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<title>Thomas Aquinas: Commentary on Aristotle's Generation and Corruption: English</title>
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      <h2 style="color:blue">In librum Aristotelis<br>
      De generatione et corruptione expositio<br>
      <br>
      COMMENTARY ON<br>
      ARISTOTLE'S<br>
      GENERATION AND CORRUPTION</h2>
      <p>by
      <h3 style="color:red">Thomas Aquinas</h3>
      <h3>tr. by Pierre Conway & R.F. Larcher</h3>
      <hr>
      <p>CONTENTS
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    <h3>BOOK I</h3>
    <ol>
      <a href="GenCorrup.htm#0">Prologue by Thomas Aquinas 1</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#1">Aristotle's Preface: Various previous opinions on the difference between generation and alteration</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2">The basic reason for these differing opinions on generation and alteration</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#3">What must be treated. Opinions of Democritus and Leucippus</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#4">Democritus' argument that natural bodies are composed of indivisible bodies</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#5">Resolution of Democritus' argument</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#6">Does simple generation exist. Problem and solution</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#7">The cause on the part of matter why generation never fails</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#8">Why in mutual generation and corruption there is sometimes absolute generation and qualified corruption</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#9">The cause of the difference between absolute and qualified generation in things not mutually generated</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#10">The difference between generation and alteration</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#11">Growth differs from generation and alteration both as to subject and to manner</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#12">The subject of growth is not something incorporeal or lacking size</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#13">Matter, even as conceived by Platonists, cannot lack size and be the subject of growth</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#14">Problems on the nature of that by which something grows</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#15">Solution of the difficulty proposed in the previous lecture</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#16">How growth takes place. Its difference from generation</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#17">Comparison of growth to food. How diminution occurs</a><br>
        Continuation by an unknown author:
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#18">De mixtura, de agere et pati, de tactu</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#19">Opiniones circa habitudinem mutuam agentis et patientis</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#20">Diversitas agentium</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#21">Opiniones de modo quo perficitur agere et pati in corporibus</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#22">Opiniones praedictae reprobantur</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#23">Sub quibus conditionibus contingit agere et pati</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#24">Quomodo mixtio differat a generation, alteratione et augmento</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#25">Opiniones de modo mixtionis refutantur</a>
    </ol><a href="GenCorrup.htm#25">
    <h3>BOOK II</h3></a>
    <ol>
      <a href="GenCorrup.htm#25"></a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#25"></a> <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.1">Refutantur falsae opiniones de materia elementorum</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.2">Qualia sint prima principia formalia elementorum</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.3">Quatuor esse elementa probatur</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.4">Omnia elementa nata sunt ex se invicem generari</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.5">Subiectum transmutationis elementorum non est aliquod corpus</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.6">De transmutatione elementorum adinvicem</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.7">Refutatur opinio Empedoclis de transmutatione elementorum</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.8">Quomodo fit mixtum ex elementis</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.9">Praeter causam materialem et formalem generabilium requiritur tertia</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.10">Quae sit causa efficiens generationis et corruptionis perpetuae</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.11">Utrum quaedam generentur ex necessitate</a>
      <li>
        <a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.12">Qualis generatio secundum Philosophum sit perpetua</a>
    </ol><a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.12">
    <hr>
    Prooemium<br>
    PROLOGUE OF SAINT THOMAS<br>
    Subject matter of this book</a> <a name="0" id="0"></a>
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          <td>Sicut tradit philosophus in III de anima, scientiae secantur quemadmodum et res: nam omnes habitus distinguuntur per obiecta, ex quibus speciem habent. Res autem quas considerat naturalis, sunt motus et mobile: dicit enim philosophus in II Physic. quod quaecumque mota movent, sunt physicae speculationis. Et ideo oportet quod secundum differentiam motuum et mobilium, distinguantur et ordinentur partes scientiae naturalis.
          <td>1. As the Philosopher says in <i>On the Soul</i> III, the sciences are divided off in the same manner as things are — for all habits are distinguished by their objects, from which they are specified. Now the things considered by Natural Science are motion and mobile being. Thus the Philosopher says in <i>Physics</i> II that whatever things move, they themselves being moved, these belong to physical speculation. Consequently, it is according to the differences between motions and mobiles that the parts of natural science must be distinguished and ordered.
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          <td>Primus autem motuum est motus localis, qui est perfectior ceteris, et communis omnibus corporibus naturalibus, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Et ideo post considerationem motuum et mobilium in communi, quae fuit tradita in libro physicorum, primo oportuit quod tractaretur de corporibus secundum quod moventur motu locali, in libro de caelo; quae est secunda pars scientiae naturalis. Restat igitur consideratio de motibus aliis consequentibus, qui non sunt communes omnibus corporibus, sed inveniuntur in solis inferioribus.
          <td>Now the first motion is local motion, which is more perfect than the other kinds, and common to all natural bodies, as is proved in <i>Physics</i> VII. Therefore, after the study of motions and mobiles in common in the book of the <i>Physics</i>, it was first necessary to treat of bodies as they are moved with local motion. This was in the book <i>On the Heavens</i>, which is the second book of natural science. What remains, therefore, is to consider the other subsequent motions which are not common to all bodies but are found only in lower bodies.
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          <td>Inter quos principatum obtinet generatio et corruptio. Alteratio enim ordinatur ad generationem sicut ad finem, qui est perfectior naturaliter his quae sunt ad finem. Augmentum etiam consequenter se habet ad generationem: nam augmentum non fit sine quadam particulari generatione, qua scilicet nutrimentum convertitur in nutritum; sicut philosophus dicit in II de anima quod cibus nutrit inquantum est potentia caro, augmentat autem inquantum est potentia quanta caro. Et ideo necesse est, quia hi motus quodammodo consequenter se habent ad generationem, quod simul de his et de generatione et corruptione tractetur.
          <td>Among these motions, generation and corruption obtain the primacy. For alteration is directed to generation as to its end, and the end is by nature more perfect than what leads to it. Growth, likewise, is subsequent to generation, for growth does not take place without a certain particular generation, namely, that by which food is converted into the thing fed. Thus the Philosopher says in <i>On the Soul</i> II that food nourishes in so far as it is potentially flesh, but it produces increase inasmuch as potentially it is quantified flesh. Therefore, since these motions are in a certain way consequent upon generation, they must be studied along with generation and corruption.
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          <td>Est autem considerandum quod de unoquoque quod in pluribus invenitur, prius est considerandum in communi, quam ad species descendere: alioquin oporteret idem dicere multoties, ita scilicet quod in singulis id quod est commune repeteretur, sicut probat philosophus in I de partibus animalium. Et ideo prius oportuit de generatione et corruptione in communi determinare, quam ad partes eius descendere. Similiter etiam considerare oportet quod, si in aliquo genere aliquod primum invenitur quod sit causa aliorum, eiusdem considerationis est commune genus et id quod est primum in genere illo: quia illud primum est causa totius generis, oportet autem eum qui considerat genus aliquod, causas totius generis considerare. Et inde est quod philosophus in metaphysica simul determinat de ente in communi et de ente primo, quod est a materia separatum. Sunt autem in genere generabilium et corruptibilium quaedam prima principia, scilicet elementa, quae sunt causa generationis et corruptionis et alterationis in omnibus aliis corporibus. Et inde est quod Aristoteles in hoc libro, qui est tertia pars scientiae naturalis, determinat non solum de generatione et corruptione in communi et aliis motibus consequentibus, sed etiam de generatione et corruptione elementorum.
          <td>2. Now it should be noted that whatever is found in a number of things should first be considered in common before coming to the specific cases. Otherwise the same thing will be frequently repeated, in that what is common will be repeated in each individual case, as the Philosopher proves in <i>On the Parts of Animals</i> I. Consequently, generation and corruption should be considered in common before coming to the parts [i.e., species] thereof. Likewise, it should be noted that if in any genus there be found some first thing which is the cause of the other things in that genus, the study of the common genus and of that which is first in that genus will belong to the same study. For that first thing is the cause of the entire genus, and anyone who studies some genus must consider the causes of the entire genus. That is why the Philosopher in the <i>Metaphysics</i> at once studies being in general and first being, which is separated from matter. Now in the genus of generable and corruptible things there are found certain first principles, namely, the elements, which are the cause of generation and corruption and alteration in all other bodies. Hence Aristotle in this book, which is the third part of natural science, discusses not only generation and corruption in general and other consequent motions, but also generation and corruption of the elements.
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          <td>His igitur praelibatis ad demonstrandum intentionem Aristotelis in hoc libro, accedendum est ad expositionem eius.
          <td>With these prefatory remarks to show Aristotle's intention in this book, we now arrive at its exposition.
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      Α<br>
      BOOK ONE <a name="1" id="1"></a>
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              <h1 style="color:red">ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΟΥΣ<br>
              ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΘΟΡΑΣ</h1>
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Lecture 1<br>
            Aristotle's Preface Various previous opinions on the difference between generation and alteration.</b>
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 1</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">(314a.) Περὶ δὲ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν φύσει γενομένων καὶ φθειρομένων, ὁμοίως κατὰ πάντων, τάς τε αἰτίας διαιρετέον καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν,
            <td>1 OUR next task is to study coming-to-be and passing-away. We are to distinguish the causes, and to state the definitions, of these processes considered in general—as changes predicable uniformly of all the things that come-to-be and pass-away by nature.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">ἔτι δὲ περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, τί ἑκάτερον,
            <td>2 Further, we are to study growth and 'alteration'. We must inquire what each of them is;
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">καὶ πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ὑποληπτέον φύσιν εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ γενέσεως, ἢ χωρίς, ὥσπερ διώρισται καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.
            <td>3 and whether 'alteration' is to be identified with coming-to-be, or whether to these different names there correspond two separate processes with distinct natures.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀρχαίων οἱ μὲν τὴν καλουμένην ἁπλῆν γένεσιν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δ' ἕτεροι ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ γένεσιν.
            <td>4 On this question, indeed, the early philosophers are divided. Some of them assert that the so-called 'unqualified coming-to-be' is 'alteration', while others maintain that 'alteration' and coming-to-be are distinct.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἕν τι τὸ πᾶν λέγουσιν εἶναι καὶ πάντα ἐξ ἑνὸς γεννῶσι, τούτοις μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν γένεσιν ἀλλοίωσιν φάναι καὶ τὸ κυρίως γινόμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι.
            <td>5 For those who say that the universe is one something (i.e. those who generate all things out of one thing) are bound to assert that coming-to-be is 'alteration', and that whatever 'comes-to-be' in the proper sense of the term is 'being altered'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅσοι δὲ πλείω τὴν ὕλην ἑνὸς τιθέασιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Λεύκιππος, τούτοις δὲ ἕτερον.
            <td>6 But those who make the matter of things more than one must distinguish coming-to-be from 'alteration'. To this latter class belong Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Καίτοι Ἀναξαγόρας γε τὴν οἰκείαν φωνὴν ἠγνόησεν· λέγει γοῦν ὡς τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ταὐτὸν καθέστηκε τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, πολλὰ δὲ λέγει τὰ στοιχεῖα, καθάπερ καὶ ἕτεροι.
            <td>7 And yet Anaxagoras himself failed to understand his own utterance. He says, at all events, that coming-to-be and passing-away are the same as 'being altered':' yet, in common with other thinkers, he affirms that the elements are many.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ τέτταρα, τὰ δὲ πάντα μετὰ τῶν κινούντων ἓξ τὸν ἀριθμόν, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ἄπειρα καὶ Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος.
            <td>8 Thus Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, while all the elements—including those which initiate movement—are six in number; whereas Anaxagoras agrees with Leucippus and Democritus that the elements are infinite.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα τίθησιν, οἷον ὀστοῦν καὶ σάρκα καὶ μυελόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἑκάστῳ συνώνυμον τὸ μέρος ἐστίν. Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος ἐκ σωμάτων ἀδιαιρέτων τἆλλα συγκεῖσθαί φασι, ταῦτα δ' ἄπειρα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ τὰς μορφάς, αὐτὰ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὰ διαφέρειν τούτοις ἐξ ὧν εἰσὶ καὶ θέσει καὶ τάξει τούτων.
            <td>9 Anaxagoras posits as elements the 'homoeomeries', viz. bone, flesh, marrow, and everything else which is such that part and whole are the same in name and nature. while Democritus and Leucippus say that there are indivisible bodies, infinite both in number and in the varieties of their shapes, of which everything else is composed—the compounds differing one from another according to the shapes, 'positions', and 'groupings' of their constituents.)
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐναντίως δὲ φαίνονται λέγοντες οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοῖς περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα· ὁ μὲν γάρ φησι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν στοιχεῖα τέσσαρα καὶ ἁπλᾶ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν, οἱ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ἁπλᾶ καὶ στοιχεῖα, γῆν δὲ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετα·
            <td>10 For the views of the school of Anaxagoras seem diametrically opposed to those of the followers of Empedocles. Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air, and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone, and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'. But the followers of Anaxagoras regard the 'homoeomeries' as 'simple' and elements, whilst they affirm that Earth, Fire, Water, and Air are composite; for each of these is (according to them) a 'common seminary' of all the 'homoeomeries'.
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          <td>In hoc igitur libro philosophus primo ponit prooemium, demonstrans suam intentionem: secundo prosequitur propositum, ibi: antiquorum quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit.
          <td>3. In this book, therefore, the Philosopher first prefaces an introduction, in which he states his intention; secondly, he carries it out (L. 3). In the introduction he does three things.
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          <td>Primo enim ponit id quod principaliter intendit. Et continuatur ad finem libri de caelo, ubi dictum est: <i>de gravi quidem igitur et levi determinatum sit hoc modo</i>. Et subditur: <i>de generatione autem et corruptione natura generatorum et corruptorum</i>, idest eorum quae naturaliter generantur et corrumpuntur, <i>universaliter de omnibus et causas dividendum est</i>, ut scilicet assignemus alias causas generationis et alias corruptionis, vel etiam ut communes causas distinguamus, applicando singulis speciebus generatorum et corruptorum naturaliter, <i>et rationes eorum determinandum est</i>, vel generationis et corruptionis, vel etiam eorum quae naturaliter generantur et corrumpuntur: utrorumque enim definitiones scire oportet, naturalis enim non solum considerat motum, sed etiam ipsa mobilia. Dicit autem <i>natura generatorum et corruptorum</i>, quia considerare de generatione et corruptione artificialium non pertinet ad naturalem.
          <td>First [1], he states what his main intention is. And this is in continuation with the end of the book <i>On the Heavens</i>, where he had said: "We have now finished our examination of the heavy and the light..." He now adds: "Our next task is to study coming-to-be and passing-away. Of all the things that come-to-be and pass-away by nature" i.e., of things that are naturally generated and corrupted, we are to distinguish the causes of these processes considered in general," assigning, namely, one set of causes for generation and another set for corruption, or else distinguishing the common causes by assigning them to the particular species of naturally generated and corrupted things, "and state their definitions," i.e., either the definitions of generation and corruption or also of the things that are naturally generated and corrupted — for one must know the definitions of each, since Natural Science not only considers motions but mobile things themselves. He says, "of things that come-to-be and pass-away by nature," because the study of the generation and corruption of artificial things does not pertain to Natural Science.
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          <td>Secundo cum dicit: amplius etc., promittit se determinaturum de aliis motibus consequentibus, scilicet de alteratione et augmentatione, quid sit utrumque.
          <td>Secondly [2], he promises to reach conclusions on the other subsequent motions, namely, on alteration and growth, as to the nature of both.
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          <td>Tertio ibi: et utrum etc., promittit se determinaturum de comparatione praedictorum adinvicem: utrum scilicet sit existimandum (vel recipiendum) quod eadem sit natura et ratio alterationis et generationis, aut <i>semota</i>, idest distincta, ut scilicet ita differant ratione et natura, sicut sunt <i>determinata</i>, idest distincta, nominibus.
          <td>Thirdly [3] he promises to settle the matter of the comparison of the aforesaid to each other, namely, whether one should consider (or accept) the nature and notion of alteration and generation as being the same, or "separate," i.e., distinct, so as to differ in notion and nature, as they are "determinate," i.e., distinct, as to name.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: antiquorum quidem igitur etc., prosequitur suum propositum.
          <td>4. Then [4] he pursues his proposition.
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          <td>Et primo determinat de generatione et corruptione in communi, et etiam de consequentibus motibus; secundo determinat de generatione et corruptione elementorum, et hoc in secundo libro, qui incipit ibi: de mixtione quidem igitur et cetera.
          <td>First, he determines concerning generation and corruption in common and also concerning the consequent motions; Secondly, he determines concerning the generation and corruption of the elements. This in Book II.
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          <td>Prima pars dividitur in duas:
          <td>The first part is divided in two:
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">in prima determinat de generatione et corruptione in communi, et aliis motibus consequentibus;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">in secunda determinat de quibusdam quae ad hoc requiruntur, ibi: quoniam autem primum oportet de materia et cetera.
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">In the first he determines concerning generation and corruption in common and concerning the other consequent motions;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">In the second he determines concerning certain things required for these, (L. 18).
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          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>As to the first he does two things:
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo inquirit utrum generatio differat ab alteratione, quod erat tertium propositorum: oportuit tamen prius hoc tangere, quia, cum differentia constituat speciem, non posset sciri propria ratio generationis et corruptionis, hoc ignorato.
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secundo determinat de generatione et consequentibus motibus, ibi: universaliter itaque de generatione et cetera.
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he inquires whether generation differs from alteration. This was the third of the things brought forward; nevertheless it must be discussed first, because, since it is the difference that determines a species, the appropriate notion of generation and corruption could not be known, if this remained unknown;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he determines concerning generation and consequent motions (L. 3).
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          <td>Circa primum tria facit:
          <td>As to the first he does three things:
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ponit diversas sententias antiquorum circa differentiam generationis et alterationis;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo rationem diversitatis assignat, ibi: quicumque igitur etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio rationem assignatam manifestat, ibi: Empedocles quidem enim et cetera.
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he cites various opinions of the ancients regarding the difference between generation and corruption;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he gives a reason for these variances, there at 7;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he elucidates this reason at 10.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod quidam antiquorum philosophorum dixerunt quod illa quae dicitur <i>simplex</i> generatio, idest absoluta, est idem quod alteratio: alii vero dixerunt aliud esse generationem simplicem et alterationem.
          <td>He says therefore first that some of the early philosophers said that what is called "simple," i.e., absolute, generation is the same as alteration, while others said that the two differ.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quicumque igitur etc., assignat rationem diversitatis praedictae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo assignat rationem quare quidam posuerunt generationem simplicem esse idem quod alterationem. Fuerunt enim quidam qui posuerunt unum esse principium materiale omnium rerum, puta aquam vel aerem vel ignem vel vaporem; et cum hoc posuerunt quod materia est tota substantia rei; ex quo sequitur quod substantia rei semper maneat; et ideo generatio in re non differt ab alteratione. Et hoc est quod dicit: quicumque dicunt <i>omne</i>, idest universum, esse unum secundum materialem substantiam, et omnia <i>generant</i>, idest causant, ex uno principio materiali, his necesse est dicere quod generatio sit idem quod alteratio; et quod idem sit aliquid <i>principaliter</i>, idest simpliciter, fieri, et alterari.
          <td>5. Then [5] he assigns the reason for the aforesaid diversity. Concerning this he does three things. First, he explains why some identified simple generation and alteration. For there were some who posited there to be one material principle of all things — e.g., water, or air, or fire, or vapor. At the same time they held that the matter of a thing is its entire substance. From this it follows that the substance of a thing always persists. Hence generation does not in reality differ from alteration. In the words of Aristotle: all who say that everything, i.e., the universe, is one with respect to material substance, and who generate all things, i.e., cause all things, from one material principle — all such must say that generation is the same as alteration and that it is the same thing for something to be made "principally," i.e., absolutely, and to be altered.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo cum dicit: quicumque autem etc., assignat rationem quare quidam posuerunt differre generationem et alterationem. Fuerunt enim quidam philosophi ponentes plura principia materialia, ex quorum congregatione et segregatione dicebant omnia fieri et corrumpi. Et secundum hoc congregationem dicebant esse generationem, et segregationem corruptionem: alterationem autem dicebant fieri per qualemcumque partium transmutationem. Hoc est ergo quod dicit, quod quicumque posuerunt plures materias rerum quam unam, sicut Empedocles, Anaxagoras et Leucippus cum Democrito, istis videtur aliud generatio et aliud alteratio.
          <td>6. Secondly [6], he tells why others postulated that generation differs from alteration. For there were certain philosophers who posited several material principles, from the association and disassociation of which all things were said to come to be and to be destroyed. In this doctrine, association was called "generation," and disassociation "corruption." But alteration, they declared, came about in terms of any change affecting the parts. Thus Aristotle says: all who posited more material principles than one, as did Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus — to all such it seemed that generation was one thing and alteration another.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Tertio ibi: sed tamen Anaxagoras etc., excipit ab his Anaxagoram, de quo dicit quod <i>propriam vocem ignoravit</i>, sicut ille qui ponit aliquid non conveniens suae positioni. Cum enim poneret multa elementa, sicut alii, tamen dixit singulariter quod generari et corrumpi sunt idem quod alterari. Et huius diversitatis ratio est quia, sicut dicitur in I Physic., Anaxagoras posuit res fieri per abstractionem a mixto: ponebat autem misceri non solum elementa, sed etiam accidentia: et ideo eundem modum ponebat productionis corporum, qui pertinet ad generationem et corruptionem, et accidentium, qui pertinet ad alterationem; ut scilicet, sicut caro fit per abstractionem, ita et albedo. Et secundum hoc generatio non differebat ab alteratione.
          <td>7. Thirdly [7], he makes an exception for Anaxagoras, who, Aristotle says, forgot his own words, as does a person who says things contrary to his own position. For although Anaxagoras, as the others, posited many elements, yet he singly declared that to be generated and corrupted is the same as to be altered. The reason for this difference is that, as is said in <i>Physics</i> I, Anaxagoras taught that things come to be by being abstracted from the compound. However, he placed not only elements but also accidents in the mixture. Consequently, he assigned the same manner of production to bodies, which come about through generation and corruption, as to accidents, which pertain to alteration — so that, just as - flesh comes to be by being abstracted [from that mixture] so too whiteness. According to this, therefore, generation is no different than alteration.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: Empedocles quidem enim etc., manifestat praemissam rationem. Et primo ostendendo quomodo quidam ponebant plura principia: eorum enim qui ponebant unum principium, erat unus absolutus modus procedendi.
          <td>8. Then [8] he explains the above-mentioned reasoning. First, by showing how some thinkers came to posit more than one principle; for in the case of those who posited but one, there was just one absolute way for things to come about;
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo manifestat quare illi qui ponebant unum principium, negabant differentiam generationis et alterationis, quam adstruebant ponentes plura principia, ibi: his quidem igitur et cetera.
          <td>Secondly, he explains why those who posited one principle denied a difference between generation and alteration, a difference which the others admitted (L.2).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum ponit differentias ponentium plura principia:
          <td>Regarding the first he shows wherein those who posited many principles differed.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>et primo Empedoclis ad omnes alios. Et dicit quod ideo praedictum est quod praedicti philosophi posuerunt plures materias, quia Empedocles ponebat quatuor elementa esse principia materialia, scilicet terram, aquam, aerem et ignem: omnia autem haec cum moventibus, scilicet cum amicitia, quae congregat, et cum lite, quae segregat, dicit esse sex numero: et ita ponebat principia finita. Sed Anaxagoras et Democritus et Leucippus posuerunt principia infinita.
          <td>First, he shows how Empedocles differed from all the others. And he says that the reason why we previously stated that the aforesaid philosophers posited several matters is that Empedocles posited the four elements as material principles, namely, earth, water, air and fire. These four, together with their movers, namely, friendship which combined, and strife which separated, he says to be in number 6. Consequently, he posited finite principles. But Anaxagoras and Democritus and Leucippus posited infinite principles.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo ibi: hic quidem etc., ponit differentiam Anaxagorae a Democrito et Leucippo. Hic enim, scilicet Anaxagoras, posuit corpora <i>homoeomera</i>, idest similium partium, esse principia materialia, utpote infinitas partes carnis et ossis et medullae et aliorum huiusmodi, quorum quaelibet pars est <i>synonyma</i> toti, idest conveniens cum toto in nomine et ratione: haec enim dicuntur <i>homoeomera</i>, idest similium partium. Et haec positio magis manifestata fuit ab Aristotele in I Physic.
