+0x104/0x2bc
          kernel_init_freeable+0x344/0x34c
          kernel_init+0x30/0x134
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #1 (icc_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x3c8
          mutex_lock_nested+0x30/0x44
          icc_set_bw+0x88/0x2b4
          _set_opp_bw+0x8c/0xd8
          _set_opp+0x19c/0x300
          dev_pm_opp_set_opp+0x84/0x94
          a6xx_gmu_resume+0x18c/0x804
          a6xx_pm_resume+0xf8/0x234
          adreno_runtime_resume+0x2c/0x38
          pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44
          __rpm_callback+0x15c/0x174
          rpm_callback+0x78/0x7c
          rpm_resume+0x318/0x524
          __pm_runtime_resume+0x78/0xbc
          adreno_load_gpu+0xc4/0x17c
          msm_open+0x50/0x120
          drm_file_alloc+0x17c/0x228
          drm_open_helper+0x74/0x118
          drm_open+0xa0/0x144
          drm_stub_open+0xd4/0xe4
          chrdev_open+0x1b8/0x1e4
          do_dentry_open+0x2f8/0x38c
          vfs_open+0x34/0x40
          path_openat+0x64c/0x7b4
          do_filp_open+0x54/0xc4
          do_sys_openat2+0x9c/0x100
          do_sys_open+0x50/0x7c
          __arm64_sys_openat+0x28/0x34
          invoke_syscall+0x8c/0x128
          el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xa0/0x11c
          do_el0_svc+0xac/0xbc
          el0_svc+0x48/0xa0
          el0t_64_sync_handler+0xac/0x13c
          el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194

   -> #0 (&gmu->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          __lock_acquire+0xe00/0x1060
          lock_acquire+0x1e0/0x2f8
          __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x3c8
          mutex_lock_nested+0x30/0x44
          a6xx_pm_resume+0xf0/0x234
          adreno_runtime_resume+0x2c/0x38
          pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44
          __rpm_callback+0x15c/0x174
          rpm_callback+0x78/0x7c
          rpm_resume+0x318/0x524
          __pm_runtime_resume+0x78/0xbc
          pm_runtime_get_sync.isra.0+0x14/0x20
          msm_gpu_submit+0x58/0x178
          msm_job_run+0x78/0x150
          drm_sched_main+0x290/0x370
          kthread+0xf0/0x100
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   other info that might help us debug this:

   Chain exists of:
     &gmu->lock --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start --> dma_fence_map

    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(dma_fence_map);
                                  lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start);
                                  lock(dma_fence_map);
     lock(&gmu->lock);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

   2 locks held by ring0/132:
    #0: ffffff8087191170 (&gpu->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msm_job_run+0x64/0x150
    #1: ffffffdb5aee57e8 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: msm_job_run+0x68/0x150

   stack backtrace:
   CPU: 7 PID: 132 Comm: ring0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc8-debug+ torvalds#554
   Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT)
   Call trace:
    dump_backtrace.part.0+0xb4/0xf8
    show_stack+0x20/0x38
    dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd0
    dump_stack+0x18/0x34
    print_circular_bug+0x1b4/0x1f0
    check_noncircular+0x78/0xac
    __lock_acquire+0xe00/0x1060
    lock_acquire+0x1e0/0x2f8
    __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x3c8
    mutex_lock_nested+0x30/0x44
    a6xx_pm_resume+0xf0/0x234
    adreno_runtime_resume+0x2c/0x38
    pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44
    __rpm_callback+0x15c/0x174
    rpm_callback+0x78/0x7c
    rpm_resume+0x318/0x524
    __pm_runtime_resume+0x78/0xbc
    pm_runtime_get_sync.isra.0+0x14/0x20
    msm_gpu_submit+0x58/0x178
    msm_job_run+0x78/0x150
    drm_sched_main+0x290/0x370
    kthread+0xf0/0x100
    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@LiBaokun96 @gregkh
ext4: fix BUG in ext4_mb_new_inode_pa() due to overflow
b7e9ec3 
[ Upstream commit bc056e7 ]

When we calculate the end position of ext4_free_extent, this position may
be exactly where ext4_lblk_t (i.e. uint) overflows. For example, if
ac_g_ex.fe_logical is 4294965248 and ac_orig_goal_len is 2048, then the
computed end is 0x100000000, which is 0. If ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical is not
the first case of adjusting the best extent, that is, new_bex_end > 0, the
following BUG_ON will be triggered:

=========================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:5116!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 673 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G E 6.5.0-rc1+ torvalds#279
RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_new_inode_pa+0xc5/0x430
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ext4_mb_use_best_found+0x203/0x2f0
 ext4_mb_try_best_found+0x163/0x240
 ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x158/0x1550
 ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x86a/0xe10
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xb0c/0x13a0
 ext4_map_blocks+0x2cd/0x8f0
 ext4_iomap_begin+0x27b/0x400
 iomap_iter+0x222/0x3d0
 __iomap_dio_rw+0x243/0xcb0
 iomap_dio_rw+0x16/0x80
=========================================================

A simple reproducer demonstrating the problem:

	mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda -b 4096 100M
	mount /dev/sda /tmp/test
	fallocate -l1M /tmp/test/tmp
	fallocate -l10M /tmp/test/file
	fallocate -i -o 1M -l16777203M /tmp/test/file
	fsstress -d /tmp/test -l 0 -n 100000 -p 8 &
	sleep 10 && killall -9 fsstress
	rm -f /tmp/test/tmp
	xfs_io -c "open -ad /tmp/test/file" -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 8192"

We simply refactor the logic for adjusting the best extent by adding
a temporary ext4_free_extent ex and use extent_logical_end() to avoid
overflow, which also simplifies the code.

Cc: [email protected] # 6.4
Fixes: 93cdf49 ("ext4: Fix best extent lstart adjustment logic in ext4_mb_new_inode_pa()")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@takaswie @gregkh
Revert "firewire: core: obsolete usage of GFP_ATOMIC at building node…
6abadf1 
… tree"

commit 3c70de9 upstream.

This reverts commit 06f4543.

John Ogness reports the case that the allocation is in atomic context under
acquired spin-lock.

[   12.555784] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:306
[   12.555808] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 70, name: kworker/1:2
[   12.555814] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[   12.555820] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[   12.555824] irq event stamp: 208
[   12.555828] hardirqs last  enabled at (207): [<c00000000111e414>] ._raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x44/0x80
[   12.555850] hardirqs last disabled at (208): [<c00000000110ff94>] .__schedule+0x854/0xfe0
[   12.555859] softirqs last  enabled at (188): [<c000000000f73504>] .addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x2c4/0xb70
[   12.555872] softirqs last disabled at (182): [<c000000000f732b0>] .addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x70/0xb70
[   12.555884] CPU: 1 PID: 70 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G S                 6.6.0-rc1 #1
[   12.555893] Hardware name: PowerMac7,2 PPC970 0x390202 PowerMac
[   12.555898] Workqueue: firewire_ohci .bus_reset_work [firewire_ohci]
[   12.555939] Call Trace:
[   12.555944] [c000000009677830] [c0000000010d83c0] .dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xd0 (unreliable)
[   12.555963] [c0000000096778b0] [c000000000140270] .__might_resched+0x320/0x340
[   12.555978] [c000000009677940] [c000000000497600] .__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x390/0x460
[   12.555993] [c000000009677a10] [c0000000003fe620] .__kmalloc+0x70/0x310
[   12.556007] [c000000009677ac0] [c0003d00004e2268] .fw_core_handle_bus_reset+0x2c8/0xba0 [firewire_core]
[   12.556060] [c000000009677c20] [c0003d0000491190] .bus_reset_work+0x330/0x9b0 [firewire_ohci]
[   12.556079] [c000000009677d10] [c00000000011d0d0] .process_one_work+0x280/0x6f0
[   12.556094] [c000000009677e10] [c00000000011d8a0] .worker_thread+0x360/0x500
[   12.556107] [c000000009677ef0] [c00000000012e3b4] .kthread+0x154/0x160
[   12.556120] [c000000009677f90] [c00000000000bfa8] .start_kernel_thread+0x10/0x14

Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: John Ogness <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/raw
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@fdmanana @gregkh
btrfs: fix lockdep splat and potential deadlock after failure running…
36d918d 
… delayed items

commit e110f89 upstream.

