Merge pull request #97 from rbrogan-git/typo-fix

README.md

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ To mask the association between the consumed UTXOs and the output UTXOs, we hide
 
 To achieve this, we employ the usage of `nullifiers`. It's a unique hash derived from the unique commitment it consumes. For a UTXO commitment `hash(value, salt, owner public key)`, the nullifier is calculated as `hash(value, salt, owner private key)`. Only the owner of the commitment can generate the nullifier hash. Each transaction will record the nullifiers in the smart contract, to ensure that they don't get re-used (double spending).
 
-In order to prove that the UTXOs to be spent actually exist, we use a markle tree proof inside the zero knowledge proof circuit. The merkle proof is validated against a merkle tree root that is maintained by the smart contract. The smart contract keeps track of all the new UTXOs in each transaction's output commitments array, and uses a merkle tree to calculate the root hash. Then the ZKP circuit can use a root hash as public input, to prove that the input commitments (UTXOs to be spent), which are private inputs to the circuit, are included in the merkle tree represented by the root.
+In order to prove that the UTXOs to be spent actually exist, we use a merkle tree proof inside the zero knowledge proof circuit. The merkle proof is validated against a merkle tree root that is maintained by the smart contract. The smart contract keeps track of all the new UTXOs in each transaction's output commitments array, and uses a merkle tree to calculate the root hash. Then the ZKP circuit can use a root hash as public input, to prove that the input commitments (UTXOs to be spent), which are private inputs to the circuit, are included in the merkle tree represented by the root.
 
 The end result is that, from the onchain data, no one can figure out which UTXOs have been spent, while double spending is prevented.