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draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-05.xml
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draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-05.xml
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd">
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocompact="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="3"?>
<?rfc tocindent="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc comments="yes"?>
<?rfc inline="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-05"
ipr="trust200902">
<front>
<title abbrev="DOTS Signal Channel">Distributed Denial-of-Service Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel</title>
<author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy" initials="T." surname="Reddy">
<organization abbrev="McAfee">McAfee, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>Embassy Golf Link Business Park</street>
<city>Bangalore</city>
<region>Karnataka</region>
<code>560071</code>
<country>India</country>
</postal>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Mohamed Boucadair" initials="M." surname="Boucadair">
<organization>Orange</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city>Rennes</city>
<region></region>
<code>35000</code>
<country>France</country>
</postal>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Prashanth Patil" initials="P." surname="Patil">
<organization abbrev="Cisco">Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<country></country>
</postal>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Andrew Mortensen" initials="A." surname="Mortensen">
<organization>Arbor Networks, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>2727 S. State St</street>
<city>Ann Arbor, MI</city>
<region></region>
<code>48104</code>
<country>United States</country>
</postal>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Nik Teague" initials="N." surname="Teague">
<organization>Verisign, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country>United States</country>
</postal>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<date />
<workgroup>DOTS</workgroup>
<abstract>
<t>This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for
signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network traffic
mitigation on behalf of the requesting client. A companion document
defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable communication layer
for DOTS management and configuration.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="introduction" title="Introduction">
<t>A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In
most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough
end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the
attack. The victim in this attack can be an application server, a host,
a router, a firewall, or an entire network.</t>
<t>In many cases, it may not be possible for an network administrators
to determine the causes of an attack, but instead just realize that
certain resources seem to be under attack. This document defines a
lightweight protocol permitting a DOTS client to request mitigation from
one or more DOTS servers for protection against detected, suspected, or
anticipated attacks . This protocol enables cooperation between DOTS
agents to permit a highly-automated network defense that is robust,
reliable and secure.</t>
<t>The requirements for DOTS signal channel protocol are obtained from
<xref target="I-D.ietf-dots-requirements"></xref>.</t>
<t>This document satisfies all the use cases discussed in <xref
target="I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases"></xref> except the Third-party DOTS
notifications use case in Section 3.2.3 of <xref
target="I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases"></xref> which is an optional feature
and not a core use case. Third-party DOTS notifications are not part of
the DOTS requirements document. Moreover, the DOTS architecture does not
assess whether that use case may have an impact on the architecture
itself and/or the DOTS trust model.</t>
<t>This is a companion document to the DOTS data channel specification
<xref target="I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel"></xref> that defines a
configuration and bulk data exchange mechanism supporting the DOTS
signal channel.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="notation" title="Notational Conventions and Terminology">
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <xref
target="RFC2119"></xref>.</t>
<t>(D)TLS: For brevity this term is used for statements that apply to
both Transport Layer Security <xref target="RFC5246"></xref> and
Datagram Transport Layer Security <xref target="RFC6347"></xref>.
Specific terms will be used for any statement that applies to either
protocol alone.</t>
<t>The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in <xref
target="I-D.ietf-dots-architecture"></xref>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Solution Overview">
<t>Network applications have finite resources like CPU cycles, number of
processes or threads they can create and use, maximum number of
simultaneous connections it can handle, limited resources of the control
plane, etc. When processing network traffic, such applications are
supposed to use these resources to offer the intended task in the most
efficient fashion. However, an attacker may be able to prevent an
application from performing its intended task by causing the application
to exhaust the finite supply of a specific resource.</t>
<t>TCP DDoS SYN-flood, for example, is a memory-exhaustion attack on the