          <td>9. Secondly [9] he shows how Anaxagoras differed from Democritus and Leucippus. For Anaxagoras posited "homoeomerous" bodies, i.e., bodies with similar parts, to be the material principles — for example, infinite parts of flesh and of bone and of marrow and of other such, each part of which is "synonymous" with the whole, i.e., agreeing with the whole in name and notion. This theory has been explained in greater detail by Aristotle in <i>Physics</i> I.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Sed Democritus et Leucippus dixerunt omnia corpora sensibilia componi ex quibusdam indivisibilibus corporibus. Quae quidem ponebant infinita multitudine et <i>forma</i>, idest figura: nam quaedam horum corporum indivisibilium dicebant esse circularia, quaedam autem quadrata, quaedam pyramidalia, et sic de aliis. Ponebant tamen omnia esse indifferentis naturae et speciei, contra id quod ponebat Anaxagoras. Et tamen, cum ista principia sint indifferentis naturae et speciei alia corpora sensibilia differunt ab aliis, secundum differentiam eorum ex quibus componuntur, non quidem secundum differentiam in specie naturae, sed secundum differentiam positionis et ordinis; prout scilicet diversimode ordinantur et disponuntur in diversis secundum prius et posterius, ante et retro, sursum et deorsum, dextrorsum et sinistrorsum.
          <td>But Democritus and Leucippus held that all sensible bodies are composed of certain indivisible bodies supposed to be infinite in multitude and "form," i.e., shape, for they said some were circular, some square, some pyramidic, and so on. But contrary to what Anaxagoras posited, they posited all these to be indifferent in nature and species. Yet, while these principles are indifferent in nature and species, nevertheless sensible bodies differ from one another depending on the different things out of which they are composed. However, this is not according to a difference in the species of nature, but in position and order — namely, as these are variously disposed in different bodies according to prior and posterior, before and behind, above and below, right and left.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Tertio ibi: contrarie autem etc., ponit differentiam Anaxagorae ab Empedocle. Et dicit quod contrarie videntur dicere. Empedocles enim dixit quod ignis, terra, aer et aqua sunt quatuor elementa, et quod sunt magis simplicia quam caro et os et talia corpora <i>homoeomera</i>, idest similium partium: et hoc ideo, quia ponebat res fieri per congregationem ex elementis, et ideo illa corpora ponebat elementa, quae congregantur ad aliorum compositionem.
          <td>10. Thirdly [10], he shows how Anaxagoras differed from Empedocles, and he says that they seem to contradict one another. For Empedocles declared that fire, earth, air and water are the four elements, and that they are more simple than flesh and bone and such "homoeomerous" bodies, i.e., bodies of similar parts. The reason was that he posited that things come into being from the elements being assembled; hence those bodies that were assembled to form other bodies he called "elements."
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Sed Anaxagoras ponebat os et carnem et similia corpora esse magis simplicia; et elementa, scilicet terram, aquam, aerem et ignem, ponebat esse composita. Et hoc ideo, quia ponebat res fieri per abstractionem a mixto: unde, cum videret quod ex aere, aqua, terra et igne omnia alia corpora generantur, credidit quod in praedictis quatuor corporibus esset maxima commixtio, ita quod ex his omnia alia extrahi possent. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod dicebat ista quatuor corpora esse <i>panspermiam</i>, idest universalia semina, omnium aliorum corporum; quasi praedicta quatuor corpora essent commixta ex seminibus omnium aliorum corporum.
          <td>Anaxagoras, on the other hand, posited bone and flesh and similar bodies to be the more simple, and the elements, namely, earth, water, air and fire, to be composite. His reason was that he held things to come to be through being separated from a mixture. Hence, since he saw that all other bodies are generated from air, water, earth and fire, he believed that there was in these four bodies a maximum mixture, so that all other bodies could be extracted from them. Thus he [Aristotle] adds that he called these four bodies "panspermia," i.e., the universal seeds of all other bodies, in the sense that these four were a mixture of the seeds of all other bodies.
    </table>
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 2<br>
      The basic reason for these differing opinions on generation and alteration.
      <table cellpadding="12">
        <tbody>
          <tr style="text-align:center">
            <td colspan="2">
          <tr style="text-align:center">
            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 1 cont.</b>
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">(314b.) πανσπερμίαν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα κατασκευάζουσιν ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἀλλοίωσιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ μένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν·
            <td>11 Those, then, who construct all things out of a single element, must maintain that coming-to-be and passing-away are 'alteration'. For they must affirm that the underlying something always remains identical and one; and change of such a substratum is what we call 'altering'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀλλοιοῦσθαί φαμεν· τοῖς δὲ τὰ γένη πλείω ποιοῦσι διαφέρειν τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν τῆς γενέσεως· συνιόντων γὰρ καὶ διαλυομένων ἡ γένεσις συμβαίνει καὶ ἡ φθορά. Διὸ λέγει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ὅτι "φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν,... ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων." Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν τῇ ὑποθέσει οὕτω φάναι, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι λέγουσι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·
            <td>12 Those, on the other hand, who make the ultimate kinds of things more than one, must maintain that 'alteration' is distinct from coming-to-be: for coming-to-be and passing-away result from the consilience and the dissolution of the many kinds. That is why Empedocles too uses language to this effect, when he says 'There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled'. Thus it is clear (i) that to describe coming-to-be and passing-away in these terms is in accordance with their fundamental assumption, and (ii) that they do in fact so describe them:
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ τούτοις τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναι μέν τι φάναι παρὰ τὴν γένεσιν, ἀδύνατον μέντοι κατὰ τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων λεγόμενα. Τοῦτο δ' ὅτι λέγομεν ὀρθῶς, ῥᾴδιον συνιδεῖν.
            <td>13 nevertheless, they too must recognize 'alteration' as a fact distinct from coming to-be, though it is impossible for them to do so consistently with what they say. That we are right in this criticism is easy to perceive.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">
              Ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν ἠρεμούσης τῆς οὐσίας ἐν αὐτῇ μεταβολὴν κατὰ μέγεθος, τὴν καλουμένην αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους ἀρχὰς ποιοῦντες μιᾶς ἀδύνατον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. Τὰ γὰρ πάθη, καθ' ἅ φαμεν τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, διαφοραὶ τῶν στοιχείων εἰσίν, λέγω δ' οἷον θερμὸν ψυχρόν, λευκὸν μέλαν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, μαλακὸν σκληρὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ φησὶν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
              <dl>
                <dd>"ἠέλιον μὲν λευκὸν ὁρᾶν καὶ θερμὸν ἁπάντῃ,
                <dd>ὄμβρον δ' ἐν πᾶσιν δνοφόεντά τε ῥιγαλέον τε".<br>
                Ὁμοίως δὲ διορίζει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Ὥστ' εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ἐκ πυρὸς γενέσθαι ὕδωρ μηδ' ἐξ ὕδατος γῆν, οὐδ' ἐκ λευκοῦ μέλαν ἔσται οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐκ μαλακοῦ σκληρόν· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἀλλοίωσις.
              </dl>
            <td>
              14 For 'alteration' is a fact of observation. While the substance of the thing remains unchanged, we see it 'altering' just as we see in it the changes of magnitude called 'growth' and 'diminution'. Nevertheless, the statements of those who posit more 'original reals' than one make 'alteration' impossible. For 'alteration, as we assert, takes place in respect to certain qualities: and these qualities (I mean, e.g. hot-cold, white-black, dry-moist, soft-hard, and so forth) are, all of them, differences characterizing the 'elements'. The actual words of Empedocles may be quoted in illustration
              <dl>
                <dd>The sun everywhere bright to see, and hot,
                <dd>The rain everywhere dark and cold;<br>
                and he distinctively characterizes his remaining elements in a similar manner. Since, therefore, it is not possible for Fire to become Water, or Water to become Earth, neither will it be possible for anything white to become black, or anything soft to become hard; and the same argument applies to all the other qualities. Yet this is what 'alteration' essentially is.
              </dl>
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἧι καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι μίαν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποθετέον ὕλην, ἄν τε μεταβάλλῃ κατὰ τόπον, ἄν τε κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, ἄν τε κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν. Ἔτι δ' ὁμοίως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν· εἴτε γὰρ ἀλλοίωσίς (315a.) ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἓν στοιχεῖον καὶ μία πάντων ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολήν, κἂν εἰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἕν, ἔστιν ἀλλοίωσις.
            <td>15 It follows, as an obvious corollary, that a single matter must always be assumed as underlying the contrary 'poles' of any change whether change of place, or growth and diminution, or 'alteration'; further, that the being of this matter and the being of 'alteration' stand and fall together. For if the change is 'alteration', then the substratum is a single element; i.e. all things which admit of change into one another have a single matter. And, conversely, if the substratum of the changing things is one, there is 'alteration'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν ἐναντία λέγειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν αὐτός. Ἅμα μὲν γὰρ οὔ φησιν ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου γίνεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τἆλλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων, ἅμα δ' ὅταν εἰς ἓν συναγάγῃ τὴν ἅπασαν φύσιν πλὴν τοῦ νείκους, ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς γίνεσθαι πάλιν ἕκαστον. Ὥστ' ἐξ ἑνός τινος δῆλον ὅτι διαφοραῖς τισι χωριζομένων καὶ πάθεσιν ἐγένετο τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τὸ δὲ πῦρ, καθάπερ λέγει τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λευκὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν βαρὺ καὶ σκληρόν· ἀφαιρουμένων οὖν τούτων τῶν διαφορῶν (εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀφαιρεταὶ γενόμεναί γε) δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι καὶ γῆν ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ ὕδωρ ἐκ γῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, οὐ τότε μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν, μεταβάλλοντά γε τοῖς πάθεσιν. Ἔστι δ' ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκε δυνάμενα προσγίνεσθαι καὶ χωρίζεσθαι πάλιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ μαχομένων ἀλλήλοις ἔτι τοῦ νείκους καὶ τῆς φιλίας. Διόπερ καὶ τότε ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐγεννήθησαν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ γε καὶ γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ ὄντα ἓν ἦν τὸ πᾶν.
            <td>16 Empedocles, indeed, seems to contradict his own statements as well as the observed facts. For he denies that any one of his elements comes-to-be out of any other, insisting on the contrary that they are the things out of which everything else comes-to-be; and yet (having brought the entirety of existing things, except Strife, together into one) he maintains, simultaneously with this denial, that each thing once more comes-to-be out of the One. Hence it was clearly out of a One that this came-to-be Water, and that Fire, various portions of it being separated off by certain characteristic differences or qualities—as indeed he calls the sun 'white and hot', and the earth 'heavy and hard'. If, therefore, these characteristic differences be taken away (for they can be taken away, since they came-to-be), it will clearly be inevitable for Earth to come to-be out of Water and Water out of Earth, and for each of the other elements to undergo a similar transformation—not only then, but also now—if, and because, they change their qualities. And, to judge by what he says, the qualities are such that they can be 'attached' to things and can again be 'separated' from them, especially since Strife and Love are still fighting with one another for the mastery. It was owing to this same conflict that the elements were generated from a One at the former period. I say 'generated', for presumably Fire, Earth, and Water had no distinctive existence at all while merged in one.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἄδηλον δὲ καὶ πότερον ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν θετέον τὸ ἓν ἢ τὰ πολλά, λέγω δὲ πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτων. Ἧι μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλη ὑπόκειται, ἐξ οὗ μεταβάλλοντα διὰ τὴν κίνησιν γίνονται γῆ καὶ πῦρ, τὸ ἓν στοιχεῖον· ᾗ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ συνθέσεως γίνεται συνιόντων ἐκείνων, ἐκεῖνα δ' ἐκ διαλύσεως, στοιχειωδέστερα ἐκεῖνα καὶ πρότερα τὴν φύσιν.
            <td>17 There is another obscurity in the theory Empedocles. Are we to regard the One as his 'original real'? Or is it the Many—i.e. Fire and Earth, and the bodies co-ordinate with these? For the One is an 'element' in so far as it underlies the process as matter—as that out of which Earth and Fire come-to-be through a change of qualities due to 'the motion'. On the other hand, in so far as the One results from composition (by a consilience of the Many), whereas they result from disintegration, the Many are more 'elementary' than the One, and prior to it in their nature.
      </table>
    </blockquote>
    <table cellpadding="12">
      <tbody>
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Supra Aristoteles assignavit rationem quare quidam antiqui philosophi posuerunt generationem ab alteratione differre, quidam autem non, ex eo quod quidam posuerunt unum principium materiale, quidam autem multa. Hanc rationem supra manifestavit quantum ad radicem, ostendens quomodo quidam philosophorum posuerunt multa principia: nam ponentibus unum principium absolutior est sermo. Nunc autem intendit ipsam rationem secundum se manifestare. Et circa hoc duo facit:
          <td>11. In the preceding lecture Aristotle stated that the reason some ancient philosophers posited generation as differing from alteration, and others did not, was that some postulated one material principle and others more than one. He clarified above the root of this reason, showing how some posited many principles — for in the case of those proposing one principle, the exposition is more unqualified. Now he intends to elucidate this reason in itself. Concerning this he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo manifestat ipsam rationem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo obiicit contra eam, ibi: necesse est autem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he manifests the reason;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he objects to it, at 14.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo manifestat praedictam rationem quantum ad ponentes unum principium;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo quantum ad ponentes plura principia, ibi: his autem qui genera multa et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he elucidates the aforesaid reason as to those who posit one principle;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, as to those who posit several principles, at 13.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod omnibus illis philosophis qui ex uno principio materiali ponunt omnia esse producta, necesse est dicere quod generatio et corruptio idem sit alterationi. Illud enim principium materiale ponebant esse aliquod ens actu, puta ignem vel aerem aut aquam: et ponebant quod illud esset substantia omnium quae ex eo generantur: et sicut materia semper manet in his quae ex materia fiunt, ita ponebant quod illud subiectum semper manet unum et idem. Hoc autem dicimus alterari, quando, manente substantia actu existentis, fit aliqua variatio circa formam. Unde sequitur quod nulla transmutatio esse possit quae dicitur simplex generatio et corruptio, sed sola alteratio.
          <td>12. He says therefore first [11] that all the philosophers who assert that all things are produced from one material principle are forced to say that generation and corruption are the same as alteration. For they posited their one material principle to be some actual being, such as fire or air or water; they also posited it to be the substance of all things generated from it. And just as the matter always persists in things made from matter, so they said, that this subject remains one and the same. Now we say that a thing is altered when, with the substance of the thing in act remaining, some variation occurs with respect to the form. Hence it follows that there can be no change called simple generation and corruption, but only alteration.
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          <td>Nos autem ponimus omnium generabilium et corruptibilium esse unum subiectum primum, quod tamen non est ens actu, sed in potentia. Et ideo ex eo quod accipit formam, per quam fit ens actu, dicitur simpliciter generatio: ex hoc autem quod, postquam est ens actu factum, suscipit aliam quamcumque formam, dicitur alteratio.
          <td>We, on the other hand, declare that there is of all generable and corruptible things one first subject, which, however, is not a being in act but in potency. Therefore when its first subject acquires a form through which it becomes a being in act, this is called simple generation. But it is said to be altered when, after being made a being in act, it acquires any additional form.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: his autem etc., manifestat praedictam rationem quantum ad ponentes plura principia. Et dicit quod illis qui faciunt multa genera principiorum materialium, de quibus supra dictum est, necesse est dicere quod differat generatio ab alteratione. Inquantum enim illa principia materialia conveniunt in unum, contingit, secundum eos, generatio: in quantum autem dissolvuntur, contingit corruptio. Unde Empedocles dicit quod <i>natura</i>, idest forma corporis compositi ex elementis, nullius elementorum est (neque enim est de natura ignis, neque de natura aquae vel aliorum elementorum), sed est solum <i>mixtura</i>, idest solum consistit in natura quadam mixtionis; et opposita privatio consistit in segregatione mixtorum. Et quia ex hoc dicitur aliquid generari, quod acquirit propriam naturam; ideo ponebant quod ex congregatione erat generatio, et ex segregatione corruptio. Fieri alterationem autem ponebant per solam transmutationem, ut infra dicetur. Quia igitur iste sermo est proprius suppositioni eorum, scilicet quod ita loquantur, manifestum est quod ita dicunt de differentia generationis et alterationis, sicut dictum est.
          <td>13. Then [12], he elucidates the aforesaid reason as to those who posited several principles. And he says that those, mentioned above, who assign many kinds of material principles, must say that generation differs from alteration. For according to those philosophers generation comes about when those material principles combine into one; when they are separated, corruption occurs. Hence Empedocles asserts that the "nature," i.e., the form, of a body composed of elements is none of the elements (for it is not of the nature of fire or of water or of the other elements), but it is solely a "mixture," i.e., it consists solely in a certain "mixed" nature, and the opposite privation consists in the separation of what was mixed. And since something is said to be generated when it acquires its appropriate nature, they posited that generation resulted from aggregation, and corruption from separation. But alteration, they said, takes place only through transmutation, as will be explained later. Therefore, since this explanation fits their supposition, and they do indeed speak thus, it is plain that they so speak of the difference between generation and alteration, as has been said.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: necesse est autem etc., improbat ea quae dicta sunt, quantum ad ponentes plura principia: nam ponentes unum principium, ex necessitate concludunt propositum, supposita sua radice. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo obiicit communiter contra omnes; secundo specialiter contra Empedoclem, ibi: Empedocles quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.
          <td>14. Then [13] he disproves what has been stated, with respect to those who posit several principles, for those who posit but one principle reach the conclusion with necessity once its root is supposed. Concerning this he does two things:
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          <td>Primo proponit quod intendit, dicens quod his qui ponunt multa principia, necesse est dicere quod generatio sit aliud praeter alterationem, ut dictum est: sed tamen hoc est impossibile subsistere secundum ea quae ab eis dicuntur. Quod facile potest videri ex his quae sequuntur.
          <td>First, he proposes what he intends, and says that those who posit many principles must admit that generation is different from alteration, as has been said. Nevertheless, this is impossible to maintain in consistency with what they say, as will easily be seen from what follows.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: quemadmodum enim etc., manifestat propositum duabus rationibus. Circa quarum primam proponit quandam similitudinem, dicens quod sicut videmus quod, substantia <i>quiescente</i>, idest permanente, accidit in ea transmutatio secundum magnitudinem, quae nominatur augmentatio et deminutio, ita necesse est esse de alteratione, quae est motus secundum qualitatem: nam sicut quantitas fundatur in substantia, ita et qualitas. Sed impossibile est per hunc modum fieri alterationem, secundum ea quae ponunt facientes plura principia. Dicunt enim quod <i>passiones</i>, idest passibiles qualitates, secundum quas dicimus hoc contingere, scilicet alterationem, ut patet ex VII Physic., sunt differentiae propriae elementorum, scilicet calidum et frigidum, album et nigrum, siccum et humidum, molle et durum, et alia huiusmodi: sicut Empedocles dixit quod <i>sol</i>, idest ignis (ponebat enim solem igneae naturae), videtur esse albus et calidus, <i>imber</i> vero, idest aqua, videtur in omnibus esse niger, frigidus et nebulosus, sicut patet ex ipsa obscuratione aeris, quae fit per imbres: et similiter determinabat de reliquis passionibus, attribuens eas elementis.
          <td>Secondly [14], he elucidates his proposition with two arguments. In regard to the first, he presents an analogy and says that, just as, while the substance "rests," i.e., remains, we see a change occur in it as to size, called "growth" and "decrease," so too with alteration, which is a motion according to quality. For just as quantity is based on substance, so too is quality. But according to what is posited by those philosophers who assume many principles, it is impossible for alteration to occur in this manner. For they say that the "passions," i.e., the passible qualities, with respect to which we state this, namely, alteration to occur, are the proper differences of the elements, namely, hot and cold, white and black, dry and moist, soft and hard, and so on. For example, Empedocles stated that the "sun," i.e., fire, since he posited the sun to be of the nature of fire, is seen as white and hot; "rain," i.e., water, is seen always as dark, cold and cloudy, as is evident from the darkening of the air when it rains. He explained the other passions in a similar way, attributing them to the elements.
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          <td>Dicebant autem quod non erat possibile ex igne fieri aquam, aut ex aqua terram, vel quocumque modo unum elementorum converti in aliud: non enim ponebant huiusmodi elementa composita ex materia et forma, ut sic possit ex uno corrupto aliud generari; sed ponebant esse primas materias, quae non resolverentur in aliquod primum subiectum; oportet autem omne quod in aliud convertitur, resolvi in aliquod subiectum primum. Impossibile est autem propria accidentia inveniri nisi in propriis subiectis: unde, si calidum est proprium accidens ignis et frigidum aquae, impossibile est calidum esse nisi in igne, et frigidum nisi in aqua, et sic de aliis. Si ergo ex aqua non potest fieri ignis, neque ex uno elementorum aliud, consequens est quod nec possit aliquid ex albo fieri nigrum vel ex molli durum: et eadem ratio est de aliis huiusmodi qualitatibus. Cum ergo alteratio non contingat nisi secundum variationem dictarum qualitatum circa idem subiectum, consequens est quod nulla erit alteratio. Et ita nihil est quod ponunt differentiam inter generationem et alterationem.
          <td>They said that it was not possible for water to be produced from fire, or earth from water, or for any one of the elements to be converted into another in any way whatsoever. For they did not posit such elements as composed of matter and form, so that out of the corruption of one, another could be generated. Rather they posited them as first matters that would not be resolved into some first subject. But whatever is to be converted into something else must be resolved into some first subject. Now it is impossible for the proper accidents of a thing to be anywhere but in their proper subject. Hence, if "hot" is the proper accident of fire, and "cold" of water, "hot" can be found only in fire and "cold" only in water, and so on for the others. If, therefore, fire cannot come to be from water, nor one element from another, then black cannot come to be from white or hard from soft. And the same goes for all other such qualities. Consequently, since alteration occurs only when one or another of these qualities varies in one and the same subject, there is no such thing as alteration. Therefore they have no grounds to posit a difference between generation and alteration.
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          <td>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius autem et cetera. Et dicit quod necesse est supponere unam naturam contrariis, quae sunt termini motus, in quolibet motu, scilicet sive transmutetur aliquid secundum locum, sive secundum augmentum et deminutionem. Et similiter necesse est hoc esse in alteratione, ut si alteratio est, sit unum subiectum et una materia omnium habentium huiusmodi transmutationem adinvicem: et si est unum subiectum eorum secundum quae attenditur alteratio, sequitur quod sit alteratio. Quia igitur praedicti philosophi non ponunt unum subiectum omnium qualitatum secundum quas attenditur alteratio, sed plura, non possunt ponere alterationem: et sic supervacue dicunt aliud esse generationem et alterationem.
          <td>15. He presents the second argument [15] and says that it is necessary in any motion to suppose one nature for the contraries which are the termini of the motion, namely, whether something is being transmuted with respect to place, or growth and decrease. Likewise, this must be so in alteration, namely, that if there is alteration, there be one subject and one matter for all the things having such a mutual change, and that if those have one subject when alteration is looked for, it follows that there be alteration. But since the aforesaid thinkers do not posit one subject for all the qualities involved in alteration, but several, they cannot posit alteration. Consequently, they groundlessly say alteration to be different from generation.
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          <td>Differt autem haec ratio a priori: nam haec ratio assignat universalem causam medii quod assumebatur in prima ratione.
          <td>This argument differs from the first in that it states the universal cause of the middle term used in the first one.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: Empedocles quidem igitur etc., disputat contra Empedoclem specialiter, duabus rationibus. Circa quarum primam dicit quod Empedocles videtur contraria dicere non solum his quae apparent secundum sensum, in quibus videmus ex aqua fieri aerem et ex aere ignem: sed etiam videtur contraria dicere sibi ipsi. Ex una enim parte dicit quod nullum elementorum generatur ex altero, sed alia omnia elementata corpora componuntur ex eis: ex alia vero dicit quod, antequam mundus hic generaretur, contigit omnem naturam rerum congregatam esse in unum per amicitiam, praeter litem; et quod rursus unumquodque elementorum, et etiam unumquodque aliorum corporum, factum est ex illo uno per litem segregantem res. Unde manifestum est quod per quasdam differentias et passiones diversorum elementorum, factum est per litem quod ex illo uno primo hoc esset aqua et aliud esset ignis.