When running delayed items we are holding a delayed node's mutex and then
we will attempt to modify a subvolume btree to insert/update/delete the
delayed items. However if have an error during the insertions for example,
btrfs_insert_delayed_items() may return with a path that has locked extent
buffers (a leaf at the very least), and then we attempt to release the
delayed node at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which requires taking the
delayed node's mutex, causing an ABBA type of deadlock. This was reported
by syzbot and the lockdep splat is the following:

  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  syz-executor.2/13257 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88801835c0c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:
         __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline]
         lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781
         up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625
         btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline]
         btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239
         search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline]
         btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230
         btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376
         btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline]
         btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline]
         __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111
         __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153
         flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723
         btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078
         process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600
         worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751
         kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389
         ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145
         ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304

  -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
         check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
         validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
         __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
         lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
         __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603
         __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799
         __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256
         btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]
         __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156
         btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276
         btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988
         vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline]
         vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline]
         do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline]
         __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline]
         __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline]
         __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218
         do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
         do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

  other info that might help us debug this:

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(btrfs-tree-00);
                                 lock(&delayed_node->mutex);
                                 lock(btrfs-tree-00);
    lock(&delayed_node->mutex);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  3 locks held by syz-executor.2/13257:
   #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: spin_unlock include/linux/spinlock.h:391 [inline]
   #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xb87/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:287
   #1: ffff88802c1ee398 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xbb2/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
   #2: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 13257 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
   check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195
   check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
   check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
   validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
   __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
   lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
   __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603
   __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]
   mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799
   __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256
   btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]
   __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276
   btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988
   vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline]
   vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline]
   do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline]
   __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline]
   __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline]
   __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  RIP: 0033:0x7f3ad047cae9
  Code: 28 00 00 00 75 (...)
  RSP: 002b:00007f3ad12510c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3ad059bf80 RCX: 00007f3ad047cae9
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005
  RBP: 00007f3ad04c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f3ad059bf80 R15: 00007ffe56af92f8
   </TASK>
  ------------[ cut here ]------------

Fix this by releasing the path before releasing the delayed node in the
error path at __btrfs_run_delayed_items().

Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
CC: [email protected] # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@fdmanana @gregkh
btrfs: release path before inode lookup during the ino lookup ioctl
6fdce81 
commit ee34a82 upstream.

During the ino lookup ioctl we can end up calling btrfs_iget() to get an
inode reference while we are holding on a root's btree. If btrfs_iget()
needs to lookup the inode from the root's btree, because it's not
currently loaded in memory, then it will need to lock another or the
same path in the same root btree. This may result in a deadlock and
trigger the following lockdep splat:

  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129e3de #0 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  syz-executor277/5012 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88802df41710 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:
         down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645
         __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
         btrfs_search_slot+0x13a4/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2302
         btrfs_init_root_free_objectid+0x148/0x320 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4955
         btrfs_init_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1128 [inline]
         btrfs_get_root_ref+0x5ae/0xae0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1338
         btrfs_get_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1390 [inline]
         open_ctree+0x29c8/0x3030 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3494
         btrfs_fill_super+0x1c7/0x2f0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1154
         btrfs_mount_root+0x7e0/0x910 fs/btrfs/super.c:1519
         legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611
         vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519
         fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1112 [inline]
         vfs_kern_mount+0xbc/0x150 fs/namespace.c:1142
         btrfs_mount+0x39f/0xb50 fs/btrfs/super.c:1579
         legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611
         vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519
         do_new_mount+0x28f/0xae0 fs/namespace.c:3335
         do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline]
         __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline]
         __se_sys_mount+0x2d9/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3861
         do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
         do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

  -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}:
         check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
         check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
         validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
         __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
         lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
         down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645
         __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
         btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline]
         btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281
         btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline]
         btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154
         btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412
         btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline]
         btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716
         btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline]
         btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105
         btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683
         vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
         __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856
         do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
         do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

  other info that might help us debug this:

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    rlock(btrfs-tree-00);
                                 lock(btrfs-tree-01);
                                 lock(btrfs-tree-00);
    rlock(btrfs-tree-01);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  1 lock held by syz-executor277/5012:
   #0: ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 1 PID: 5012 Comm: syz-executor277 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129e3de #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
   check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195
   check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
   check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
   validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
   __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
   lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
   down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645
   __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
   btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline]
   btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281
   btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline]
   btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154
   btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412
   btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline]
   btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716
   btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline]
   btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105
   btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683
   vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  RIP: 0033:0x7f0bec94ea39

Fix this simply by releasing the path before calling btrfs_iget() as at
point we don't need the path anymore.

Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
Fixes: 23d0b79 ("btrfs: Add unprivileged version of ino_lookup ioctl")
CC: [email protected] # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@njavali @gregkh
scsi: qla2xxx: Use raw_smp_processor_id() instead of smp_processor_id()
25bd0c7 
commit 59f10a0 upstream.

The following call trace was observed:

localhost kernel: nvme nvme0: NVME-FC{0}: controller connect complete
localhost kernel: BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: kworker/u129:4/75092
localhost kernel: nvme nvme0: NVME-FC{0}: new ctrl: NQN "nqn.1992-08.com.netapp:sn.b42d198afb4d11ecad6d00a098d6abfa:subsystem.PR_Channel2022_RH84_subsystem_291"
localhost kernel: caller is qla_nvme_post_cmd+0x216/0x1380 [qla2xxx]
localhost kernel: CPU: 6 PID: 75092 Comm: kworker/u129:4 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B   W  OE    --------- ---  5.14.0-70.22.1.el9_0.x86_64+debug #1
localhost kernel: Hardware name: HPE ProLiant XL420 Gen10/ProLiant XL420 Gen10, BIOS U39 01/13/2022
localhost kernel: Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_async_event_work [nvme_core]
localhost kernel: Call Trace:
localhost kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
localhost kernel: check_preemption_disabled+0xc8/0xd0
localhost kernel: qla_nvme_post_cmd+0x216/0x1380 [qla2xxx]

Use raw_smp_processor_id() instead of smp_processor_id().

Also use queue_work() across the driver instead of queue_work_on() thus
avoiding usage of smp_processor_id() when CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT is enabled.

Cc: [email protected]
Suggested-by: John Garry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@aneftin @gregkh
net/core: Fix ETH_P_1588 flow dissector
48e105a 
[ Upstream commit 75ad80e ]

When a PTP ethernet raw frame with a size of more than 256 bytes followed
by a 0xff pattern is sent to __skb_flow_dissect, nhoff value calculation
is wrong. For example: hdr->message_length takes the wrong value (0xffff)
and it does not replicate real header length. In this case, 'nhoff' value
was overridden and the PTP header was badly dissected. This leads to a
kernel crash.

net/core: flow_dissector
net/core flow dissector nhoff = 0x0000000e
net/core flow dissector hdr->message_length = 0x0000ffff
net/core flow dissector nhoff = 0x0001000d (u16 overflow)
...
skb linear:   00000000: 00 a0 c9 00 00 00 00 a0 c9 00 00 00 88
skb frag:     00000000: f7 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

Using the size of the ptp_header struct will allow the corrected
calculation of the nhoff value.

net/core flow dissector nhoff = 0x0000000e
net/core flow dissector nhoff = 0x00000030 (sizeof ptp_header)
...
skb linear:   00000000: 00 a0 c9 00 00 00 00 a0 c9 00 00 00 88 f7 ff ff
skb linear:   00000010: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
skb linear:   00000020: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
skb frag:     00000000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

