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<body><h2 id="pgepubid00251"><a id="SECTION_IV"/>SECTION IV</h2>
<h3 id="pgepubid00252">OF THE MEANS OF BELIEF</h3>
<h4 id="pgepubid00253"><a id="p_242"/>242</h4>
<p><i>Preface to the second part.</i>—To speak of those who have treated of this matter.</p>
<p>I admire the boldness with which these persons undertake to speak of God. In addressing their argument to infidels, their first chapter is to prove Divinity from the works of nature.<a id="FNanchor_91_95"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_91_95" class="fnanchor pginternal">[91]</a> I should not be astonished at their enterprise, if they were addressing their argument to the faithful; for it is certain that those who have the living faith in their heart see at once that all existence is none other than the work of the God whom they adore. But for those in whom this light is extinguished, and in whom we purpose to rekindle it, persons destitute of faith and grace, who, seeking with all their light whatever they see in nature that can bring them to this knowledge, find only obscurity and darkness; to tell them that they have only to look at the smallest things which surround them, and they will see God openly, to give them, as a complete proof of this great and important matter, the course of the moon and planets, and to claim to have concluded the proof with such an argument, is to give them ground for believing that the proofs of our religion are very weak. And I see by reason and experience that nothing is more calculated to arouse their contempt.</p>
<p>It is not after this manner that Scripture speaks, which has a better knowledge of the things that are of God. It says, on the contrary, that God is a hidden God, and that, since the corruption of nature, He has left men in a darkness from which they can escape only through Jesus Christ, without whom all communion with God is cut off. <i>Nemo novit Patrem, nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare.</i><a id="FNanchor_92_96"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_92_96" class="fnanchor pginternal">[92]</a></p>
<p>This is what Scripture points out to us, when it says in so many places that those who seek God find Him.<a id="FNanchor_93_97"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_93_97" class="fnanchor pginternal">[93]</a> It is not of that light, "like the noonday sun," that this is said. We do<a id="Page_72" class="pageno" title="[Pg 72]"/> not say that those who seek the noonday sun, or water in the sea, shall find them; and hence the evidence of God must not be of this nature. So it tells us elsewhere: <i>Vere tu es Deus absconditus</i>.<a id="FNanchor_94_98"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_94_98" class="fnanchor pginternal">[94]</a></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00254"><a id="p_243"/>243</h4>
<p>It is an astounding fact that no canonical writer has ever made use of nature to prove God. They all strive to make us believe in Him. David, Solomon, etc., have never said, "There is no void, therefore there is a God." They must have had more knowledge than the most learned people who came after them, and who have all made use of this argument. This is worthy of attention.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00255"><a id="p_244"/>244</h4>
<p>"Why! Do you not say yourself that the heavens and birds prove God?" No. "And does your religion not say so?" No. For although it is true in a sense for some souls to whom God gives this light, yet it is false with respect to the majority of men.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00256"><a id="p_245"/>245</h4>
<p>There are three sources of belief: reason, custom, inspiration. The Christian religion, which alone has reason, does not acknowledge as her true children those who believe without inspiration. It is not that she excludes reason and custom. On the contrary, the mind must be opened to proofs, must be confirmed by custom, and offer itself in humbleness to inspirations, which alone can produce a true and saving effect. <i>Ne evacuetur crux Christi.</i><a id="FNanchor_95_99"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_95_99" class="fnanchor pginternal">[95]</a></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00257"><a id="p_246"/>246</h4>
<p><i>Order.</i>—After the letter <i>That we ought to seek God</i>, to write the letter <i>On removing obstacles</i>; which is the discourse on "the machine,"<a id="FNanchor_96_100"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_96_100" class="fnanchor pginternal">[96]</a> on preparing the machine, on seeking by reason.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00258"><a id="p_247"/>247</h4>
<p><i>Order.</i>—A letter of exhortation to a friend to induce him to seek. And he will reply, "But what is the use of seeking? Nothing is seen." Then to reply to him, "Do not despair." And he will answer that he would be glad to find some light, but that, according to this very religion, if he believed in it, it will be of no use to him, and that therefore he prefers not to seek. And to answer to that: The machine.<a id="Page_73" class="pageno" title="[Pg 73]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00259"><a id="p_248"/>248</h4>
<p><i>A letter which indicates the use of proofs by the machine.</i>— Faith is different from proof; the one is human, the other is a gift of God. <i>Justus ex fide vivit.</i><a id="FNanchor_97_101"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_97_101" class="fnanchor pginternal">[97]</a> It is this faith that God Himself puts into the heart, of which the proof is often the instrument, <i>fides ex auditu</i>;<a id="FNanchor_98_102"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_98_102" class="fnanchor pginternal">[98]</a> but this faith is in the heart, and makes us not say <i>scio</i>, but <i>credo</i>.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00260"><a id="p_249"/>249</h4>
<p>It is superstition to put one's hope in formalities; but it is pride to be unwilling to submit to them.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00261"><a id="p_250"/>250</h4>
<p>The external must be joined to the internal to obtain anything from God, that is to say, we must kneel, pray with the lips, etc., in order that proud man, who would not submit himself to God, may be now subject to the creature.<a id="FNanchor_99_103"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_99_103" class="fnanchor pginternal">[99]</a> To expect help from these externals is superstition; to refuse to join them to the internal is pride.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00262"><a id="p_251"/>251</h4>
<p>Other religions, as the pagan, are more popular, for they consist in externals. But they are not for educated people. A purely intellectual religion would be more suited to the learned, but it would be of no use to the common people. The Christian religion alone is adapted to all, being composed of externals and internals. It raises the common people to the internal, and humbles the proud to the external; it is not perfect without the two, for the people must understand the spirit of the letter, and the learned must submit their spirit to the letter.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00263"><a id="p_252"/>252</h4>
<p>For we must not misunderstand ourselves; we are as much automatic as intellectual; and hence it comes that the instrument by which conviction is attained is not demonstrated alone. How few things are demonstrated? Proofs only convince the mind. Custom is the source of our strongest and most believed proofs. It bends the automaton, which persuades the mind without its thinking about the matter. Who has demonstrated that there will be a to-morrow, and that we shall die? And what is more believed? It is, then, custom which persuades us of it; it is<a id="Page_74" class="pageno" title="[Pg 74]"/> custom that makes so many men Christians; custom that makes them Turks, heathens, artisans, soldiers, etc. (Faith in baptism is more received among Christians than among Turks.) Finally, we must have recourse to it when once the mind has seen where the truth is, in order to quench our thirst, and steep ourselves in that belief, which escapes us at every hour; for always to have proofs ready is too much trouble. We must get an easier belief, which is that of custom, which, without violence, without art, without argument, makes us believe things, and inclines all our powers to this belief, so that out soul falls naturally into it. It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction, when the automaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both our parts must be made to believe, the mind by reasons which it is sufficient to have seen once in a lifetime, and the automaton by custom, and by not allowing it to incline to the contrary. <i>Inclina cor meum, Deus.</i><a id="FNanchor_100_104"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_100_104" class="fnanchor pginternal">[100]</a></p>
