Merge branch 'master' into node-running-overview

arbitrum-docs/audit-reports.mdx

@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@
 | **Trail of Bits**       | 08/29/2024 | USDC Custom Gateway & ArbOS Timestamp Upgrade Action contract | [view](hosted-audit-reports/2024_08_29_trail_of_bits_security_audit_usdc_custom_gateway_and_arbos_upgrade_at_timestamp_action.pdf) |
 | **Trail of Bits**       | 08/29/2024 | Orbit & Governance Upgrade Actions Contracts v2.1             | [view](hosted-audit-reports/2024_08_29_trail_of_bits_security_audit_orbit_and_governance_upgrade_actions_v2.1.pdf)                 |
 | **Open Zeppelin**       | 09/05/2024 | Stylus Rust SDK                                               | [view](hosted-audit-reports/2024_09_05_open_zeppelin_security_audit_stylus_rust_sdk.pdf)                                           |
+| **Trail of Bits**       | 09/25/2024 | Timeboost Auction Contracts                                   | [view](hosted-audit-reports/2024_09_25_trail_of_bits_security_audit_timeboost_auction_contracts.pdf)                               |

arbitrum-docs/how-arbitrum-works/bold/gentle-introduction.md

@@ -86,54 +86,6 @@ Let’s dive in to an overview of how BoLD actually works.
 
 That’s it! We’ve now walked through each of the steps that validators will take to dispute challenges with the BoLD protocol. One final note here is that each of the steps explained above can take place concurrently and this is one of the reasons why BoLD can guarantee that disputes are resolved within a fixed time frame.
 