victim and ACK-flood is a CPU exhaustion attack on the victim (<xref
target="RFC4987"></xref>). Attacks on the link are carried out by
sending enough traffic such that the link becomes excessively congested,
and legitimate traffic suffers high packet loss. Stateful firewalls can
also be attacked by sending traffic that causes the firewall to hold
excessive state. The firewall then runs out of memory, and can no longer
instantiate the state required to pass legitimate flows. Other possible
DDoS attacks are discussed in <xref target="RFC4732"></xref>.</t>
<t>In each of the cases described above, the possible arrangements
between the DOTS client and DOTS server to mitigate the attack are
discussed in <xref target="I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases"></xref>. An example
of network diagram showing a deployment of these elements is shown in
<xref target="fig1"></xref>. Architectural relationships between
involved DOTS agents is explained in <xref
target="I-D.ietf-dots-architecture"></xref>. In this example, the DOTS
server is operating on the access network.</t>
<t><figure anchor="fig1" title="Sample DOTS Deployment (1)">
<artwork align="center"><![CDATA[
Network
Resource CPE router Access network __________
+-----------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ / \
| |____| |_______| |___ | Internet |
|DOTS client| | DOTS gateway | | DOTS server | | |
| | | | | | | |
+-----------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ \__________/
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
<t>The DOTS server can also be running on the Internet, as depicted in
<xref target="fig_blah"></xref>.</t>
<figure anchor="fig_blah" title="Sample DOTS Deployment (2)">
<artwork align="center"><![CDATA[
Network DDoS mitigation
Resource CPE router __________ service
+-----------+ +-------------+ / \ +-------------+
| |____| |_______| |___ | |
|DOTS client| |DOTS gateway | | Internet | | DOTS server |
| | | | | | | |
+-----------+ +-------------+ \__________/ +-------------+
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t></t>
<t>In typical deployments, the DOTS client belongs to a different
administrative domain than the DOTS server. For example, the DOTS client
is a firewall protecting services owned and operated by an domain, while
the DOTS server is owned and operated by a different domain providing
DDoS mitigation services. That domain providing DDoS mitigation service
might, or might not, also provide Internet access service to the website
operator.</t>
<t>The DOTS server may (not) be co-located with the DOTS mitigator. In
typical deployments, the DOTS server belongs to the same administrative
domain as the mitigator.</t>
<t>The DOTS client can communicate directly with the DOTS server or
indirectly via a DOTS gateway.</t>
<t>This document focuses on the DOTS signal channel.</t>
</section>
<section title="Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel">
<t>DOTS signaling can happen with DTLS <xref target="RFC6347"></xref>
over UDP and TLS <xref target="RFC5246"></xref> over TCP. A DOTS client
can use DNS to determine the IP address(es) of a DOTS server or a DOTS
client may be provided with the list of DOTS server IP addresses. The
DOTS client MUST know a DOTS server's domain name; hard-coding the
domain name of the DOTS server into software is NOT RECOMMENDED in case
the domain name is not valid or needs to change for legal or other
reasons. The DOTS client performs A and/or AAAA record lookup of the
domain name and the result will be a list of IP addresses, each of which
can be used to contact the DOTS server using UDP and TCP.</t>
<t>If an IPv4 path to reach a DOTS server is found, but the DOTS
server's IPv6 path is not working, a dual-stack DOTS client can
experience a significant connection delay compared to an IPv4-only DOTS
client. The other problem is that if a middlebox between the DOTS client
and DOTS server is configured to block UDP, the DOTS client will fail to
establish a DTLS session with the DOTS server and will, then, have to
fall back to TLS over TCP incurring significant connection delays. <xref
target="I-D.ietf-dots-requirements"></xref> discusses that DOTS client
and server will have to support both connectionless and
connection-oriented protocols.</t>
<t>To overcome these connection setup problems, the DOTS client can try
connecting to the DOTS server using both IPv6 and IPv4, and try both
DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP in a fashion similar to the Happy
Eyeballs mechanism <xref target="RFC6555"></xref>. These connection
attempts are performed by the DOTS client when its initializes, and the
client uses that information for its subsequent alert to the DOTS
server. In order of preference (most preferred first), it is UDP over
IPv6, UDP over IPv4, TCP over IPv6, and finally TCP over IPv4, which
adheres to <xref target="RFC6724">address preference order</xref> and
the DOTS preference that UDP be used over TCP (to avoid TCP's head of
line blocking).</t>
<t><figure anchor="fig_happy_eyeballs" title="Happy Eyeballs">
<artwork align="center"><![CDATA[
DOTS client DOTS server
| |
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv6 ---->X |
|--TCP SYN, IPv6-------------->X |
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv4 ---->X |
|--TCP SYN, IPv4----------------------------------------->|
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv6 ---->X |
|--TCP SYN, IPv6-------------->X |
|<-TCP SYNACK---------------------------------------------|
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv4 ---->X |