<p>The reason acts slowly, with so many examinations, and on so many principles, which must be always present, that at every hour it falls asleep, or wanders, through want of having all its principles present. Feeling does not act thus; it acts in a moment, and is always ready to act. We must then put our faith in feeling; otherwise it will be always vacillating.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00264"><a id="p_253"/>253</h4>
<p>Two extremes: to exclude reason, to admit reason only.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00265"><a id="p_254"/>254</h4>
<p>It is not a rare thing to have to reprove the world for too much docility. It is a natural vice like credulity, and as pernicious. Superstition.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00266"><a id="p_255"/>255</h4>
<p>Piety is different from superstition.</p>
<p>To carry piety as far as superstition is to destroy it.</p>
<p>The heretics reproach us for this superstitious submission. This is to do what they reproach us for ...</p>
<p>Infidelity, not to believe in the Eucharist, because it is not seen.</p>
<p>Superstition to believe propositions. Faith, etc.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00267"><a id="p_256"/>256</h4>
<p>I say there are few true Christians, even as regards faith. There are many who believe but from superstition. There are<a id="Page_75" class="pageno" title="[Pg 75]"/> many who do not believe solely from wickedness. Few are between the two.</p>
<p>In this I do not include those who are of truly pious character, nor all those who believe from a feeling in their heart.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00268"><a id="p_257"/>257</h4>
<p>There are only three kinds of persons; those who serve God, having found Him; others who are occupied in seeking Him, not having found Him; while the remainder live without seeking Him, and without having found Him. The first are reasonable and happy, the last are foolish and unhappy; those between are unhappy and reasonable.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00269"><a id="p_258"/>258</h4>
<p><i>Unusquisque sibi Deum fingit.</i><a id="FNanchor_101_105"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_101_105" class="fnanchor pginternal">[101]</a></p>
<p>Disgust.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00270"><a id="p_259"/>259</h4>
<p>Ordinary people have the power of not thinking of that about which they do not wish to think. "Do not meditate on the passages about the Messiah," said the Jew to his son. Thus our people often act. Thus are false religions preserved, and even the true one, in regard to many persons.</p>
<p>But there are some who have not the power of thus preventing thought, and who think so much the more as they are forbidden. These undo false religions, and even the true one, if they do not find solid arguments.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00271"><a id="p_260"/>260</h4>
<p>They hide themselves in the press, and call numbers to their rescue. Tumult.</p>
<p><i>Authority.</i>—So far from making it a rule to believe a thing because you have heard it, you ought to believe nothing without putting yourself into the position as if you had never heard it.</p>
<p>It is your own assent to yourself, and the constant voice of your own reason, and not of others, that should make you believe.</p>
<p>Belief is so important! A hundred contradictions might be true. If antiquity were the rule of belief, men of ancient time would then be without rule. If general consent, if men had perished?</p>
<p>False humanity, pride.</p>
<p>Lift the curtain. You try in vain; if you must either believe,<a id="Page_76" class="pageno" title="[Pg 76]"/> or deny, or doubt. Shall we then have no rule? We judge that animals do well what they do. Is there no rule whereby to judge men?</p>
<p>To deny, to believe, and to doubt well, are to a man what the race is to a horse.</p>
<p>Punishment of those who sin, error.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00272"><a id="p_261"/>261</h4>
<p>Those who do not love the truth take as a pretext that it is disputed, and that a multitude deny it. And so their error arises only from this, that they do not love either truth or charity. Thus they are without excuse.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00273"><a id="p_262"/>262</h4>
<p>Superstition and lust. Scruples, evil desires. Evil fear; fear, not such as comes from a belief in God, but such as comes from a doubt whether He exists or not. True fear comes from faith; false fear comes from doubt. True fear is joined to hope, because it is born of faith, and because men hope in the God in whom they believe. False fear is joined to despair, because men fear the God in whom they have no belief. The former fear to lose Him; the latter fear to find Him.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00274"><a id="p_263"/>263</h4>
<p>"A miracle," says one, "would strengthen my faith." He says so when he does not see one. Reasons, seen from afar, appear to limit our view; but when they are reached, we begin to see beyond. Nothing stops the nimbleness of our mind. There is no rule, say we, which has not some exceptions, no truth so general which has not some aspect in which it fails. It is sufficient that it be not absolutely universal to give us a pretext for applying the exceptions to the present subject, and for saying, "This is not always true; there are therefore cases where it is not so." It only remains to show that this is one of them; and that is why we are very awkward or unlucky, if we do not find one some day.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00275"><a id="p_264"/>264</h4>
<p>We do not weary of eating and sleeping every day, for hunger and sleepiness recur. Without that we should weary of them. So, without the hunger for spiritual things, we weary of them. Hunger after righteousness, the eighth beatitude.<a id="Page_77" class="pageno" title="[Pg 77]"/><a id="FNanchor_102_106"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_102_106" class="fnanchor pginternal">[102]</a></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00276"><a id="p_265"/>265</h4>
<p>Faith indeed tells what the senses do not tell, but not the contrary of what they see. It is above them and not contrary to them.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00277"><a id="p_266"/>266</h4>
<p>How many stars have telescopes revealed to us which did not exist for our philosophers of old! We freely attack Holy Scripture on the great number of stars, saying, "There are only one thousand and twenty-eight,<a id="FNanchor_103_107"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_103_107" class="fnanchor pginternal">[103]</a> we know it." There is grass on the earth, we see it—from the moon we would not see it—and on the grass are leaves, and in these leaves are small animals; but after that no more.—O presumptuous man!—The compounds are composed of elements, and the elements not.—O presumptuous man! Here is a fine reflection.—We must not say that there is anything which we do not see.—We must then talk like others, but not think like them.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00278"><a id="p_267"/>267</h4>
<p>The last proceeding of reason is to recognise that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it. It is but feeble if it does not see so far as to know this. But if natural things are beyond it, what will be said of supernatural?</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00279"><a id="p_268"/>268</h4>
<p><i>Submission.</i>—We must know where to doubt, where to feel certain, where to submit. He who does not do so, understands not the force of reason. There are some who offend against these three rules, either by affirming everything as demonstrative, from want of knowing what demonstration is; or by doubting everything, from want of knowing where to submit; or by submitting in everything, from want of knowing where they must judge.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00280"><a id="p_269"/>269</h4>
<p>Submission is the use of reason in which consists true Christianity.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00281"><a id="p_270"/>270</h4>