-## The Economics of Disputes in Arbitrum BoLD
-
-:::tip
-This section on BoLD's economics only applies to Arbitrum One, following the [BoLD DAO vote](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232). As always, Arbitrum Orbit chain owners have full discretion over whether they adopt BoLD and how to use BoLD for the benefit of their project & users. The structure for how BoLD is used for Arbitrum One (outlined below) can be used to inform decisions around how BoLD is used for your Orbit chain(s).
-:::
-
-Given that participation in BoLD is permissionless, it is recommended that the size of the bonds required to participate be high enough to disincentivize malicious actors from attacking Arbitrum One and Nova and to mitigate against spam (that would otherwise delay confirmations). High bonding values do not harm decentralization because (1) trustless bonding pools can be deployed permissionlessly to let the community open challenges and post assertions, and (2) any number of honest parties of unknown identities can emerge to bond their funds to the correct assertion and participate in the defense of Arbitrum at any time within a challenge. As with the current dispute resolution protocol, there are no protocol level incentives for parties who opt in to participate in validating Arbitrum One and Nova with BoLD. The bonds can be any ERC20 token and be set to any size for Arbitrum One and Nova, as determined by the Arbitrum DAO.
-
-BoLD lets validators permissionlessly become proposers and challengers if they want to. The role of a proposer is required to help progress the chain which requires bonding ETH, proposing and then posting state assertions to the parent chain. This bond is known as an “assertion bond”. The chain only needs 1 proposer to make progress. Therefore, most parties can watch the chain and independently verify assertions without being a proposer. In the unhappy case where there is a dispute about a proposed state assertion, BoLD lets anyone permissionlessly put up a bond of ETH to open challenges in the defense of Arbitrum (in their capacity as a challenger to invalid state assertions). This bond is known as a “challenge bond”.
-
-While both of these bonds can be any ERC20 token and be set to any size, this proposal recommends the use of the WETH ERC20 token & the following bond sizes:
-
-- Assertion bonds: 3600 ETH - required from validators to bond their funds to an assertion in the eventual hopes of having that assertion be confirmed by the rollup protocol. This is a one-time bond required to be able to start posting assertions. This bond can be withdrawn once a validator’s assertion is confirmed and can alternatively be put together via a trustless bonding pool.
-- Challenge-bonds, per level: 555/79 ETH (UPDATED) - required from validators to open challenges against an assertion observed on Ethereum, for each level. Note that “level” corresponds to the level of granularity at which the interactive dissection game gets played over, starting at the block level, moving on to a range of WASM execution steps, and then finally to the level of a single step of execution. These values were carefully calculated to optimize for the resource ratio and gas costs in the event of an attack, as explained in the [Economics of Disputes in Arbitrum BoLD](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/BoLD/blob/main/docs/research-specs/Economics.pdf) and the [BoLD whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.10491). This effectively means that an entity that has already put up a bond to propose an assertion does not need to put up a separate assertion bond to challenge an invalid state assertion that they observe. To be explicitly clear, a validator would still require 555 ETH and 79 ETH for on-going challenges. These additional challenge bond amounts are needed to participate in the interactive dispute game (back and forth) and narrows down the disagreement to a single step of execution that is then proven on Ethereum. The 555 ETH and 79 ETH challenge bonds can be put together via a trustless bonding pool, and does not all have to be put up by the validator that opened the challenge. These bonds can be refunded at the end of a challenge and can also alternatively be put together by the community using a trustless bonding pool.
-
-BoLD makes permissionless validation possible for Arbitrum rollup chains and marks a major step towards [full decentralization](https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/state-of-progressive-decentralization). This significant milestone also lays the groundwork for productive discussions about future economic incentives for those participating in the protocol since anyone can participate.
-
-### Reimbursements and penalties
-
-Once all of a validator’s proposed assertions are confirmed, a validator can withdraw their bond in full. Other costs spent by the honest parties to defend Arbitrum, such as the L1 gas costs and the challenge bonds, are fully refundable following confirmation of all sub-challenges. Challenge bonds will be automatically refundable in-protocol while L1 gas costs will be reimbursed by the Arbitrum Foundation using an off-chain procedure. All costs spent by malicious actors, including the assertion bond, are confiscated and sent to an Arbitrum DAO controlled address at the conclusion of a challenge. All eligible entities who wish to be paid a reward or be reimbursed by the Arbitrum DAO or the Arbitrum Foundation are expected to undergo the Arbitrum Foundation’s KYC process.
-
-#### Service fee for “Active” proposers
-
-A service fee is to be paid to active block-level proposers as a way of removing the disincentive for participation by honest parties who bond their own capital and propose assertions for Arbitrum One. The fee should be denominated in ETH and should correlate to the annualized income that Ethereum mainnet validators receive, over the same time period. At the time of writing, the estimated annual income for Ethereum mainnet validators is approximately 3% to 4% of their stake (based on [CoinDesk Indices Composite Ether Staking Rate (CESR) benchmark](https://www.coindesk.com/indices/ether/cesr) and [Rated.Network](https://explorer.rated.network/network?network=mainnet&timeWindow=all&rewardsMetric=average&geoDistType=all&hostDistType=all&soloProDist=stake)). This fee is not a “reward” for the same reasons why the protocol does not automatically reward honest parties with all the funds confiscated from a malicious actor.
-
-This service fee can be paid out upon an active proposer’s top-level assertion being confirmed on Ethereum and will be calculated using the duration of time that the proposer was considered active by the protocol. The procedure that calculates this will be handled off-chain by the Arbitrum Foundation. BoLD makes it permissionless for any validator to become a proposer and also introduces a way to pay a service fee to honest parties for locking up capital to do so. Validators are not considered active proposers until they successfully propose an assertion with a bond.
-
-In order to become an active proposer for Arbitrum One, post-BoLD, a validator has to propose an L2 state assertion to Ethereum. If they do not have an active bond on L1, they then need to attach a bond to their assertion in order to successfully post the assertion. Subsequent assertions posted by the same address will simply move the already-supplied bond to their latest proposed assertion. Meanwhile, if an entity, say Bob, has posted a successor assertion to one previously made by another entity, Alice, then Bob would be considered by the protocol to be the current active proposer. Alice would no longer be considered by the protocol as the active proposer and once Alice’s assertion is confirmed, then Alice gets her assertion bond refunded. There can only be 1 “active” proposer at any point in time.
-
-This service fee would not apply to entities that use the DAO’s funds to become a proposer, if the proposal passes. The DAO may choose, via governance, to fund other parties or change this reward or service fee model at any time.
-
-As mentioned above in Step 5, once all of a validator’s assertions are confirmed, a validator can withdraw their full assertion bond and have their challenge bonds refunded automatically. Funds from a malicious party will be confiscated and sent to the ArbitrumDAO treasury.
-
-#### Rewards and Reimbursements for Defenders - "Defender's Bounty"
-
-The service fee described above is meant to incentivize or reimburse an honest, active proposer for locking up their capital to propose assertions and advance the chain. Similarly, in the event of an attack, a reward is paid out to honest defenders using confiscated funds from malicious actors. This reward is defined as the "Defender's Bounty".
-
-Specifically, 1% (one percent) of the confiscated funds from a malicious actor is proposed to be rewarded to honest parties who deposit a challenge bond and post assertions as part of a sub-challenge, proportional to the amount that a defender has put up to defend a correct state assertion during the challenge. Note that any gas costs spent by honest parties to defend Arbitrum One during a challenge is 100% refundable by the Arbitrum Foundation. In this model, honest defenders and proposers of Arbitrum One stand are incentivized to participate while malicious actors stand to lose everything they spent attacking Arbitrum One.
-
-- How to reimburse the challenge bond and gas costs to honest parties, and
-- What to do with the funds confiscated from a malicious actor (including, but not limited to, rewarding the honest parties with a portion of the confiscated funds, burning the confiscated funds in its entirety, or sending the confiscated funds to the DAO treasury).
-
-Note that honest parties are not automatically rewarded with the funds confiscated from malicious actors to avoid creating a situation where honest parties wastefully compete to be the first one to make each honest move in the interactive fraud proof game. Additionally, BoLD resolves disputes by determining which top-level assertion is correct, without necessarily being able to classify every move as “honest” or “malicious” as part of the interactive fraud proof game without off-chain knowledge.
-
-Defenders are only eligible for this reward if they deposit a challenge bond (555 or 79 ETH, depending on the level), posted an on-chain assertion as part of a sub-challenge (i.e. not the top-level assertion), and have had their on-chain sub-challenge assertion get confirmed by the protocol. The calculation for this reward is conducted off-chain by the Arbitrum Foundation and payment will be made via an Arbitrum DAO vote (since confiscated funds go to a Arbitrum DAO-controlled address).
-
-The topic of further improvements and new economic and incentive models for BoLD are valuable and we believe it deserves the full focus and attention of the community via a separate proposal/discussion - decoupled from this proposal to bring BoLD to mainnet. Details around additional or new proposed economic or incentive models for BoLD will need continued research and development work, but the deployment of BoLD as-is represents a substantial improvement to the security of Arbitrum even without economic-related concerns resolved.
-
 ## What can I do with BoLD today?
 