Kernel trace:
[   74.984279] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   74.989471] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2440!
[   74.995237] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[   75.001098] CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Tainted: G     U            5.15.85-intel-ese-standard-lts #1
[   75.011629] Hardware name: Intel Corporation A-Island (CPU:AlderLake)/A-Island (ID:06), BIOS SB_ADLP.01.01.00.01.03.008.D-6A9D9E73-dirty Mar 30 2023
[   75.026507] RIP: 0010:eth_type_trans+0xd0/0x130
[   75.031594] Code: 03 88 47 78 eb c7 8b 47 68 2b 47 6c 48 8b 97 c0 00 00 00 83 f8 01 7e 1b 48 85 d2 74 06 66 83 3a ff 74 09 b8 00 04 00 00 eb ab <0f> 0b b8 00 01 00 00 eb a2 48 85 ff 74 eb 48 8d 54 24 06 31 f6 b9
[   75.052612] RSP: 0018:ffff9948c0228de0 EFLAGS: 00010297
[   75.058473] RAX: 00000000000003f2 RBX: ffff8e47047dc300 RCX: 0000000000001003
[   75.066462] RDX: ffff8e4e8c9ea040 RSI: ffff8e4704e0a000 RDI: ffff8e47047dc300
[   75.074458] RBP: ffff8e4704e2acc0 R08: 00000000000003f3 R09: 0000000000000800
[   75.082466] R10: 000000000000000d R11: ffff9948c0228dec R12: ffff8e4715e4e010
[   75.090461] R13: ffff9948c0545018 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000800
[   75.098464] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e4e8fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   75.107530] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   75.113982] CR2: 00007f5eb35934a0 CR3: 0000000150e0a002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[   75.121980] PKRU: 55555554
[   75.125035] Call Trace:
[   75.127792]  <IRQ>
[   75.130063]  ? eth_get_headlen+0xa4/0xc0
[   75.134472]  igc_process_skb_fields+0xcd/0x150
[   75.139461]  igc_poll+0xc80/0x17b0
[   75.143272]  __napi_poll+0x27/0x170
[   75.147192]  net_rx_action+0x234/0x280
[   75.151409]  __do_softirq+0xef/0x2f4
[   75.155424]  irq_exit_rcu+0xc7/0x110
[   75.159432]  common_interrupt+0xb8/0xd0
[   75.163748]  </IRQ>
[   75.166112]  <TASK>
[   75.168473]  asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
[   75.173175] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xe2/0x350
[   75.178749] Code: 85 c0 0f 8f 04 02 00 00 31 ff e8 39 6c 67 ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 50 02 00 00 31 ff e8 52 b0 6d ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 b1 00 00 00 49 63 ce 4c 2b 2c 24 48 89 c8 48 6b d1 68 48 c1
[   75.199757] RSP: 0018:ffff9948c013bea8 EFLAGS: 00000202
[   75.205614] RAX: ffff8e4e8fb00000 RBX: ffffb948bfd23900 RCX: 000000000000001f
[   75.213619] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffffff94206161 RDI: ffffffff94212e20
[   75.221620] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 000000117568973a R09: 0000000000000001
[   75.229622] R10: 000000000000afc8 R11: ffff8e4e8fb29ce4 R12: ffffffff945ae980
[   75.237628] R13: 000000117568973a R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000000000
[   75.245635]  ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xc7/0x350
[   75.250518]  cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40
[   75.254539]  do_idle+0x1d9/0x260
[   75.258166]  cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
[   75.262582]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xc2/0xcb
[   75.268259]  </TASK>
[   75.270721] Modules linked in: 8021q snd_sof_pci_intel_tgl snd_sof_intel_hda_common tpm_crb snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_sof_intel_hda snd_hda_ext_core snd_sof_pci snd_sof snd_sof_xtensa_dsp snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_soc_core snd_compress iTCO_wdt ac97_bus intel_pmc_bxt mei_hdcp iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_hdmi pmt_telemetry intel_pmc_core pmt_class snd_hda_intel x86_pkg_temp_thermal snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core kvm_intel snd_pcm snd_timer kvm snd mei_me soundcore tpm_tis irqbypass i2c_i801 mei tpm_tis_core pcspkr intel_rapl_msr tpm i2c_smbus intel_pmt thermal sch_fq_codel uio uhid i915 drm_buddy video drm_display_helper drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm fuse configfs
[   75.342736] ---[ end trace 3785f9f360400e3a ]---
[   75.347913] RIP: 0010:eth_type_trans+0xd0/0x130
[   75.352984] Code: 03 88 47 78 eb c7 8b 47 68 2b 47 6c 48 8b 97 c0 00 00 00 83 f8 01 7e 1b 48 85 d2 74 06 66 83 3a ff 74 09 b8 00 04 00 00 eb ab <0f> 0b b8 00 01 00 00 eb a2 48 85 ff 74 eb 48 8d 54 24 06 31 f6 b9
[   75.373994] RSP: 0018:ffff9948c0228de0 EFLAGS: 00010297
[   75.379860] RAX: 00000000000003f2 RBX: ffff8e47047dc300 RCX: 0000000000001003
[   75.387856] RDX: ffff8e4e8c9ea040 RSI: ffff8e4704e0a000 RDI: ffff8e47047dc300
[   75.395864] RBP: ffff8e4704e2acc0 R08: 00000000000003f3 R09: 0000000000000800
[   75.403857] R10: 000000000000000d R11: ffff9948c0228dec R12: ffff8e4715e4e010
[   75.411863] R13: ffff9948c0545018 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000800
[   75.419875] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e4e8fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   75.428946] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   75.435403] CR2: 00007f5eb35934a0 CR3: 0000000150e0a002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[   75.443410] PKRU: 55555554
[   75.446477] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[   75.453738] Kernel Offset: 0x11c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[   75.465794] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

Fixes: 4f1cc51 ("net: flow_dissector: Parse PTP L2 packet header")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Neftin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@gregkh
vfio/mdev: Fix a null-ptr-deref bug for mdev_unregister_parent()
5209377 
[ Upstream commit c777b11 ]

Inject fault while probing mdpy.ko, if kstrdup() of create_dir() fails in
kobject_add_internal() in kobject_init_and_add() in mdev_type_add()
in parent_create_sysfs_files(), it will return 0 and probe successfully.
And when rmmod mdpy.ko, the mdpy_dev_exit() will call
mdev_unregister_parent(), the mdev_type_remove() may traverse uninitialized
parent->types[i] in parent_remove_sysfs_files(), and it will cause
below null-ptr-deref.

If mdev_type_add() fails, return the error code and kset_unregister()
to fix the issue.

 general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
 CPU: 2 PID: 10215 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G        W        N 6.6.0-rc2+ torvalds#20
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:__kobject_del+0x62/0x1c0
 Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 51 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 28 48 8d 7d 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 24 01 00 00 48 8b 75 10 48 89 df 48 8d 6b 3c e8
 RSP: 0018:ffff88810695fd30 EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffa0270268 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000010
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10233a4ef1
 R10: ffff888119d2778b R11: 0000000063666572 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: fffffbfff404e2d4 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffffffa0271660
 FS:  00007fbc81981540(0000) GS:ffff888119d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007fc14a142dc0 CR3: 0000000110a62003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
 DR0: ffffffff8fb0bce8 DR1: ffffffff8fb0bce9 DR2: ffffffff8fb0bcea
 DR3: ffffffff8fb0bceb DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0
  ? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
  ? __kobject_del+0x62/0x1c0
  kobject_del+0x32/0x50
  parent_remove_sysfs_files+0xd6/0x170 [mdev]
  mdev_unregister_parent+0xfb/0x190 [mdev]
  ? mdev_register_parent+0x270/0x270 [mdev]
  ? find_module_all+0x9d/0xe0
  mdpy_dev_exit+0x17/0x63 [mdpy]
  __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x2fa/0x4b0
  ? module_flags+0x300/0x300
  ? __fput+0x4e7/0xa00
  do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
 RIP: 0033:0x7fbc813221b7
 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d1 8c 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a1 8c 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe780e0648 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe780e06a8 RCX: 00007fbc813221b7
 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 000055e214df9b58
 RBP: 000055e214df9af0 R08: 00007ffe780df5c1 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007fbc8139ecc0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe780e0870
 R13: 00007ffe780e0ed0 R14: 000055e214df9260 R15: 000055e214df9af0
  </TASK>
 Modules linked in: mdpy(-) mdev vfio_iommu_type1 vfio [last unloaded: mdpy]
 Dumping ftrace buffer:
    (ftrace buffer empty)
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 RIP: 0010:__kobject_del+0x62/0x1c0
 Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 51 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 28 48 8d 7d 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 24 01 00 00 48 8b 75 10 48 89 df 48 8d 6b 3c e8
 RSP: 0018:ffff88810695fd30 EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffa0270268 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000010
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10233a4ef1
 R10: ffff888119d2778b R11: 0000000063666572 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: fffffbfff404e2d4 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffffffa0271660
 FS:  00007fbc81981540(0000) GS:ffff888119d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007fc14a142dc0 CR3: 0000000110a62003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
 DR0: ffffffff8fb0bce8 DR1: ffffffff8fb0bce9 DR2: ffffffff8fb0bcea
 DR3: ffffffff8fb0bceb DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
 PKRU: 55555554
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
 Dumping ftrace buffer:
    (ftrace buffer empty)
 Kernel Offset: disabled
 Rebooting in 1 seconds..