<p><i>St. Augustine.</i><a id="FNanchor_104_108"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_104_108" class="fnanchor pginternal">[104]</a>—Reason would never submit, if it did not judge that there are some occasions on which it ought to submit. It is then right for it to submit, when it judges that it ought to submit.<a id="Page_78" class="pageno" title="[Pg 78]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00282"><a id="p_271"/>271</h4>
<p>Wisdom sends us to childhood. <i>Nisi efficiamini sicut parvuli.</i><a id="FNanchor_105_109"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_105_109" class="fnanchor pginternal">[105]</a></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00283"><a id="p_272"/>272</h4>
<p>There is nothing so conformable to reason as this disavowal of reason.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00284"><a id="p_273"/>273</h4>
<p>If we submit everything to reason, our religion will have no mysterious and supernatural element. If we offend the principles of reason, our religion will be absurd and ridiculous.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00285"><a id="p_274"/>274</h4>
<p>All our reasoning reduces itself to yielding to feeling.</p>
<p>But fancy is like, though contrary to feeling, so that we cannot distinguish between these contraries. One person says that my feeling is fancy, another that his fancy is feeling. We should have a rule. Reason offers itself; but it is pliable in every sense; and thus there is no rule.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00286"><a id="p_275"/>275</h4>
<p>Men often take their imagination for their heart; and they believe they are converted as soon as they think of being converted.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00287"><a id="p_276"/>276</h4>
<p>M. de Roannez said: "Reasons come to me afterwards, but at first a thing pleases or shocks me without my knowing the reason, and yet it shocks me for that reason which I only discover afterwards." But I believe, not that it shocked him for the reasons which were found afterwards, but that these reasons were only found because it shocks him.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00288"><a id="p_277"/>277</h4>
<p>The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know. We feel it in a thousand things. I say that the heart naturally loves the Universal Being, and also itself naturally, according as it gives itself to them; and it hardens itself against one or the other at its will. You have rejected the one, and kept the other. Is it by reason that you love yourself?</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00289"><a id="p_278"/>278</h4>
<p>It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not by the reason.<a id="Page_79" class="pageno" title="[Pg 79]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00290"><a id="p_279"/>279</h4>
<p>Faith is a gift of God; do not believe that we said it was a gift of reasoning. Other religions do not say this of their faith. They only gave reasoning in order to arrive at it, and yet it does not bring them to it.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00291"><a id="p_280"/>280</h4>
<p>The knowledge of God is very far from the love of Him.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00292"><a id="p_281"/>281</h4>
<p>Heart, instinct, principles.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00293"><a id="p_282"/>282</h4>
<p>We know truth, not only by the reason, but also by the heart, and it is in this last way that we know first principles; and reason, which has no part in it, tries in vain to impugn them. The sceptics, who have only this for their object, labour to no purpose. We know that we do not dream, and however impossible it is for us to prove it by reason, this inability demonstrates only the weakness of our reason, but not, as they affirm, the uncertainty of all our knowledge. For the knowledge of first principles, as space, time, motion, number, is as sure as any of those which we get from reasoning. And reason must trust these intuitions of the heart, and must base them on every argument. (We have intuitive knowledge of the tri-dimensional nature of space, and of the infinity of number, and reason then shows that there are no two square numbers one of which is double of the other. Principles are intuited, propositions are inferred, all with certainty, though in different ways.) And it is as useless and absurd for reason to demand from the heart proofs of her first principles, before admitting them, as it would be for the heart to demand from reason an intuition of all demonstrated propositions before accepting them.</p>
<p>This inability ought, then, to serve only to humble reason, which would judge all, but not to impugn our certainty, as if only reason were capable of instructing us. Would to God, on the contrary, that we had never need of it, and that we knew everything by instinct and intuition! But nature has refused us this boon. On the contrary, she has given us but very little knowledge of this kind; and all the rest can be acquired only by reasoning.<a id="Page_80" class="pageno" title="[Pg 80]"/></p>
<p>Therefore, those to whom God has imparted religion by intuition are very fortunate, and justly convinced. But to those who do not have it, we can give it only by reasoning, waiting for God to give them spiritual insight, without which faith is only human, and useless for salvation.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00294"><a id="p_283"/>283</h4>
<p class="c1">Order.—Against the objection that Scripture has no order.</p>
<p>The heart has its own order; the intellect has its own, which is by principle and demonstration. The heart has another. We do not prove that we ought to be loved by enumerating in order the causes of love; that would be ridiculous.</p>
<p>Jesus Christ and Saint Paul employ the rule of love, not of intellect; for they would warm, not instruct. It is the same with Saint Augustine. This order consists chiefly in digressions on each point to indicate the end, and keep it always in sight.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00295"><a id="p_284"/>284</h4>
<p>Do not wonder to see simple people believe without reasoning. God imparts to them love of Him and hatred of self. He inclines their heart to believe. Men will never believe with a saving and real faith, unless God inclines their heart; and they will believe as soon as He inclines it. And this is what David knew well, when he said: <i>Inclina cor meum, Deus, in ...</i><a id="FNanchor_106_110"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_106_110" class="fnanchor pginternal">[106]</a></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00296"><a id="p_285"/>285</h4>
<p>Religion is suited to all kinds of minds. Some pay attention only to its establishment,<a id="FNanchor_107_111"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_107_111" class="fnanchor pginternal">[107]</a> and this religion is such that its very establishment suffices to prove its truth. Others trace it even to the apostles. The more learned go back to the beginning of the world. The angels see it better still, and from a more distant time.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00297"><a id="p_286"/>286</h4>
<p>Those who believe without having read the Testaments, do so because they have an inward disposition entirely holy, and all that they hear of our religion conforms to it. They feel that a God has made them; they desire only to love God; they desire to hate themselves only. They feel that they have no strength in themselves; that they are incapable of coming to God; and that if God does not come to them, they can have no communion with Him. And they hear our religion say that men must love<a id="Page_81" class="pageno" title="[Pg 81]"/> God only, and hate self only; but that all being corrupt and unworthy of God, God made Himself man to unite Himself to us. No more is required to persuade men who have this disposition in their heart, and who have this knowledge of their duty and of their inefficiency.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00298"><a id="p_287"/>287</h4>
<p>Those whom we see to be Christians without the knowledge of the prophets and evidences, nevertheless judge of their religion as well as those who have that knowledge. They judge of it by the heart, as others judge of it by the intellect. God Himself inclines them to believe, and thus they are most effectively convinced.</p>
<p>I confess indeed that one of those Christians who believe without proofs will not perhaps be capable of convincing an infidel who will say the same of himself. But those who know the proofs of religion will prove without difficulty that such a believer is truly inspired by God, though he cannot prove it himself.</p>