|--TCP ACK----------------------------------------------->|
|<------------Establish TLS Session---------------------->|
|----------------DOTS signal----------------------------->|
| |
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
<t>In reference to <xref target="fig_happy_eyeballs"></xref>, the DOTS
client sends two TCP SYNs and two DTLS ClientHello messages at the same
time over IPv6 and IPv4. In this example, it is assumed that the IPv6
path is broken and UDP is dropped by a middle box but has little impact
to the DOTS client because there is no long delay before using IPv4 and
TCP. The DOTS client repeats the mechanism to discover if DOTS signaling
with DTLS over UDP becomes available from the DOTS server, so the DOTS
client can migrate the DOTS signal channel from TCP to UDP, but such
probing SHOULD NOT be done more frequently than every 24 hours and MUST
NOT be done more frequently than every 5 minutes.</t>
</section>
<section title="DOTS Signal Channel">
<section title="Overview">
<t>The DOTS signal channel is built on top of the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) <xref target="RFC7252"></xref>, a
lightweight protocol originally designed for constrained devices and
networks. CoAP’s expectation of packet loss, support for
asynchronous non-confirmable messaging, congestion control, small
message overhead limiting the need for fragmentation, use of minimal
resources, and support for (D)TLS make it a good foundation on which
to build the DOTS signaling mechanism.</t>
<t>The DOTS signal channel is layered on existing standards (<xref
target="fig_dots"></xref>).</t>
<t><list style="empty">
<t>TBD: The default port number for DOTS signal channel is 5684
(Section 12.7 of <xref target="RFC7252"></xref> and Section 10.4
of <xref target="I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls"></xref>), for both
UDP and TCP.</t>
</list></t>
<t><figure anchor="fig_dots"
title="Abstract Layering of DOTS signal channel over CoAP over (D)TLS">
<artwork align="center"><![CDATA[ +--------------+
| DOTS |
+--------------+
| CoAP |
+--------------+
| TLS | DTLS |
+--------------+
| TCP | UDP |
+--------------+
| IP |
+--------------+
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
<t>The signal channel is initiated by the DOTS client. Once the signal
channel is established, the DOTS agents periodically send heartbeats
to keep the channel active. At any time, the DOTS client may send a
mitigation request message to the DOTS server over the active channel.
While mitigation is active, the DOTS server periodically sends status
messages to the client, including basic mitigation feedback details.
Mitigation remains active until the DOTS client explicitly terminates
mitigation, or the mitigation lifetime expires.</t>
<t>Messages exchanged between DOTS client and server are serialized
using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) <xref
target="RFC7049"></xref>, CBOR is a binary encoding designed for small
code and message size. CBOR encoded payloads are used to convey signal
channel specific payload messages that convey request parameters and
response information such as errors. This specification uses the
encoding rules defined in <xref
target="I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor"></xref> for representing mitigation
scope and DOTS signal channel session configuration data defined using
YANG (<xref target="YANG"></xref>) as CBOR data.</t>
<t>DOTS agents MUST support GET, PUT, and DELETE CoAP methods. The
payload included in CoAP responses with 2.xx and 3.xx Response Codes
MUST be of content type "application/cbor" (Section 5.5.1 of <xref
target="RFC7252"></xref>). CoAP responses with 4.xx and 5.xx error
Response Codes MUST include a diagnostic payload (Section 5.5.2 of
<xref target="RFC7252"></xref>). The Diagnostic Payload may contain
additional information to aid troubleshooting.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="YANG" title="DOTS Signal YANG Module">
<t>This document defines a YANG <xref target="RFC6020"></xref> module
for mitigation scope and DOTS signal channel session configuration
data.</t>
<section title="Mitigation Request YANG Module Tree Structure">
<t>This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal", which
has the following tree structure:<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[module: ietf-dots-signal
+--rw mitigation-scope
+--rw client-identifier* binary
+--rw scope* [mitigation-id]
+--rw mitigation-id int32
+--rw target-ip* inet:ip-address
+--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
+--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
| +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| +--rw upper-port inet:port-number
+--rw target-protocol* uint8
+--rw fqdn* inet:domain-name
+--rw uri* inet:uri
+--rw alias-name* string
+--rw lifetime? int32
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
</section>
<section title="Mitigation Request YANG Module ">
<t><figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[<CODE BEGINS> file "[email protected]"
module ietf-dots-signal {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal";
prefix "signal";
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix "inet";
}
organization "IETF DOTS Working Group";
contact
"Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <[email protected]>
Mohamed Boucadair <[email protected]>
Prashanth Patil <[email protected]>
Andrew Mortensen <[email protected]>
Nik Teague <[email protected]>";
description
"This module contains YANG definition for DOTS
signal sent by the DOTS client to the DOTS server.