          <td>16. Then [16,; he disputes against Empedocles in particular, with two arguments. In the first of these he declares that Empedocles seems to be at odds not only with what our senses reveal, namely, the fact that we see that air comes to be from water and fire from air, but he seems to contradict himself also. For, on the one hand, he says that no element is generated from another, but all other "elemented" bodies are composed of them; and, on the other hand, he says that before this present world was generated, all the nature of things was assembled by Friendship into one, minus Strife, and that each of the elements and also each of the other bodies came to be out of that one through the influence of Strife, separating things. From this it is plain that through certain differences and passions of the various elements it was brought about by Strife out of that one that one thing be water and another fire.
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          <td>Et exemplificat de differentiis et passionibus: sicut ipse dicit quod <i>sol</i>, idest ignis, est albus et calidus et levis, terra autem gravis et dura. Et sic patet quod istae differentiae de novo superveniunt elementis. Omne autem quod de novo advenit, potest auferri. Quia igitur huiusmodi differentiae sunt auferibiles, utpote de novo genitae, manifestum est quod, ablatis huiusmodi differentiis, necesse est fieri et aquam ex terra et terram ex aqua, et similiter unumquodque elementorum ex alio: et hoc non <i>tunc</i> solum, scilicet in principio mundi, sed etiam nunc: et hoc per transmutationem passionum.
          <td>And he gives an example of the "differences and passions" — thus he [Empedocles] says that the "sun," i.e., fire, is white and hot and light, but earth is heavy and hard. From this, it is evident that such differences are newly acquired by the elements. Now whatever is newly acquired can be removed. Therefore, since these differences are removable inasmuch as they are newly engendered, it is plain that, once removed, it is necessary that water be made from earth, and earth from water, and, in general, each element from some other — and this not only "then," i.e., in the beginning of the world, but also now, coming about through the change of the passions.
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          <td>Et quod talis transmutatio passionum fieri possit, probat dupliciter. Primo quidem ex natura ipsarum passionum: quia ex his quae dicit Empedocles, sequitur quod possint de novo advenire, puta per litem segregantem, et rursus separari ab elementis, puta per amicitiam unientem. Aliter ex causa illarum passionum: quia etiam nunc contrariantur adinvicem lis et amicitia. Et ideo <i>tunc, scilicet in principio mundi, ex uno generata sunt elementa, supervenientibus his differentiis: non enim potest dici quod ignis, terra et aqua existentia actu, essent unum totum</i>.
          <td>That such a transmutation of passions can occur he proves in two ways. First, from the very nature of these passions. For, from what Empedocles says, it follows that they can be newly acquired, for example, when Strife separates, and then be separated from the elements when Friendship unites. He proves it in another way from the cause of those passions, because even now [their causes, namely] Friendship and Strife, are contrary to one another. And therefore "then," i.e., in the beginning of the world, the elements were generated from the one, with the differences being acquired, for it cannot be said that fire, earth and water, as actual existents, could constitute the one whole.
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          <td>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: incertum autem et cetera. Et dicit quod incertum est utrum Empedocles debuerit unum principium ponere aut multa, quamvis ipse multa posuerit, scilicet ignem et terram et alia quae coexistunt eis. Et ideo dicit esse incertum, quia inquantum supponitur unum quoddam, ex quo sicut ex materia fiunt ignis, terra et aqua per aliquam transmutationem a lite segregante, videtur quod sit unum elementum: inquantum autem illud unum fit ex compositione elementorum in unum convenientium per amicitiam, illa autem, scilicet elementa, fiunt ex illo uno per quandam dissolutionem per operationem litis, videtur magis quod illa quatuor sint elementa et prius natura. Et licet hoc magis attendebat Empedocles, ponens res fieri per congregationem et segregationem, Aristoteles tamen in praecedenti ratione probat quod necesse est elementa fieri non per solam segregationem, sed per quandam transmutationem, supervenientibus differentiis elementorum: ex quo sequitur contrarium eius quod intendebat Empedocles, scilicet quod illud unum sit magis principium.
          <td>17. In the second argument [17] he says that it is not certain whether Empedocles should have posited one principle or many, even though he did indeed posit many, namely, fire and earth and other things that co-exist with them. He says it is uncertain because, in so far as there is supposed some one thing out of which, as from matter, fire and earth and water come to be through some transmutation caused by the separating action of Strife, it seems that there is one element. But in so far as that one results from the composition of the elements coming together into one through Friendship, and they, namely, the elements, come to be from that one through a certain dissolving caused by Strife, it seems rather that those four are elements and are prior by nature. And although this was more the idea of Empedocles, positing things as produced through Friendship and Strife, Aristotle nevertheless proves in the preceding argument the elements to be produced not by separation alone, but also by a certain change with the arrival of the differences of the elements. From this follows the contrary to what Empedocles intended; namely, that the one is more of a principle [than they].
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    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 3<br>
      What must be treated. Opinions of Democritus and Leucippus.
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 2</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅλως τε δὴ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ἁπλῆς λεκτέον, πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ πῶς ἔστιν, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπλῶν κινήσεων, οἷον περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως.
            <td>18 We have therefore to discuss the whole subject of 'unqualified' coming-to-be and passing-away; we have to inquire whether these changes do or do not occur and, if they occur, to explain the precise conditions of their occurrence. We must also discuss the remaining forms of change, viz. growth and 'alteration'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Πλάτων μὲν οὖν μόνον περὶ γενέσεως ἐσκέψατο καὶ φθορᾶς, ὅπως ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως οὐ πάσης ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων· πῶς δὲ σάρκες ἢ ὀστᾶ ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων, οὐδέν· ἔτι οὔτε περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως οὔτε περὶ αὐξήσεως, τίνα τρόπον ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς πράγμασιν. Ὅλως δὲ παρὰ τὰ ἐπιπολῆς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδεὶς ἐπέστησεν ἔξω Δημοκρίτου. Οὗτος δ' ἔοικε μὲν περὶ ἁπάντων φροντίσαι, ἤδη (315b.) δὲ ἐν τῷ πῶς διαφέρειν. Οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐξήσεως οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν διώρισεν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ὅ τι μὴ κἂν ὁ τυχὼν εἴπειεν, ὅτι προσιόντος αὐξάνονται τῷ ὁμοίῳ (πῶς δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκέτι), οὐδὲ περὶ μίξεως, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐδενός, οἷον τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν, τίνα τρόπον τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχει τὰς φυσικὰς ποιήσεις.
            <td>19 For though, no doubt, Plato investigated the conditions under which things come-to-be and pass-away, he confined his inquiry to these changes; and he discussed not all coming-to-be, but only that of the elements. He asked no questions as to how flesh or bones, or any of the other similar compound things, come-to-be; nor again did he examine the conditions under which 'alteration' or growth are attributable to things. A similar criticism applies to all our predecessors with the single exception of Democritus. Not one of them penetrated below the surface or made a thorough examination of a single one of the problems. Democritus, however, does seem not only to have thought carefully about all the problems, but also to be distinguished from the outset by his method. For, as we are saying, none of the other philosophers made any definite statement about growth, except such as any amateur might have made. They said that things grow 'by the accession of like to like', but they did not proceed to explain the manner of this accession. Nor did they give any account of 'combination': and they neglected almost every single one of the remaining problems, offering no explanation, e.g. of 'action' or 'passion' how in physical actions one thing acts and the other undergoes action.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος ποιήσαντες τὰ σχήματα τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ τούτων ποιοῦσι, διακρίσει μὲν καὶ συγκρίσει γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, τάξει δὲ καὶ θέσει ἀλλοίωσιν.
            <td>20 Democritus and Leucippus, however, postulate the 'figures', and make 'alteration' and coming-to-be result from them. They explain coming-to-be and passing-away by their 'dissociation' and 'association', but 'alteration' by their 'grouping' and 'Position'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δ' ᾤοντο τἀληθὲς ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι, ἐναντία δὲ καὶ ἄπειρα τὰ φαινόμενα, τὰ σχήματα ἄπειρα ἐποίησαν, ὥστε ταῖς μεταβολαῖς τοῦ συγκειμένου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντίον δοκεῖν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ μετακινεῖσθαι μικροῦ ἐμμιγνυμένου καὶ ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἑνὸς μετακινηθέντος· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία γίνεται γραμμάτων.
            <td>21 And since they thought that the 'truth lay in the appearance, and the appearances are conflicting and infinitely many, they made the 'figures' infinite in number. Hence—owing to the changes of the compound—the same thing seems different and conflicting to different people: it is 'transposed' by a small additional ingredient, and appears utterly other by the 'transposition' of a single constituent. For Tragedy and Comedy are both composed of the same letters.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν πᾶσιν ἕτερον εἶναι γένεσις καὶ ἀλλοίωσις, καὶ γίνεσθαι μὲν καὶ φθείρεσθαι συγκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δὲ μεταβαλλόντων τῶν παθημάτων, περὶ τούτων ἐπιστήσασι θεωρητέον. Ἀπορίας γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα καὶ πολλὰς καὶ εὐλόγους. Εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι σύγκρισις ἡ γένεσις, πολλὰ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει· εἰσὶ δ' αὖ λόγοι ἕτεροι ἀναγκαστικοὶ καὶ οὐκ εὔποροι διαλύειν ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν. Εἴτε μή ἐστι σύγκρισις ἡ γένεσις, ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις ἢ ἀλλοίωσις, ἢ εἰ καὶ τοῦτο διαλῦσαι χαλεπὸν ὂν πειρατέον.
            <td>22 Since almost all our predecessors think (i) that coming-to-be is distinct from 'alteration', and (ii) that, whereas things 'alter' by change of their qualities, it is by 'association' and 'dissociation' that they come-to-be and pass-away, we must concentrate our attention on these theses. For they lead to many perplexing and well-grounded dilemmas. If, on the one hand, coming-to-be is 'association', many impossible consequences result: and yet there are other arguments, not easy to unravel, which force the conclusion upon us that coming-to-be cannot possibly be anything else. If, on the other hand, coming-to-be is not 'association', either there is no such thing as coming-to-be at all or it is 'alteration': or else we must endeavour to unravel this dilemma too—and a stubborn one we shall find it.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων πάντων, πότερον οὕτω γίνεται καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ αὐξάνεται τὰ ὄντα καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις πάσχει, τῶν πρώτων ὑπαρχόντων μεγεθῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, ἢ οὐθέν ἐστι μέγεθος ἀδιαίρετον· διαφέρει γὰρ τοῦτο πλεῖστον. Καὶ πάλιν εἰ μεγέθη, πότερον, ὡς Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππος, σώματα ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἢ ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ ἐπίπεδα.
            <td>23 The fundamental question, in dealing with all these difficulties, is this: 'Do things come-to-be and "alter" and grow, and undergo the contrary changes, because the primary "reals" are indivisible magnitudes? Or is no magnitude indivisible?' For the answer we give to this question makes the greatest difference. And again, if the primary 'reals' are indivisible magnitudes, are these bodies, as Democritus and Leucippus maintain? Or are they planes, as is asserted in the Timaeus?
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄλογον μέχρι ἐπιπέδων διαλῦσαι. Διὸ μᾶλλον εὔλογον σώματα εἶναι ἀδιαίρετα. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα πολλὴν ἔχει ἀλογίαν. Ὅμως δὲ τούτοις ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ γένεσιν ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τροπῇ καὶ διαθιγῇ μετακινοῦντα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ταῖς τῶν σχημά(316a.) των διαφοραῖς, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Δημόκριτος. Διὸ καὶ χροιὰν οὔ φησιν εἶναι· τροπῇ γὰρ χρωματίζεσθαι. Τοῖς δ' εἰς ἐπίπεδα διαιροῦσιν οὐκέτι· οὐδὲν γὰρ γίνεται πλὴν στερεὰ συντιθεμένων· πάθος γὰρ οὐδ' ἐγχειροῦσι γεννᾶν οὐδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν.
            <td>24 To resolve bodies into planes and no further—this, as we have also remarked elsewhere, is itself a paradox. Hence there is more to be said for the view that there are indivisible bodies. Yet even these involve much of paradox. Still, as we have said, it is possible to construct 'alteration' and coming-to-be with them, if one 'transposes' the same by 'turning' and 'intercontact', and by 'the varieties of the figures', as Democritus does. (His denial of the reality of colour is a corollary from this position: for, according to him, things get coloured by 'turning' of the 'figures'.) But the possibility of such a construction no longer exists for those who divide bodies into planes. For nothing except solids results from putting planes together: they do not even attempt to generate any quality from them.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δύνασθαι τὰ ὁμολογούμενα συνορᾶν ἡ ἀπειρία. Διὸ ὅσοι ἐνῳκήκασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς μᾶλλον δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαύτας ἀρχὰς αἳ ἐπὶ πολὺ δύνανται συνείρειν· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὀλίγα βλέψαντες, ἀποφαίνονται ῥᾷον. Ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἄτομα εἶναι μεγέθη οἱ μέν φασιν ὅτι τὸ αὐτοτρίγωνον πολλὰ ἔσται, Δημόκριτος δ' ἂν φανείη οἰκείοις καὶ φυσικοῖς λόγοις πεπεῖσθαι. Δῆλον δ' ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν προιοῦσιν.
            <td>25 Lack of experience diminishes our power of taking a comprehensive view of the admitted facts. Hence those who dwell in intimate association with nature and its phenomena grow more and more able to formulate, as the foundations of their theories, principles such as to admit of a wide and coherent development: while those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatize on the basis of a few observations. The rival treatments of the subject now before us will serve to illustrate how great is the difference between a 'scientific' and a 'dialectical' method of inquiry. For, whereas the Platonists argue that there must be atomic magnitudes 'because otherwise "The Triangle" will be more than one', Democritus would appear to have been convinced by arguments appropriate to the subject, i.e. drawn from the science of nature. Our meaning will become clear as we proceed.
      </table>
    </blockquote>
    <table cellpadding="12">
      <tbody>
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Postquam philosophus prosecutus est opinionem antiquorum philosophorum circa differentiam generationis et alterationis, hic incipit determinare de generatione et alteratione, et de aliis motibus. Et circa hoc duo facit:
          <td>18. After giving the opinions of the ancient philosophers concerning the difference between generation and alteration, the Philosopher here begins to determine about generation and alteration and the other motions. Concerning this he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo dicit de quo est intentio;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo incipit prosequi suam intentionem, ibi: Democritus autem et Leucippus et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he states his intention;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he begins to carry it out, at 20.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>As to the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ponit suam intentionem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo suae intentionis rationem assignat, ibi: Plato igitur et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he states his intention;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he gives the reason for his intention, at 19.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod, quia antiqui philosophi dubitaverunt de differentia generationis et alterationis, dicendum est nobis in universali de <i>simplici generatione et corruptione</i>, idest secundum quam aliquid dicitur simpliciter generari et corrumpi; utrum scilicet generatio simpliciter est aut non. Nam secundum illos qui dicunt generationem ab alteratione differre, generatio simpliciter est: non est autem secundum eos qui earum differentiam negant. Et si est simpliciter generatio, dicendum quomodo est. Et similiter dicendum est de aliis motibus, qui ordinantur quodammodo ad generationem simplicem, ut supra dictum est, puta de alteratione et augmentatione.
          <td>He says therefore first [18] that because the early philosophers doubted about the difference between generation and alteration, it is necessary for us to speak in a general way about simple generation and corruption, i.e., according to which something is said to be generated and corrupted absolutely [simpliciter], and to determine whether absolute generation exists or not. For according to those who declare that generation differs from alteration, absolute generation does not exist, but not for those who deny a difference between them. Moreover, if absolute generation does exist, we must explain how. And the same questions must be answered for the other motions that are in a certain way ordained to simple generation, such as alteration and growth, as was said above.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: Plato igitur etc., assignat rationem suae intentionis, ex eo quod alii philosophi de his insufficienter tractaverunt. Et dicit quod Plato inquisivit de generatione et corruptione tantum, quomodo sint in rebus: non tamen de omni generatione, sed solum de generatione elementorum, non autem quomodo generentur carnes et ossa, aut aliquod aliorum mixtorum corporum: neque etiam tractavit de alteratione et augmentatione, quomodo sint in rebus. Et universaliter nullus aliorum philosophorum dixit determinate aliquid praeter ea quae superficietenus apparent, nisi solus Democritus, qui videtur curam habuisse de omnibus diligenter inquirere. Sed iam differt quomodo inquisiverint: quia non sufficienter. Nullus enim, nec ipse nec alius, determinavit de augmentatione, ut ita sit dicere, quod etiam non quicumque idiota dicere posset, scilicet quod augmentatio fiat adveniente aliquo simili: sed quomodo per adventum similis aliquid augmentetur, hoc non dixerunt. Neque etiam aliquid dixerunt de mixtione, vel de aliquo aliorum consimili nullo, ut ita dicam; puta de facere et pati, scilicet quomodo hoc agat et hoc patiatur, secundum naturales operationes.
          <td>19. Then [19] he assigns as the reason for his intention the fact that other philosophers have not adequately treated this matter. And he says that Plato investigated only the question of how generation and corruption occur in things, but in doing so he limited himself to generation of the elements and did not treat of how flesh and bones or any of the other mixed [i.e., composite] bodies are generated. Moreover, he neglected to discuss how alteration and growth exist in things. And in general, none of the other philosophers definitively stated anything except those things which appear on the surface — except Democritus, who seems to have been concerned to inquire diligently into every thing. But the basic difference is in the inquiry — none did so adequately. For none of them, neither he [Democritus], nor any other, said anything about growth, as to what it was, that any uneducated person could not have said, namely, that growth takes place by something akin to the original being added to it. But how something is increased by the addition of that which is similar, they did not say. Neither did they say anything of mixtures, nor of any of the similar things, so to speak — for example, of acting and being acted upon, namely, as to how, in terms of natural operation, this acts and that is acted upon.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: Democritus autem et Leucippus etc., incipit prosequi suum propositum.
          <td>20. Then at [20] he begins to execute his plan.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo determinat de generatione et alteratione, eo quod earum connexa est consideratio;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo determinat de augmentatione, ibi: de augmentatione autem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he determines about generation and alteration, since they should be studied together;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, about growth (L. 11).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ponit opiniones aliorum de generatione et alteratione;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo determinat de his secundum propriam opinionem, ibi: determinatis autem his et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he gives other's opinions about generation and alteration;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he decides about them according to his own opinion (L. 6).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>As to the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo recitat opinionem Democriti, qui de omnibus curam habuit, ut dictum est;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo inquirit de veritate ipsius, ibi: quoniam autem videtur omnibus et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he states the opinion of Democritus, who had a concern for everything;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he examines the truth of his statements, at 22.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ponit opinionem Democriti;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ponit rationem ipsius, ibi: quoniam autem existimabant et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he states Democritus' opinion;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he presents Democritus' argument, at 21.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod Democritus et Leucippus, qui faciebant principia rerum corpora indivisibilia infinitarum figurarum, ex his causabant generationem et alterationem. Dicebant enim quod per congregationem et segregationem dictorum corporum figuratorum, causabatur generatio et corruptio: per mutationem autem ordinis et positionis dictorum corporum, causabatur alteratio.
          <td>He says therefore first [20] that Democritus and Leucippus, who constituted the principles of things out of indivisible bodies of infinite shapes, used them as causes of generation and alteration. For they said that through the aggregation and separation of such figured bodies generation and corruption were caused; while it was through a change in the order and position of the aforesaid bodies that alteration was caused.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem existimabant etc., assignat rationem praedictae positionis. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod, sicut dicit philosophus in IV Metaphys., quidam antiqui philosophi posuerunt verum esse in apparendo, ita scilicet quod quidquid videtur alicui, est verum; adeo quod etiam ponebant contradictoria simul esse vera, si diversis ita videtur.
          <td>21. Then [21] he gives the reason for the aforesaid position. And the better to under this, it should be noted that, as the Philosopher says in Metaph. IV, some of the early philosophers made truth to be in the way things appear, namely, as a thing appeared to someone, so was its truth — even to the point of holding contradictories to be simultaneously true, if both sides seem so to different persons.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Hoc est ergo quod dicit, quod quia Democritus et Leucippus existimabant quod verum erat in apparendo, et diversis hominibus contraria apparent et infinita, ut ostendit multiplicitas opinionum quae est inter homines, ideo induxerunt infinitas figuras in primis rerum principiis, ut ex his ratio accipi possit infinitarum opinionum. Et inde est quod per transmutationem aliquam eius quod venit in compositionem alicuius totius, contingit quod idem videtur contrario modo se habere alii et alii; sicut propter diversum situm, collum columbae videtur esse alterius et alterius coloris. Et huiusmodi transmutatio situs aut ordinis fit per aliquod modicum quod supervenit: et, ut sit universaliter dicere, transmutato uno indivisibilium corporum, videtur aliud et aliud.
          <td>So what the Philosopher says is that, because Democritus and Leucippus assumed that the true consists in appearance, and to different men contrary and infinite things appear, as the variety of opinions among men indicates, they therefore were led to posit infinite shapes in the first principles of things, in order to have an explanation for these infinite opinions. Consequently, any variation affecting something contributing to the composition of some whole, results in the same appearing one way to one and in a contrary way to another, — just as, from different vantage points, the color of a dove's neck seems to vary. Such a change of position or order is due to something slight that intervenes. Indeed, to state the matter generally, as one of these indivisible bodies changes [its position and order], the appearance of a thing changes.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Et ponit exemplum in sermonibus, quorum prima principia indivisibilia sunt litterae: ex eisdem autem litteris, transmutatis secundum ordinem aut positionem, fiunt diversi sermones, puta comoedia, quae est sermo de rebus urbanis, et tragoedia, quae est sermo de rebus bellicis. Igitur sic apparet ratio quare per variationem ordinis et positionis, dicebat Democritus alterationem causari.
          <td>He gives an example of this in words, whose first indivisible principles are letters: by using the same letters and merely varying their order and position, different verbal compositions are produced, e.g., a comedy, concerned with pleasant things, and a tragedy, concerned with wars. This, then, is the reason why Democritus held that alteration is caused by a variation of order and position.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem videtur omnibus etc., inquirit veritatem huius opinionis.
          <td>22. Then [22] he investigates the truth of this opinion.
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ostendit difficultatem circa haec existentem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo incipit inquirere veritatem, ibi: principium autem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows the difficulties inherent in such an investigation;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he begins to inquire into the truth, at 23.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod quia, iam pene abolitis opinionibus primorum naturalium, qui ponebant idem esse generationem et alterationem, omnibus fere videbatur tunc temporis quod aliud esset alteratio et generatio (ita scilicet quod generatio et corruptio esset per hoc quod aliqua congregantur et disgregantur, alteratio vero per hoc quod aliquorum transmutatione causantur diversae passiones), necesse est considerare, ut de his sciatur veritas. Habent enim haec quaestiones multas et rationabiles. Quia si generatio nihil est aliud quam congregatio, multa impossibilia contingunt, ut infra patebit: ex opposito autem inveniuntur aliae rationes, quae videntur cogentes et non de facili solubiles, quibus ostenditur quod non contingit aliter se habere quam quod generatio sit congregatio; ita scilicet quod, si generatio non sit congregatio, vel omnino non sit generatio, vel si est, quod sit idem quod alteratio. Et quamvis hoc sit difficile solvere, tamen debemus tentare solvere hanc difficultatem.
          <td>He says therefore first [22] that by this time the opinions of the first natural philosophers who identified generation and alteration, were almost entirely abolished, and nearly everyone seemed to agree that generation is different from alteration (generation and corruption deriving from association and disassociation, while alteration arose when, by a change of certain things, diverse passions were caused). One must, then, consider these matters in order to arrive at the truth. But they involve many problems, and ones challenging reason. For, if generation is nothing more than association, many impossibilities follow, as will be plain below. On the other hand, there are found other arguments, which appear cogent and not easy to answer, for holding that generation is not different from association, concluding that, if generation is not admitted to be association, then either there is no generation at all, or if there is, it is identical with alteration. Now even though it is difficult to solve this problem, we ought to attempt it.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: principium autem etc., procedit ad solvendum praedictam difficultatem.
          <td>23. Then [23] he proceeds to solve the difficulty.