<p>For God having said in His prophecies (which are undoubtedly prophecies), that in the reign of Jesus Christ He would spread His spirit abroad among nations, and that the youths and maidens and children of the Church would prophesy;<a id="FNanchor_108_112"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_108_112" class="fnanchor pginternal">[108]</a> it is certain that the Spirit of God is in these, and not in the others.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00299"><a id="p_288"/>288</h4>
<p>Instead of complaining that God had hidden Himself, you will give Him thanks for having revealed so much of Himself; and you will also give Him thanks for not having revealed Himself to haughty sages, unworthy to know so holy a God.</p>
<p>Two kinds of persons know Him: those who have a humble heart, and who love lowliness, whatever kind of intellect they may have, high or low; and those who have sufficient understanding to see the truth, whatever opposition they may have to it.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00300"><a id="p_289"/>289</h4>
<p><i>Proof.</i>—1. The Christian religion, by its establishment, having established itself so strongly, so gently, whilst contrary to nature.—2. The sanctity, the dignity, and the humility of a Christian soul.—3. The miracles of Holy Scripture.—4. Jesus Christ in particular.—5. The apostles in particular.—6. Moses<a id="Page_82" class="pageno" title="[Pg 82]"/> and the prophets in particular.—7. The Jewish people.—8. The prophecies.—9. Perpetuity; no religion has perpetuity.— 10. The doctrine which gives a reason for everything.—11. The sanctity of this law.—12. By the course of the world.</p>
<p>Surely, after considering what is life and what is religion, we should not refuse to obey the inclination to follow it, if it comes into our heart; and it is certain that there is no ground for laughing at those who follow it.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00301"><a id="p_290"/>290</h4>
<p><i>Proofs of religion.</i>—Morality, Doctrine, Miracles, Prophecies, Types.</p>
<hr class="c2"/>
<p><a id="Page_83" class="pageno" title="[Pg 83]"/></p>
<h2 id="pgepubid00302"><a id="SECTION_V"/>SECTION V</h2>
<h3 id="pgepubid00303">JUSTICE AND THE REASON OF EFFECTS</h3>
<h4 id="pgepubid00304"><a id="p_291"/>291</h4>
<p>In the letter <i>On Injustice</i> can come the ridiculousness of the law that the elder gets all. "My friend, you were born on this side of the mountain, it is therefore just that your elder brother gets everything."</p>
<p>"Why do you kill me?"</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00305"><a id="p_292"/>292</h4>
<p>He lives on the other side of the water.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00306"><a id="p_293"/>293</h4>
<p>"Why do you kill me? What! do you not live on the other side of the water? If you lived on this side, my friend, I should be an assassin, and it would be unjust to slay you in this manner. But since you live on the other side, I am a hero, and it is just."</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00307"><a id="p_294"/>294</h4>
<p>On what shall man found the order of the world which he would govern?<a id="FNanchor_109_113"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_109_113" class="fnanchor pginternal">[109]</a> Shall it be on the caprice of each individual? What confusion! Shall it be on justice? Man is ignorant of it.</p>
<p>Certainly had he known it, he would not have established this maxim, the most general of all that obtain among men, that each should follow the custom of his own country. The glory of true equity would have brought all nations under subjection, and legislators would not have taken as their model the fancies and caprice of Persians and Germans instead of this unchanging justice. We should have seen it set up in all the States on earth and in all times; whereas we see neither justice nor injustice which does not change its nature with change in climate. Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian decides the truth. Fundamental laws change after a few years of possession; right has its epochs; the entry of Saturn into the Lion<a id="Page_84" class="pageno" title="[Pg 84]"/> marks to us the origin of such and such a crime. A strange justice that is bounded by a river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side.</p>
<p>Men admit that justice does not consist in these customs, but that it resides in natural laws, common to every country. They would certainly maintain it obstinately, if reckless chance which has distributed human laws had encountered even one which was universal; but the farce is that the caprice of men has so many vagaries that there is no such law.</p>
<p>Theft, incest, infanticide, parricide, have all had a place among virtuous actions. Can anything be more ridiculous than that a man should have the right to kill me because he lives on the other side of the water, and because his ruler has a quarrel with mine, though I have none with him?</p>
<p>Doubtless there are natural laws; but good reason once corrupted has corrupted all. <i>Nihil amplius nostrum est;<a id="FNanchor_110_114"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_110_114" class="fnanchor pginternal">[110]</a> quod nostrum dicimus, artis est. Ex senatus—consultis et plebiscitis crimina exercentur.<a id="FNanchor_111_115"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_111_115" class="fnanchor pginternal">[111]</a> Ut olim vitiis, sic nunc legibus laboramus.</i><a id="FNanchor_112_116"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_112_116" class="fnanchor pginternal">[112]</a></p>
<p>The result of this confusion is that one affirms the essence of justice to be the authority of the legislator; another, the interest of the sovereign;<a id="FNanchor_113_117"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_113_117" class="fnanchor pginternal">[113]</a> another, present custom,<a id="FNanchor_114_118"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_114_118" class="fnanchor pginternal">[114]</a> and this is the most sure. Nothing, according to reason alone, is just in itself; all changes with time. Custom creates the whole of equity, for the simple reason that it is accepted. It is the mystical foundation of its authority;<a id="FNanchor_115_119"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_115_119" class="fnanchor pginternal">[115]</a> whoever carries it back to first principles destroys it. Nothing is so faulty as those laws which correct faults. He who obeys them because they are just, obeys a justice which is imaginary, and not the essence of law; it is quite self-contained, it is law and nothing more. He who will examine its motive will find it so feeble and so trifling that if he be not accustomed to contemplate the wonders of human imagination, he will marvel that one century has gained for it so much pomp and reverence. The art of opposition and of revolution is to unsettle established customs, sounding them even to their source, to point out their want of authority and justice. We must, it is said, get back to the natural and fundamental laws of the State, which an unjust custom has abolished. It is a game certain to result in the loss of all; nothing will be just on the balance. Yet people readily lend their ear to such arguments. They shake off the yoke as soon as they recognise it; and the great profit by their ruin, and by that of these curious investigators of accepted customs. But from a contrary mistake<a id="Page_85" class="pageno" title="[Pg 85]"/> men sometimes think they can justly do everything which is not without an example. That is why the wisest of legislators<a id="FNanchor_116_120"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_116_120" class="fnanchor pginternal">[116]</a> said that it was necessary to deceive men for their own good; and another, a good politician, <i>Cum veritatem qua liberetur ignoret, expedit quod fallatur.</i><a id="FNanchor_117_121"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_117_121" class="fnanchor pginternal">[117]</a> We must not see the fact of usurpation; law was once introduced without reason, and has become reasonable. We must make it regarded as authoritative, eternal, and conceal its origin, if we do not wish that it should soon come to an end.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00308"><a id="p_295"/>295</h4>
<p><i>Mine, thine.</i>—"This dog is mine," said those poor children; "that is my place in the sun." Here is the beginning and the image of the usurpation of all the earth.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00309"><a id="p_296"/>296</h4>
<p>When the question for consideration is whether we ought to make war, and kill so many men—condemn so many Spaniards to death—only one man is judge, and he is an interested party. There should be a third, who is disinterested.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00310"><a id="p_297"/>297</h4>