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2017-10-04 {
description
"Add units and fix some nits.";
reference
"-05";
}
revision 2017-08-03 {
reference
"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel";
}
container mitigation-scope {
description
"Top level container for a mitigation request.";
leaf-list client-identifier {
type binary;
description
"A client identifier conveyed by a DOTS gateway
to a remote DOTS server.";
}
list scope {
key mitigation-id;
description "Identifier for the mitigation request.";
leaf mitigation-id {
type int32;
description "Mitigation request identifier.";
}
leaf-list target-ip {
type inet:ip-address;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 address identifying the target.";
}
leaf-list target-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";
}
list target-port-range {
key "lower-port upper-port";
description "Port range. When only lower-port is present,
it represents a single port.";
leaf lower-port {
type inet:port-number;
mandatory true;
description "Lower port number.";
}
leaf upper-port {
type inet:port-number;
must ". >= ../lower-port" {
error-message
"The upper port number must be greater than or
equal to lower port number.";
}
description "Upper port number.";
}
}
leaf-list target-protocol {
type uint8;
description "Identifies the target protocol number.";
}
leaf-list fqdn {
type inet:domain-name;
description "FQDN";
}
leaf-list uri {
type inet:uri;
description "URI";
}
leaf-list alias-name {
type string;
description "alias name";
}
leaf lifetime {
type int32;
units "seconds";
default 3600;
description
"Indicates the lifetime of the mitigation request.";
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
</section>
<section title="Session Configuration YANG Module Tree Structure">
<t>This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal-config",
which has the following structure:<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[module: ietf-dots-signal-config
+--rw signal-config
+--rw session-id? int32
+--rw heartbeat-interval? int16
+--rw missing-hb-allowed? int16
+--rw max-retransmit? int16
+--rw ack-timeout? int16
+--rw ack-random-factor? decimal64
+--rw trigger-mitigation? boolean]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
</section>
<section title="Session Configuration YANG Module ">
<t><figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[<CODE BEGINS> file "[email protected]"
module ietf-dots-signal-config {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-config";
prefix "config";
organization "IETF DOTS Working Group";
contact
"Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <[email protected]>
Mohamed Boucadair <[email protected]>
Prashanth Patil <[email protected]>
Andrew Mortensen <[email protected]>
Nik Teague <[email protected]>";
description
"This module contains YANG definition for DOTS
signal channel session configuration.
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2017-10-04 {
description
"Add units/defaults and fix some nits.";
reference
"-05";
}
revision 2016-11-28 {
reference
"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel";
}
container signal-config {
description "Top level container for DOTS signal channel session
configuration.";
leaf session-id {
type int32;
description "An identifier for the DOTS signal channel
session configuration data.";
}
leaf heartbeat-interval {
type int16;
units "seconds";
default 30;
description
"DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other
after mutual authentication in order to keep
the DOTS signal channel open.";
}
leaf missing-hb-allowed {
type int16;
default 5;
description
"Maximum number of missing heartbeats allowed.";
}
leaf max-retransmit {
type int16;
default 3;
description
"Maximum number of retransmissions of a
Confirmable message.";
}
leaf ack-timeout {
type int16;
units "seconds";
default 2;
description
"Initial retransmission timeout value.";
}
leaf ack-random-factor {
type decimal64 {
fraction-digits 2;
}
default 1.5;
description
"Random factor used to influence the timing of
retransmissions";
}
leaf trigger-mitigation {
type boolean;
default true;
description
"If false, then mitigation is triggered
only when the DOTS server channel session is lost";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="m_req" title="Mitigation Request">
<t>The following methods are used to request or withdraw mitigation
requests:<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="PUT:">DOTS clients use the PUT method to request
mitigation (<xref target="post"></xref>). During active
mitigation, DOTS clients may use PUT requests to convey mitigation
efficacy updates to the DOTS server (<xref
target="put"></xref>).</t>
<t hangText="DELETE:">DOTS clients use the DELETE method to
withdraw a request for mitigation from the DOTS server (<xref
target="del"></xref>).</t>
<t hangText="GET:">DOTS clients may use the GET method to
subscribe to DOTS server status messages, or to retrieve the list
of existing mitigations (<xref target="get"></xref>).</t>
</list></t>
<t>Mitigation request and response messages are marked as
Non-confirmable messages. DOTS agents SHOULD follow the data
transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of <xref
target="RFC8085"></xref> and control transmission behavior by not
sending on average more than one UDP datagram per RTT to the peer DOTS
agent.</t>
<t>Requests marked by the DOTS client as Non-confirmable messages are
sent at regular intervals until a response is received from the DOTS
server and if the DOTS client cannot maintain a RTT estimate then it