Fixes: da44c34 ("vfio/mdev: simplify mdev_type handling")
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Farman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@lxbsz @gregkh
ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting
47f8239 
[ Upstream commit e3dfcab ]

When unmounting all the dirty buffers will be flushed and after
the last osd request is finished the last reference of the i_count
will be released. Then it will flush the dirty cap/snap to MDSs,
and the unmounting won't wait the possible acks, which will ihold
the inodes when updating the metadata locally but makes no sense
any more, of this. This will make the evict_inodes() to skip these
inodes.

If encrypt is enabled the kernel generate a warning when removing
the encrypt keys when the skipped inodes still hold the keyring:

WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0
CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S  6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1
Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015
RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00
RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000
RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40
R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120
kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph]
deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140
task_work_run+0x67/0xb0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b

Later the kernel will crash when iput() the inodes and dereferencing
the "sb->s_master_keys", which has been released by the
generic_shutdown_super().

Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/59162
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milind Changire <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@sergey-senozhatsky @gregkh
dma-debug: don't call __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() under free_entri…
fe2b811 
…es_lock

[ Upstream commit fb5a431 ]

__dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() calls into printk -> serial console
output (qcom geni) and grabs port->lock under free_entries_lock
spin lock, which is a reverse locking dependency chain as qcom_geni
IRQ handler can call into dma-debug code and grab free_entries_lock
under port->lock.

Move __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() call out of free_entries_lock
scope so that we don't acquire serial console's port->lock under it.

Trimmed-down lockdep splat:

 The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

               -> #2 (free_entries_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80
        dma_entry_alloc+0x38/0x110
        debug_dma_map_page+0x60/0xf8
        dma_map_page_attrs+0x1e0/0x230
        dma_map_single_attrs.constprop.0+0x6c/0xc8
        geni_se_rx_dma_prep+0x40/0xcc
        qcom_geni_serial_isr+0x310/0x510
        __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x110/0x244
        handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x54
        handle_irq_event+0x50/0x88
        handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa4/0xcc
        handle_irq_desc+0x28/0x40
        generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x30
        gic_handle_irq+0xc4/0x148
        do_interrupt_handler+0xa4/0xb0
        el1_interrupt+0x34/0x64
        el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
        el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68
        arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8
        ____do_softirq+0x18/0x24
        ...

               -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}:
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80
        qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x184/0x1dc
        console_flush_all+0x344/0x454
        console_unlock+0x94/0xf0
        vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c
        vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48
        vprintk+0xb4/0xbc
        _printk+0x68/0x90
        register_console+0x230/0x38c
        uart_add_one_port+0x338/0x494
        qcom_geni_serial_probe+0x390/0x424
        platform_probe+0x70/0xc0
        really_probe+0x148/0x280
        __driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x114
        driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100
        __device_attach_driver+0x64/0xdc
        bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd8
        __device_attach+0xe4/0x140
        device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
        bus_probe_device+0x44/0xb0
        device_add+0x538/0x668
        of_device_add+0x44/0x50
        of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x94/0xc8
        of_platform_bus_create+0x270/0x304
        of_platform_populate+0xac/0xc4
        devm_of_platform_populate+0x60/0xac
        geni_se_probe+0x154/0x160
        platform_probe+0x70/0xc0
        ...

               -> #0 (console_owner){-...}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c
        lock_acquire+0x234/0x284
        console_flush_all+0x330/0x454
        console_unlock+0x94/0xf0
        vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c
        vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48
        vprintk+0xb4/0xbc
        _printk+0x68/0x90
        dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110
        debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8
        __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4
        dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c
        get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm]
        msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm]
        msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm]
        msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm]
        drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c
        drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4
        vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50
        ...

 Chain exists of:
   console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> free_entries_lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(free_entries_lock);
                                lock(&port_lock_key);
                                lock(free_entries_lock);
   lock(console_owner);

                *** DEADLOCK ***

 Call trace:
  dump_backtrace+0xb4/0xf0
  show_stack+0x20/0x30
  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84
  dump_stack+0x18/0x24
  print_circular_bug+0x1cc/0x234
  check_noncircular+0x78/0xac
  __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c
  lock_acquire+0x234/0x284
  console_flush_all+0x330/0x454
  console_unlock+0x94/0xf0
  vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c
  vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48
  vprintk+0xb4/0xbc
  _printk+0x68/0x90
  dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110
  debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8
  __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4
  dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c
  get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm]
  msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm]
  msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm]
  msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm]
  drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c
  drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4
  vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50
  ...

Reported-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@chenhuacai @gregkh
LoongArch: Set all reserved memblocks on Node#0 at initialization
1987875 
[ Upstream commit b795fb9 ]

After commit 61167ad ("mm: pass nid to reserve_bootmem_region()")
we get a panic if DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled:

[    0.000000] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000002b82, era == 90000000040e3f28, ra == 90000000040e3f18
[    0.000000] Oops[#1]:
[    0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.5.0+ torvalds#733
[    0.000000] pc 90000000040e3f28 ra 90000000040e3f18 tp 90000000046f4000 sp 90000000046f7c90
[    0.000000] a0 0000000000000001 a1 0000000000200000 a2 0000000000000040 a3 90000000046f7ca0
[    0.000000] a4 90000000046f7ca4 a5 0000000000000000 a6 90000000046f7c38 a7 0000000000000000
[    0.000000] t0 0000000000000002 t1 9000000004b00ac8 t2 90000000040e3f18 t3 90000000040f0800
[    0.000000] t4 00000000000f0000 t5 80000000ffffe07e t6 0000000000000003 t7 900000047fff5e20
[    0.000000] t8 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaab u0 0000000000000018 s9 0000000000000000 s0 fffffefffe000000
[    0.000000] s1 0000000000000000 s2 0000000000000080 s3 0000000000000040 s4 0000000000000000
[    0.000000] s5 0000000000000000 s6 fffffefffe000000 s7 900000000470b740 s8 9000000004ad4000
[    0.000000]    ra: 90000000040e3f18 reserve_bootmem_region+0xec/0x21c
[    0.000000]   ERA: 90000000040e3f28 reserve_bootmem_region+0xfc/0x21c
[    0.000000]  CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
[    0.000000]  PRMD: 00000000 (PPLV0 -PIE -PWE)
[    0.000000]  EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
[    0.000000]  ECFG: 00070800 (LIE=11 VS=7)
[    0.000000] ESTAT: 00010800 [PIL] (IS=11 ECode=1 EsubCode=0)
[    0.000000]  BADV: 0000000000002b82
[    0.000000]  PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000)
[    0.000000] Modules linked in:
[    0.000000] Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____))
[    0.000000] Stack : 0000000000000000 9000000002eb5430 0000003a00000020 90000000045ccd00
[    0.000000]         900000000470e000 90000000002c1918 0000000000000000 9000000004110780
[    0.000000]         00000000fe6c0000 0000000480000000 9000000004b4e368 9000000004110748
[    0.000000]         0000000000000000 900000000421ca84 9000000004620000 9000000004564970
[    0.000000]         90000000046f7d78 9000000002cc9f70 90000000002c1918 900000000470e000
[    0.000000]         9000000004564970 90000000040bc0e0 90000000046f7d78 0000000000000000
[    0.000000]         0000000000004000 90000000045ccd00 0000000000000000 90000000002c1918
[    0.000000]         90000000002c1900 900000000470b700 9000000004b4df78 9000000004620000
[    0.000000]         90000000046200a8 90000000046200a8 0000000000000000 9000000004218b2c
[    0.000000]         9000000004270008 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 90000000045ccd00
[    0.000000]         ...
[    0.000000] Call Trace:
[    0.000000] [<90000000040e3f28>] reserve_bootmem_region+0xfc/0x21c
[    0.000000] [<900000000421ca84>] memblock_free_all+0x114/0x350
[    0.000000] [<9000000004218b2c>] mm_core_init+0x138/0x3cc
[    0.000000] [<9000000004200e38>] start_kernel+0x488/0x7a4
[    0.000000] [<90000000040df0d8>] kernel_entry+0xd8/0xdc
[    0.000000]
[    0.000000] Code: 02eb21ad  00410f4c  380c31ac <262b818d> 6800b70d  02c1c196  0015001c  57fe4bb1  260002cd