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo praemittit duas quaestiones, quae necessariae sunt ad solvendum praedictam difficultatem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo eas prosequitur, ibi: hoc quidem igitur et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he prefaces two questions that are necessary in solving the aforesaid difficulty;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he tackles them, at 24.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod principium ad solvendum omnia praedicta, oportet accipere ab hoc quod inquiratur primo quidem, utrum entia naturalia sic generentur et alterentur et augmententur et contrariis motibus moveantur, quod sint aliquae primae magnitudines indivisibiles, vel nulla est magnitudo indivisibilis: hoc enim multum differt ad propositum. Secundo autem oportet inquirere, si sunt aliquae magnitudines indivisibiles, utrum illae magnitudines sint corpora, sicut dixerunt Democritus et Leucippus, vel sint <i>planities</i>, idest superficies, sicut Plato scripsit in Timaeo.
          <td>He says therefore first [23] that the starting point in solving all the aforesaid must be first of all an inquiry into whether natural beings are so generated and altered and augmented and moved by contrary motions, as to require certain primary indivisible magnitudes; or whether there is no indivisible magnitude. The answer to this is most important. Secondly, one must inquire whether, if there be indivisible magnitudes, they are bodies, as Democritus and Leucippus would have it, or are "planes," i.e., surfaces, as Plato set down in the <i>Timaeus</i>.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: hoc quidem igitur etc., prosequitur praemissas quaestiones.
          <td>24. Then at [24] he pursues the aforesaid questions.
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo prosequitur secundam, quam brevius pertransit;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo prosequitur primam, ibi: habet autem quaestionem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he pursues the second, which he covers more briefly;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he tackles the first (L. 4).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>As to the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ostendit convenientius posuisse, quantum ad ea quae considerantur in scientia naturali, Democritum quam Platonem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo causam huius assignat, ibi: causa autem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows that as far as natural science is concerned Democritus' position is more fitting than Plato's;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he tells why, at 25.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod, sicut in III de caelo dictum est, inconveniens est hoc ipsum etiam secundum se consideratum, quod corpora naturalia resolvantur usque ad superficies: et ideo magis est rationabile, si sint aliquae magnitudines indivisibiles, ex quibus corpora naturalia componuntur, quod huiusmodi magnitudines indivisibiles sint corpora, quam quod sint superficies: quamvis et hoc ipsum multam irrationabilitatem habeat, scilicet quod sint aliqua corpora indivisibilia, ex quibus corpora naturalia componantur, sicut partim ostensum est in libro de caelo, et partim infra patebit. Sed tamen ideo est magis rationabile ponere corpora indivisibilia quam superficies, quia his qui ponunt corpora indivisibilia esse principia corporum naturalium, contingit assignare causam generationis et alterationis: quae quidem alteratio, sicut dictum est, transmutat aliquid unum et idem per quandam conversionem corporum indivisibilium, et per alium modum contactus secundum diversum situm et ordinem, et etiam secundum differentiam figurarum, sicut ponebat Democritus, assignans causam alterationis. Unde Democritus ponebat quod color et aliae huiusmodi qualitates naturales, non sint aliquid habens esse fixum in natura: sed quod aliquid videtur coloratum per quandam <i>conversionem</i>, idest per aliquam variationem corporum indivisibilium secundum ordinem et situm. Manifestum est enim quod quaedam nobis apparent, quorum apparentia causatur ex aliquo modo reflexionis secundum aliquem ordinem et situm, sicut forma quae apparet in speculo, et sicut colores iridis, et alia huiusmodi. Talia ergo existimabat esse Democritus omnes formas et qualitates rerum naturalium: et secundum hoc, suppositis suis principiis, ex diversitate positionis et ordinis causabat omnem diversitatem alterationis.
          <td>He says therefore first [24] that, as was said in <i>On the Heavens</i> III, to resolve bodies into surfaces is unfitting even in itself. Consequently, it is more reasonable, if there should be certain indivisible magnitudes out of which natural bodies are composed, that these magnitudes be bodies rather than surfaces — although even this involves great irrationality, namely, that there be certain indivisible bodies, out of which natural bodies would be composed, as was shown in part in the book <i>On the Heavens</i> and as will be shown in part below. Nevertheless it is more reasonable to posit indivisible bodies rather than surfaces, because those who posit indivisible bodies as the principles of natural bodies do assign a cause of generation and alteration, which alteration, as has been said, transmutes some one and the same thing by a certain "turning" of the indivisible bodies and by some manner of contact according to different positions and orders, and also according to a difference of shapes, as Democritus posited in assigning the cause of alteration. Hence Democritus posited that color and other such natural qualities are not something with a fixed existence in nature, but that a thing appears to be colored through a certain "turning," i.e., through a certain variation of the indivisible bodies according to order and position. For it is plain that certain things appear to us whose appearance is produced by some sort of reflection according to a certain order and position — for example, the form that appears in a mirror, or the colors of a rainbow, and so on. Democritus supposed that all the forms and qualities of natural things to be of that nature. According to this and in the light of his principles, he explained every variety of alteration in terms of differences in position and order.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Sed Platonici, qui resolvebant corpora in superficies, non poterant assignare causam alicuius transmutationis formalis: quia ex superficiebus, quando componuntur adinvicem, nihil est rationabile fieri nisi solida. Cum enim puncta, lineae et superficies purae sint res mathematicae, non possunt causare ex seipsis aliquam passionem naturalem: unde, sicut ex punctis non fit nisi linea, et ex lineis non fit nisi superficies, ita ex superficiebus non potest causari nisi corpus. Sed nec ipsi Platonici conantur ad hoc quod ex commixtione superficierum assignent causam alicuius passionis naturalis.
          <td>But the Platonists, who resolved bodies into planes, were unable to assign a cause for any change in form, for when planes are united one to the other, nothing but solids can reasonably result. Seeing that points, lines and pure planes are mathematical things, they cannot of themselves cause any natural quality. Consequently, just as from points only a line results and from lines a surface, so from surfaces the only thing that can be caused is a body. But not even the Platonists try to explain, by a mingling of surfaces, the cause of any natural quality.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: causa autem etc., assignat rationem quare circa hoc magis defecit Plato quam Democritus. Et dicit quod causa huius quod Plato minus potuit videre <i>confessa</i>, idest ea quae sunt omnibus manifesta, fuit inexperientia: quia scilicet, circa intelligibilia intentus, sensibilibus non intendebat, circa quae est experientia. Et ideo illi philosophi qui magis studuerunt circa res sensibiles et naturales, magis potuerunt adinvenire talia principia, quibus possent multa sensibilia adaptare. Sed Platonici, qui erant indocti <i>existentium</i>, idest circa entia naturalia et sensibilia, respicientes ad pauca sensibilium quae eis occurrebant, ex multis <i>sermonibus</i> vel rationibus, idest ex multis quae in universali rationaliter considerabant, <i>de facili enuntiant</i>, idest absque diligenti perscrutatione sententiam proferunt de rebus sensibilibus.
          <td>25. Then [253 he shows why Plato failed more than Democritus in this matter. And he says that the reason why Plato could not see "confessed" things, i.e., things plain to all, was lack of experience; for, being intent on speculation, he did not turn his attention to sensible things, which are the basis of experience. Consequently, those philosophers who paid more attention to sensible and natural things were better able to discover principles to which they could adapt many facts of sense observation. But the Platonists who were untaught with respect to "existents," i.e., natural and sensible things, and considered solely the few sensible things that came their way, from many "discourses" or arguments, i.e., from many things they considered by reason on universal plane, "facilely enunciate," i.e., offer a judgment on sensible things without a diligent examination.
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          <td>Potest autem considerari ex his quae prae manibus habentur, quantum differunt in perscrutatione veritatis illi qui considerant <i>physice</i>, idest naturaliter, attendentes rebus sensibilibus, ut Democritus, et illi qui considerant <i>logice</i>, idest rationaliter, attendentes communibus rationibus, sicut Platonici. Ad ostendendum enim quod magnitudines aliquae sunt indivisibiles, Platonici, logice procedentes, dicunt quod aliter sequeretur quod <i>autotrigonum</i>, idest per se triangulus, hoc est idea trianguli, <i>multa erit</i>, idest in multos triangulos dividetur: quod est inconveniens. Ponebat enim Plato omnium sensibilium esse quasdam ideas separatas, puta hominis et equi et similium, quas vocabat per se hominem et per se equum: quia scilicet, logice loquendo, homo, secundum quod est species, est praeter materialia et individualia principia, ita quod idea nihil habet nisi quod pertinet ad rationem speciei. Et eadem ratione hoc ponebat in figuris. Unde ponebat ideam triangulorum sensibilium, quae hic dicitur <i>autotrigonum</i>, esse indivisibilem: alioquin sequeretur quod divideretur in multa, quod est contra rationem ideae, ad quam pertinet quod sit unum praeter multa. Et ita non est inconveniens quod sint multae superficies triangulares indivisibiles conformes ideae: et eadem ratio est de aliis superficiebus.
          <td>The matter at hand affords us an opportunity to consider the difference between seeking the truth "physically," i.e., naturally, by examining natural things, as Democritus did, and seeking it "logically," i.e., by reason, attending to common reasons, as the Platonists did. For, in order to prove that some magnitudes are indivisible, the Platonists, proceeding "logically," say that otherwise it would follow that the "autotrigonum," i.e., the " <i>per se</i> triangle," that is, the idea of triangle, will be manifold, i.e., divided into many triangles, which is unallowable. For Plato postulated that, of all sensible things, there were certain separated "ideas," for example, of man and horse and so on. These ideas he called " ear se man" and " <i>per se</i> horse," since, logically speaking, man, as a species, is something over and above material and individual principles, and thus, the "idea" contains nothing but what pertains to the notion of the species. And for the same reason he posited this in figures. Thus he posited the "idea" of sensible triangles, here called the "autotrigonum," to be indivisible — otherwise it would follow that it would be divided into many, which is contrary to the notion of idea, which requires that it be one existing outside the many. Thus it is not unacceptable for there to be many indivisible triangular surfaces conforming to the idea; and the same is true of other surfaces.
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          <td>Sed Democritus videtur persuadere quod sint magnitudines indivisibiles, per rationes proprias et naturales, ut manifestum erit ex sequentibus.
          <td>But Democritus is seen to argue for indivisible magnitudes, using proper and natural reasons, as will be plain in what follows.
    </table>
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 4<br>
      Democritus' argument that natural bodies are composed out of indivisible bodies
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 2 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θείη σῶμά τι εἶναι καὶ μέγεθος πάντῃ διαιρετόν, καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν. Τί γὰρ ἔσται ὅπερ τὴν διαίρεσιν διαφεύγει; εἰ γὰρ πάντῃ διαιρετόν, καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν, κἂν ἅμα εἴη τοῦτο πάντῃ διῃρημένον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἅμα διῄρηται· κἂν εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀδύνατον.
            <td>26 For to suppose that a body (i.e. a magnitude) is divisible through and through, and that this division is possible, involves a difficulty. What will there be in the body which escapes the division? If it is divisible through and through, and if this division is possible, then it might be, at one and the same moment, divided through and through, even though the dividings had not been effected simultaneously: and the actual occurrence of this result would involve no impossibility.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέσον ὡσαύτως, καὶ ὅλως δέ, εἰ πάντῃ πέφυκε διαιρετόν, ἂν διαιρεθῇ, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον γεγονός, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν εἰς μυρία μυριάκις διῃρημένα ᾖ, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον· καίτοι ἴσως οὐδεὶς ἂν διέλοι. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πάντῃ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ σῶμα, διῃρήσθω.
            <td>27 Hence the same principle will apply whenever a body is by nature divisible through and through, whether by bisection, or generally by any method whatever: nothing impossible will have resulted if it has actually been divided—not even if it has been divided into innumerable parts, themselves divided innumerable times. Nothing impossible will have resulted, though perhaps nobody in fact could so divide it. Since, therefore, the body is divisible through and through, let it have been divided.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τί οὖν ἔσται λοιπόν; μέγεθος; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε· ἔσται γάρ τι οὐ διῃρημένον, ἦν δὲ πάντῃ διαιρετόν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδὲν ἔσται σῶμα μηδὲ μέγεθος, διαίρεσις δ' ἔσται, ἢ ἐκ στιγμῶν ἔσται, καὶ ἀμεγέθη ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται, ἢ οὐδὲν παντάπασιν, ὥστε κἂν γίνοιτο ἐκ μηδενὸς κἂν εἴη συγκείμενον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν δὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ φαινόμενον. Ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν ᾖ ἐκ στιγμῶν, οὐκ ἔσται ποσόν. Ὁπότε γὰρ ἥπτοντο καὶ ἓν ἦν μέγεθος καὶ ἅμα ἦσαν, οὐδὲν ἐποίουν μεῖζον τὸ πᾶν. Διαιρεθέντος γὰρ εἰς δύο καὶ πλείω, οὐδὲν ἔλαττον οὐδὲ μεῖζον τὸ πᾶν τοῦ πρότερον, ὥστε κἂν πᾶσαι συντεθῶσιν, οὐδὲν ποιήσουσι μέγεθος.
            <td>28 What, then, will remain? A magnitude? No: that is impossible, since then there will be something not divided, whereas ex hypothesis the body was divisible through and through. But if it be admitted that neither a body nor a magnitude will remain, and yet division is to take place, the constituents of the body will either be points (i.e. without magnitude) or absolutely nothing. If its constituents are nothings, then it might both come-to-be out of nothings and exist as a composite of nothings: and thus presumably the whole body will be nothing but an appearance. But if it consists of points, a similar absurdity will result: it will not possess any magnitude. For when the points were in contact and coincided to form a single magnitude, they did not make the whole any bigger (since, when the body was divided into two or more parts, the whole was not a bit smaller or bigger than it was before the division): hence, even if all the points be put together, they will not make any magnitude.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἴ τι διαιρουμένου οἷον ἔκπρισμα (316b.) γίνεται τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ μεγέθους σῶμά τι ἀπέρχεται, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ἐκεῖνο πῶς διαιρετόν.
            <td>29 But suppose that, as the body is being divided, a minute section—a piece of sawdust, as it were—is extracted, and that in this sense—a body 'comes away' from the magnitude, evading the division. Even then the same argument applies. For in what sense is that section divisible?
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ δὲ μὴ σῶμα ἀλλ' εἶδός τι χωριστὸν ἢ πάθος ὃ ἀπῆλθεν, καὶ ἔστι τὸ μέγεθος στιγμαὶ ἢ ἁφαὶ τοδὶ παθοῦσαι, ἄτοπον ἐκ μὴ μεγεθῶν μέγεθος εἶναι.
            <td>30 But if what 'came away' was not a body but a separable form or quality, and if the magnitude is 'points or contacts thus qualified': it is paradoxical that a magnitude should consist of elements, which are not magnitudes.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔτι δὲ ποῦ ἔσονται, καὶ ἀκίνητοι ἢ κινούμεναι αἱ στιγμαί; ἁφή τε ἀεὶ μία δυοῖν τινων, ὡς ὄντος τινὸς παρὰ τὴν ἁφὴν καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν στιγμήν. Εἰ δή τις θήσεται ὁτιοῦν ἢ ὁπηλικονοῦν σῶμα εἶναι πάντῃ διαιρετόν, πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει.
            <td>31 Moreover, where will the points be? And are they motionless or moving? And every contact is always a contact of two somethings, i.e. there is always something besides the contact or the division or the point. These, then, are the difficulties resulting from the supposition that any and every body, whatever its size, is divisible through and through.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔτι ἐὰν διελὼν συνθῶ τὸ ξύλον ἤ τι ἄλλο, πάλιν ἴσον τε καὶ ἕν. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἔχει δηλονότι κἂν τέμω τὸ ξύλον καθ' ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον. Πάντῃ ἄρα διῄρηται δυνάμει. Τί οὖν ἔστι παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστι τι πάθος, ἀλλὰ πῶς εἰς ταῦτα διαλύεται καὶ γίνεται ἐκ τούτων; ἢ πῶς χωρίζεται ταῦτα;
            <td>32 There is, besides, this further consideration. If, having divided a piece of wood or anything else, I put it together, it is again equal to what it was, and is one. Clearly this is so, whatever the point at which I cut the wood. The wood, therefore, has been divided potentially through and through. What, then, is there in the wood besides the division? For even if we suppose there is some quality, yet how is the wood dissolved into such constituents and how does it come-to-be out of them? Or how are such constituents separated so as to exist apart from one another?
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἁφῶν ἢ στιγμῶν εἶναι τὰ μεγέθη, ἀνάγκη εἶναι σώματα ἀδιαίρετα καὶ μεγέθη. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα θεμένοις οὐχ ἧττον συμβαίνει ἀδύνατα. Ἔσκεπται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑτέροις.
            <td>33 Since, therefore, it is impossible for magnitudes to consist of contacts or points, there must be indivisible bodies and magnitudes. Yet, if we do postulate the latter, we are confronted with equally impossible consequences, which we have examined in other works.
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    </blockquote>
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          <td>Postquam philosophus ostendit quod circa propositum opinio Democriti potior erat quam opinio Platonis, et ratio Democriti erat magis propria, ad hoc manifestandum inducit rationem Democriti.
          <td>26. After showing that, with regard to the matter at hand, the opinion of Democritus is stronger than that of Plato, and that his argument is more appropriate, to show this, the Philosopher presents Democritus' argument.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ponit eam;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo solvit, ibi: sed et haec tentandum est solvere et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he cites it;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he answers it (L. 5).
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          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ponit rationem Democriti, ducentem ad hoc impossibile, scilicet quod corpus sit <i>omnino</i> divisum, idest quantumcumque dividi potest;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ostendit hoc esse impossibile, ibi: quid ergo erit et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he presents the argument of Democritus, which leads to the impossibility that a body can be wholly divided, i.e., divided as much as it can be divided;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he shows that this is impossible, at 29.
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          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>Concerning the first he does two things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ponit rationem ducentem ad hoc impossibile;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo manifestat necessitatem dictae rationis, ibi: quapropter et secundum medium et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he presents the argument that leads to this impossibility;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he shows the necessity existing in this argument, at 28.
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          <td>Circa primum considerandum quod oportet ponere corpus vel componi ex indivisibilibus, vel esse divisibile <i>omnino</i>, idest totaliter, secundum quodcumque signum. Et ideo Democritus, ad ostendendum quod corpus sit compositum ex indivisibilibus corporibus, conatur ostendere impossibile esse quod corpus sensibile, puta lignum aut lapis, sit divisibile <i>omnino</i>, idest secundum quodcumque signum datum in corpore. Et ideo dicit quod, si quis ponat aliquod corpus, puta sensibile, et magnitudinem quamcumque, puta superficiem vel lineam, divisibilem esse <i>omnino</i>, idest secundum quodcumque signum datum, et si ponatur hoc esse possibile, remanet quaestio: quid est illud quod <i>effugit divisionem</i>, idest quod remanet post divisionem? Necesse est enim quod, diviso quocumque divisibili, remaneant aliquae partes divisibiles, in quas fit divisio.
          <td>27. With respect to the first [26] it should be observed that one must hold either that a body is composed of indivisibles, or that it is "wholly," i.e., totally, divisible, according to every sign [point]. And therefore Democritus, in order to show that a sensible body is composed of indivisible bodies, tries to show that it is impossible for a sensible body, such as wood or stone, to be "wholly" divisible, i.e., according to every given sign [i.e., point] in the body. Consequently, he says that if you posit that such a body (for example, a sensible body), or any magnitude whatsoever (for example, a surface or a line), is "wholly" divisible, i.e., with respect to every given sign, and this is considered possible, the question remains: "What is it that "escapes division," i.e., that remains after the division? For it is necessary that, when any divisible thing has been divided, there remain certain divisible parts, upon which division takes place.
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          <td>Ideo autem dicit Democritus hoc habere quaestionem, quia, si corpus sit <i>omnino</i>, idest secundum totum, divisibile, et hoc sit possibile, consequens erit quod nihil prohibeat corpus esse simul divisum quantumcumque dividi potest, etsi divisio non fiat simul, sed successive; sicut si possibile est aliquem hominem pervenire ad aliquem locum, nihil prohibet eum pervenisse illuc, licet non simul, sed successive perveniat. Et si hoc ponatur, nullum impossibile debet sequi: quia possibili posito, non sequitur aliquod impossibile, secundum philosophum in I priorum.
          <td>Democritus says that such a question arises because if the body is "wholly," i.e., in its entirety, divisible, and this is possible, then there will be nothing to prevent it from being at one time divided as far as it can, even though the division does not take place all at once but successively — just as, if a man can arrive at some particular place, there is nothing to prevent his having arrived there, even though he should not do so all at once, but successively. If this is granted, no impossibility should follow, because, when something possible is assumed, nothing impossible follows, according to the Philosopher in <i>Prior Analytics</i> I.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quapropter et secundum medium etc., manifestat necessitatem praedictae rationis. Si enim ponatur aliquod corpus divisibile per medium, et ponatur esse divisum per medium, nullum sequitur inconveniens. Et hoc est quod dicit: <i>quapropter</i>, quia scilicet posito possibili nullum sequitur impossibile, similiter erit si aliquid ponatur esse divisibile et divisum secundum medium; et universaliter, si corpus est natum esse divisibile <i>omnino</i>, idest secundum quodcumque signum, <i>si dividatur</i>, idest si ponatur esse divisum, <i>nullum erit impossibile nascens</i>, idest ex hoc non debet impossibile nasci: quia neque si aliquid est divisibile in mille millia partium, et ponatur esse divisum, nullum sequitur impossibile, etsi nullus dividat actu.
          <td>28. Then [27] he shows the necessity existing in the above argument. For if it should be granted that a body is divisible through the middle, and has been so divided, nothing impossible follows. And this is what he says: Hence, since, something possible having been laid down, nothing impossible follows, it will be something similar to this if something is supposed as divisible and actually divided in the middle. And universally, if a body is such as to be apt to be "wholly" divided, i.e., according to every sign [point], then "if it is divided;" i.e,, if it is assumed to have been so divided, "no impossibility will result,""i.e., from this nothing impossible should arise — any more than if something is divisible into a thousand times a thousand parts and we assume that it has been so divided, no impossibility follows, even if no one has actually divided it.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Et ita videtur quod, sive aliquod corpus sit divisibile in paucas partes sive in multas sive totaliter, non videtur sequi aliquod impossibile, si ponatur aliquid esse divisum inquantum est divisibile. Quia igitur, secundum ponentes corpus naturale non componi ex indivisibilibus corporibus, est divisibile <i>omnino</i>, idest secundum totum, ponatur esse secundum totum divisum. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo et primum, scilicet quod sit divisibile secundum totum. Est ergo compositum ex indivisibilibus.
          <td>Consequently, it seems that whether a body is divisible into a few parts or into a great many parts or totally, no impossibility seems to follow upon the assumption that it has been divided as far as it is divisible. Therefore, since, according to those who maintain that a natural body is not composed of indivisible bodies, it is totally divisible, let it be considered as totally divided. But this is impossible; therefore the first, namely, the assumption that it is totally divisible, is also impossible. Therefore, it is composed of indivisibles.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quid ergo erit etc., ostendit esse impossibile quod corpus sit totaliter divisum, ex hoc quod non erit dare quid remaneat post divisionem.
          <td>29. Then [28] he shows that it is impossible for a body to have been totally divided, on the ground that one cannot posit anything as remaining after the division.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Primo ergo ostendit quod non erit dare quid remaneat ex divisione, quae est principalis pars;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo quod non erit dare quid remaneat, quod ex incidenti sit elapsum, ibi: sed et si qua et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, therefore, he shows that one cannot give anything as remaining from the division as a principal part;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, that one cannot give anything as remaining that might have fallen out of the division, at 30.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo: si corpus ponatur omnino esse divisum, quaerendum restat quid erit <i>reliquum</i>, idest quod remanet post divisionem: sicut videmus remanere in omni divisione ea in quae divisum resolvitur.
          <td>He says therefore first [28] that if a body is assumed to have been totally divided, it remains to ask what is "left," i.e., what remains after the division — as in every division we are wont to see the things into which the divided object was resolved.
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          <td>Et primo ostendit quod non remaneat magnitudo. Hoc enim est impossibile: sequeretur enim quod adhuc remaneret divisibile non divisum, vel quod magnitudo esset aliquid non divisibile; dicebatur autem quod corpus erat omnino divisibile: et ita oportet quod id quod remanet post divisionem, nullo modo sit divisibile; cum tamen supponatur ab adversario quod magnitudo sit omnino divisibilis.
          <td>First he shows that a magnitude will not remain. For such a thing is impossible — since it would follow that some divisible part not yet divided was remaining or that a magnitude was something not divisible. But it was said that body was wholly divisible. Consequently, what remains after division cannot be divisible in any way whatsoever, and it is being supposed by the adversary that the magnitude is wholly divisible.