SHOULD NOT send more than one Non-confirmable request every 3 seconds,
and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate when possible (case 2 in
Section 3.1.3 of <xref target="RFC8085"></xref>).</t>
<section anchor="post" title="Requesting mitigation">
<t>When a DOTS client requires mitigation for any reason, the DOTS
client uses CoAP PUT method to send a mitigation request to the DOTS
server (<xref target="Figure1"></xref>, illustrated in JSON
diagnostic notation). The DOTS server can enable mitigation on
behalf of the DOTS client by communicating the DOTS client's request
to the mitigator and relaying selected mitigator feedback to the
requesting DOTS client.</t>
<t><figure anchor="Figure1" title="PUT to convey DOTS signals">
<artwork align="left"><![CDATA[ Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
{
"mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifer": "string",
"scope": [
{
"mitigation-id": integer,
"target-ip": [
"string"
],
"target-prefix": [
"string"
],
"target-port-range": [
{
"lower-port": integer,
"upper-port": integer
}
],
"target-protocol": [
integer
],
"fqdn": [
"string"
],
"uri": [
"string"
],
"alias-name": [
"string"
],
"lifetime": integer
}
]
}
}
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
<t>The parameters are described below.</t>
<t><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="client-identifer:">The client identifer MAY be
conveyed by the DOTS gateway to propagate the DOTS client
identity to the DOTS server. The'client-identifier' value MUST
be assigned by the DOTS gateway in a manner that ensures that
there is no probability that the same value will be accidentally
assigned to a different DOTS client. The client-identifier
attribute SHOULD NOT to be advertised by the DOTS client.</t>
<t hangText="mitigation-id:">Identifier for the mitigation
request represented using an integer. This identifier MUST be
unique for each mitigation request bound to the DOTS client,
i.e., the mitigation-id parameter value in the mitigation
request needs to be unique relative to the mitigation-id
parameter values of active mitigation requests conveyed from the
DOTS client to the DOTS server. This identifier MUST be
generated by the DOTS client. This document does not make any
assumption about how this identifier is generated. This is a
mandatory attribute.</t>
<t hangText="target-ip:">A list of IP addresses under attack.
This is an optional attribute.</t>
<t hangText="target-prefix:">A list of prefixes under attack.
Prefixes are represented using CIDR notation <xref
target="RFC4632"></xref>. This is an optional attribute.</t>
<t hangText="target-port-range:">A list of ports under attack.
The port range, lower-port for lower port number and upper-port
for upper port number. When only lower-port is present, it
represents a single port. For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: the range
of ports (e.g., 1024-65535). This is an optional attribute.</t>
<t hangText="target-protocol:">A list of protocols under attack.
Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry <xref
target="proto_numbers"></xref>. The value 0 has a special
meaning for 'all protocols'. This is an optional attribute.</t>
<t hangText="fqdn: ">A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names.
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) is the full name of a system,
rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a
hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN. This is an optional
attribute.</t>
<t hangText="uri: ">A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URI). This is an optional attribute.</t>
<t hangText="alias-name:">A list of aliases. Aliases can be
created using the DOTS data channel (Section 3.1.1 of <xref
target="I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel"></xref>) or direct
configuration, or other means and then used in subsequent signal
channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources
under attack. This is an optional attribute.</t>
<t hangText="lifetime: ">Lifetime of the mitigation request in
seconds. Upon the expiry of this lifetime, and if the request is
not refreshed, the mitigation request is removed. The request
can be refreshed by sending the same request again. The default
lifetime of the mitigation request is 3600 seconds (60 minutes)
-- this value was chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is
not typically a burden on the DOTS client, while expiring the
request where the client has unexpectedly quit in a timely
manner. A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite
lifetime for the mitigation request. The server MUST always
indicate the actual lifetime in the response and the remaining
lifetime in status messages sent to the client. This is an
optional attribute in the request.</t>
</list></t>
<t>The CBOR key values for the parameters are defined in <xref
target="mapping"></xref>. <xref target="IANA"></xref> defines how
the CBOR key values can be allocated to standards bodies and
vendors.</t>
<t>FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of
scope alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI
resolve represent the full scope of the mitigation.</t>
<t>In the PUT request at least one of the attributes target-ip or
target-prefix or fqdn or uri or alias-name MUST be present. DOTS
agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don't
understand.</t>
<t>The relative order of two mitigation requests from a DOTS client
is determined by comparing their respective 'mitigation-id' values.
