From 6d8d94352cc132e46ccac9719623835f901bec0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bitcrab Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2019 21:42:27 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] Create bsip-0081.md --- bsip-0081.md | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 bsip-0081.md diff --git a/bsip-0081.md b/bsip-0081.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b28e521 --- /dev/null +++ b/bsip-0081.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ + BSIP: 0081 + Title: Reduce MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05 +Author: Jerry Liu +Status: Draft +Type: Protocol +Created: 2018-08-17 +Discussion: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26928.0 +Worker: no +Abstract +We here propose to reduce the Maximum short squeeze ratio (MSSR) of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05, to lower the shorting incentive. + +Motivation +BitShares is a financial system with leverage, here in the traders there are BTS longers and shorters, surely the traders are finding their chance to make profit in trading, if shorters can always find chance to make big profit by shorting BTS, that’s not a good news to BTS ecosystem, from the perspective of the whole BTS ecosystem consisted of DEX and smartcoin, we need to review the rules continually, while guaranteeing fairness and the risks always be released in time, we also need to try optimize the rules to encourage BTS longers, to provide enough incentive to make BTS ecosystem to grow up. + +Rationale +Currently there are 2 key smartcoin parameters which are maintained by witnesses, they are MCR(Maintenance collateral ratio ) and MSSR(Maximum short squeeze ratio) , now MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1. + +When a debt position is margin called, the placed sell orders is at price feed price/MSSR, so MSSR determine the discount of collateral force selling the higher MSSR, the bigger the discount. + +So high MSSR benefits the filling of margin call sell orders and help to release risks rapidly, however at the same time, high MSSR means buying margin call orders is with big discount, so it encourage BTS shorters to accumulate smartcoins and wait or even try to make margin call happen and get cheaper collateral. This does not do good to the ecosystem grow up. + +We need to release risks rapidly while margin call happen, we also need to try to lower the shorting incentive, so we need a balance, what a MSSR is appropriate depend on the liquidity of the market and also some other factors. + +bitCNY have a very good liquidity, BTS/bitCNY pair in DEX is the pair with highest BTS volume on the earth, after in 19th July the hard fork activated the target CR feature, the sell pressure comes from margin called orders decreased greatly, we are sure that the for bitCNY black swan has very very little chance to happen, it’s the time to reduce MSSR to push bitCNY ecosysm move forward. + +Specification +Witnesses adjust the MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05 while publishing feed price. + +Discussion +Will this change be implemented to bitUSD and other smartcoins? +This time, no! bitUSD and other smartcoins has a much lower liquidity than bitCNY, a high MSSR need to be kept to guarantee the rapid settlement of margin called dept positions. + +How to make sure a strong consensus is reached? +China community has discussed about this change for years, however, target CR feature + good bitCNY liquidity make current time the good time to do the change, in the forum thread, about 70% of the voters support this change, if necessary, a opinion survey worker proposal will be created to collect stake based opinion. As MSSR comes from witness publishing, so when BTS community reach a strong consensus to do the change, we need witnesses to apply the change based on the community consensus + +Summary for Shareholders +Reduce shorting incentive while guaranteeing fairness and safe is an important logic for the ecosystem to evolve. + +Copyright +This document is placed in the public domain. From b350ab13784fc52037f930a34cdc0055b0a1e05a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bitcrab Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2019 23:01:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Update bsip-0081.md --- bsip-0081.md | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/bsip-0081.md b/bsip-0081.md index b28e521..31ac2c8 100644 --- a/bsip-0081.md +++ b/bsip-0081.md @@ -1,16 +1,17 @@ - BSIP: 0081 - Title: Reduce MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05 +BSIP: 0081 +Title: Reduce MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05 Author: Jerry Liu Status: Draft Type: Protocol Created: 2018-08-17 Discussion: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26928.0 Worker: no -Abstract -We here propose to reduce the Maximum short squeeze ratio (MSSR) of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05, to lower the shorting incentive. -Motivation -BitShares is a financial system with leverage, here in the traders there are BTS longers and shorters, surely the traders are finding their chance to make profit in trading, if shorters can always find chance to make big profit by shorting BTS, that’s not a good news to BTS ecosystem, from the perspective of the whole BTS ecosystem consisted of DEX and smartcoin, we