<p><i>Veri juris.</i><a id="FNanchor_118_122"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_118_122" class="fnanchor pginternal">[118]</a>—We have it no more; if we had it, we should take conformity to the customs of a country as the rule of justice. It is here that, not finding justice, we have found force, etc.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00311"><a id="p_298"/>298</h4>
<p><i>Justice, might.</i>—It is right that what is just should be obeyed; it is necessary that what is strongest should be obeyed. Justice without might is helpless; might without justice is tyrannical. Justice without might is gainsaid, because there are always offenders; might without justice is condemned. We must then combine justice and might, and for this end make what is just strong, or what is strong just.</p>
<p>Justice is subject to dispute; might is easily recognised and is not disputed. So we cannot give might to justice, because might has gainsaid justice, and has declared that it is she herself who is just. And thus being unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong just.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00312"><a id="p_299"/>299</h4>
<p>The only universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary affairs, and of the majority in others. Whence comes this?<a id="Page_86" class="pageno" title="[Pg 86]"/> From the might which is in them. Hence it comes that kings, who have power of a different kind, do not follow the majority of their ministers.</p>
<p>No doubt equality of goods is just; but, being unable to cause might to obey justice, men have made it just to obey might. Unable to strengthen justice, they have justified might; so that the just and the strong should unite, and there should be peace, which is the sovereign good.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00313"><a id="p_300"/>300</h4>
<p>"When a strong man armed keepeth his goods, his goods are in peace."<a id="FNanchor_119_123"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_119_123" class="fnanchor pginternal">[119]</a></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00314"><a id="p_301"/>301</h4>
<p>Why do we follow the majority? It is because they have more reason? No, because they have more power.</p>
<p>Why do we follow the ancient laws and opinions? Is it because they are more sound? No, but because they are unique, and remove from us the root of difference.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00315"><a id="p_302"/>302</h4>
<p>... It is the effect of might, not of custom. For those who are capable of originality are few; the greater number will only follow, and refuse glory to those inventors who seek it by their inventions. And if these are obstinate in their wish to obtain glory, and despise those who do not invent, the latter will call them ridiculous names, and would beat them with a stick. Let no one then boast of his subtlety, or let him keep his complacency to himself.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00316"><a id="p_303"/>303</h4>
<p>Might is the sovereign of the world, and not opinion.—But opinion makes use of might.—It is might that makes opinion. Gentleness is beautiful in our opinion. Why? Because he who will dance on a rope will be alone,<a id="FNanchor_120_124"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_120_124" class="fnanchor pginternal">[120]</a> and I will gather a stronger mob of people who will say that it is unbecoming.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00317"><a id="p_304"/>304</h4>
<p>The cords which bind the respect of men to each other are in general cords of necessity; for there must be different degrees, all men wishing to rule, and not all being able to do so, but some being able.<a id="Page_87" class="pageno" title="[Pg 87]"/></p>
<p>Let us then imagine we see society in the process of formation. Men will doubtless fight till the stronger party overcomes the weaker, and a dominant party is established. But when this is once determined, the masters, who do not desire the continuation of strife, then decree that the power which is in their hands shall be transmitted as they please. Some place it in election by the people, others in hereditary succession, etc.</p>
<p>And this is the point where imagination begins to play its part. Till now power makes fact; now power is sustained by imagination in a certain party, in France in the nobility, in Switzerland in the burgesses, etc.</p>
<p>These cords which bind the respect of men to such and such an individual are therefore the cords of imagination.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00318"><a id="p_305"/>305</h4>
<p>The Swiss are offended by being called gentlemen, and prove themselves true plebeians in order to be thought worthy of great office.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00319"><a id="p_306"/>306</h4>
<p>As duchies, kingships, and magistracies are real and necessary, because might rules all, they exist everywhere and always. But since only caprice makes such and such a one a ruler, the principle is not constant, but subject to variation, etc.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00320"><a id="p_307"/>307</h4>
<p>The chancellor is grave, and clothed with ornaments, for his position is unreal. Not so the king, he has power, and has nothing to do with the imagination. Judges, physicians, etc. appeal only to the imagination.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00321"><a id="p_308"/>308</h4>
<p>The habit of seeing kings accompanied by guards, drums, officers, and all the paraphernalia which mechanically inspire respect and awe, makes their countenance, when sometimes seen alone without these accompaniments, impress respect and awe on their subjects; because we cannot separate in thought their persons from the surroundings with which we see them usually joined. And the world, which knows not that this effect is the result of habit, believes that it arises by a natural force, whence come these words, "The character of Divinity is stamped on his countenance," etc.<a id="Page_88" class="pageno" title="[Pg 88]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00322"><a id="p_309"/>309</h4>
<p><i>Justice.</i>—As custom determines what is agreeable, so also does it determine justice.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00323"><a id="p_310"/>310</h4>
<p><i>King and tyrant.</i>—I, too, will keep my thoughts secret.</p>
<p>I will take care on every journey.</p>
<p>Greatness of establishment, respect for establishment.</p>
<p>The pleasure of the great is the power to make people happy.</p>
<p>The property of riches is to be given liberally.</p>
<p>The property of each thing must be sought. The property of power is to protect.</p>
<p>When force attacks humbug, when a private soldier takes the square cap off a first president, and throws it out of the window.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00324"><a id="p_311"/>311</h4>
<p>The government founded on opinion and imagination reigns for some time, and this government is pleasant and voluntary; that founded on might lasts for ever. Thus opinion is the queen of the world, but might is its tyrant.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00325"><a id="p_312"/>312</h4>
<p>Justice is what is established; and thus all our established laws will necessarily be regarded as just without examination, since they are established.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00326"><a id="p_313"/>313</h4>
<p><i>Sound opinions of the people.</i>—Civil wars are the greatest of evils.<a id="FNanchor_121_125"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_121_125" class="fnanchor pginternal">[121]</a> They are inevitable, if we wish to reward desert; for all will say they are deserving. The evil we have to fear from a fool who succeeds by right of birth, is neither so great nor so sure.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00327"><a id="p_314"/>314</h4>
<p>God has created all for Himself. He has bestowed upon Himself the power of pain and pleasure.</p>
<p>You can apply it to God, or to yourself. If to God, the Gospel is the rule. If to yourself, you will take the place of God. As God is surrounded by persons full of charity, who ask of Him the blessings of charity that are in His power, so ... Recognise then and learn that you are only a king of lust, and take the ways of lust.<a id="Page_89" class="pageno" title="[Pg 89]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00328"><a id="p_315"/>315</h4>