The reason is early memblock_reserve() in memblock_init() set node id to
MAX_NUMNODES, making NODE_DATA(nid) a NULL dereference in the call chain
reserve_bootmem_region() -> init_reserved_page(). After memblock_init(),
those late calls of memblock_reserve() operate on subregions of memblock
.memory regions. As a result, these reserved regions will be set to the
correct node at the first iteration of memmap_init_reserved_pages().

So set all reserved memblocks on Node#0 at initialization can avoid this
panic.

Reported-by: WANG Xuerui <[email protected]>
Tested-by: WANG Xuerui <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: WANG Xuerui <[email protected]>  # with nits addressed
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@aquini @gregkh
mm/slab_common: fix slab_caches list corruption after kmem_cache_dest…
51988be 
…roy()

commit 46a9ea6 upstream.

After the commit in Fixes:, if a module that created a slab cache does not
release all of its allocated objects before destroying the cache (at rmmod
time), we might end up releasing the kmem_cache object without removing it
from the slab_caches list thus corrupting the list as kmem_cache_destroy()
ignores the return value from shutdown_cache(), which in turn never removes
the kmem_cache object from slabs_list in case __kmem_cache_shutdown() fails
to release all of the cache's slabs.

This is easily observable on a kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y
as after that ill release the system will immediately trip on list_add,
or list_del, assertions similar to the one shown below as soon as another
kmem_cache gets created, or destroyed:

  [ 1041.213632] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ffff89f596fb5768, but was 52f1e5016aeee75d. (next=ffff89f595a1b268)
  [ 1041.219165] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [ 1041.221517] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62!
  [ 1041.223452] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  [ 1041.225408] CPU: 2 PID: 1852 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B   W  OE      6.5.0 torvalds#15
  [ 1041.228244] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS edk2-20230524-3.fc37 05/24/2023
  [ 1041.231212] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0xae/0xb0

Another quick way to trigger this issue, in a kernel with CONFIG_SLUB=y,
is to set slub_debug to poison the released objects and then just run
cat /proc/slabinfo after removing the module that leaks slab objects,
in which case the kernel will panic:

  [   50.954843] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xa56b6b6b6b6b6b8b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  [   50.961545] CPU: 2 PID: 1495 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B   W  OE      6.5.0 torvalds#15
  [   50.966808] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS edk2-20230524-3.fc37 05/24/2023
  [   50.972663] RIP: 0010:get_slabinfo+0x42/0xf0

This patch fixes this issue by properly checking shutdown_cache()'s
return value before taking the kmem_cache_release() branch.

Fixes: 0495e33 ("mm/slab_common: Deleting kobject in kmem_cache_destroy() without holding slab_mutex/cpu_hotplug_lock")
Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@hnaz @gregkh
mm: memcontrol: fix GFP_NOFS recursion in memory.high enforcement
7bc7cbf 
commit 9ea9cb0 upstream.

Breno and Josef report a deadlock scenario from cgroup reclaim
re-entering the filesystem:

[  361.546690] ======================================================
[  361.559210] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  361.571703] 6.5.0-0_fbk700_debug_rc0_kbuilder_13159_gbf787a128001 #1 Tainted: G S          E
[  361.589704] ------------------------------------------------------
[  361.602277] find/9315 is trying to acquire lock:
[  361.611625] ffff88837ba140c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x68/0x4f0
[  361.631437]
[  361.631437] but task is already holding lock:
[  361.643243] ffff8881765b8678 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x1e/0x40

[  362.904457]  mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x30
[  362.912414]  __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x68/0x4f0
[  362.922460]  btrfs_evict_inode+0x301/0x770
[  362.982726]  evict+0x17c/0x380
[  362.988944]  prune_icache_sb+0x100/0x1d0
[  363.005559]  super_cache_scan+0x1f8/0x260
[  363.013695]  do_shrink_slab+0x2a2/0x540
[  363.021489]  shrink_slab_memcg+0x237/0x3d0
[  363.050606]  shrink_slab+0xa7/0x240
[  363.083382]  shrink_node_memcgs+0x262/0x3b0
[  363.091870]  shrink_node+0x1a4/0x720
[  363.099150]  shrink_zones+0x1f6/0x5d0
[  363.148798]  do_try_to_free_pages+0x19b/0x5e0
[  363.157633]  try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages+0x266/0x370
[  363.190575]  reclaim_high+0x16f/0x1f0
[  363.208409]  mem_cgroup_handle_over_high+0x10b/0x270
[  363.246678]  try_charge_memcg+0xaf2/0xc70
[  363.304151]  charge_memcg+0xf0/0x350
[  363.320070]  __mem_cgroup_charge+0x28/0x40
[  363.328371]  __filemap_add_folio+0x870/0xd50
[  363.371303]  filemap_add_folio+0xdd/0x310
[  363.399696]  __filemap_get_folio+0x2fc/0x7d0
[  363.419086]  pagecache_get_page+0xe/0x30
[  363.427048]  alloc_extent_buffer+0x1cd/0x6a0
[  363.435704]  read_tree_block+0x43/0xc0
[  363.443316]  read_block_for_search+0x361/0x510
[  363.466690]  btrfs_search_slot+0xc8c/0x1520

This is caused by the mem_cgroup_handle_over_high() not respecting the
gfp_mask of the allocation context.  We used to only call this function on
resume to userspace, where no locks were held.  But c9afe31 ("memcg:
synchronously enforce memory.high for large overcharges") added a call
from the allocation context without considering the gfp.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c9afe31 ("memcg: synchronously enforce memory.high for large overcharges")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>	[5.17+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@fdmanana @gregkh
btrfs: fix race between reading a directory and adding entries to it
ef1054f 
commit 8e7f82d upstream.