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          <td>Secundo concludit quod, si illud quod relinquitur post divisionem, neque sit corpus neque magnitudo, et tamen sit facta divisio secundum totum, sicut dictum est; relinquitur quod divisio erit aut ex punctis, ita quod corpus finaliter resolvetur in puncta, et per consequens ea ex quibus componitur corpus erunt sine magnitudine; aut sequitur quod id quod est residuum post divisionem, sit omnino nihil.
          <td>Secondly, he concludes that, if what is left after division is neither a body nor a magnitude, and yet a total division was made, it remains that the division will either be out of points, in such a way that the body will be finally resolved into points, and consequently, the things from which a body is composed will lack dimensions, or else it follows that what remains after division is utterly nothing.
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          <td>Tertio ostendit hoc secundum esse impossibile. Quia, cum unumquodque generetur ex his in quae resolvitur, si ergo resolvitur in nihil, sequetur quod etiam generetur ex nihil. Quod autem componitur ex nihilo, nihil est. Sequetur ergo quod corpus de quo agitur, sit nihil; et etiam totum universum eadem ratione; sed quidquid erit in rerum natura, erit secundum apparentiam tantum, et non secundum existentiam.
          <td>Thirdly, he shows that the second alternative is impossible. For, since each thing is generated out of that into which it is resolved, then, if it is resolved into nothing, it will follow that it may be generated from nothing. But what is composed out of nothing, is nothing. It will follow, therefore, that the body in question is nothing, and for the same reason, the whole universe. Whatever there will be in nature will be there according to appearance only and not according to existence.
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          <td>Quarto probatur primum praemissorum, scilicet quod non fiat resolutio in puncta. Quia similiter sequeretur quod sit corpus compositum ex punctis: et ita ulterius sequeretur quod non sit quantum ipsum corpus. Ante enim quam corpus divideretur, et puncta tangebant se, prout scilicet extrema duarum linearum sunt simul, et ex hoc erat una magnitudo continua, et simul erant omnia puncta, nondum distincta adinvicem, non faciebant totum maius: punctum enim nihil est aliud quam quaedam divisio partium lineae, ex hoc autem quod aliquid dividitur in duo vel plura, non efficitur totum nec maius nec minus quam prius fuerit: ita enim corpus parvum, sicut magnum, potest dividi in duo vel plura. Et sic patet quod puncta, quae nihil aliud sunt quam divisiones, non faciunt aliquid maius. Unde relinquitur quod, si puncta componantur adinvicem, non faciunt aliquid maius. Sic igitur videtur esse impossibile quod corpus sit omnino divisum: quia non potest assignari quid sit residuum divisionis, tanquam principalis pars corporis divisi.
          <td>Fourthly, he proves the first alternative set down above, namely, that there is not resolution into points. For then it would likewise follow that a body is composed of points and it would further follow that the body would not be quantified. For, before the body was divided, and the points were in contact, in the way that the extremities of two lines are together, so as to form a single continuous magnitude, and the points were all together and not yet set off from each other, they did not make a greater whole. For a point is nothing other than a certain division of the parts of a line. By the fact of a thing's being divided into two or more, the whole is not made either greater or less than it was previously, A small body, just as a large one, may be divided into two or more. Thus it is plain that points, which are nothing but divisions, do not make anything greater. Hence it remains that if the points are assembled, they do not make anything greater. Consequently, it is seen to be impossible for a body to be divided through and through, because it is impossible to assign anything that remains as the residue of division, as a principal part of the divided body.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: sed et si qua etc., ostendit quod non potest assignari quid residuum divisionis, tanquam aliquid quod elabitur.
          <td>30. Then [29] he shows that it is impossible to show some residue of division on the hypothesis of something "falling out."
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ostendit quod tale aliquid non potest esse corpus;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ostendit quod non potest esse quodcumque incorporeum, ibi: si autem non est corpus et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows that such a thing cannot be a body;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, that it cannot be something incorporeal, at 31.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod si, divisa totaliter magnitudine corporea divisi corporis, fiat quasi aliqua rasura serrae, quae elabitur ex divisione, praeter principales partes in quas lignum dividitur; et dicatur quod ex magnitudine corporali totaliter divisa egrediatur aliquod corpus, quasi residuum; sequetur idem sermo qui et supra: quomodo scilicet sustineri poterit quod illud corpus sit adhuc divisibile, secundum ponentes nullum corpus esse indivisibile, cum positum sit corpus naturale esse divisum omnino.
          <td>He says therefore first [29] that if, the whole bodily magnitude of the divided body having been divided, something comparable to a piece of sawdust should be produced, which falls out by reason of the division apart from the principal parts into which the wood is divided, and one should say that out of the wholly divided bodily magnitude some body comes out as though a residue, there follows the same argument as above — namely, how can those hold that body to be still divisible who hold no body to be indivisible and one is holding a natural body to be wholly divided?
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: si autem non est corpus etc., ostendit quod huiusmodi residuum non potest esse aliquod incorporeum quodcumque; et hoc tribus rationibus. Circa quarum primam dicit quod, si id quod egreditur a magnitudine totaliter divisa non sit corpus, sed aliqua <i>species</i>, idest forma, <i>segregabilis</i>, idest separabilis a subiecto, aut etiam aliqua passio, sicut posuit Anaxagoras passiones et habitus separari et commisceri; et se habet huiusmodi passio secedens a magnitudine, per modum puncti vel tactus; illi qui hoc ponunt, patiuntur primo quidem hoc inconveniens, quod magnitudo componatur ex non magnitudinibus. Quod videtur inconveniens: nam unumquodque constituitur ex rebus sui generis; non enim colores componuntur ex figuris, nec e converso.
          <td>31. Then [30] he shows that such a residue cannot be any incorporeal thing, for three reasons. With regard to the first he says that if what slipped away from the totally divided magnitude is not a body but some "species," i.e., a form "segregatable," i.e., separable from the subject or also, as Anaxagoras says, some passion, since he taught that passions and habits can be separated and combined, and this passion which leaves a magnitude is after the manner of a point or contact, those who posit this fall first of all into this impossibility, namely, that a magnitude is composed of non-magnitudes. This is seen to be untenable, for each thing is constituted out of the things of its genus — colors are not composed from figures, nor conversely.
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          <td>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius autem et cetera. Circa quod considerandum est quod quidam posuerunt lineam componi ex punctis. Et potest poni dupliciter: scilicet uno modo ex punctis motis, sicut quidam dixerunt quod punctus motus constituit lineam, et linea mota constituit superficiem, et superficies mota corpus; alio modo potest poni quod ex punctis etiam non motis constituatur magnitudo, sicut ex partibus.
          <td>32. He presents the second reason[31], in regard to which it should be noted that certain ones maintained that a line is composed out of points. This can be in two ways: in one way, out of moved points, in the sense of those who suppose that a point in motion forms a line, and a line in motion forms a plane, and a plane in motion a body; in another way, out of points not moved, so that a magnitude is composed out of points as out of parts.
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          <td>Utrolibet autem modo magnitudo componatur ex punctis, oportebit assignare <i>ubi sint</i> puncta, idest quem situm habeant in magnitudine: est enim assignare de singulis partibus ex quibus componitur magnitudo. Sed hoc non potest assignari. Quia punctus non videtur esse aliud in magnitudine, quam ut quidam tactus lineae continuae, vel divisio partium lineae iam divisae. Tactus autem semper est unus quorundam duorum, quae scilicet sunt partes magnitudinis habentes determinatum situm in magnitudine: quasi illud quod est pars magnitudinis habens determinatum situm inter partes eius, sit aliquid praeter ipsum tactum et divisionem, et per consequens praeter punctum. Non ergo videtur esse possibile quod magnitudo dividatur in puncta vel tactus aut divisiones. Si ergo aliquis ponat quodcumque corpus, aut quantamcumque quantitatem, esse omnino divisibilem, continget hoc inconveniens quod nunc dictum est.
          <td>However, in whichever of these two ways a magnitude is supposed to be composed of points, one will have to designate "where" the points are, i.e., what position they occupy in the magnitude, as can be done for each part of which a magnitude is composed. But [in this case] this cannot be designated, for a point is seen to be nothing other in a magnitude than a certain contact of a continuous line, or the division of the parts of a line that has been divided. But contact is always one [contact] of some certain two which, namely, are parts of a magnitude, possessing definite positions in a magnitude — as though that which is a part of the magnitude, having a definite position among its parts, is something over and above the contact and the division, and consequently something over and above the point. It is not therefore seen as possible that a magnitude be divided into points or contacts or divisions. If, therefore, someone should posit any body, or any quantity, to be wholly divisible, there will occur this unacceptable consequence which has been stated.
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          <td>Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: amplius si et cetera. Et dicit quod si, postquam divisero lignum vel quodcumque aliud corpus, iterum ex eisdem partibus compono ipsum, fiet aequale et unum corpus: quia scilicet eadem sunt in quae aliquid dividitur, et ex quibus componitur. Unde videtur similiter se habere si divido lignum <i>secundum quodcumque signum</i> (quod supra dixit <i>omnino</i>), ut scilicet ex his in quae dividitur, possit iterum componi. Sit ergo lignum <i>omnino divisum potestate</i>, idest in omnia in quae poterat dividi: quid igitur erit praeter divisionem? Quia oportet omnem divisionem ad aliquid terminari. Si enim dicatur quod id quod est residuum divisioni, sit aliqua passio, sequeretur quod corpus divideretur in passiones; et ex consequenti generabitur ex eis, quod est impossibile; quia neque substantia neque quantitas generatur ex passionibus. Aut etiam quomodo est possibile quod passiones sint separatae?
          <td>33. He presents the third reason [32] and says that if after having divided a piece of wood or any other body, I put it together regain out of the same parts, an equal and single body will be produced, since the things into which something is divided, and out of which it is composed are the same. Hence the case seems to be the same if I divide the wood according to "any sign [point] whatever" (which he above referred to as "wholly") so that, out of those things into which it is divided, it may be again composed. Let the wood then have been "wholly divided in potency," i.e., into all that into which it can be divided. What then will remain beyond the division? For every division must terminate at something. If we should say that the residue of the division is some passion, it would follow that the body would have been divided into passions — and consequently, will be generated out of them, which is impossible. For neither substance nor quantity is generated out of passions. Or how are passions able to be separated"?
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          <td>Ulterius autem concludit principale propositum, dicens quod, si impossibile est quod magnitudo componatur ex tactibus aut punctis, sicut praedictae rationes concludunt, necesse est ponere quod sint quaedam corpora indivisibilia, et quod sint quaedam magnitudines indivisibiles: quia, si corpus sit omnino divisibile, sequeretur quod componatur ex tactibus vel ex punctis, ut ex dictis patet.
          <td>He further concludes his principal proposition [33] saying that, if it is impossible that a magnitude be composed out of contacts or points, as the aforesaid arguments conclude, one must posit that there are certain indivisible bodies, and certain indivisible magnitudes — for, if a body should be wholly divisible, it would follow that it would be composed out of contacts or out of points, as is evident from what has been said.
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          <td>Ulterius autem, post rationem Democriti, subiungit Aristoteles quod hoc ponentibus, scilicet esse corpora indivisibilia, non minus accidit impossibile: et de hoc perscrutatum est in aliis, scilicet in III de caelo.
          <td>Further still, after presenting the arguments of Democritus, Aristotle adds that, likewise for those who posit this, namely, the existence of indivisible bodies, no less an impossibility follows; and this was examined elsewhere, namely, in <i>On the Heavens</i> III.
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    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 5<br>
      Resolution of Democritus' argument
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 2 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πειρατέον λύειν· διὸ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν ἀπορίαν λεκτέον.
            <td>34 But we must try to disentangle these perplexities, and must therefore formulate the whole problem over again.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἅπαν σῶμα αἰσθητὸν εἶναι διαιρετὸν καθ' ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμει διαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ἐντελεχείᾳ ὑπάρξει.
            <td>35 On the one hand, then, it is in no way paradoxical that every perceptible body should be indivisible as well as divisible at any and every point. For the second predicate will attach to it potentially, but the first actually.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὸ δ' εἶναι ἅμα πάντῃ διαιρετὸν δυνάμει ἀδύνατον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν, κἂν γένοιτο, οὐχ ὥστε εἶναι ἅμα ἄμφω ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διῃρημένον, ἀλλὰ διῃρημένον καθ' ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἔσται λοιπόν, καὶ ἀσώματον ἐφθαρμένον τὸ σῶμα, καὶ γίνοιτο δ' ἂν πάλιν ἤτοι ἐκ στιγμῶν ἢ ὅλως ἐξ οὐδενός. Καὶ τοῦτο πῶς δυνατόν; ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε διαιρεῖται εἰς χωριστὰ καὶ ἀεὶ εἰς ἐλάττω μεγέθη καὶ εἰς ἀπέχοντα καὶ κεχωρισμένα, φανερόν. Οὔτε δὴ κατὰ μέρος διαιροῦντι εἴη ἂν ἄπειρος ἡ θρύψις, οὔτε ἅμα οἷόν τε διαιρεθῆναι κατὰ πᾶν σημεῖον (οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν), ἀλλὰ μέχρι του. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἄτομα ἐνυπάρχειν μεγέθη ἀόρατα,
            <td>36 On the other hand, it would seem to be impossible for a body to be, even potentially, divisible at all points simultaneously. For if it were possible, then it might actually occur, with the result, not that the body would simultaneously be actually both (indivisible and divided), but that it would be simultaneously divided at any and every point. Consequently, nothing will remain and the body will have passed-away into what is incorporeal: and so it might come-to-be again either out of points or absolutely out of nothing. And how is that possible? But now it is obvious that a body is in fact divided into separable magnitudes which are smaller at each division—into magnitudes which fall apart from one another and are actually separated. Hence (it is urged) the process of dividing a body part by part is not a 'breaking up' which could continue ad infinitum; nor can a body be simultaneously divided at every point, for that is not possible; but there is a limit, beyond which the 'breaking up' cannot proceed.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">ἄλλως τε καὶ εἴπερ ἔσται γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ ἡ μὲν διακρίσει ἡ δὲ συγκρίσει. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκάζειν δοκῶν (317a.) λόγος εἶναι μεγέθη ἄτομα οὗτός ἐστιν·
            <td>37 The necessary consequence—especially if coming-to-be and passing-away are to take place by 'association' and 'dissociation' respectively—is that a body must contain atomic magnitudes which are invisible.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">ὅτι δὲ λανθάνει παραλογιζόμενος, καὶ ᾗ λανθάνει, λέγωμεν. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι στιγμὴ στιγμῆς ἐχομένη, τὸ πάντῃ εἶναι διαιρετὸν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὑπάρχει τοῖς μεγέθεσιν, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. Δοκεῖ δ', ὅταν τοῦτο τεθῇ, καὶ ὁπῃοῦν καὶ πάντῃ στιγμὴν εἶναι, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διαιρεθῆναι τὸ μέγεθος εἰς μηδέν· πάντῃ γὰρ εἶναι στιγμήν, ὥστε ἢ ἐξ ἁφῶν ἢ ἐκ στιγμῶν εἶναι. Τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ὑπάρχει πάντῃ, ὅτι μία ὁπῃοῦν ἐστι, καὶ πᾶσαι ὡς ἑκάστη· πλείους δὲ μιᾶς οὐκ εἰσίν· ἐφεξῆς γὰρ οὐκ εἰσίν, ὥστ' οὐ πάντῃ· εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μέσον διαιρετόν, καὶ κατ' ἐχομένην στιγμὴν ἔσται διαιρετόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐχόμενον σημεῖον σημείου ἢ στιγμὴ στιγμῆς. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ διαίρεσις ἢ σύνθεσις. Ὥστ' ἔστι καὶ διάκρισις καὶ σύγκρισις, ἀλλ' οὔτ' εἰς ἄτομα καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων (πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ ἀδύνατα) οὔτε οὕτως ὥστε πάντῃ διαίρεσιν γενέσθαι (εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἐχομένη στιγμὴ στιγμῆς, τοῦτ' ἂν ἦν), ἀλλ' εἰς μικρὰ καὶ ἐλάττω ἐστί, καὶ σύγκρισις ἐξ ἐλαττόνων.
            <td>38 Such is the argument which is believed to establish the necessity of atomic magnitudes: we must now show that it conceals a faulty inference, and exactly where it conceals it. For, since point is not 'immediately-next' to point, magnitudes are 'divisible through and through' in one sense, and yet not in another. When, however, it is admitted that a magnitude is 'divisible through and through', it is thought there is a point not only anywhere, but also everywhere, in it: hence it is supposed to follow, from the admission, that the magnitude must be divided away into nothing. For it is supposed—there is a point everywhere within it, so that it consists either of contacts or of points. But it is only in one sense that the magnitude is 'divisible through and through', viz. in so far as there is one point anywhere within it and all its points are everywhere within it if you take them singly one by one. But there are not more points than one anywhere within it, for the points are not 'consecutive': hence it is not simultaneously 'divisible through and through'. For if it were, then, if it be divisible at its centre, it will be divisible also at a point 'immediately-next' to its centre. But it is not so divisible: for position is not 'immediately-next' to position, nor point to point—in other words, division is not 'immediately-next' to division, nor composition to composition. Hence there are both 'association' and 'dissociation', though neither (a) into, and out of, atomic magnitudes (for that involves many impossibilities), nor (b) so that division takes place through and through—for this would have resulted only if point had been 'immediately-next' to point: but 'dissociation' takes place into small (i.e. relatively small) parts, and 'association' takes place out of relatively small parts.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ τελεία γένεσις συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει ὥρισται, ὥς τινές φασιν, τὴν δ' ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ μεταβολὴν ἀλλοίωσιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ σφάλλεται πάντα. Ἔστι γὰρ γένεσις ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ οὐ συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει, ἀλλ' ὅταν μεταβάλλῃ ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε ὅλον. Οἱ δὲ οἴονται ἀλλοίωσιν πᾶσαν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολήν· τὸ δὲ διαφέρει. Ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ μέν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἐν τούτοις ᾖ ἡ μεταβολή, γένεσις ἔσται ἢ φθορά, ὅταν δ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλοίωσις.
            <td>39 It is wrong, however, to suppose, as some assert, that coming-to-be and passing-away in the unqualified and complete sense are distinctively defined by 'association' and 'dissociation', while the change that takes place in what is continuous is 'alteration'. On the contrary, this is where the whole error lies. For unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away are not effected by 'association' and 'dissociation'. They take place when a thing changes, from this to that, as a whole. But the philosophers we are criticizing suppose that all such change is 'alteration': whereas in fact there is a difference. For in that which underlies the change there is a factor corresponding to the definition and there is a material factor. When, then, the change is in these constitutive factors, there will be coming-to-be or passing-away: but when it is in the thing's qualities, i.e. a change of the thing per accidents, there will be 'alteration'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Διακρινόμενα δὲ καὶ συγκρινόμενα εὔφθαρτα γίνεται. Ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττω ὑδάτια διαιρεθῇ, θᾶττον ἀὴρ γίνεται, ἐὰν δὲ συγκριθῇ, βραδύτερον. Μᾶλλον δ' ἔσται δῆλον ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον.
            <td>40 'Dissociation' and 'association' affect the thing's susceptibility to passing-away. For if water has first been 'dissociated' into smallish drops, air comes-to-be out of it more quickly: while, if drops of water have first been 'associated', air comes-to-be more slowly. Our doctrine will become clearer in the sequel.'
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω, ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν σύγκρισιν, οἵαν δή τινές φασιν.
            <td>41 Meantime, so much may be taken as established—viz. that coming-to-be cannot be 'association', at least not the kind of 'association' some philosophers assert it to be.
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    </blockquote>
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          <td>Praemissa ratione Democriti, hic procedit ad eius solutionem.
          <td>34. Having presented Democritus' argument, he [the Philosopher] now proceeds to answer it.
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          <td>Et primo exponit de quo est intentio: dicens quod tentandum est solvere praedictam dubitationem. Et ideo, ut melius solvatur, oportet a principio repetere quaestionem: ostenso enim breviter in quo virtus quaestionis consistat, facilius apparebit ubi debeat adhiberi solutio.
          <td>First he states his intention [34], saying that one must attempt to solve the aforesaid problem. Consequently, the better to solve it, the question must be review from the very beginning, for when one gets a brief look at what the force of the question consists in, the easier it will be seen where to apply the solution.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: omne quidem igitur etc., prosequitur intentum.
          <td>Secondly, at [35] he carries out his proposal.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ponit veritatem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ponit obiectiones Democriti contra veritatem, ibi: esse autem potestate simul etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio solvit, ibi: quoniam autem latet et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he presents the truth;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he presents Democritus' objections against the truth, at 37;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he answers them, at 38.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod non est inconveniens dicere utrumque horum, scilicet quod omne corpus sensibile sit divisibile secundum quodcumque signum (quod supra dixerat <i>omnino</i>), vel quod non sit divisibile. Alterum enim horum in potentia est verum, scilicet quod corpus sensibile sit divisibile secundum quodcumque signum: alterum vero horum est verum secundum <i>entelechiam</i>, idest secundum actum, scilicet quod corpus sensibile non sit divisibile secundum quodcumque signum in actu.
          <td>35. He says therefore first [35] that it is not inadmissible to maintain both of these statements, namely, that every sensible body is divisible with respect to any and every sign [point] (denominated above as being "wholly" divisible), or that it is not divisible. For one of these is true in potency, namely, that a sensible body is divisible with respect to any and every sign; the other is true in "entelechy," i.e., in act, namely, that a sensible body is not divisible according to every sign in act.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: esse autem potestate simul etc., ponit duas rationes Democriti contra praedictam veritatem. Circa quarum primam dicit quod, secundum obiectionem Democriti, videtur impossibile esse quod corpus sensibile sit simul divisibile in potentia <i>omnino</i>, idest secundum quodcumque signum, sicut nuper dictum est. Credebat enim Democritus quod quidquid esset simul in potentia, posset esse simul in actu: et argumentabatur, sicut est possibile simul in potentia corpus sensibile omnino dividi, quod hoc fieret in actu; non quidem ita quod esset simul in potentia divisibile et actu divisum, sed quod esset simul divisum actu, secundum quodcumque signum. Sed hoc ostendebat esse impossibile: quia, sicut ex supra dictis patet, sequeretur quod nihil corporeum esset residuum a divisione, et quod corpus corrumperetur in incorporeum, et ex consequenti quod corpus generaretur ex aliquo incorporeo, idest aut ex punctis aut omnino ex nihilo. Sed hoc est impossibile. Non ergo est possibile quod corpus sensibile sit omnino divisum simul. Neque ergo videtur possibile quod sit omnino divisibile in potentia.
          <td>36. Then at [36] he presents Democritus' two arguments against this truth. Concerning the first of these, he [Aristotle] says that according to Democritus' objection it seems impossible for a sensible body to be all at once "wholly" divisible in potency, as was said above. For Democritus believed that whatever could be all at one time in potency, could be all at one time in act, and he argued that, just as it is possible for a body to be all at one time wholly divided in potency, this could also take place in act — not in the sense that it would be at one and the same time potentially divisible and actually divided, but in the sense that it would be divided in act according to every point. But this he showed to be impossible, because as is evident from what was said above, it would follow that nothing bodily would be left as a residue of division, and that the body would be dissolved into something incorporeal, and as a consequence a body would be generated from something incorporeal, i.e., from points or from absolute nothing. But this is impossible. Therefore it is not possible for a sensible body to be all at one time wholly divided. Neither, then, could it have been potentially so divisible.
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          <td>Sed quia videmus ad sensum quod corpus sensibile dividitur in partes abinvicem separabiles vel etiam in partes divisibiles, et maior magnitudo semper dividitur in minores magnitudines, et totum coniunctum dividitur in aliqua segregata et separata; manifestum est hoc ita se habere. Non ergo est possibile neque quod fiat divisio in infinitum <i>secundum partem</i>, ita scilicet quod pars post partem a toto sensibili corpore separetur: neque est possibile quod corpus sensibile dividatur simul secundum quodcumque signum (neutrum enim horum est possibile, quia utrobique videtur sequi praedictum inconveniens): sed videtur quod divisio corporis sensibilis possit procedere usque ad aliquem terminum. Unde sequitur quod necesse sit aliquas magnitudines esse indivisibiles, et aliqua corpora indivisibilia, secundum Democritum.
