From ce892bc439272a0ec41498a5b46df143ca11f68b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: weishu <twsxtd@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 17:29:02 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] kernel: don't umount for non zygote child process. fixes
 #1054,#1049,#1045

---
 kernel/core_hook.c       | 12 +++++++++---
 kernel/selinux/selinux.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/selinux/selinux.h |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/core_hook.c b/kernel/core_hook.c
index 176a0239db0a..5a8ebc8dc4d9 100644
--- a/kernel/core_hook.c
+++ b/kernel/core_hook.c
@@ -531,8 +531,6 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	// todo: check old process's selinux context, if it is not zygote, ignore it!
-
 	if (!is_appuid(new_uid) || is_isolated_uid(new_uid.val)) {
 		// pr_info("handle setuid ignore non application or isolated uid: %d\n", new_uid.val);
 		return 0;
@@ -551,8 +549,16 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 #endif
 	}
 
+	// check old process's selinux context, if it is not zygote, ignore it!
+	// because some su apps may setuid to untrusted_app but they are in global mount namespace
+	// when we umount for such process, that is a disaster!
+	bool is_zygote_child = is_zygote(old->security);
+	if (!is_zygote_child) {
+		pr_info("handle umount ignore non zygote child: %d\n", current->pid);
+		return 0;
+	}
 	// umount the target mnt
-	pr_info("handle umount for uid: %d\n", new_uid.val);
+	pr_info("handle umount for uid: %d, pid: %d\n", new_uid.val, current->pid);
 
 	// fixme: use `collect_mounts` and `iterate_mount` to iterate all mountpoint and
 	// filter the mountpoint whose target is `/data/adb`
diff --git a/kernel/selinux/selinux.c b/kernel/selinux/selinux.c
index 43935486ff78..0260fd570ed0 100644
--- a/kernel/selinux/selinux.c
+++ b/kernel/selinux/selinux.c
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ static int transive_to_domain(const char *domain)
 
 	error = security_secctx_to_secid(domain, strlen(domain), &sid);
 	if (error) {
-		pr_info("security_secctx_to_secid %s -> sid: %d, error: %d\n", domain, sid, error);
+		pr_info("security_secctx_to_secid %s -> sid: %d, error: %d\n",
+			domain, sid, error);
 	}
 	if (!error) {
 		if (!ksu_sid)
@@ -107,3 +108,18 @@ bool is_ksu_domain()
 {
 	return ksu_sid && current_sid() == ksu_sid;
 }
+
+bool is_zygote(void *sec)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = (struct task_security_struct *)sec;
+	if (!tsec) {
+		return false;
+	}
+	char *domain;
+	u32 seclen;
+	int err = security_secid_to_secctx(tsec->sid, &domain, &seclen);
+	if (err) {
+		return false;
+	}
+	return strncmp("u:r:zygote:s0", domain, seclen) == 0;
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/kernel/selinux/selinux.h b/kernel/selinux/selinux.h
index 1ccc0d53ea3d..0c4978568af7 100644
--- a/kernel/selinux/selinux.h
+++ b/kernel/selinux/selinux.h
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ bool getenforce();
 
 bool is_ksu_domain();
 
+bool is_zygote(void *cred);
+
 void apply_kernelsu_rules();
 
 #endif