<p><i>The reason of effects.</i>—It is wonderful that men would not have me honour a man clothed in brocade, and followed by seven or eight lackeys! Why! He will have me thrashed, if I do not salute him. This custom is a force. It is the same with a horse in fine trappings in comparison with another! Montaigne<a id="FNanchor_122_126"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_122_126" class="fnanchor pginternal">[122]</a> is a fool not to see what difference there is, to wonder at our finding any, and to ask the reason. "Indeed," says he, "how comes it," etc....</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00329"><a id="p_316"/>316</h4>
<p><i>Sound opinions of the people.</i>—To be spruce is not altogether foolish, for it proves that a great number of people work for one. It shows by one's hair, that one has a valet, a perfumer, etc., by one's band, thread, lace, ... etc. Now it is not merely superficial nor merely outward show to have many arms at command. The more arms one has, the more powerful one is. To be spruce is to show one's power.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00330"><a id="p_317"/>317</h4>
<p>Deference means, "Put yourself to inconvenience." This is apparently silly, but is quite right. For it is to say, "I would indeed put myself to inconvenience if you required it, since indeed I do so when it is of no service to you." Deference further serves to distinguish the great. Now if deference was displayed by sitting in an arm-chair, we should show deference to everybody, and so no distinction would be made; but, being put to inconvenience, we distinguish very well.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00331"><a id="p_318"/>318</h4>
<p>He has four lackeys.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00332"><a id="p_319"/>319</h4>
<p>How rightly do we distinguish men by external appearances rather than by internal qualities! Which of us two shall have precedence? Who will give place to the other? The least clever. But I am as clever as he. We should have to fight over this. He has four lackeys, and I have only one. This can be seen; we have only to count. It falls to me to yield, and I am a fool if I contest the matter. By this means we are at peace, which is the greatest of boons.<a id="Page_90" class="pageno" title="[Pg 90]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00333"><a id="p_320"/>320</h4>
<p>The most unreasonable things in the world become most reasonable, because of the unruliness of men. What is less reasonable than to choose the eldest son of a queen to rule a State? We do not choose as captain of a ship the passenger who is of the best family.</p>
<p>This law would be absurd and unjust; but because men are so themselves, and always will be so, it becomes reasonable and just. For whom will men choose, as the most virtuous and able? We at once come to blows, as each claims to be the most virtuous and able. Let us then attach this quality to something indisputable. This is the king's eldest son. That is clear, and there is no dispute. Reason can do no better, for civil war is the greatest of evils.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00334"><a id="p_321"/>321</h4>
<p>Children are astonished to see their comrades respected.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00335"><a id="p_322"/>322</h4>
<p>To be of noble birth is a great advantage. In eighteen years it places a man within the select circle, known and respected, as another would have merited in fifty years. It is a gain of thirty years without trouble.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00336"><a id="p_323"/>323</h4>
<p>What is the Ego?</p>
<p>Suppose a man puts himself at a window to see those who pass by. If I pass by, can I say that he placed himself there to see me? No; for he does not think of me in particular. But does he who loves someone on account of beauty really love that person? No; for the small-pox, which will kill beauty without killing the person, will cause him to love her no more.</p>
<p>And if one loves me for my judgment, memory, he does not love <i>me</i>, for I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where, then, is this Ego, if it be neither in the body nor in the soul? And how love the body or the soul, except for these qualities which do not constitute <i>me</i>, since they are perishable? For it is impossible and would be unjust to love the soul of a person in the abstract, and whatever qualities might be therein. We never, then, love a person, but only qualities.</p>
<p>Let us, then, jeer no more at those who are honoured on account of rank and office; for we love a person only on account of borrowed qualities.<a id="Page_91" class="pageno" title="[Pg 91]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00337"><a id="p_324"/>324</h4>
<p>The people have very sound opinions, for example:</p>
<p>1. In having preferred diversion and hunting to poetry. The half-learned laugh at it, and glory in being above the folly of the world; but the people are right for a reason which these do not fathom.</p>
<p>2. In having distinguished men by external marks, as birth or wealth. The world again exults in showing how unreasonable this is; but it is very reasonable. Savages laugh at an infant king.<a id="FNanchor_123_127"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_123_127" class="fnanchor pginternal">[123]</a></p>
<p>3. In being offended at a blow, on in desiring glory so much. But it is very desirable on account of the other essential goods which are joined to it; and a man who has received a blow, without resenting it, is overwhelmed with taunts and indignities.</p>
<p>4. In working for the uncertain; in sailing on the sea; in walking over a plank.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00338"><a id="p_325"/>325</h4>
<p>Montaigne is wrong. Custom should be followed only because it is custom, and not because it is reasonable or just. But people follow it for this sole reason, that they think it just. Otherwise they would follow it no longer, although it were the custom; for they will only submit to reason or justice. Custom without this would pass for tyranny; but the sovereignty of reason and justice is no more tyrannical than that of desire. They are principles natural to man.</p>
<p>It would therefore be right to obey laws and customs, because they are laws; but we should know that there is neither truth nor justice to introduce into them, that we know nothing of these, and so must follow what is accepted. By this means we would never depart from them. But people cannot accept this doctrine; and, as they believe that truth can be found, and that it exists in law and custom, they believe them, and take their antiquity as a proof of their truth, and not simply of their authority apart from truth. Thus they obey laws, but they are liable to revolt when these are proved to be valueless; and this can be shown of all, looked at from a certain aspect.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00339"><a id="p_326"/>326</h4>
<p><i>Injustice.</i>—It is dangerous to tell the people that the laws are unjust; for they obey them only because they think them just.<a id="Page_92" class="pageno" title="[Pg 92]"/> Therefore it is necessary to tell them at the same time that they must obey them because they are laws, just as they must obey superiors, not because they are just, but because they are superiors. In this way all sedition is prevented, if this can be made intelligible, and it be understood what is the proper definition of justice.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00340"><a id="p_327"/>327</h4>
<p>The world is a good judge of things, for it is in natural ignorance, which is man's true state.<a id="FNanchor_124_128"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_124_128" class="fnanchor pginternal">[124]</a> The sciences have two extremes which meet. The first is the pure natural ignorance in which all men find themselves at birth. The other extreme is that reached by great intellects, who, having run through all that men can know, find they know nothing, and come back again to that same ignorance from which they set out; but this is a learned ignorance which is conscious of itself. Those between the two, who have departed from natural ignorance and not been able to reach the other, have some smattering of this vain knowledge, and pretend to be wise. These trouble the world, and are bad judges of everything. The people and the wise constitute the world; these despise it, and are despised. They judge badly of everything, and the world judges rightly of them.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00341"><a id="p_328"/>328</h4>
<p><i>The reason of effects.</i>—Continual alternation of pro and con.</p>