          <td>But because our senses reveal that a sensible body is divided into parts that can be separated one from the other or even into divisible parts, and that a larger magnitude is always divided into smaller magnitudes, and that a connected whole is divided into separate and isolated parts, it is evident that that is the way things are. It is therefore not possible for there to be division to infinity "according to part," in such a way, namely, that part after part be separated from the whole sensible body; neither is it possible for a sensible body to be divided all at one time according to every sign. (Neither of these is possible since in both cases the same impossible situation occurs.) But one sees that the division of a sensible body can proceed up to a certain limit. Hence it follows that there must be certain indivisible magnitudes and certain indivisible bodies, according to Democritus.
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          <td>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et aliter et cetera. Et dicit quod aliter etiam videtur esse necessarium esse corpora indivisibilia, scilicet si generatio sit per congregationem, et corruptio per segregationem. Et hoc quidem necessarium erat ponere Democrito, quia ponebat formas et naturas rerum determinari secundum positionem et ordinem: videmus autem quod totum cuius forma consistit in positione et ordine, sicut domus, non generatur nisi congregatione, neque corrumpitur nisi segregatione. Et ideo, cum non sit possibile in principiis generationis et corruptionis procedere in infinitum, ponebat quod essent aliqua principia prima, ex quibus corpora congregabantur, et in quae segregabantur. Et huiusmodi dicebat esse corpora indivisibilia.
          <td>37. The second objection of Democritus] is presented [37], in which he says that, for another reason also, it seems to be necessary that there be indivisible bodies, namely, if generation comes about through assembling, and corruption through separation. And Democritus was forced to posit this, because he laid down that the forms and natures of things are determined on the basis of position and order; for we see that a whole whose form consists in position and order, as for example a house, is generated only by assembling, and destroyed only by separating. Consequently, since it is not possible to proceed to infinity with regard to principles of generation and corruption, he laid down that there were certain first principles from which bodies are assembled and into which they are separated, And he said the indivisible bodies were such things.
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          <td>Sic igitur Aristoteles epilogando concludit quod praedictus sermo est, qui videtur cogere ad ponendum magnitudines indivisibiles.
          <td>Aristotle, summing up, concludes that the aforesaid exposition is that which seems to compel us to hold for indivisible magnitudes.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem latet etc., solvit praedictas rationes:
          <td>38. Then [38] he answers the aforesaid arguments.
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">et primo primam;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo secundam, ibi: sed non simplex et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, the first one;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, the second one, at 40.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum est considerandum quod tota virtus primae rationis Democriti in hoc consistit, quod si corpus sensibile est simul omnino divisibile in potentia, quod sit simul omnino divisum actu. Sed haec consequentia non tenet in omnibus. Quaedam enim sunt, de quorum ratione est esse in potentia: unde in talibus non potest poni esse simul in actu quod est simul in potentia, quia auferretur ratio et natura illius rei.
          <td>With respect to the first [38] it should be noted that the whole force of Democritus' first argument lies in this, that if a sensible body is all at one time wholly divisible in potency, it is all at one time wholly divided in act. But this consequent does not hold in all things. For there are some things in which to be in potency enters into their very notion. Hence in such things it is not possible to posit that to be all at one time in act which is all at one time in potency, since it would remove the very notion and nature of that thing.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Quod quidem primo manifestum est in successivis. In prima enim parte diei simul possibile est esse horas diei: non tamen potest poni quod omnes horae illius diei sint simul actu; auferretur enim natura temporis, de cuius ratione est quod sit numerus motus secundum prius et posterius; si enim esset simul quaelibet pars eius, iam non esset secundum prius et posterius.
          <td>This is manifest first of all in successive things. For, in the beginning of a day, it is possible all at one time for the hours to be, but it is impossible to posit all the hours of that day to exist all at one time in act, because that would destroy the very nature of time, in whose notion there is that it be the number of motion according to prior and subsequent. If all its parts existed at once, it would not be according to prior and subsequent.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo apparet hoc in permanentibus. De substantia enim aeris est materia, quae est in potentia ad omnes formas: tamen non potest poni quod ex aere sit generatum quidquid ex eo potest generari; quia iam tolleretur natura materiae, quae semper est in potentia ad omnes formas. Sic igitur contra rationem magnitudinis, ut puta lineae, est, quod sit simul omnino actu divisa: unde non sequitur, si est simul omnino divisibilis in potentia, quod possit poni simul omnino actu divisa.
          <td>Secondly, it appears in permanent things. For in the substance of air is matter, which is in potency to all forms, yet it cannot be posited that whatever can be generated from air has been generated therefrom. That would destroy the very nature of matter, which is always in potency to all forms. Consequently, it is against the notion of magnitude, for example, of a line, that it be at any time wholly divided in act. Therefore, from the fact that it is all at one time wholly divisible in potency, it does not follow that it can be posited as all at one time divided in act.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Quod hoc sit contra rationem lineae, patet. Nam divisio lineae in actu nihil aliud est quam punctus in actu: si ergo linea esset simul omnino in actu divisa, oporteret quod punctus esset ubique in actu in linea, et ita oporteret quod puncti essent contigui vel consequenter se habentes in linea. Hoc autem non potest esse: quia, cum puncta sint indivisibilia, multorum punctorum contiguorum unum non excederet aliud, quia unum tangeret aliud secundum se totum; et ita omnes puncti non essent nisi unus punctus. Non ergo potest esse quod puncti sint ubique in actu in linea: et ita contra rationem lineae est quod sit simul omnino divisa in actu. Et ita non sequitur quod, si sit simul divisibilis omnino in potentia, quod possit poni omnino esse divisa in actu.
          <td>That such a thing is against the notion of a line is plain. For the division of a line in act is nothing more than a point in act. If, therefore, a line were all at one time wholly divided in act, it would be necessary for a point to be everywhere in act in the line and, consequently, the points would have to be contiguous or consecutive in the line. But this cannot be: because, since points are indivisible, given many contiguous points, one would not extend beyond another, for one would touch another in its entirety. Thus all the points taken together would amount only to one point. Therefore, it cannot be said that the points are everywhere in act in the line. Consequently, it is against the notion of a line that it be all at one time wholly divided in act. And therefore it does not follow that, if something be all at one time wholly divisible in potency, one can posit it to be wholly divided in act.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo philosophus quod Democritus <i>latet paralogizans</i>, idest facit paralogismum latentem; et ostendendum est quomodo lateat eius defectus. Quia enim punctus non potest esse puncto contiguus, per consequens non potest esse quod linea sit omnino divisa in actu: et ita esse divisibile ubique, licet aliquo modo conveniat magnitudinibus, scilicet in potentia, tamen quodam modo non convenit eis, scilicet in actu. Quia quando ponitur ubique esse divisa in actu, videtur poni ex consequenti quod ubique sit punctus, cum punctus in actu nihil aliud sit quam divisio in actu lineae. Si autem punctus est ubique in actu in linea, necesse est quod magnitudo dividatur in puncta, cum nihil aliud in magnitudine inveniatur: vel etiam, secundum aliam litteram, quod dividatur in nihil, quia nihil erit residuum praeter divisionem, si ubique sit punctum, quod est divisio. Et ideo sequitur quod magnitudo vel sit ex punctis, vel ex tactibus partium lineae, sive divisionibus lineae (quod in idem redit): ponitur enim secundum praedicta, quod hoc quod existit ubique in linea, sit punctus, vel tactus, aut divisio, si linea sit simul omnino divisa.
          <td>39. Therefore the Philosopher says that Democritus is concealing a paralogism, i.e., that he commits a hidden fallacy, and that one must show where its defect lies hidden. Now, since one point cannot be contiguous to another, it is impossible for a line to be wholly divided in act. Consequently, the property of being everywhere divisible, although it belongs in some sense to magnitudes, i.e., in potency, yet in another sense it does not belong to them, i.e., in act. For when it [a line] is assumed to be everywhere divided, one implies also that it is everywhere a point, for a point in act is nothing else than a division of the line in act. But if a point is everywhere in act in a line, then the magnitude must be divided into points, since nothing else is found anywhere in the magnitude. Or else, according to another version, it must be divided into nothing, because nothing will remain but division, if everywhere there is a point, which is a division. Consequently, it follows that a magnitude will be constituted, either out of points, or out of contacts between parts of the line, or out of divisions of the line (which is the same thing) for the assumption, according to the above, is that what exists everywhere in the line, if it be all at one time wholly divided, is either a point, or a contact, or a division.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Sed hoc non potest esse: quia sequeretur quod solum unus punctus esset <i>ubique</i>, idest in qualibet parte lineae; et quod omnes puncti lineae non plus continerent de situ quam unusquisque eorum; immo quod non essent plures quam unus, vel plures divisiones quam una. Non enim possunt se habere consequenter, ita quod punctus unus sit post alium, neque quod se tangant secundum ultima tantum, et secundum alia secernantur; quia, cum sint indivisibiles, secundum totum coniunguntur: et ideo omnes puncti sic coniuncti non sunt nisi unus. Et ideo non est possibile quod punctus sit ubique in linea. Quia si linea esset divisibilis secundum medium sui, et punctus esset contiguus puncto, posset etiam dividi secundum contiguum punctum, si esset omnino divisibilis: sed hoc est impossibile, quia non est contiguum vel <i>habitum</i>, idest consequenter se habens, punctum puncto, vel quodcumque signum signo. Hoc autem punctum in actu nihil aliud est quam actualis divisio lineae, aut <i>compositio</i> sive tactus partium lineae.
          <td>But this cannot be, because it would follow that one single point would be "everywhere," i.e., in each part of the line, and that all the points of the line would occupy no more space than each one. Indeed, there would be no more than one point nor more divisions than one. For the points assumed to be present could not be consecutive in the sense of one being after another; neither could they be in contact as to their extremities only while being in other respects separated, because, being indivisible, they are in contact according to their wholes. Therefore all the points so conjoined are just one point. Hence, it is impossible for a point to be everywhere in a line. For if a line were divisible through its middle and point touched point, that line could also be divided according to a contiguous point, the line being wholly divisible. But this is impossible, because point is not contiguous to point nor "had," i.e., consecutive, nor is any sign so to another point. This point in act is nothing other than an actual division of the line, or the "composition" or contact of the parts of the line.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Unde concedendum est quod in corporibus sensibilibus invenitur congregatio et segregatio: non tamen in indivisibilia corpora, aut ex indivisibilibus (multa enim impossibilia sequerentur, ut in III de caelo dictum est): neque ita quod divisio actualis lineae fiat ubique (hoc enim contingeret, si punctus esset contiguus puncto, quod est impossibile, ut ex dictis patet): sed segregatio corporum est in aliqua parva et minora, congregatio vero est ex aliquibus parvis et minoribus; non autem ex minimis, quae oportet esse indivisibilia.
          <td>Hence it must be conceded that in sensible bodies combination and separation are found, but not separation into indivisible bodies or combination out of indivisible bodies (for otherwise many impossibilities would follow, as was said in <i>On the Heavens</i> III). Neither can a line be actually divided everywhere (which would happen, if point were contiguous to point, which is impossible as is evident from what has been said). But the separation of bodies is into certain small and lesser things, and combination is out of certain small and lesser things, but not out of least things which have to be indivisibles.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: sed non simplex etc., solvit secundam rationem Democriti, per interemptionem.
          <td>40. Then [39] he answers he second argument of Democritus by destroying its foundation.
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo interimit generationem simplicem et corruptionem esse congregationem et segregationem, ut Democritus existimabat;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ostendit quantum ad quid potest verificari dictum Democriti, ibi: segregata autem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he destroys the notion that simple generation and corruption are instances of assembling and separation, as Democritus believed;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he shows to what extent the dictum of Democritus can be verified, at 41.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod non est ita dicendum, sicut quidam dixerunt, quod simplex et perfecta generatio fiat per congregationem, corruptio autem per segregationem; et quod omnis transmutatio quae fit in aliquo continuo permanente, scilicet non congregato nec segregato, sit alteratio. Credebant enim hoc accidere in rebus naturalibus, sicut accidit in domo et in omnibus huiusmodi, quorum forma consistit in positione et ordine: non enim fiunt nisi per congregationem partium, neque corrumpuntur nisi per segregationem; quaecumque autem alia transmutatio in huiusmodi accidit, praeter solutionem continuitatum, alteratio est.
          <td>He says therefore first [39] that one should not say, as some have said, that simple and perfect generation occurs through assembling, and corruption through separating, and that any change which takes place in a permanent continuum, i.e., which is not assembled or disintegrated, is alteration. For they thought that this occurred in natural things as it does in a house and in all such things, whose form consists in position and order, because these things come to be only by assembling the parts, and are disintegrated only by separating the parts. Whatever other change occurs in such things, provided it is not a dissolving of the continuous, is alteration.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Hoc est ergo ex quo procedit tota fallacia. Est enim generatio et corruptio in rebus naturalibus, quarum forma non est positio et ordo: non quidem per congregationem et segregationem, sed quia fit transmutatio <i>ex hoc toto</i>, idest non dissoluto in partes, <i>in hoc totum</i>, quasi non congregatum ex aliquibus partibus. Sed antiqui philosophi existimabant omnem talem transmutationem, quae fit aliquo toto integro permanente, esse alterationem. Quod quidem non est verum: quandoque enim potest esse simplex generatio, et quandoque alteratio. Sed in hoc differunt: quia in subiecto aliquo est hoc quidem secundum <i>rationem</i>, idest secundum formam, hoc autem secundum materiam (nam corpus naturale actu existens compositum est ex materia et forma): quando igitur est transmutatio secundum materiam et formam, ita scilicet quod materia accipiat aliam formam substantialem, erit simplex generatio et corruptio; quando autem est transmutatio secundum passiones et accidentia, erit alteratio.
          <td>It is from this belief that the entire fallacy proceeds. For there is generation and corruption in natural things, whose form does not consist in position and order, not indeed through assembling and separating, but because there is a change "from this whole," i.e., from this whole not resolved into its parts, "into that whole," which is not an assembly of parts. But the early philosophers thought that every such change, that occurs while the whole remains intact, is alteration. However, this is not true. For at one time there can be simple generation and at another alteration. They differ in this: In a subject there is present something according to "notion," i.e., according to form, and something according to matter (for a natural body that exists in act is a composite of matter and form). When, therefore, there is a change according to matter and form, in such a way, namely, that the matter acquires a different substantial form, there will be simple generation and corruption; but when there is a change according to passions and accidents, it will be alteration.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: segregata autem etc., ostendit quantum ad quid verificetur dictum Democriti. Manifestum est enim quod aliqua, ex hoc quod sunt congregata vel segregata, redduntur levius vel difficilius corruptibilia vel mutabilia. Si enim aqua dividatur in parvissimas partes, minus poterit resistere actioni contrarii agentis, et ita citius ex aqua corrupta generabitur aer: si vero congregetur multum de aqua, magis resistet agenti, et sic tardius corrumpetur, ut ex ea possit generari aer. Et hoc magis manifestum erit in sequentibus.
          <td>41. Then [40] he shows in what sense Democritus' dictum is verified. For it is plain that some things, by the very fact that they are assembled or separated, are rendered more easy or more difficult to destroy or modify. For if water be divided into very small parts, it is less able to resist the action of a contrary agent, and in this way, from the corrupted water, air will be more quickly generated. But if much water is assembled, it will offer greater resistance to an agent and thus will be more slowly corrupted so as to allow air to be generated from it. But this will be clearer in what follows.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Ultimo autem epilogando dicit nunc intantum esse determinatum quod impossibile est generationem esse congregationem, qualem quidam inquiunt, scilicet ex corporibus indivisibilibus.
          <td>Finally, as a summary, he says that so much can be taken as established, namely that generation cannot be assembling, of the sort that some maintain, namely, that out of indivisible bodies.
    </table>
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 6<br>
      Does simple generation exist? Problem and solution.
      <table cellpadding="12">
        <tbody>
          <tr style="text-align:center">
            <td colspan="2">
          <tr style="text-align:center">
            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 3</b>
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, πρῶτον θεωρητέον πότερόν ἐστί τι γινόμενον ἁπλῶς καὶ φθειρόμενον, ἢ κυρίως μὲν οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δ' ἔκ τινος καὶ τί, λέγω δ' οἷον ἐκ κάμνοντος ὑγιαῖνον καὶ κάμνον ἐξ ὑγιαίνοντος, ἢ μικρὸν ἐκ μεγάλου καὶ (317b.) μέγα ἐκ μικροῦ, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
            <td>42 Now that we have established the preceding distinctions, we must first consider whether there is anything which comes-to-be and passes-away in the unqualified sense: or whether nothing comes-to-be in this strict sense, but everything always comes-to-be something and out of something—I mean, e.g. comes-to-be-healthy out of being-ill and ill out of being-healthy, comes-to-be-small out of being big and big out of being-small, and so on in every other instance.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἔσται γένεσις, ἁπλῶς ἄν τι γίνοιτο ἐκ μὴ ὄντος,
            <td>43 For if there is to be coming-to-be without qualification, 'something' must—without qualification—'come-to-be out of not-being',
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">ὥστ' ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι ὑπάρχει τισὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν.
            <td>44 so that it would be true to say that 'not-being is an attribute of some things'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὶς μὲν γὰρ γένεσις ἐκ μὴ ὄντος τινός, οἷον ἐκ μὴ λευκοῦ ἢ μὴ καλοῦ, ἡ δὲ ἁπλῆ ἐξ ἁπλῶς μὴ ὄντος.
            <td>45 For qualified coming-to-be is a process out of qualified not-being (e.g. out of not-white or not-beautiful), but unqualified coming-to-be is a process out of unqualified not-being.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὸ δ' ἁπλῶς ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον σημαίνει καθ' ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν τοῦ ὄντος, ἢ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ πάντα περιέχον.
            <td>46 Now 'unqulified' means either (i) the primary predication within each Category, or (ii) the universal, i.e. the all-comprehensive, predication.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ πρῶτον, οὐσίας ἔσται γένεσις ἐκ μὴ οὐσίας. Ὧι δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει οὐσία μηδὲ τὸ τόδε, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμία κατηγοριῶν, οἷον οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε τὸ ποῦ· χωριστὰ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὰ πάθη τῶν οὐσιῶν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὅλως, ἀπόφασις ἔσται καθόλου πάντων, ὥστε ἐκ μηδενὸς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον.
            <td>47 Hence, if 'unqualified not-being 'means the negation of 'being' in the sense of the primary term of the Category in question, we shall have, in 'unqualified coming-to-be', a coming-to-be of a substance out of not-substance. But that which is not a substance or a 'this' clearly cannot possess predicates drawn from any of the other Categories either—e.g. we cannot attribute to it any quality, quantity, or position. Otherwise, properties would admit of existence in separation from substances. If, on the other hand, 'unqualified not-being' means 'what is not in any sense at all', it will be a universal negation of all forms of being, so that what comes-to-be will have to come-to-be out of nothing.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις τε διηπόρηται καὶ διώρισται τοῖς λόγοις ἐπὶ πλεῖον· συντόμως δὲ καὶ νῦν λεκτέον, ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς γίνεται, τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον ἐξ ὄντος ἀεί· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὂν ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ μὴ ὂν ἀνάγκη προυπάρχειν λεγόμενον ἀμφοτέρως.
            <td>48 Although we have dealt with these problems at greater length in another work, where we have set forth the difficulties and established the distinguishing definitions, the following concise restatement of our results must here be offered: In one sense things come-to-be out of that which has no 'being' without qualification: yet in another sense they come-to-be always out of what is'. For coming-to-be necessarily implies the pre-existence of something which potentially 'is', but actually 'is not'; and this something is spoken of both as 'being' and as 'not-being'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὃ δὲ καὶ τούτων διωρισμένων ἔχει θαυμαστὴν ἀπορίαν, πάλιν ἐπαναποδιστέον, πῶς ἔστιν ἁπλῆ γένεσις, εἴτ' ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος οὖσα εἴτε καί πως ἄλλως.
            <td>49 These distinctions may be taken as established: but even then it is extraordinarily difficult to see how there can be 'unqualified coming-to-be' (whether we suppose it to occur out of what potentially 'is', or in some other way), and we must recall this problem for further examination.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις ἆρ' ἔστιν οὐσίας γένεσις καὶ τοῦ τοῦδε, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ τοιοῦδε καὶ τοσοῦδε καὶ ποῦ. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ φθορᾶς.
            <td>50 For the question might be raised whether substance (i.e. the 'this') comes-to-be at all. Is it not rather the 'such', the 'so great', or the 'somewhere', which comes-to-be? And the same question might be raised about 'passing-away' also.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ γάρ τι γίνεται, δῆλον ὡς ἔσται δυνάμει τις οὐσία, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ' οὔ, ἐξ ἧς ἡ γένεσις ἔσται καὶ εἰς ἣν ἀνάγκη μεταβάλλειν τὸ φθειρόμενον. Πότερον οὖν ὑπάρξει τι τούτῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἐντελεχείᾳ; λέγω δ' οἷον ἆρ' ἔσται ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποῦ τὸ δυνάμει μόνον τόδε καὶ ὄν, ἁπλῶς δὲ μὴ τόδε μηδ' ὄν; εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἀλλὰ πάντα δυνάμει, χωριστόν τε συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ οὕτως ὄν, καὶ ἔτι, ὃ μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι προυπάρχοντος· εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τόδε τι ἢ οὐσίαν οὐχ ὑπάρξει, τῶν δ' ἄλλων τι τῶν εἰρημένων, ἔσται, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη τῶν οὐσιῶν.
            <td>51 For if a substantial thing comes-to-be, it is clear that there will 'be' (not actually, but potentially) a substance, out of which its coming-to-be will proceed and into which the thing that is passing-away will necessarily change. Then will any predicate belonging to the remaining Categories attach actually to this presupposed substance? In other words, will that which is only potentially a 'this' (which only potentially is), while without the qualification 'potentially' it is not a 'this' (i.e. is not), possess, e.g. any determinate size or quality or position? For (i) if it possesses none of these determinations actually, but all of them only potentially, the result is first that a being, which is not a determinate being, is capable of separate existence; and in addition that coming-to-be proceeds out of nothing pre-existing—a thesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest philosophers. On the other hand (ii) if, although it is not a 'this somewhat' or a substance, it is to possess some of the remaining determinations quoted above, then (as we said)' properties will be separable from substances.
      </table>
    </blockquote>
    <table cellpadding="12">
      <tbody>
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          <td>Postquam philosophus determinavit de generatione et alteratione secundum opiniones aliorum, hic incipit inquirere de eis secundum opinionem propriam.
          <td>42. After determining about generation and alteration according to the opinions of others, the Philosopher here begins to inquire about them according to his own opinion.
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo inquirit utrum sit aliqua simplex generatio, secundum quam aliquid dicitur simpliciter generari;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo de differentia alterationis ad simplicem generationem, ibi: de generatione autem et alteratione et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he asks whether there is any simple generation, according to which something is said to be generated absolutely;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, the difference between alteration and simple generation (L. 10).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit.
          <td>With respect to the first he does two things.
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          <td>Primo dicit de quo est intentio: dicens quod post determinationem praedictorum, in consideratione veritatis primo occurrit videndum utrum aliquid generetur et corrumpatur simpliciter; vel <i>proprie</i> quidem, idest simpliciter seu principaliter, nihil generatur vel corrumpitur, sed semper generatur aliquid ex aliquo et in aliquid; quod videtur pertinere ad generationem vel corruptionem secundum quid. Et inducit exemplum, puta cum ex <i>laborante</i>, idest infirmo, fit sanum: non enim fit ens simpliciter, quia et prius erat, sed fit <i>aliquid</i>, scilicet sanum, cum prius non esset sanum, sed <i>laborans</i>, idest infirmum. Et eadem ratio est cum fit aliquid laborans ex sano, vel parvum ex magno, aut e converso, et sic de omnibus aliis quae hoc modo dicuntur: huiusmodi enim generatio secundum quid invenitur in omni genere mobilium, ut patet in VIII Physic.
          <td>First he states his intention [42] and says that after having determined the foregoing, the first point in the inquiry into the truth is to see whether something is generated and corrupted absolutely, or whether "properly," i.e., absolutely or principally, nothing is generated or corrupted, but that always something is generated from something and into something — which seems to pertain to generation and corruption in a qualified sense. And he gives as an example the case when, from something "laboring," i.e., ill, something healthy comes to be. In this case absolute being is not produced, because it already existed, but "something," namely, to be healthy, is, since previously "healthy" was not, but "laboring," i.e., ill. And the same holds when something is made ill from healthy, or the small from the large, or conversely, and so on for all changes stated in this manner — for such generation in a qualified sense is found in every class of mobile being, as is plain in <i>Physics</i> VIII.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo ibi: si enim simpliciter etc., exequitur propositum.