 Today, BoLD is deployed on a public testnet using Ethereum Sepolia as a base layer for anyone to experiment with and test on. The intent behind this testnet is purely to demonstrate, first-hand, how disputes can effectively resolved by a single party in a fixed challenge period on Arbitrum chains. Feedback gained from developers, users, and researchers will help improve and strengthen BoLD’s design.

arbitrum-docs/launch-orbit-chain/aep-fee-router-introduction.mdx

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: 'The AEP fee router: introduction'
+sidebar_label: 'AEP fee router: overview'
+description: 'Learn what is the AEP fee router.'
+author: Midroni
+sme: Midroni
+user_story: As a current Orbit chain owner, I need to understand what the AEP fee router is.
+content_type: get-started
+---
+
+## What is the Arbitrum expansion program?
+
+The [Arbitrum Expansion Program](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-arbitrum-expansion-program-and-developer-guild/20722) (AEP) allows Orbit chains to deploy on *any chain*permissionlessly. As part of the [AEP license](https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/assets/files/Arbitrum%20Expansion%20Program%20Jan182024-4f08b0c2cb476a55dc153380fa3e64b0.pdf), Orbit chains deployed outside of Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova must pay 10% of their **Net Protocol Revenue** to the Arbitrum DAO.
+
+The Arbitrum Expansion Program and Developer Guild are initiatives launched in collaboration with Offchain Labs to promote the development of customized Arbitrum chains using the Orbit framework. The Expansion Program simplifies the process for teams to create Layer 2 (L2) and Layer 3 (L3) chains, offering self-service tools and customization options.
+Projects benefit from features like:
+
+- Dedicated block space
+- Custom gas tokens
+- Flexible governance.
+
+These chains can settle to any chain relying on the Ethereum security model.
+
+The Developer Guild incentivizes developers contributing to the Arbitrum codebase, with 2% of revenue from new chains going to a fund dedicated to this purpose. The Expansion Program is designed to align with Ethereum, encourage innovation, and enable projects to tailor the Arbitrum stack to their specific needs. The program also aims to streamline chain deployment, making it easier for developers to adopt Arbitrum's technology while contributing back to the community.
+
+As an Orbit chain owner, you may have the following questions:
+
+## How do I send my AEP fees from my Orbit chain to the Arbitrum DAO?
+
+Arbitrum provides Orbit chains with easily deployable smart contracts that can streamline the transfer of AEP Fees into the Arbitrum DAO treasury. These contracts are known as **AEP Fee Routers**.
+
+## What is net protocol revenue?
+
+Net Protocol Revenue is equivalent to an Orbit chain's profit (revenue minus costs).
+
+## How can I ensure I'm complying with the AEP license?
+
+The Arbitrum Foundation will track compliance based on fees received through the **AEP Fee Router**.
+
+## How can I set up an AEP fee router on my Orbit chain?
+
+You can learn how to set up your AEP fee router in [implementation guide](/launch-orbit-chain/how-tos/set-up-aep-fee-router.mdx).