<p>We have then shown that man is foolish, by the estimation he makes of things which are not essential; and all these opinions are destroyed. We have next shown that all these opinions are very sound, and that thus, since all these vanities are well founded, the people are not so foolish as is said. And so we have destroyed the opinion which destroyed that of the people.</p>
<p>But we must now destroy this last proposition, and show that it remains always true that the people are foolish, though their opinions are sound; because they do not perceive the truth where it is, and, as they place it where it is not, their opinions are always very false and very unsound.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00342"><a id="p_329"/>329</h4>
<p><i>The reason of effects.</i>—The weakness of man is the reason why so many things are considered fine, as to be good at playing the lute. It is only an evil because of our weakness.<a id="Page_93" class="pageno" title="[Pg 93]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00343"><a id="p_330"/>330</h4>
<p>The power of kings is founded on the reason and on the folly of the people, and specially on their folly. The greatest and most important thing in the world has weakness for its foundation, and this foundation is wonderfully sure; for there is nothing more sure than this, that the people will be weak. What is based on sound reason is very ill founded, as the estimate of wisdom.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00344"><a id="p_331"/>331</h4>
<p>We can only think of Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like others, laughing with their friends, and when they diverted themselves with writing their <i>Laws</i> and the <i>Politics</i>, they did it as an amusement. That part of their life was the least philosophic and the least serious; the most philosophic was to live simply and quietly. If they wrote on politics, it was as if laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; and if they presented the appearance of speaking of a great matter, it was because they knew that the madmen, to whom they spoke, thought they were kings and emperors. They entered into their principles in order to make their madness as little harmful as possible.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00345"><a id="p_332"/>332</h4>
<p>Tyranny consists in the desire of universal power beyond its scope.</p>
<p>There are different assemblies of the strong, the fair, the sensible, the pious, in which each man rules at home, not elsewhere. And sometimes they meet, and the strong and the fair foolishly fight as to who shall be master, for their mastery is of different kinds. They do not understand one another, and their fault is the desire to rule everywhere. Nothing can effect this, not even might, which is of no use in the kingdom of the wise, and is only mistress of external actions.</p>
<p><i>Tyranny</i>— ... So these expressions are false and tyrannical: "I am fair, therefore I must be feared. I am strong, therefore I must be loved. I am ..."</p>
<p>Tyranny is the wish to have in one way what can only be had in another. We render different duties to different merits; the duty of love to the pleasant; the duty of fear to the strong; the duty of belief to the learned.<a id="Page_94" class="pageno" title="[Pg 94]"/></p>
<p>We must render these duties; it is unjust to refuse them, and unjust to ask others. And so it is false and tyrannical to say, "He is not strong, therefore I will not esteem him; he is not able, therefore I will not fear him."</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00346"><a id="p_333"/>333</h4>
<p>Have you never seen people who, in order to complain of the little fuss you make about them, parade before you the example of great men who esteem them? In answer I reply to them, "Show me the merit whereby you have charmed these persons, and I also will esteem you."</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00347"><a id="p_334"/>334</h4>
<p><i>The reason of effects.</i>—Lust and force are the source of all our actions; lust causes voluntary actions, force involuntary ones.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00348"><a id="p_335"/>335</h4>
<p><i>The reason of effects.</i>—It is then true to say that all the world is under a delusion; for, although the opinions of the people are sound, they are not so as conceived by them, since they think the truth to be where it is not. Truth is indeed in their opinions, but not at the point where they imagine it. [Thus] it is true that we must honour noblemen, but not because noble birth is real superiority, etc.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00349"><a id="p_336"/>336</h4>
<p><i>The reason of effects.</i>—We must keep our thought secret, and judge everything by it, while talking like the people.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00350"><a id="p_337"/>337</h4>
<p><i>The reason of effects.</i>—Degrees. The people honour persons of high birth. The semi-learned despise them, saying that birth is not a personal, but a chance superiority. The learned honour them, not for popular reasons, but for secret reasons. Devout persons, who have more zeal than knowledge, despise them, in spite of that consideration which makes them honoured by the learned, because they judge them by a new light which piety gives them. But perfect Christians honour them by another and higher light. So arise a succession of opinions for and against, according to the light one has.<a id="Page_95" class="pageno" title="[Pg 95]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00351"><a id="p_338"/>338</h4>
<p>True Christians nevertheless comply with folly, not because they respect folly, but the command of God, who for the punishment of men has made them subject to these follies. <i>Omnis creatura subjecta est vanitati.<a id="FNanchor_125_129"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_125_129" class="fnanchor pginternal">[125]</a> Liberabitur.</i><a id="FNanchor_126_130"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_126_130" class="fnanchor pginternal">[126]</a> Thus Saint Thomas<a id="FNanchor_127_131"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_127_131" class="fnanchor pginternal">[127]</a> explains the passage in Saint James on giving place to the rich, that if they do it not in the sight of God, they depart from the command of religion.</p>
<hr class="c2"/>
<p><a id="Page_96" class="pageno" title="[Pg 96]"/></p>
<h2 id="pgepubid00352"><a id="SECTION_VI"/>SECTION VI</h2>
<h3 id="pgepubid00353">THE PHILOSOPHERS</h3>
<h4 id="pgepubid00354"><a id="p_339"/>339</h4>
<p>I can well conceive a man without hands, feet, head (for it is only experience which teaches us that the head is more necessary than feet). But I cannot conceive man without thought; he would be a stone or a brute.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00355"><a id="p_340"/>340</h4>
<p>The arithmetical machine produces effects which approach nearer to thought than all the actions of animals. But it does nothing which would enable us to attribute will to it, as to the animals.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00356"><a id="p_341"/>341</h4>
<p>The account of the pike and frog of Liancourt.<a id="FNanchor_128_132"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_128_132" class="fnanchor pginternal">[128]</a> They do it always, and never otherwise, nor any other thing showing mind.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00357"><a id="p_342"/>342</h4>
<p>If an animal did by mind what it does by instinct, and if it spoke by mind what it speaks by instinct, in hunting, and in warning its mates that the prey is found or lost; it would indeed also speak in regard to those things which affect it closer, as example, "Gnaw me this cord which is wounding me, and which I cannot reach."</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00358"><a id="p_343"/>343</h4>
<p>The beak of the parrot, which it wipes, although it is clean.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00359"><a id="p_344"/>344</h4>
<p>Instinct and reason, marks of two natures.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00360"><a id="p_345"/>345</h4>
<p>Reason commands us far more imperiously than a master; for in disobeying the one we are unfortunate, and in disobeying the other we are fools.<a id="Page_97" class="pageno" title="[Pg 97]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00361"><a id="p_346"/>346</h4>
<p>Thought constitutes the greatness of man.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00362"><a id="p_347"/>347</h4>
<p>Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush him. A vapour, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But, if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the advantage which the universe has over him; the universe knows nothing of this.</p>