need to review the rules continually, while guaranteeing fairness and the risks always be released in time, we also need to try optimize the rules to encourage BTS longers, to provide enough incentive to make BTS ecosystem to grow up. +### **Abstract** + + +### **Motivation** +Bitshares community becomes more and more aware that BTS need a powerful economy model, one simple selection is to charge the tradings and buy back BTS using the accumulated fees, as did in many exchange platform tokens, the continuous income can help to provide smartcoin liquidity and sustain BTS price. Margin call tradings are potential to contribute a big part of the income to the system, however up to now the margin call trading is not charged, we need to find a suitable way to get this part of system income. Rationale Currently there are 2 key smartcoin parameters which are maintained by witnesses, they are MCR(Maintenance collateral ratio ) and MSSR(Maximum short squeeze ratio) , now MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1. From 7b960683ccc536540ae23dcc8f14b839b0a38d79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bitcrab Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 23:22:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Create bsip-0087.md --- bsip-0087.md | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) create mode 100644 bsip-0087.md diff --git a/bsip-0087.md b/bsip-0087.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..016259d --- /dev/null +++ b/bsip-0087.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ + BSIP: + Title: Force Settlement Fee Ratio + Authors: + Jerry Liu bitcrab@qq.com + Status: Draft + Type: Protocol + Created: 2020-02-23 + Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/260 + Worker: TBD + +# Abstract +This BSIP provide a solution to charge fee from force settlement. + +# Motivation +Force settlement is an important part in smartcoin design, it provides the power to smartcoin owner to ask for collaterals with reference to feed price, and then guarantees the peg of smartcoin. + +The community continuously optimize the rules of smartcoin to balance the interests of relevant parties, taking bitCNY as an example, at the beginning the rules focus more on smart coin peg but care less on debt position owners’ interests, change are done to give debt position owners more protection, the force settlement offset has been changed from 0 to 2%, the max settlement volume per maintenance period has been changed from no limit to 0.5% of smartcoin supply. + +In the past several weeks, force settlement happened more intensively than before, the background is that the crypto market seemly switched from bear to bull, and BTS price went above 0.22CNY - which is the voted threshold per BSIP76, at some time the frequently happened force settlements made the lowest debt position collateral ratio even higher than 3, this phenomenon triggered warm discussion, almost all the users agree that the settler need to pay more cost while executing force settlement, and the cost will be paid to system as fee. + +# Rationale +Force settlement fee can be seen as to pay part of the cost for smartcoin supply, stabilization and also the liquidation of collaterals, it is irrelevant to market fee sharing. +To ensure the debt positions can always be closed with suffcient smartcoin, it is more feasible to cut off part of the traded collaterals as fee, instead of smartcoin. + +# Specification +Add one new parameter Force Settlement Fee Ratio(FSFR) for each smartcoin, which is controlled by the smartcoin owner. +`Force settlement order price = settlement price*(1+FSO)/(1-FSFR)` + +Here settlement price is a new introduced parameter which is defined in BSIP71, settlement price = feed price when there is no bad debt. + +FSO is Force Settlement Offset. + +When a force settlement is executed, the buyer sells smartcoin with quantity `X` and get collaterals in quantity `X*(1-FSFR)/[settlement price*(1+FSO)]`, the settled debt position owner sells collaterals in quantity `X/[settlement price*(1+FSO)]` and get smartcoin in quantity `X`, the delta in paid and received collaterals in quantity `X*FSFR/[settlement price*(1+FSO)]` will be paid to the owner of the smartcoin as force settlement fee. + +# Copyright +This document is placed in the public domain. From 3f8aefb24460252d1441bb8dc3270df2ed2c7be4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bitcrab Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 00:15:08 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Update bsip-0081.md --- bsip-0081.md | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/bsip-0081.md b/bsip-0081.md index 31ac2c8..8c539c7 100644 --- a/bsip-0081.md +++ b/bsip-0081.md @@ -1,41 +1,50 @@ -BSIP: 0081 -Title: Reduce MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05 -Author: Jerry Liu -Status: Draft -Type: Protocol -Created: 2018-08-17 -Discussion: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26928.0 -Worker: no + BSIP: 0081 + Title: Simple Maker-Taker Market Fees + Author: Abit More + Status: Draft + Type: Protocol + Created: 2019-10-02 + Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/229 + Obsoletes: BSIP-0003 + Worker: TBD -### **Abstract** +# Abstract +[BSIP67](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/130) proposed a mechanism +which has maker-taker fees in consideration, but