Guard against workflow shell execution vulnerabilities #2341
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This is with regards to what happened to another project, ref: <https://www.wiz.io/blog/ultralytics-ai-library-hacked-via-github-for-cryptomining> Basically, do NOT trust that things like branch names don't contain any attempt at executing shell code if referenced in a workflow segment that runs a shell command.
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This is in reaction to what happened ref: https://www.wiz.io/blog/ultralytics-ai-library-hacked-via-github-for-cryptomining
I think I caught all the instances. I'd double-check the
windows-build.ymlchanges as the variable references are github-workflow style rather than shell. If what I did doesn't work you might have to explicitly assign the values to shell variables then use those with the"..."quoting.