When opening a directory (opendir(3)) or rewinding it (rewinddir(3)), we
are not holding the directory's inode locked, and this can result in later
attempting to add two entries to the directory with the same index number,
resulting in a transaction abort, with -EEXIST (-17), when inserting the
second delayed dir index. This results in a trace like the following:

  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: BTRFS error (device dm-3): err add delayed dir index item(name: cockroach-stderr.log) into the insertion tree of the delayed node(root id: 5, inode id: 4539217, errno: -17)
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1504!
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 7159 Comm: cockroach Not tainted 6.4.15-200.fc38.x86_64 #1
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: Hardware name: ASUS ESC500 G3/P9D WS, BIOS 2402 06/27/2018
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RIP: 0010:btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: Code: eb dd 48 (...)
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RSP: 0000:ffffa9980e0fbb28 EFLAGS: 00010282
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b10b8f4a3c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8b177ec21540 RDI: ffff8b177ec21540
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RBP: ffff8b110cf80888 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa9980e0fb938
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff86146508 R12: 0000000000000014
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: R13: ffff8b1131ae5b40 R14: ffff8b10b8f4a418 R15: 00000000ffffffef
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: FS:  00007fb14a7fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff8b177ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: CR2: 000000c00143d000 CR3: 00000001b3b4e002 CR4: 00000000001706f0
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: Call Trace:
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  <TASK>
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? die+0x36/0x90
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? do_trap+0xda/0x100
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  btrfs_insert_dir_item+0x200/0x280
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  btrfs_add_link+0xab/0x4f0
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? ktime_get_real_ts64+0x47/0xe0
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  btrfs_create_new_inode+0x7cd/0xa80
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  btrfs_symlink+0x190/0x4d0
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? schedule+0x5e/0xd0
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? __d_lookup+0x7e/0xc0
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  vfs_symlink+0x148/0x1e0
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  do_symlinkat+0x130/0x140
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  __x64_sys_symlinkat+0x3d/0x50
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
  Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel:  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

The race leading to the problem happens like this:

1) Directory inode X is loaded into memory, its ->index_cnt field is
   initialized to (u64)-1 (at btrfs_alloc_inode());

2) Task A is adding a new file to directory X, holding its vfs inode lock,
   and calls btrfs_set_inode_index() to get an index number for the entry.

   Because the inode's index_cnt field is set to (u64)-1 it calls
   btrfs_inode_delayed_dir_index_count() which fails because no dir index
   entries were added yet to the delayed inode and then it calls
   btrfs_set_inode_index_count(). This functions finds the last dir index
   key and then sets index_cnt to that index value + 1. It found that the
   last index key has an offset of 100. However before it assigns a value
   of 101 to index_cnt...

3) Task B calls opendir(3), ending up at btrfs_opendir(), where the VFS
   lock for inode X is not taken, so it calls btrfs_get_dir_last_index()
   and sees index_cnt still with a value of (u64)-1. Because of that it
   calls btrfs_inode_delayed_dir_index_count() which fails since no dir
   index entries were added to the delayed inode yet, and then it also
   calls btrfs_set_inode_index_count(). This also finds that the last
   index key has an offset of 100, and before it assigns the value 101
   to the index_cnt field of inode X...

4) Task A assigns a value of 101 to index_cnt. And then the code flow
   goes to btrfs_set_inode_index() where it increments index_cnt from
   101 to 102. Task A then creates a delayed dir index entry with a
   sequence number of 101 and adds it to the delayed inode;

5) Task B assigns 101 to the index_cnt field of inode X;

6) At some later point when someone tries to add a new entry to the
   directory, btrfs_set_inode_index() will return 101 again and shortly
   after an attempt to add another delayed dir index key with index
   number 101 will fail with -EEXIST resulting in a transaction abort.

Fix this by locking the inode at btrfs_get_dir_last_index(), which is only
only used when opening a directory or attempting to lseek on it.

Reported-by: ken <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAE6xmH+Lp=Q=E61bU+v9eWX8gYfLvu6jLYxjxjFpo3zHVPR0EQ@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
Fixes: 9b378f6 ("btrfs: fix infinite directory reads")
CC: [email protected] # 6.5+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@biger410 @gregkh
scsi: target: core: Fix deadlock due to recursive locking
5a44dd7 
[ Upstream commit a154f5f ]

The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of
mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and
second in target_free_device().

 PID: 148266   TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00  CPU: 10   COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx"
  #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f
  #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224
  #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee
  #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7
  #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3
  #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c
  torvalds#6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod]
  torvalds#7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod]
  torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f
  torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583
 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc
 torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07
 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080
 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364

Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion")
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@wangxiaoningnxp @gregkh
net: stmmac: platform: fix the incorrect parameter
135042b 
[ Upstream commit 6b09edc ]

The second parameter of stmmac_pltfr_init() needs the pointer of
"struct plat_stmmacenet_data". So, correct the parameter typo when calling the
function.

Otherwise, it may cause this alignment exception when doing suspend/resume.
[   49.067201] CPU1 is up
[   49.135258] Internal error: SP/PC alignment exception: 000000008a000000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[   49.143346] Modules linked in: soc_imx9 crct10dif_ce polyval_ce nvmem_imx_ocotp_fsb_s400 polyval_generic layerscape_edac_mod snd_soc_fsl_asoc_card snd_soc_imx_audmux snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_wm8962 el_enclave snd_soc_fsl_micfil rtc_pcf2127 rtc_pcf2131 flexcan can_dev snd_soc_fsl_xcvr snd_soc_fsl_sai imx8_media_dev(C) snd_soc_fsl_utils fuse
[   49.173393] CPU: 0 PID: 565 Comm: sh Tainted: G         C         6.5.0-rc4-next-20230804-05047-g5781a6249dae torvalds#677
[   49.183721] Hardware name: NXP i.MX93 11X11 EVK board (DT)
[   49.189190] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   49.196140] pc : 0x80800052
[   49.198931] lr : stmmac_pltfr_resume+0x34/0x50
[   49.203368] sp : ffff800082f8bab0
[   49.206670] x29: ffff800082f8bab0 x28: ffff0000047d0ec0 x27: ffff80008186c170
[   49.213794] x26: 0000000b5e4ff1ba x25: ffff800081e5fa74 x24: 0000000000000010
[   49.220918] x23: ffff800081fe0000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000
[   49.228042] x20: ffff0000001b4010 x19: ffff0000001b4010 x18: 0000000000000006
[   49.235166] x17: ffff7ffffe007000 x16: ffff800080000000 x15: 0000000000000000
[   49.242290] x14: 00000000000000fc x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[   49.249414] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000a60 x9 : ffff800082f8b8c0
[   49.256538] x8 : 0000000000000008 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000005f54a200
[   49.263662] x5 : 0000000001000000 x4 : ffff800081b93680 x3 : ffff800081519be0
[   49.270786] x2 : 0000000080800052 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000001b4000
[   49.277911] Call trace:
[   49.280346]  0x80800052
[   49.282781]  platform_pm_resume+0x2c/0x68
[   49.286785]  dpm_run_callback.constprop.0+0x74/0x134
[   49.291742]  device_resume+0x88/0x194
[   49.295391]  dpm_resume+0x10c/0x230
[   49.298866]  dpm_resume_end+0x18/0x30
[   49.302515]  suspend_devices_and_enter+0x2b8/0x624
[   49.307299]  pm_suspend+0x1fc/0x348
[   49.310774]  state_store+0x80/0x104
[   49.314258]  kobj_attr_store+0x18/0x2c
[   49.318002]  sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54
[   49.321659]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x120/0x1ec
[   49.326088]  vfs_write+0x1bc/0x300
[   49.329485]  ksys_write+0x70/0x104
[   49.332874]  __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
[   49.336783]  invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
[   49.340527]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xe4
[   49.345224]  do_el0_svc+0x38/0x98
[   49.348526]  el0_svc+0x2c/0x84
[   49.351568]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c
[   49.355910]  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
[   49.359567] Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? (????????)
[   49.365644] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 97117eb ("net: stmmac: platform: provide stmmac_pltfr_init()")
Signed-off-by: Clark Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Semin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@shayshyi @gregkh
RDMA/mlx5: Fix mkey cache possible deadlock on cleanup
42ec848 
commit 374012b upstream.

Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the
workqueue without holding the rb_lock.
This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which
we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started.