it's relatively complex. +This BSIP proposes a protocol change to enable asset owners to specify +different market fee rate for maker orders and taker orders. -### **Motivation** -Bitshares community becomes more and more aware that BTS need a powerful economy model, one simple selection is to charge the tradings and buy back BTS using the accumulated fees, as did in many exchange platform tokens, the continuous income can help to provide smartcoin liquidity and sustain BTS price. Margin call tradings are potential to contribute a big part of the income to the system, however up to now the margin call trading is not charged, we need to find a suitable way to get this part of system income. +# Motivation -Rationale -Currently there are 2 key smartcoin parameters which are maintained by witnesses, they are MCR(Maintenance collateral ratio ) and MSSR(Maximum short squeeze ratio) , now MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1. +Asset owners need tools to incentivize trading of their assets. -When a debt position is margin called, the placed sell orders is at price feed price/MSSR, so MSSR determine the discount of collateral force selling the higher MSSR, the bigger the discount. +# Rationale -So high MSSR benefits the filling of margin call sell orders and help to release risks rapidly, however at the same time, high MSSR means buying margin call orders is with big discount, so it encourage BTS shorters to accumulate smartcoins and wait or even try to make margin call happen and get cheaper collateral. This does not do good to the ecosystem grow up. +Maker-taker fee model is adopted widely in centralized exchanges and helped +them to attract trading activities. -We need to release risks rapidly while margin call happen, we also need to try to lower the shorting incentive, so we need a balance, what a MSSR is appropriate depend on the liquidity of the market and also some other factors. +# Specification -bitCNY have a very good liquidity, BTS/bitCNY pair in DEX is the pair with highest BTS volume on the earth, after in 19th July the hard fork activated the target CR feature, the sell pressure comes from margin called orders decreased greatly, we are sure that the for bitCNY black swan has very very little chance to happen, it’s the time to reduce MSSR to push bitCNY ecosysm move forward. +There is already a flag `market_fee_percent` in asset options. -Specification -Witnesses adjust the MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05 while publishing feed price. +Add a new flag `taker_fee_percent` into asset options, assign +`market_fee_percent` to `taker_fee_percentage` at the consensus +upgrade time for existing assets. The new flag can only be set +or updated by asset owners after the consensus upgrade. -Discussion -Will this change be implemented to bitUSD and other smartcoins? -This time, no! bitUSD and other smartcoins has a much lower liquidity than bitCNY, a high MSSR need to be kept to guarantee the rapid settlement of margin called dept positions. +Before the consensus upgrade, when an order buying that asset +got filled, the amount `bought_amount * market_fee_percent` +will go to the asset's accumulated fees. -How to make sure a strong consensus is reached? -China community has discussed about this change for years, however, target CR feature + good bitCNY liquidity make current time the good time to do the change, in the forum thread, about 70% of the voters support this change, if necessary, a opinion survey worker proposal will be created to collect stake based opinion. As MSSR comes from witness publishing, so when BTS community reach a strong consensus to do the change, we need witnesses to apply the change based on the community consensus +After the consensus upgrade, when an order buying the asset +got filled, +* if the order is a *maker*, the amount + `bought_amount * market_fee_percent` will go to the + asset's accumulated fees; +* otherwise (if the order is a *taker*), the amount + `bought_amount * taker_fee_percent` will go to the + asset's accumulated fees. -Summary for Shareholders -Reduce shorting incentive while guaranteeing fairness and safe is an important logic for the ecosystem to evolve. - -Copyright +# Copyright This document is placed in the public domain. From db8df4a5642a861eacb660fc5bfc520528b2bd7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Stefan=20Schie=C3=9Fl?= Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 13:15:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] assign bsip-0087.md --- README.md | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6a30f49..f25eda6 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -86,4 +86,5 @@ Number | Title | [81](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/229) | Simple Maker-Taker Market Fees | Abit More | Protocol | Draft [84](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/81) | Elections Based on non-Core Asset | Peter Conrad | Protocol | Draft [85](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/240) | Maker Order Creation Fee Discount | Abit More | Protocol | Draft -[86](bsip-0086.md) | Share market fees to the network | Abit More | Protocol | Approved \ No newline at end of file +[86](bsip-0086.md) | Share market fees to the network | Abit More | Protocol | Approved +[87](bsip-0087.md) | Force Settlement Fee (working title) | Bitcrab | Protocol | Draft