          <td>43. Secondly, [43], he carries out his proposal:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo proponit dubitationem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo solvit eam, ibi: de his quidem etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio obiicit contra solutionem, ibi: quod autem et his determinatis et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he states a doubt;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he resolves it, at 48;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he objects to the solution, at 49.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>Regarding the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ponit dubitationem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo excludit quandam responsionem, ibi: simpliciter autem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he states the doubt;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he rejects one answer, at 46.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum tria facit.
          <td>As to the first he does three things:
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Primo proponit quandam consequentiam: dicens quod, si sit aliqua generatio simpliciter, sequitur quod aliquid generabitur ex simpliciter non ente.
          <td>First he proposes a certain consequence [43] saying that, if absolute generation should occur, it would follow that something would be generated from absolute non-being.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo, cum dicit: quapropter verum erit etc., ostendit consequens esse impossibile. Illud enim ex quo aliquid generatur, potest dici esse illud; sicut si ex ligno generatur arca, potest dici quod lignum est arca. Si ergo ex non ente simpliciter generatur ens, verum erit dicere quod non ens <i>existit</i>, idest est ens; quod est contradictoria esse simul vera. Sic ergo videtur et antecedens esse impossibile, scilicet quod aliquid generetur simpliciter ex non ente. Sequitur autem hoc inconveniens, si dicatur ex non ente simpliciter fieri aliquid sicut ex subiecto permanente: non autem sequitur, si ponatur ex non ente fieri aliquid simpliciter ordine tantum, idest, post non ens fit ens. Sed Aristoteles hoc disputative obiicit.
          <td>44. Secondly [44] he shows that the consequent is impossible. For that from which something is generated can be called it; for example, if from wood a cabinet is generated, it can be said that the cabinet is wood. If, therefore, from absolute non-being being is generated, it will be true to say that nonbeing exists, i.e., that it is being — which is to have contradictories true at the same time. Consequently the antecedent is seen to be impossible, namely, that something be generated absolutely from non-being. Now this inadmissibility follows if something should be said to be produced from non-being absolutely, as from a permanent subject; it does not follow, however, if it is pointed out that something is produced from non-being absolutely according to order alone, i.e., that after non-being is produced being. But Aristotle is objecting here in a disputative manner.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Tertio ibi: quaedam enim generatio etc., ostendit necessitatem primae consequentiae. Sicut enim se habet generatio quaedam ad non ens aliquod, sic se habet generatio simpliciter ad non ens simpliciter. Sed generatio <i>quaedam</i>, idest secundum quam aliquid dicitur generari secundum quid, est ex non ente quodam, puta ex non albo, cum fit aliquid album, aut ex non bono, cum fit aliquid bonum. Ergo simpliciter generatio, secundum quam aliquid dicitur generari simpliciter, est ex simpliciter non ente.
          <td>45. Thirdly [45], he shows the necessity of the first consequence. For just as some particular generation is related to some particular non-being, so absolute generation is related to absolute non-being. But a "certain" generation, i.e., a generation according to which something is said to be generated in a qualified sense is from a certain non-being, for example, from non-white, when something becomes white, or from non-good, when something becomes good. Therefore, absolute generation, according to which something is said to be generated absolutely, is from absolute now-being.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: simpliciter autem etc., excludit quandam solutionem, quae possit dari distinguendo ens simpliciter. Unde primo ponit ipsam distinctionem, dicens quod <i>simpliciter ens</i> potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo ut significat id quod est primum inter omnia praedicamenta entis, prout scilicet simpliciter ens dicitur de substantia; alio modo secundum quod simpliciter ens dicitur ipsum ens universale, quod omnia praedicamenta comprehendit. Et hoc modo <i>simpliciter non ens</i> potest dici vel quod non est substantia, vel quod nullo modo est ens.
          <td>46. Then [46] he excludes a certain solution that could be given by distinguishing "absolute being." Hence he first presents the distinction and says that "absolute being" may be understood in two ways: in one way as meaning that which is the first among the predicaments of being, namely, substance; in another way as meaning universal being, which includes all the predicaments. According to these distinctions, "absolute non-being" may be said either of what is not substance, or of what is in no way being.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo ibi: si quidem primum etc., ostendit quod secundum utrumque sensum sequitur inconveniens. Si enim simpliciter dicatur primum ens quod est substantia, ergo et simpliciter non ens dicetur non substantia. Si ergo generatio simplex hoc requirit, quod sit simpliciter entis ex simpliciter non ente, sequetur quod erit substantia ex non substantia. Sed quando ponitur non esse substantiam neque <i>hoc</i> (quod est demonstrativum individualis substantiae), manifestum est quod nullum aliorum praedicamentorum remanebit, idest neque quale neque quantum neque ubi: quia sequeretur quod <i>passiones</i>, idest accidentia, separarentur a substantiis, quod est impossibile.
          <td>47. Secondly [47], he shows that according to both senses something inadmissible follows. For if "absolute being" is taken to mean the first being, which is substance, then "absolute non-being" will be non-substance. If, therefore, absolute generation requires that there be absolute being from absolute nonbeing, it will follow that there will be substance from non-substance. But when it is assumed that neither substance exists nor a "this" (which implies an individual substance), then it is plain that none of the other predicaments will remain, i.e., neither quality, nor quantity, nor "where" — because otherwise it would follow that "passions," i.e., accidents, would exist separated from substances, which is impossible.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Si autem dicatur quod illud ex quo aliquid generatur simpliciter, sit non ens universaliter, prout ens simpliciter dicitur ens commune, sequetur quod per hoc quod dicitur non ens, intelligatur universaliter negatio omnium entium. Unde sequetur quod illud quod generatur simpliciter, generetur penitus ex nihilo: quod est contra rationem naturalis generationis, et contra sententias omnium philosophorum naturalium, qui scilicet de generatione naturali locuti sunt.
          <td>But if it should be said that that from which something is generated absolutely is universal non-being, in the sense that "absolute being" is taken to mean common being, it will follow that the expression, "non-being," means the negation of all beings. Hence it will follow that what would be generated absolutely would be generated from absolutely nothing. But this is against the notion of natural generation, and against the doctrines of all the natural philosophers, who discussed natural generation.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: de his quidem etc., solvit praedictam dubitationem. Et dicit quod de ista materia etiam in aliis libris, scilicet in I Physic., <i>amplius</i>, idest diffusius, et dubitationes positae sunt et determinationes. Et ideo nunc brevius est dicendum, quod simpliciter generatur aliquid quodam modo ex non ente, alio modo ex ente: oportet enim illud quod praeexistit generationi, esse potentia ens, actu autem non ens. Et ita verum est quod dicitur utroque modo: scilicet quod generatio simpliciter sit ex ente, et ex non ente.
          <td>48. Then at [48] he resolves this doubt. And he says that this matter has been "more fully" discussed, i.e., discussed at greater length, also in other books, namely, in <i>Physics</i> I, with the difficulties presented and the determinations made. Therefore now it is enough to state more briefly that something is absolutely generated in a way from non-being, and in a way from being - for that which pre-exists to the generation must be being in potency but non-being in act. Consequently, what is said on both sides is true, namely, that absolute generation is from being, and from non-being.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quod autem et his determinatis etc., obiicit contra praedictam solutionem. Et circa hoc tria facit:
          <td>49. Then [49] he objects against this solution. Concerning this he does three things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ponit obiectionem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo huius occasione introducit aliam quaestionem, et solvit eam, ibi: de his autem quantum etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio solvit dubitationem praedictam, ibi: propter quid et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he presents the objection;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he uses this as an occasion for asking another question and answering it (L. 7);
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he answers the doubt under discussion (L. 8).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum tria facit.
          <td>In regard to the first he does three things:
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Primo dicit de quo est intentio: et dicit quod, quia etiam post praedictam determinationem adhuc insurgit mirabilis dubitatio, rursus oportet tentare quomodo simpliciter generatio sit, sive ex ente in potentia, sive qualiter sit alio modo.
          <td>First, he states his intention [49] and says that because the foregoing determination begets a wondrous question, it will be necessary once more to investigate how absolute generation takes place, i.e., whether from being in potency, or in some other way.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo ibi: quaeret enim quis etc., movet quandam quaestionem: utrum scilicet generatio simplex sit tantum substantiae et <i>huius</i>, idest individui in genere substantiae; non autem sit quanti neque qualis neque ubi, et aliorum praedicamentorum, quae non sunt simpliciter entia. Et eadem quaestio potest fieri de corruptione. Et est hoc supponendum pro certo, quod generatio et corruptio simplex sit solius substantiae.
          <td>50. Secondly [50], he raises a certain question: Is simple generation only of substance and of "this," i.e., the individual in the genus of substance, and not of quantity or quality or "where" or the other predicaments, which are not beings absolutely? And the same question can be put with regard to corruption. And it is to be supposed as a certainty that simple generation and corruption are of substance alone.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Tertio ibi: si enim quid generabitur etc., prosequitur dubitationem. Et dicit quod, si non generatur simpliciter nisi <i>quid</i>, idest existens in genere substantiae; et illud ex quo aliquid generatur, est potentia ens, sicut supra dictum est, et non actu; sequitur quod illud ex quo generatur substantia, et in quod transmutatur quando corrumpitur, sit substantia in potentia, non autem actu. Restat ergo quaerendum utrum sit in actu aliquod aliorum praedicamentorum, puta quantum vel quale aut ubi, aut quodcumque aliorum praedicamentorum; cum tamen sit in potentia <i>ens hoc</i>, idest substantia, quae est ens simpliciter; ita tamen quod non sit <i>simpliciter</i>, idest in actu, neque <i>hoc</i>, idest neque substantia, neque ens.
          <td>51. Thirdly [51], he continues with the problem. And he says that if the only thing generated absolutely is the "what," i.e., something existing in the genus of substance, and if that from which something is generated is being in potency, as was said above, and not in act, it follows that that from which substance is generated, as well as that into which it is changed when corrupted, is substance in potency and not in act. Therefore it remains to inquire whether it is any of the other predicaments in act, such as quantity or quality or "where" or any of the other predicaments, while at the same time being potentially "this being," i.e., substance, which is being absolutely, although not existing "absolutely," i.e., in act, as "this," i.e., as substance or being.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Quaecumque autem pars huius dubitationis detur, sequitur inconveniens. Si enim nihil aliorum est in actu, sed est in potentia omnia genera praedicamentorum, sequitur primo quod <i>non ens sit separatum</i>, idest quod materia, quae est ens in potentia, subiecta sit privationi, quae est non ens, absque omni forma. Secundo sequitur illud quod maxime timuerunt primi philosophi, quod aliquid generetur ex nullo praeexistente: quod enim non est ens actu, nihil est.
          <td>Whichever part of this difficulty is conceded, something inadmissible follows. For if it is none of the others in act, but is all of the genera of the predicaments in potency, it follows first of all than non-being is separated, i.e., that matter, which is being in potency, is existing under privation, which is non-being, but without any form. Secondly, there follows what the first philosophers most feared, namely, that something be generated from no pre-existing thing: for what is not being in act, is nothing.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Si vero ponatur quod id ex quo generatur substantia, non sit <i>hoc aliquid</i>, idest individuum in genere substantiae, neque sit substantia in actu, sed sit in actu aliquod aliorum praedicamentorum; sequitur inconveniens quod prius induximus, quod scilicet <i>passiones</i>, idest accidentia, separentur a substantiis; quod est manifeste impossibile.
          <td>But if it is supposed that that from which substance is generated is not a "this something," i.e., an individual in the genus of substance, nor substance in act, but is one of the other predicaments in act, there follows the inadmissible consequence we adduced before, namely, that "passions," i.e., accidents, exist isolated from substances — which is plainly impossible.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Sic igitur videtur quod non possit esse generatio simpliciter hoc modo, quod substantia generetur ex non ente actu, ente autem in potentia, ut praedicta solutio dicebat.
          <td>Consequently, it seems that absolute generation cannot occur in this way, namely, that a substance be generated from what is non-being in act and being in potency, as the foregoing solution suggested.
    </table>
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 7<br>
      The cause on the part of matter why generation never fails.
      <table cellpadding="12">
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            <td colspan="2">
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 3 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περί τε τούτων οὖν ὅσον ἐνδέχεται πραγματευτέον, καὶ τίς αἰτία τοῦ γένεσιν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἁπλῆν καὶ τὴν κατὰ μέρος.
            <td>52 We must therefore concentrate all our powers on the discussion of these difficulties and on the solution of a further question—viz. What is the cause of the perpetuity of coming-to-be? Why is there always unqualified, as well as partial, coming-to-be?
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">(318a.) Οὔσης δ' αἰτίας μιᾶς μὲν ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φαμεν τῆς κινήσεως, μιᾶς δὲ τῆς ὕλης, τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν λεκτέον.
            <td>53 'Cause' in this connexion has two senses. It means (i) the source from which, as we say, the process 'originates', and (ii) the matter. It is the material cause that we have here to state.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνης εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον ἀεί. Τούτων δὲ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἀκινήτου ἀρχῆς τῆς ἑτέρας καὶ προτέρας διελεῖν ἐστι φιλοσοφίας ἔργον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς κινεῖσθαι τἆλλα κινοῦντος ὕστερον ἀποδοτέον, τί τοιοῦτον τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λεγομένων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, νῦν δὲ τὴν ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει τιθεμένην αἰτίαν εἴπωμεν, δι' ἣν ἀεὶ φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις οὐχ ὑπολείπει τὴν φύσιν· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἴσως τοῦτο γένοιτο δῆλον, καὶ περὶ τοῦ νῦν ἀπορηθέντος, πῶς ποτὲ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως.
            <td>For, as to the other cause, we have already explained (in our treatise on Motion that it involves (a) something immovable through all time and (b) something always being moved. And the accurate treatment of the first of these—of the immovable 'originative source'—belongs to the province of the other, or 'prior', philosophy: while as regards 'that which sets everything else in motion by being itself continuously moved', we shall have to explain later' which amongst the so-called 'specific' causes exhibits this character. But at present we are to state the material cause—the cause classed under the head of matter—to which it is due that passing-away and coming-to-be never fail to occur in Nature. For perhaps, if we succeed in clearing up this question, it will simultaneously become clear what account we ought to give of that which perplexed us just now, i.e. of unqualified passing-away and coming-to-be.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν ἱκανὴν καὶ τί τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ συνείρειν τὴν γένεσιν, εἴπερ τὸ φθειρόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν μηδέν ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὶ οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ποῦ τὸ μὴ ὄν. Εἴπερ οὖν ἀεί τι τῶν ὄντων ἀπέρχεται, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐκ ἀνήλωται πάλαι καὶ φροῦδον τὸ πᾶν, εἴ γε πεπερασμένον ἦν ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τῶν γινομένων ἕκαστον;
            <td>54 Our new question too—viz. 'what is the cause of the unbroken continuity of coming-to-be?'—is sufficiently perplexing, if in fact what passes-away vanishes into 'what is not' and 'what is not' is nothing (since 'what is not' is neither a thing, nor possessed of a quality or quantity, nor in any place). If, then, some one of the things 'which are' constantly disappearing, why has not the whole of 'what is' been used up long ago and vanished away assuming of course that the material of all the several comings-to-be was finite?
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, οὐχ ὑπολείπει· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατον. Κατ' ἐνέργειαν μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄπειρον,
            <td>55 For, presumably, the unfailing continuity of coming-to-be cannot be attributed to the infinity of the material. That is impossible, for nothing is actually infinite.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">δυνάμει δ' ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὥστ' ἔδει ταύτην εἶναι μόνην τὴν μὴ ὑπολείπουσαν τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἀεὶ ἔλαττον· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. Ἆρ' οὖν διὰ τὸ τὴν τοῦδε φθορὰν ἄλλου εἶναι γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τοῦδε γένεσιν ἄλλου εἶναι φθορὰν ἄπαυστον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν;
            <td>56 A thing is infinite only potentially, i.e. the dividing of it can continue indefinitely: so that we should have to suppose there is only one kind of coming-to-be in the world—viz. one which never fails, because it is such that what comes-to-be is on each successive occasion smaller than before. But in fact this is not what we see occurring. Why, then, is this form of change necessarily ceaseless? Is it because the passing-away of this is a coming-to-be of something else, and the coming-to-be of this a passing-away of something else?
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    </blockquote>
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          <td>Postquam Aristoteles contra praemissam solutionem obiecit, hic introducit aliam quaestionem, per cuius solutionem solvitur praedicta obiectio. Et circa hoc duo facit:
          <td>52. After presenting an objection against the aforesaid solution, the Philosopher here introduces another question, the answer to which resolves the previous objection. About this he does two things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo introducit quaestionem et solvit eam;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ex eius solutione procedit ad solvendum quaestionem principaliter intentam, ibi: propter quid autem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he introduces the question and resolves it;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he uses this solution to resolve the main question (L. 8).
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          <td>Circa primum tria facit:
          <td>With respect to the first he does three things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo proponit quaestionem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo prosequitur eam, ibi: habet autem dubitationem etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio solvit eam, ibi: quocirca propter huius et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he presents the question;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he tackles the question, at 54;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he resolves it, at 57.
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          <td>Circa primum duo facit.
          <td>Regarding the first he does two things:
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          <td>Primo introducit quaestionem: et dicit quod de his, scilicet de obiectione praemissa, tractandum est quantum convenit proposito: et ut hoc melius declaretur, inquirendum est quae est causa quod generatio sit semper, et illa scilicet quae est simpliciter, et illa quae est <i>secundum partem</i>, idest secundum quid. Oportet enim ponenti mundum et motum perpetuum, ponere etiam generationem perpetuam. Quid autem necessitatis habeant rationes Aristotelis circa perpetuitatem motus et circa perpetuitatem mundi, manifestavimus in VIII Physic. et in I de caelo.
          <td>First he introduces the question [52] and says that "these," namely, the previous objection should be handled to the extent that the proposition requires, and that, in order to get a better understanding, we should inquire into the reason why generation always exists, i.e., both absolute generation and generation "with respect to a part," i.e., generation in a qualified sense. Now those who posit that the world and motion are perpetual must also posit perpetual generation. What the force of Aristotle's arguments is with regard to the perpetuity of motion and the eternity of the world we have explained in <i>Physics</i> VIII and in <i>On the Heavens</i> I.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: existente autem etc., exponit introductam quaestionem. Et dicit quod causa perpetuitatis generationis, una quidem accipi potest quae dicitur <i>unde est principium motus</i>, idest causa movens vel efficiens: alia causa potest accipi quae est materia. Et talis nunc assignanda est, scilicet materialis: de causa enim movente dictum est prius in <i>sermonibus de motu</i>, idest in VIII Physic.: ibi enim dictum est quod est quoddam movens immobile per omne tempus, scilicet motor caeli; aliud autem est movens quod semper movetur, scilicet ipsum caelum.
          <td>53. Secondly [53], he explains the question he has introduced and says that one cause that may be assigned of the eternity of generation is that which is called "whence the principle [beginning] of motion comes," i.e., the moving or efficient cause; another cause may be assigned, which is matter. And this is the one to be assigned now, namely, the material — for the moving cause has been discussed in the tract on motion," i.e., in <i>Physics</i> VIII, where it was said that there exists a certain immobile mover for all time, namely, the mover of the heavens, and a mover which is always moved, namely, the heavens.
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          <td>De uno autem horum, scilicet de movente primo, determinare pertinet ad aliam partem philosophiae, quae est prima inter alias: unde in XII Metaphys. determinavit philosophus de causa perpetuitatis motus et generationis. De alio autem movente, scilicet quod causat perpetuam generationem propter hoc quod ipsum continue movetur, postea in fine huius libri assignandum est quod talis sit causa <i>singularium dictorum</i>, idest perpetuitatis generationis simpliciter et secundum quid.
          <td>To determine concerning one of these, namely, the first mover, pertains to another part of philosophy, the part which is first among all the parts; hence in <i>Metaphysics</i> XII the Philosopher determined concerning the cause of the perpetuity of motion and of generation. But regarding the other mover, namely, the mover which causes perpetual generation because it is itself continually being moved, it will later be assigned, at the end of the present book, how this is the cause "of each of the aforesaid," i.e., of the perpetuity of generation absolutely speaking and in the qualified sense.
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          <td>Sed nunc oportet assignare causam propter quam generatio et corruptio in sempiternum non deserant naturam rerum, causam dico <i>positam in materiae specie</i>, idest materialem causam. Et ne videatur hoc esse praeter propositum, subiungit quod forte simul manifestabitur quomodo oporteat dicere circa hanc quaestionem, et quomodo oporteat dicere de generatione et corruptione simpliciter.
          <td>But now we must assign the cause why in perpetuity, generation and corruption do not desert nature, and which is the cause "classed under the head of matter," namely, the material cause. And lest this seem to be foreign to the proposition, he [Aristotle] adds that perhaps it will at the same time be shown both what must be said about this question and what must be said of absolute generation and corruption.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: habet autem dubitationem etc., prosequitur quaestionem introductam.
          <td>54. Then [54] he pursues the question brought up.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo obiicit ad excludendum perpetuitatem generationis;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo excludit quasdam responsiones, ibi: non enim utique et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he presents an objection that would deny perpetuity of generation;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he rejects some answers to this objection, at 55.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod videtur habere dubitationem sufficienter moventem, quae est causa quare generatio <i>complicatur</i>, idest revolvitur sempiterne circa rerum naturam, si illud quod corrumpitur simpliciter, cedit in non ens. Sicut enim quod generatur simpliciter, fit ex non ente simpliciter, ita quod corrumpitur simpliciter, videtur quod in non ens simpliciter cedat, ita quod hoc non ens omnino nihil sit. Neque enim potest esse <i>quid</i>, idest substantia: quia, cum corruptio simpliciter sit substantiae, oportet quod corruptum simpliciter cedat in non substantiam. Et per consequens non ens illud in quod terminatur corruptio, oportet quod neque sit quale neque quantum neque ubi, neque aliorum praedicamentorum aliquod: eo quod accidentia non possunt esse sine substantia.
          <td>He says therefore first [54] that there seems to be sufficient reason to inquire as to the cause why generation is "folded around," i.e., eternally revolves in nature, if that which is corrupted absolutely falls into non-being. For just as what is generated absolutely comes to be from non-being absolutely, so what is corrupted absolutely would seem to fall into non-being absolutely, in the sense that this non-being would be absolutely nothing. For that into which it falls cannot be a "something," i.e., a substance, for since absolute corruption is of substance, what is corrupted absolutely must fall into non-substance. Consequently, neither can the non-being at which corruption ends be quality, or quantity, or "where," or any of the other predicaments, since accidents cannot exist without substance.
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          <td>Si ergo generatio et corruptio sint sempiterna, videtur quod semper aliquod entium cedat in non ens: et ita semper subtrahatur aliquid habentium naturam. Manifestum est autem quod omne finitum consumitur, si semper ab eo fiat ablatio. Si ergo totum universum est finitum, ex quo generatur unumquodque entium, si generatio ab aeterno fuit, ab olim debuit esse consumptum totum ens, ita quod iam non relinqueretur nisi <i>inane</i>, idest vacuum.
          <td>If, therefore, generation and corruption go on forever, it seems that some being will always be falling into non-being. Consequently, there is always being subtracted some one or other of the things having natures. Now, it is plain that whatever is finite will be consumed if something is continually removed from it. Hence, if the whole universe, from which each and every being is generated, is finite, and if generation is <i>ab aeterno</i>, then all being should have been exhausted long ago, so that nothing should be left now but emptiness, i.e., the void.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: non enim utique etc., excludit duas obviationes. Quarum prima fuit antiquorum naturalium, qui, ut possent causare perpetuitatem generationis, attribuerunt infinitum principiis. Nam omnes qui posuerunt unum principium, vel ignem vel aerem vel aquam vel aliquod medium, dixerunt illud principium esse infinitum. Democritus autem posuit spatium vacuum infinitum, et corpora etiam indivisibilia infinita. Similiter etiam Anaxagoras posuit infinitas partes consimiles esse principia.