<p>All our dignity consists, then, in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space and time which we cannot fill. Let us endeavour, then, to think well; this is the principle of morality.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00363"><a id="p_348"/>348</h4>
<p><i>A thinking reed.</i>—It is not from space that I must seek my dignity, but from the government of my thought. I shall have no more if I possess worlds. By space the universe encompasses and swallows me up like an atom; by thought I comprehend the world.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00364"><a id="p_349"/>349</h4>
<p><i>Immateriality of the soul.</i>—Philosophers<a id="FNanchor_129_133"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_129_133" class="fnanchor pginternal">[129]</a> who have mastered their passions. What matter could do that?</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00365"><a id="p_350"/>350</h4>
<p><i>The Stoics.</i>—They conclude that what has been done once can be done always, and that since the desire of glory imparts some power to those whom it possesses, others can do likewise. There are feverish movements which health cannot imitate.</p>
<p>Epictetus<a id="FNanchor_130_134"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_130_134" class="fnanchor pginternal">[130]</a> concludes that since there are consistent Christians, every man can easily be so.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00366"><a id="p_351"/>351</h4>
<p>Those great spiritual efforts, which the soul sometimes assays, are things on which it does not lay hold.<a id="FNanchor_131_135"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_131_135" class="fnanchor pginternal">[131]</a> It only leaps to them, not as upon a throne, for ever, but merely for an instant.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00367"><a id="p_352"/>352</h4>
<p>The strength of a man's virtue must not be measured by his efforts, but by his ordinary life.<a id="Page_98" class="pageno" title="[Pg 98]"/></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00368"><a id="p_353"/>353</h4>
<p>I do not admire the excess of a virtue as of valour, except I see at the same time the excess of the opposite virtue, as in Epaminondas,<a id="FNanchor_132_136"/><a href="18269-h-10.html#Footnote_132_136" class="fnanchor pginternal">[132]</a> who had the greatest valour and the greatest kindness. For otherwise it is not to rise, it is to fall. We do not display greatness by going to one extreme, but in touching both at once, and filling all the intervening space. But perhaps this is only a sudden movement of the soul from one to the other extreme, and in fact it is ever at one point only, as in the case of a firebrand. Be it so, but at least this indicates agility if not expanse of soul.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00369"><a id="p_354"/>354</h4>
<p>Man's nature is not always to advance; it has its advances and retreats.</p>
<p>Fever has its cold and hot fits; and the cold proves as well as the hot the greatness of the fire of fever.</p>
<p>The discoveries of men from age to age turn out the same. The kindness and the malice of the world in general are the same. <i>Plerumque gratæ principibus vices.</i><a id="FNanchor_133_137"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_133_137" class="fnanchor pginternal">[133]</a></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00370"><a id="p_355"/>355</h4>
<p>Continuous eloquence wearies.</p>
<p>Princes and kings sometimes play. They are not always on their thrones. They weary there. Grandeur must be abandoned to be appreciated. Continuity in everything is unpleasant. Cold is agreeable, that we may get warm.</p>
<p>Nature acts by progress, <i>itus et reditus</i>. It goes and returns, then advances further, then twice as much backwards, then more forward than ever, etc.</p>
<p>The tide of the sea behaves in the same manner; and so apparently does the sun in its course.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00371"><a id="p_356"/>356</h4>
<p>The nourishment of the body is little by little. Fullness of nourishment and smallness of substance.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00372"><a id="p_357"/>357</h4>
<p>When we would pursue virtues to their extremes on either side, vices present themselves, which insinuate themselves insensibly there, in their insensible journey towards the infinitely little:<a id="Page_99" class="pageno" title="[Pg 99]"/> and vices present themselves in a crowd towards the infinitely great, so that we lose ourselves in them, and no longer see virtues. We find fault with perfection itself.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00373"><a id="p_358"/>358</h4>
<p>Man is neither angel nor brute, and the unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the brute.<a id="FNanchor_134_138"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_134_138" class="fnanchor pginternal">[134]</a></p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00374"><a id="p_359"/>359</h4>
<p>We do not sustain ourselves in virtue by our own strength, but by the balancing of two opposed vices, just as we remain upright amidst two contrary gales. Remove one of the vices, and we fall into the other.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00375"><a id="p_360"/>360</h4>
<p>What the Stoics propose is so difficult and foolish!</p>
<p>The Stoics lay down that all those who are not at the high degree of wisdom are equally foolish and vicious, as those who are two inches under water.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00376"><a id="p_361"/>361</h4>
<p><i>The sovereign good. Dispute about the sovereign good.</i>—<i>Ut sis contentus temetipso et ex te nascentibus bonis.</i><a id="FNanchor_135_139"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_135_139" class="fnanchor pginternal">[135]</a> There is a contradiction, for in the end they advise suicide. Oh! What a happy life, from which we are to free ourselves as from the plague!</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00377"><a id="p_362"/>362</h4>
<p><i>Ex senatus-consultis et plebiscitis</i> ...</p>
<p>To ask like passages.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00378"><a id="p_363"/>363</h4>
<p><i>Ex senatus-consultis et plebiscitis scelera exercentur.</i> Sen. 588.<a id="FNanchor_136_140"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_136_140" class="fnanchor pginternal">[136]</a></p>
<p><i>Nihil tam absurde dici potest quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.</i> Divin.<a id="FNanchor_137_141"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_137_141" class="fnanchor pginternal">[137]</a></p>
<p><i>Quibusdam destinatis sententiis consecrati quæ non probant coguntur defendere.</i> Cic.<a id="FNanchor_138_142"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_138_142" class="fnanchor pginternal">[138]</a></p>
<p><i>Ut omnium rerum sic litterarum quoque intemperantia laboramus.</i> Senec.<a id="FNanchor_139_143"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_139_143" class="fnanchor pginternal">[139]</a></p>
<p><i>Id maxime quemque decet, quod est cujusque suum maxime.</i><a id="FNanchor_140_144"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_140_144" class="fnanchor pginternal">[140]</a></p>
<p><i>Hos natura modos primum dedit.</i><a id="FNanchor_141_145"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_141_145" class="fnanchor pginternal">[141]</a> Georg.</p>
<p><i>Paucis opus est litteris ad bonam mentem.</i><a id="Page_100" class="pageno" title="[Pg 100]"/><a id="FNanchor_142_146"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_142_146" class="fnanchor pginternal">[142]</a></p>
<p class="c1">Si quando turpe non sit, tamen non est non turpe quum id a multitudine laudetur.</p>
<p><i>Mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac.</i><a id="FNanchor_143_147"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_143_147" class="fnanchor pginternal">[143]</a> Ter.</p>
<h4 id="pgepubid00379"><a id="p_364"/>364</h4>
<p><i>Rarum est enim ut satis se quisque vereatur.</i><a id="FNanchor_144_148"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_144_148" class="fnanchor pginternal">[144]</a></p>
<p><i>Tot circa unum caput tumultuantes deos.</i><a id="FNanchor_145_149"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_145_149" class="fnanchor pginternal">[145]</a></p>
<p><i>Nihil turpius quam cognitioni assertionem præcurrere.</i> Cic.<a id="FNanchor_146_150"/><a href="18269-h-11.html#Footnote_146_150" class="fnanchor pginternal">[146]</a></p>
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