Lockdep:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted
 [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------
 [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock:
 [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900
 [ 2785.343403 ]
 [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock:
 [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.346273 ]
 [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock.
 [ 2785.346273 ]
 [ 2785.347720 ]
 [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
 [ 2785.349003 ]
 [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
 [ 2785.350160 ]        __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0
 [ 2785.350962 ]        delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.352044 ]        process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310
 [ 2785.352879 ]        worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0
 [ 2785.353636 ]        kthread+0x28f/0x330
 [ 2785.354370 ]        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
 [ 2785.355135 ]
 [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
 [ 2785.356515 ]        __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0
 [ 2785.357349 ]        lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540
 [ 2785.358121 ]        __flush_work+0xe8/0x900
 [ 2785.358852 ]        __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0
 [ 2785.359711 ]        mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.360781 ]        mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.361969 ]        __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.362960 ]        mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.363870 ]        auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
 [ 2785.364715 ]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
 [ 2785.365695 ]        bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560
 [ 2785.366525 ]        device_del+0x492/0xb80
 [ 2785.367276 ]        mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.368615 ]        mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.369934 ]        mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.371292 ]        devlink_reload+0x439/0x590
 [ 2785.372075 ]        devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0
 [ 2785.372973 ]        genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290
 [ 2785.374011 ]        genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0
 [ 2785.374798 ]        netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
 [ 2785.375612 ]        genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
 [ 2785.376295 ]        netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710
 [ 2785.377121 ]        netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0
 [ 2785.377926 ]        sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
 [ 2785.378668 ]        __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290
 [ 2785.379440 ]        __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
 [ 2785.380255 ]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
 [ 2785.381031 ]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
 [ 2785.381967 ]
 [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this:
 [ 2785.381967 ]
 [ 2785.383448 ]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
 [ 2785.383448 ]
 [ 2785.384544 ]        CPU0                    CPU1
 [ 2785.385383 ]        ----                    ----
 [ 2785.386193 ]   lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock);
 [ 2785.386940 ]				lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work));
 [ 2785.388327 ]				lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock);
 [ 2785.389425 ]   lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work));
 [ 2785.390414 ]
 [ 2785.390414 ]  *** DEADLOCK ***
 [ 2785.390414 ]
 [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872:
 [ 2785.392341 ]  #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40
 [ 2785.393630 ]  #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0
 [ 2785.395324 ]  #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.397322 ]  #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.399231 ]  #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600
 [ 2785.400864 ]  #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib]

Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree")
Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@r-c-n @gregkh
usb: hub: Guard against accesses to uninitialized BOS descriptors
136f69a 
commit f74a7af upstream.

Many functions in drivers/usb/core/hub.c and drivers/usb/core/hub.h
access fields inside udev->bos without checking if it was allocated and
initialized. If usb_get_bos_descriptor() fails for whatever
reason, udev->bos will be NULL and those accesses will result in a
crash:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 17818 Comm: kworker/5:1 Tainted: G W 5.15.108-18910-gab0e1cb584e1 #1 <HASH:1f9e 1>
Hardware name: Google Kindred/Kindred, BIOS Google_Kindred.12672.413.0 02/03/2021
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:hub_port_reset+0x193/0x788
Code: 89 f7 e8 20 f7 15 00 48 8b 43 08 80 b8 96 03 00 00 03 75 36 0f b7 88 92 03 00 00 81 f9 10 03 00 00 72 27 48 8b 80 a8 03 00 00 <48> 83 78 18 00 74 19 48 89 df 48 8b 75 b0 ba 02 00 00 00 4c 89 e9
RSP: 0018:ffffab740c53fcf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa1bc5f678000 RCX: 0000000000000310
RDX: fffffffffffffdff RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa1be9655b840
RBP: ffffab740c53fd70 R08: 00001b7d5edaa20c R09: ffffffffb005e060
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffab740c53fd3e R14: 0000000000000032 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa1be96540000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000022e80c005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
Call Trace:
hub_event+0x73f/0x156e
? hub_activate+0x5b7/0x68f
process_one_work+0x1a2/0x487
worker_thread+0x11a/0x288
kthread+0x13a/0x152
? process_one_work+0x487/0x487
? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x70/0x70
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fall back to a default behavior if the BOS descriptor isn't accessible
and skip all the functionalities that depend on it: LPM support checks,
Super Speed capabilitiy checks, U1/U2 states setup.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Cañuelo <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@zackr @gregkh
drm/vmwgfx: Keep a gem reference to user bos in surfaces
1474b39 
commit 91398b4 upstream.

Surfaces can be backed (i.e. stored in) memory objects (mob's) which
are created and managed by the userspace as GEM buffers. Surfaces
grab only a ttm reference which means that the gem object can
be deleted underneath us, especially in cases where prime buffer
export is used.

Make sure that all userspace surfaces which are backed by gem objects
hold a gem reference to make sure they're not deleted before vmw
surfaces are done with them, which fixes:
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2632 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
Modules linked in: overlay vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock snd_ens1371 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm gameport>
CPU: 2 PID: 2632 Comm: vmw_ref_count Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2-vmwgfx #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
Code: eb 9e 0f b6 1d 8b 5b a6 01 80 fb 01 0f 87 ba e4 80 00 83 e3 01 75 89 48 c7 c7 c0 3c f9 a3 c6 05 6f 5b a6 01 01 e8 15 81 98 ff <0f> 0b e9 6f ff ff ff 0f b>
RSP: 0018:ffffbdc34344bba0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ffff960475ea1548 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff960475ea1540
RBP: ffffbdc34344bba8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 65646e75203a745f
R10: ffffffffa5b32b20 R11: 72657466612d6573 R12: ffff96037d6a6400
R13: ffff9603484805b0 R14: 000000000000000b R15: ffff9603bed06060
FS:  00007f5fd8520c40(0000) GS:ffff960475e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f5fda755000 CR3: 000000010d012005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? show_regs+0x6e/0x80
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
 ? __warn+0x91/0x150
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
 ? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0
 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
 drm_gem_object_handle_put_unlocked+0xba/0x110 [drm]
 drm_gem_object_release_handle+0x6e/0x80 [drm]
 drm_gem_handle_delete+0x6a/0xc0 [drm]
 ? __pfx_vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx]
 vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x33/0x40 [vmwgfx]
 drm_ioctl_kernel+0xbc/0x160 [drm]
 drm_ioctl+0x2d2/0x580 [drm]
 ? __pfx_vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx]
 ? do_vmi_munmap+0xee/0x180
 vmw_generic_ioctl+0xbd/0x180 [vmwgfx]
 vmw_unlocked_ioctl+0x19/0x20 [vmwgfx]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x99/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2a/0x50
 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
 ? handle_mm_fault+0x16e/0x2f0
 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x34/0x170
 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xd/0x20
 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50
 ? exc_page_fault+0x8e/0x190
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
RIP: 0033:0x7f5fda51aaff
Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 7>
RSP: 002b:00007ffd536a4d30 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd536a4de0 RCX: 00007f5fda51aaff
RDX: 00007ffd536a4de0 RSI: 0000000040086442 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000040086442 R08: 000055fa603ada50 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd536a51b8
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055fa5ebb4c80 R15: 00007f5fda90f040
 </TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

A lot of the analyis on the bug was done by Murray McAllister and
Ian Forbes.

Reported-by: Murray McAllister <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Forbes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <[email protected]>
Fixes: a950b98 ("drm/vmwgfx: Do not drop the reference to the handle too soon")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v6.2+
Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@athira-rajeev @gregkh
powerpc/pseries: Fix STK_PARAM access in the hcall tracing code
e28ca99 
commit 3b67876 upstream.