If two mitigation requests have overlapping mitigation scopes, the
mitigation request with higher numeric 'mitigation-id' value will
override the mitigation request with a lower numeric 'mitigation-id'
value. Two mitigation-ids are overlapping if there is a common IP
address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name. The overlapped lower
numeric 'mitigation-id' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer
available at the DOTS server.</t>
<t>The Uri-Path option carries a major and minor version
nomenclature to manage versioning and DOTS signal channel in this
specification uses v1 major version.</t>
<t>If the DOTS client is using the certificate provisioned by the
EST server in the DOTS gateway-domain to authenticate itself to the
DOTS gateway, then the 'client-identifier' value will be the output
of a cryptographic hash algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded
ASN.1 representation of the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of an
X.509 certificate. The output of the cryptographic hash algorithm is
base64url encoded. In this version of the specification, the
cryptographic hash algorithm used is SHA-256 <xref
target="RFC6234"></xref>. If the 'client-identifier' value is
already present in the mitigation request received from the DOTS
client, the DOTS gateway computes the 'client-identifier' value, as
discussed above, and adds the computed 'client-identifier' value to
the end of the 'client-identifier' list.</t>
<t>In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client
MUST authenticate itself to the DOTS server (<xref
target="mutauth"></xref>). If the 'client-identifier' value is not
present in the mitigation request, the DOTS server may use the
algorithm in Section 7 of <xref target="RFC7589"></xref> to derive
the DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate.
The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions
using the DOTS client identity, so the DOTS server can validate
whether the aliases conveyed in the mitigation request were indeed
created by the same DOTS client using the DOTS data channel session.
If the aliases were not created by the DOTS client, the DOTS server
returns 4.00 (Bad Request) in the response.</t>
<t>The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using
the DOTS client identity, and the DOTS server uses 'mitigation-id'
parameter value to detect duplicate mitigation requests. If the
mitigation request contains both alias-name and other parameters
identifying the target resources (such as, target-ip, target-prefix,
target-port-range, fqdn, or uri), then the DOTS server appends the
parameter values in alias-name with the corresponding parameter
values in target-ip, target-prefix, target-port-range, fqdn, or
uri.</t>
<t><xref target="Figure2"></xref> shows a PUT request example to
signal that ports 80, 8080, and 443 on the servers 2001:db8:6401::1
and 2001:db8:6401::2 are being attacked (illustrated in JSON
diagnostic notation).</t>
<t><figure anchor="Figure2" title="PUT for DOTS signal">
<artwork align="left"><![CDATA[ Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
"mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifier": "E9CZ9INDbd+2eRQozYqqbQ2yXLVKB9+xcprMF+44U1g=",
"scope": [
{
"mitigation-id": 12332,
"target-ip": [
"2001:db8:6401::1",
"2001:db8:6401::2"
],
"target-port-range": [
{
"lower-port": 80
},
{
"lower-port": 443
},
{
"lower-port": 8080
}
],
"target-protocol": [
6
]
}
]
}
}
The CBOR encoding format is shown below:
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1)
A2 # map(2)
18 20 # unsigned(32)
78 2C # text(44)
4539435A39494E4462642B326552516F7A59717162513279584C564B42392B786370724D462B34345531673D
# "E9CZ9INDbd+2eRQozYqqbQ2yXLVKB9+xcprMF+44U1g="
02 # unsigned(2)
81 # array(1)
A4 # map(4)
03 # unsigned(3)
19 302C # unsigned(12332)
04 # unsigned(4)
82 # array(2)
70 # text(16)
323030313A6462383A363430313A3A31 # "2001:db8:6401::1"
70 # text(16)
323030313A6462383A363430313A3A32 # "2001:db8:6401::2"
05 # unsigned(5)
83 # array(3)
A1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
18 50 # unsigned(80)
A1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
19 01BB # unsigned(443)
A1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
19 1F90 # unsigned(8080)
08 # unsigned(8)
81 # array(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
<t>The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT
request using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP
4.xx codes are some sort of invalid requests. <xref
target="put_response"></xref> shows a PUT response for CoAP 2.xx
response codes.</t>