In powerpc pseries system, below behaviour is observed while
enabling tracing on hcall:
  # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/
  # cat events/powerpc/hcall_exit/enable
  0
  # echo 1 > events/powerpc/hcall_exit/enable

  # ls
  -bash: fork: Bad address

Above is from power9 lpar with latest kernel. Past this, softlockup
is observed. Initially while attempting via perf_event_open to
use "PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT", kernel panic was observed.

perf config used:
================
  memset(&pe[1],0,sizeof(struct perf_event_attr));
  pe[1].type=PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT;
  pe[1].size=96;
  pe[1].config=0x26ULL; /* 38 raw_syscalls/sys_exit */
  pe[1].sample_type=0; /* 0 */
  pe[1].read_format=PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED|PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_RUNNING|PERF_FORMAT_ID|PERF_FORMAT_GROUP|0x10ULL; /* 1f */
  pe[1].inherit=1;
  pe[1].precise_ip=0; /* arbitrary skid */
  pe[1].wakeup_events=0;
  pe[1].bp_type=HW_BREAKPOINT_EMPTY;
  pe[1].config1=0x1ULL;

Kernel panic logs:
==================

  Kernel attempted to read user page (8) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000008
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004c2814
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in: nfnetlink bonding tls rfkill sunrpc dm_service_time dm_multipath pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
  CPU: 0 PID: 1431 Comm: login Not tainted 6.4.0+ #1
  Hardware name: IBM,8375-42A POWER9 (raw) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.30 (VL950_892) hv:phyp pSeries
  NIP page_remove_rmap+0x44/0x320
  LR  wp_page_copy+0x384/0xec0
  Call Trace:
    0xc00000001416e400 (unreliable)
    wp_page_copy+0x384/0xec0
    __handle_mm_fault+0x9d4/0xfb0
    handle_mm_fault+0xf0/0x350
    ___do_page_fault+0x48c/0xc90
    hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x70
    do_hash_fault+0x1a4/0x330
    data_access_common_virt+0x198/0x1f0
   --- interrupt: 300 at 0x7fffae971abc

git bisect tracked this down to below commit:
'commit baa49d8 ("powerpc/pseries: hvcall stack frame overhead")'

This commit changed STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD (112 ) to
STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE (32 ) since 32 bytes is the minimum size
for ELFv2 stack. With the latest kernel, when running on ELFv2,
STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE is used to allocate stack size.

During plpar_hcall_trace, first call is made to HCALL_INST_PRECALL
which saves the registers and allocates new stack frame. In the
plpar_hcall_trace code, STK_PARAM is accessed at two places.
  1. To save r4: std     r4,STK_PARAM(R4)(r1)
  2. To access r4 back: ld      r12,STK_PARAM(R4)(r1)

HCALL_INST_PRECALL precall allocates a new stack frame. So all
the stack parameter access after the precall, needs to be accessed
with +STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE. So the store instruction should be:
  std     r4,STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE+STK_PARAM(R4)(r1)

If the "std" is not updated with STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE, we will
end up with overwriting stack contents and cause corruption.
But instead of updating 'std', we can instead remove it since
HCALL_INST_PRECALL already saves it to the correct location.

similarly load instruction should be:
  ld      r12,STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE+STK_PARAM(R4)(r1)

Fix the load instruction to correctly access the stack parameter
with +STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE and remove the store of r4 since the
precall saves it correctly.

Cc: [email protected] # v6.2+
Fixes: baa49d8 ("powerpc/pseries: hvcall stack frame overhead")
Co-developed-by: Naveen N Rao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@mpe @gregkh
powerpc/47x: Fix 47x syscall return crash
70f6756 
commit f0eee81 upstream.

Eddie reported that newer kernels were crashing during boot on his 476
FSP2 system:

  kernel tried to execute user page (b7ee2000) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  BUG: Unable to handle kernel instruction fetch
  Faulting instruction address: 0xb7ee2000
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  BE PAGE_SIZE=4K FSP-2
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 61 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.55-d23900f.ppcnf-fsp2 #1
  Hardware name: ibm,fsp2 476fpe 0x7ff520c0 FSP-2
  NIP:  b7ee2000 LR: 8c008000 CTR: 00000000
  REGS: bffebd83 TRAP: 0400   Not tainted (6.1.55-d23900f.ppcnf-fs p2)
  MSR:  00000030 <IR,DR>  CR: 00001000  XER: 20000000
  GPR00: c00110ac bffebe63 bffebe7e bffebe88 8c008000 00001000 00000d12 b7ee2000
  GPR08: 00000033 00000000 00000000 c139df10 48224824 1016c314 10160000 00000000
  GPR16: 10160000 10160000 00000008 00000000 10160000 00000000 10160000 1017f5b0
  GPR24: 1017fa50 1017f4f0 1017fa50 1017f740 1017f630 00000000 00000000 1017f4f0
  NIP [b7ee2000] 0xb7ee2000
  LR [8c008000] 0x8c008000
  Call Trace:
  Instruction dump:
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The problem is in ret_from_syscall where the check for
icache_44x_need_flush is done. When the flush is needed the code jumps
out-of-line to do the flush, and then intends to jump back to continue
the syscall return.

However the branch back to label 1b doesn't return to the correct
location, instead branching back just prior to the return to userspace,
causing bogus register values to be used by the rfi.

The breakage was introduced by commit 6f76a01
("powerpc/syscall: implement system call entry/exit logic in C for PPC32") which
inadvertently removed the "1" label and reused it elsewhere.

Fix it by adding named local labels in the correct locations. Note that
the return label needs to be outside the ifdef so that CONFIG_PPC_47x=n
compiles.

Fixes: 6f76a01 ("powerpc/syscall: implement system call entry/exit logic in C for PPC32")
Cc: [email protected] # v5.12+
Reported-by: Eddie James <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Eddie James <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
wmamills pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2023
@PiyushXilinx @gregkh
usb: gadget: udc-xilinx: replace memcpy with memcpy_toio
098bc05 
commit 3061b64 upstream.

For ARM processor, unaligned access to device memory is not allowed.
Method memcpy does not take care of alignment.

USB detection failure with the unalingned address of memory, with
below kernel crash. To fix the unalingned address kernel panic,
replace memcpy with memcpy_toio method.

Kernel crash:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80000c05008a
Mem abort info:
  ESR = 0x96000061
  EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
  SET = 0, FnV = 0
  EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
Data abort info:
  ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000061
  CM = 0, WnR = 1
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000000143b000
[ffff80000c05008a] pgd=100000087ffff003, p4d=100000087ffff003,
pud=100000087fffe003, pmd=1000000800bcc003, pte=00680000a0010713
Internal error: Oops: 96000061 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.19-xilinx-v2022.1 #1
Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.0 (DT)
pstate: 200000c5 (nzCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __memcpy+0x30/0x260
lr : __xudc_ep0_queue+0xf0/0x110
sp : ffff800008003d00
x29: ffff800008003d00 x28: ffff800009474e80 x27: 00000000000000a0
x26: 0000000000000100 x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff000800bc8080
x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000012 x21: ffff000800bc8080
x20: 0000000000000012 x19: ffff000800bc8080 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: ffff800876482000 x16: ffff800008004000 x15: 0000000000004000
x14: 00001f09785d0400 x13: 0103020101005567 x12: 0781400000000200
x11: 00000000c5672a10 x10: 00000000000008d0 x9 : ffff800009463cf0
x8 : ffff8000094757b0 x7 : 0201010055670781 x6 : 4000000002000112
x5 : ffff80000c05009a x4 : ffff000800a15012 x3 : ffff00080362ad80
x2 : 0000000000000012 x1 : ffff000800a15000 x0 : ffff80000c050088
Call trace:
 __memcpy+0x30/0x260
 xudc_ep0_queue+0x3c/0x60
 usb_ep_queue+0x38/0x44
 composite_ep0_queue.constprop.0+0x2c/0xc0
 composite_setup+0x8d0/0x185c
 configfs_composite_setup+0x74/0xb0
 xudc_irq+0x570/0xa40
 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x58/0x170
 handle_irq_event+0x60/0x120
 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc0/0x220
 handle_domain_irq+0x60/0x90
 gic_handle_irq+0x74/0xa0
 call_on_irq_stack+0x2c/0x60
 do_interrupt_handler+0x54/0x60
 el1_interrupt+0x30/0x50
 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
 el1h_64_irq+0x78/0x7c
 arch_cpu_idle+0x18/0x2c
 do_idle+0xdc/0x15c
 cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x60
 rest_init+0xc8/0xe0
 arch_call_rest_init+0x10/0x1c
 start_kernel+0x694/0x6d4
 __primary_switched+0xa4/0xac

Fixes: 1f7c516 ("usb: gadget: Add xilinx usb2 device support")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Piyush Mehta <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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2 participants
@arnopo @Nicolas62x