          <td>55. Then [55] he excludes two answers. The first was that of the ancient natural philosophers who, in order to account for the perpetuity of generation, attributed infinity to the principles. For all who posited one principle, such as fire or air or water or something in-between, endowed that principle with infinity. Democritus however assumed infinite empty space, as well as an infinitude of indivisible bodies. Likewise, Anaxagoras posited an infinitude of similar parts as principles.
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          <td>Omnia ergo haec excludit philosophus, dicens quod non potest dici quod ideo generatio non deficit, quia infinitum est illud ex quo aliquid generatur, sive sit unum sive multa principia: hoc enim est impossibile, quia, ut probatum est in III Physic. et in I de caelo, nihil est actu infinitum in natura.
          <td>All these tenets are rejected by the Philosopher, who says that it cannot be that the reason why generation does not cease is because that is infinite from which something is generated, whether there be one principle or many principles. For such a thing is impossible, since, as was proved in <i>Physics</i> III and in <i>On the Heavens</i> I, there is in nature no infinite in act.
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          <td>Secundam obviationem ponit et excludit ibi: potestate autem et cetera. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod, quamvis non sit aliquid infinitum actu in natura, est tamen aliquid infinitum in potentia, sicut patet in divisione continui. Et ita posset aliquis dicere quod, sicut a continuo, quamvis non sit infinitum actu, in infinitum aliquid per divisionem subtrahitur, et tamen non totum consumitur; ita a corpore naturali ex quo omnia generantur, quamvis non sit infinitum, semper abstrahitur aliquid quod per corruptionem secedit in non ens, nunquam tamen totaliter consumitur.
          <td>56. A second answer is now presented and refuted [56]. For someone could say that, although there is not present in nature any infinite in act, there is nevertheless an infinite in potency, as is evident in the division of a continuum. Consequently, someone could say that, just as, even though it is not infinite in act, something can be taken <i>ad infinitum</i> by division from a continuum without its being consumed, so too, from natural body, out of which all things are generated, even though it is not infinite, something can be taken which, by corruption, falls away to non-being, yet without its ever being totally consumed.
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          <td>Sed hoc excluditur. Quia si a continuo finito, ut dicitur in III Physic., semper subtrahatur eadem quantitas, quantumcumque sit magnum, tandem consumetur; puta si a diametro caeli quis semper subtrahat palmum. Sed in infinitum continuum dividitur, si semper fiat subtractio secundum eandem proportionem; puta si continuum dividatur per medium, et medium per medium, et sic in infinitum; et eadem ratio est de quacumque alia proportione. Sic autem divisione facta, manifestum est quod id quod post medium accipitur, semper erit minus eo quod prius accipiebatur: nam dimidium dimidii semper minus est quam dimidium totius. Unde Aristoteles concludit quod, si hac ratione generatio et corruptio in infinitum duraret, qua ratione continuum in infinitum dividitur, oportebit quod id quod postea generatur, semper sit minus in quantitate, ut sic, semper minori existente eo quod subtrahitur a corpore naturali, non totaliter consumatur. Hoc autem non videmus ita accidere, quod semper sit minus quod generatur. Hoc igitur quod generatio et corruptio in infinitum durat, non potest esse simile divisioni magnitudinis in infinitum.
          <td>But this is excluded. For if, from a finite continuum, as is said in <i>Physics</i> III, the same quantity is always removed, it will, no matter how large, be finally consumed —. for example, if one should continue to remove a palm's breadth from the diameter of the heaven. But a continuum is divided <i>ad infinitum</i> if subtraction is always made according to the same proportion — for example, if a continuum be divided in half, and the half into half, and so on infinitely. The same holds for any other ratio. Such a division having been made, it is plain that what is taken after the half will always be less than what was taken before — for the half of the half is always less than the half of the whole. Hence Aristotle concludes that, if this is the way that generation and corruption are to endure forever, i.e., in the way that a continuum is forever divided, then whatever is generated later will always have to be smaller in quantity, so that, by virtue of what is subtracted from natural body being always less, the original quantity will not be totally consumed. But we do not see this happen, namely, what is generated being always less. Consequently, the way generation and corruption endure <i>ad infinitum</i> cannot be similar to the division of a magnitude <i>ad infinitum</i>.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quocirca propter huius etc., exclusis falsis solutionibus, concludit veram: scilicet quod ideo necesse est esse transmutationem generationis et corruptionis indeficientem vel <i>inquietam</i>, idest non cessantem, quia corruptio huius est generatio alterius, et e converso. Nam generatio per se quidem est ex ente in potentia, idest ex materia, quae est sicut subiectum rerum naturalium: accidit enim materiae ex qua aliquid generatur, quod sit subiecta alteri formae, secundum quam est ens actu, et privationi formae inducendae, secundum quam est non ens actu: et ideo Aristoteles dicit in I Physic., ex ente quidem actu per accidens, ex ente autem in potentia per se.
          <td>57. Then [57] having rejected the false solutions, he concludes to the true one, namely, that the reason why the transmutation of generation and corruption must be unfailing, or "unceating," i.e., unceasing, is that the corruption of this is the generation of something else, and vice versa. For generation <i>per se</i> is indeed from a being in potency, i.e., from matter, which is as the subject of natural things — it is accidental to the matter out of which something is generated that it be the subject of another form, with respect to which it is being in act, and at the same time of the privation of the form to be induced, with respect to which it is non-being in act. On this account Aristotle in <i>Physics</i> I says that generation is <i>per accidens</i> from a being in act, but <i>per se</i> from a being in potency.
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          <td>Et similiter corrumpitur aliquid per se quidem in ens potentia: quod quidem subiicitur et alteri formae, secundum quam est ens actu, et privationi prioris formae, secundum quam est non ens actu. Et ita non sequitur quod id quod corrumpitur secedat a tota rerum natura: quia quamvis fiat non ens hoc quod est corruptum, remanet tamen aliquid aliud, quod est generatum. Unde non potest materia remanere quin sit subiecta alicui formae: et inde est quod uno corrupto aliud generatur, et uno generato aliud corrumpitur: et sic consideratur quidam circulus in generatione et corruptione, ratione cuius habet aptitudinem ad perpetuitatem.
          <td>Similarly, a thing is ear se corrupted into a being in potency, which indeed is now subject to another form, according to which it is a being in act, and to the privation of the previous form, with respect to which it is now non-being in act. Consequently it does not follow that what is corrupted departs completely from the whole nature of things, for although that which is corrupted becomes non-being, yet something else remains, namely, that which has been generated. Accordingly matter cannot remain without being subjected to some form. That is why, upon the corruption of one thing, another is generated, and upon the generation of one thing another is corrupted. Consequently, there is in generation and corruption a certain cycle which gives it the aptitude to last forever.
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          <td>Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod existimandum est praedictam causam esse sufficientem de hoc quod generatio et corruptio simpliciter sit circa unumquodque entium in sempiternum. Quod quidem oportet dicere, supposita perpetuitate mundi et motus: quod tamen fides Catholica non supponit, ut alibi dictum est.
          <td>Finally he concludes with the summary that the aforesaid cause should be considered sufficient as to why there should be absolute generation and corruption with respect to each and every thing in perpetuity. This is true on the supposition that the world and motion are eternal — which, however, the Catholic faith does not suppose, as has been said elsewhere.
    </table>
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 8<br>
      Why, in mutual generation and corruption, there, is sometimes absolute generation and qualified corruption, and conversely.
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 3 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν ὁμοίως περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι πᾶσιν ἱκανὴν αἰτίαν. Διὰ τί δέ ποτε τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς γίνεσθαι λέγεται καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὰ δ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς, πάλιν σκεπτέον, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι γένεσις μὲν τουδὶ φθορὰ δὲ τουδί, καὶ φθορὰ μὲν τουδὶ γένεσις δὲ τουδί· ζητεῖ γάρ τινα τοῦτο λόγον. Λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι φθείρεται νῦν ἁπλῶς, καὶ οὐ μόνον τοδί· καὶ αὕτη μὲν γένεσις ἁπλῶς, αὕτη δὲ φθορά. Τοδὶ δὲ γίνεται μέν τι, γίνεται δ' ἁπλῶς οὔ· φαμὲν γὰρ τὸν μανθάνοντα γίνεσθαι μὲν ἐπιστήμονα, γίνεσθαι δ' ἁπλῶς οὔ.
            <td>58 The cause implied in this solution must no doubt be considered adequate to account for coming-to-be and passing-away in their general character as they occur in all existing things alike. Yet, if the same process is a coming-to-be of this but a passing-away of that, and a passing-away of this but a coming-to-be of that, why are some things said to come-to-be and pass-away without qualification, but others only with a qualification? The distinction must be investigated once more, for it demands some explanation. (It is applied in a twofold manner.) For (i) we say 'it is now passing-away' without qualification, and not merely 'this is passing-away': and we call this change 'coming-to-be', and that 'passing-away', without qualification. And (ii) so-and-so 'comes-to-be-something', but does not 'come-to-be' without qualification; for we say that the student 'comes-to-be-learned', not 'comes-to-be' without qualification.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις (318b.) διορίζομεν λέγοντες ὅτι τὰ μὲν τόδε τι σημαίνει τὰ δ' οὔ, διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τὸ ζητούμενον. Διαφέρει γὰρ εἰς ἃ μεταβάλλει τὸ μεταβάλλον, οἷον ἴσως ἡ μὲν εἰς πῦρ ὁδὸς γένεσις μὲν ἁπλῆ, φθορὰ δέ &lt;�τίς&gt; τινός ἐστιν, οἷον γῆς, ἡ δὲ γῆς γένεσις τὶς γένεσις, γένεσις δ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς, φθορὰ δ' ἁπλῶς, οἷον πυρός, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης λέγει δύο, τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι φάσκων πῦρ καὶ γῆν. Τὸ δὴ ταῦτα ἢ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ὑποτίθεσθαι διαφέρει οὐδέν· τὸν γὰρ τρόπον ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἁπλῶς ὁδὸς φθορὰ ἁπλῆ, ἡ δ' εἰς τὸ ἁπλῶς ὂν γένεσις ἁπλῆ. Οἷς οὖν διώρισται εἴτε πυρὶ καὶ γῇ εἴτε ἄλλοις τισί, τούτων ἔσται τὸ μὲν ὂν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν. Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον τούτῳ διοίσει τὸ ἁπλῶς τι γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τοῦ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἄλλον δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ ὁποία τις ἂν ᾖ· ἧς μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραὶ τόδε τι σημαίνουσι, μᾶλλον οὐσία,
            <td>59 (i) Now we often divide terms into those which signify a 'this somewhat' and those which do not. And (the first form of) the distinction, which we are investigating, results from a similar division of terms. For it makes a difference into what the changing thing changes. Perhaps, e.g. the passage into Fire is 'coming-to-be' unqualified, but 'passing-away-of-something' (e.g. Earth): whilst the coming-to-be of Earth is qualified (not unqualified) 'coming-to-be', though unqualified 'passing-away' (e.g. of Fire). This would be the case on the theory set forth in Parmenides: for he says that the things into which change takes place are two, and he asserts that these two, viz. what is and what is not, are Fire and Earth. Whether we postulate these, or other things of a similar kind, makes no difference. For we are trying to discover not what undergoes these changes, but what is their characteristic manner. The passage, then, into what 'is' not except with a qualification is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into what 'is' without qualification is unqualified coming-to-be. Hence whatever the contrasted 'poles' of the changes may be whether Fire and Earth, or some other couple—the one of them will be 'a being' and the other 'a not-being'. We have thus stated one characteristic manner in which unqualified will be distinguished from qualified coming-to-be and passing-away: but they are also distinguished according to the special nature of the material of the changing thing. For a material, whose constitutive differences signify more a 'this somewhat', is itself more 'substantial' or 'real':
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">ἧς δὲ στέρησιν, μὴ ὄν, οἷον τὸ μὲν θερμὸν κατηγορία τις καὶ εἶδος, ἡ δὲ ψυχρότης στέρησις, διαφέρουσι δὲ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ταύταις ταῖς διαφοραῖς.
            <td>60 while a material, whose constitutive differences signify privation, is 'not real'. (Suppose, e.g. that 'the hot' is a positive predication, i.e. a 'form', whereas 'cold' is a privation, and that Earth and Fire differ from one another by these constitutive differences.)
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Δοκεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς πολλοῖς τῷ αἰσθητῷ καὶ μὴ αἰσθητῷ διαφέρειν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς αἰσθητὴν μεταβάλλῃ ὕλην, γίνεσθαί φασιν, ὅταν δ' εἰς ἀφανῆ, φθείρεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τῷ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι διορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ὄν, τὸ δ' ἄγνωστον μὴ ὄν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις ἐπιστήμης ἔχει δύναμιν.
            <td>61 The opinion, however, which most people are inclined to prefer, is that the distinction depends upon the difference between 'the perceptible' and 'the imperceptible'. Thus, when there is a change into perceptible material, people say there is 'coming-to-be'; but when there is a change into invisible material, they call it 'passing-away'. For they distinguish 'what is' and 'what is not' by their perceiving and not-perceiving, just as what is knowable 'is' and what is unknowable 'is not'—perception on their view having the force of knowledge.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Καθάπερ οὖν αὐτοὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ ζῆν καὶ εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ πράγματα, τρόπον τινὰ διώκοντες τἀληθές, αὐτὸ δὲ λέγοντες οὐκ ἀληθές.
            <td>62 Hence, just as they deem themselves to live and to 'be' in virtue of their perceiving or their capacity to perceive, so too they deem the things to 'be' qua perceived or perceptible—and in this they are in a sense on the track of the truth, though what they actually say is not true.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Συμβαίνει δὴ κατὰ δόξαν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἄλλως τὸ γίνεσθαί τε ἁπλῶς καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι· πνεῦμα γὰρ καὶ ἀὴρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἧττόν ἐστιν (διὸ καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα ἁπλῶς τῇ εἰς ταῦτα μεταβολῇ φθείρεσθαι λέγουσιν, γίνεσθαι δ' ὅταν εἰς ἁπτὸν καὶ εἰς γῆν μεταβάλλῃ), κατὰ δ' ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον τόδε τι καὶ εἶδος ταῦτα τῆς γῆς.
            <td>63 Thus unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away turn out to be different according to common opinion from what they are in truth. For Wind and Air are in truth more real more a 'this somewhat' or a 'form'—than Earth. But they are less real to perception which explains why things are commonly said to 'pass-away' without qualification when they change into Wind and Air, and to 'come-to-be' when they change into what is tangible, i.e. into Earth.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἁπλῆν γένεσιν φθορὰν οὖσάν τινος, τὴν δὲ φθορὰν [τὴν] ἁπλῆν γένεσιν οὖσάν τινος, εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν ὕλην διαφέρειν ἢ τῷ οὐσίαν (319a.) εἶναι ἢ τῷ μή, ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν μᾶλλον τὴν δὲ μή, ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν μᾶλλον αἰσθητὴν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην ἐξ ἧς καὶ εἰς ἥν, τὴν δὲ ἧττον εἶναι.
            <td>64 We have now explained why there is 'unqualified coming-to-be' (though it is a passing-away-of-something) and 'unqualified passing-away (though it is a coming-to-be-of-something). For this distinction of appellation depends upon a difference in the material out of which, and into which, the changes are effected. It depends either upon whether the material is or is not 'substantial', or upon whether it is more or less 'substantial', or upon whether it is more or less perceptible.
      </table>
    </blockquote>
    <table cellpadding="12">
      <tbody>
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          <td>Soluta dubitatione quam introduxerat de continuitate generationis, hic procedit ad solvendum quaestionem principaliter intentam. Et circa hoc duo facit:
          <td>58. Having resolved the question which he had introduced concerning the continuity of generation, he [the Philosopher] here proceeds to resolve the question principally intended. About this he does two things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo movet quaestionem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo solvit eam, ibi: quemadmodum enim determinavimus et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he raises the question;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he solves it, at 59.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod iterum est perscrutandum quare quaedam dicantur simpliciter generari et corrumpi, quaedam autem non; sicut dictum est in determinatione praecedentis quaestionis quod generatio huius est corruptio illius, et corruptio huius est generatio alterius. Videtur enim hoc requirere quandam rationem: nam ex quo adinvicem generantur et corrumpuntur, videtur quod eadem ratione sit simpliciter generatio et corruptio unius et alterius. Dicimus enim in diversis quae non ex invicem generantur, quoniam aliquid corrumpitur simpliciter et non solum <i>hoc</i>, idest secundum quid; et quod quaedam est simpliciter generatio seu corruptio, et quod quaedam generantur secundum quid et non simpliciter; sicut dicimus quod ille qui addiscit, fit quidem sciens, quod est fieri secundum quid, non tamen fit simpliciter, quia simpliciter erat etiam antequam esset sciens. De utroque ergo considerandum est: scilicet quare in generatis ex invicem quaedam dicuntur generari simpliciter et quaedam secundum quid; et quare etiam haec differentia contingat in his quae non ex invicem generantur.
          <td>He says therefore first [58] that we must investigate once more why some things are said to be generated and corrupted absolutely and others not, in keeping with what was said in the determination of the preceding question, namely, that the generation of this is the corruption of that, and the corruption of this is the generation of something else. For this seems to require some explanation, for, from the fact that things are mutually generated and corrupted, there would seem to be the same reason explaining the absolute generation and corruption of one and the other, For we say in things that are not generated one from the other that something is corrupted absolutely, and not merely "this," i.e., in the qualified sense and not absolutely. For example, we say that one who is learning is indeed becoming a knower, and this is to become in a qualified sense; nevertheless he does not become absolutely, because he was existing absolutely before he was a knower. Consequently, attention must be paid to both: namely, as to why, in the case of things being generated one from another, some are said to be cases of absolute generation and others of generation in a qualified sense; and as to why this distinction also prevails in things that are not generated one from another.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quemadmodum enim determinavimus etc., solvit praemissam quaestionem:
          <td>59. Then [59] he answers this question.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">et primo in his quae generantur adinvicem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo in his quae non generantur adinvicem, ibi: dicuntur autem haec quidem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, in the cases where things are generated one from another;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, in the cases where things are not so generated (L. 9).
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          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo solvit quaestionem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo epilogat, ibi: esse quidem igitur et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First he answers the question;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he summarizes, at 66.
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          <td>Circa primum, proponit tres modos secundum quos contingit in adinvicem generatis, quod unius generatio et corruptio sit simpliciter, et alterius secundum quid.
          <td>Regarding the first he proposes three ways according to which, in things that are generated one from another, it happens that there is generation and corruption of one absolutely and of the other in a qualified sense.
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          <td>Circa quorum primum dicit quod, sicut multoties determinatum est, quaedam quae affirmative dicuntur, significant <i>hoc aliquid</i>, idest quoddam ens, quaedam vero significant non ens: et ex hoc contingit id de quo quaeritur, scilicet quod quaedam dicuntur generari vel corrumpi simpliciter, quaedam secundum quid. Differt enim quantum ad hoc, quid sit illud in quod aliquid transmutatur per generationem et corruptionem. Puta si dicamus, secundum opinionem Parmenidis, quod ignis sit ens et terra non ens, transmutatio quae est via in ignem, puta si ex terra generetur ignis, dicetur generatio simpliciter, quia est via in ens; corruptio autem non simpliciter, sed <i>alicuius</i>, scilicet terrae, quae est non ens. E converso autem generatio terrae erit generatio <i>aliqua</i>, non autem generatio simplex, quia est generatio non entis; sed est corruptio simplex, quia est corruptio entis, scilicet ignis. Sic enim Parmenides dixit duo esse principia rerum, scilicet ens et non ens, appellans ens ignem, et non ens terram; forte propter hoc, quod ignis inter alia elementa habet plus de forma, terra vero minus.
          <td>With respect to the first way [59] he says that, as has been determined many times, some things that are described affirmatively signify a "this something," i.e., a certain being, while some signify non-being. And this accounts for the present question, namely, why some things are said to be generated and corrupted absolutely and others in a qualified sense. For in this matter the difference depends on that into which a thing is changed through generation and corruption. For example, if we should follow the opinion of Parmenides and say that fire is being and earth non-being, then a change heading toward fire (for example, if from earth fire is generated) will be called generation absolutely (because it is headed toward being) but not corruption in the strict sense, but rather corruption "of this," i.e., of earth, which is a non-being. Conversely, the generation of earth will be "a certain" generation, but not absolute generation, because it is the generation of non-being; but it will be absolute corruption, because it is the corruption of being, namely, of fire. Thus, indeed, did Parmenides posit two principles of things, namely, being and non-being, calling fire "being" and earth "non-being." Perhaps a reason was that among the other elements fire possesses more form and earth less.
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          <td>Hoc autem exemplum non procedit secundum sententiam Aristotelis, qui existimavit utrumque esse ens: et ideo subiungit quod nihil differt ad propositum talia exempla vel alia supponere. Quaerimus enim, inducendo exempla, modum, sed non subiectum; non curantes scilicet utrum sic se habeat in his terminis, vel in quibuscumque aliis. Et propter hoc etiam in libris logicae utitur exemplis secundum opiniones aliorum philosophorum; quae non sunt inducenda quasi sint verba Aristotelis. Hoc igitur ex praemissis est accipiendum, quod corruptio simpliciter est, quae est via in non ens simpliciter; generatio simpliciter, quae est via in simpliciter ens. Determinetur ergo hoc quod dictum est de generatione et corruptione simpliciter vel secundum quid, sive in igne et terra, sive in quibuslibet aliis terminis, dummodo ita se habeant quod unum sit ens et aliud non ens; sicut si dicamus vivum et mortuum, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi.
          <td>This example, however, is not according to the opinion of Aristotle, who considered both to be being — therefore, he adds that whether one supposes such examples or others makes no difference as far as the proposition is concerned. For we are concerned, when we introduce examples, with the manner and not the subject, i.e., not worrying whether it is actually the case in these terms, or in any others. On this account, in the books on Logic also, he uses examples according to the opinions of other philosophers, but they are not to be introduced as though they were the words of Aristotle. Therefore from what has gone before, this much should be gathered, that absolute corruption is that which tends toward non-being absolutely, and absolute generation that which tends toward being absolutely. Therefore, let what has been said about absolute or qualified generation and corruption be considered as determined, whether in fire and earth, or in any other terms, provided they be so related that one is being and the other non-being, as if we should "living" and "dead," or anything else of the sort.
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          <td>Concludit igitur quod uno modo differt simpliciter generari et corrumpi et non simpliciter, sicut dictum est.
          <td>He concludes therefore that there is one way in which absolute generation and corruption differ from non-absolute.
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          <td>Sed videtur quod haec differentia non sit conveniens. Via enim quae est in simpliciter non ens, quam dicit esse corruptionem simpliciter, non potest intelligi in id quod est omnino nihil: quia omnis naturalis corruptio fit per resolutionem in aliquam materiam. Similiter etiam non potest intelligi non ens simpliciter, quod sit privatio pura sine forma: quia materia nunquam denudatur ab omni forma, ita quod sit sub sola privatione. Ergo oportet per non ens in quod tendit corruptio simplex, intelligi privationem quae est adiuncta alicui formae. Cuilibet autem formae naturali quae est in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, adiungitur privatio: non ergo unum dicetur magis generari vel corrumpi simpliciter, in his quae adinvicem generantur et corrumpuntur, quam aliud.
          <td>60. But it seems that this is not a suitable difference. For the road to absolute non-being, which he says is absolute corruption, cannot be understood as leading to what is absolutely nothing — since every natural corruption comes about by something being resolved into some certain matter. Similarly, absolute non-being cannot be understood as pure privation without farm - since matter is never divested of every form, so as to be under privation only. Therefore, the non-being into which simple corruption tends must be understood as a privation joined to some form. Now privation is conjoined to every natural form in things that can be generated and corrupted. Consequently, in those things which are mutually generated and corrupted, one thing will not be said to be more generated or corrupted absolutely than another.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicendum est ergo quod non ens simpliciter intelligitur hic materia cum privatione adiuncta alicui formae. Sed duplex est forma: una quidem perfecta, quae complet speciem alicuius rei naturalis, sicut forma ignis vel aquae aut hominis aut plantae; alia autem est forma incompleta, quae neque perficit aliquam speciem naturalem, neque est finis intentionis naturae, sed se habet in via generationis vel corruptionis. Manifestum est enim in generatione compositorum, puta animalis, quod inter principium generationis, quod est semen, et ultimam formam animalis completi, sunt multae generationes mediae, ut Avicenna dicit in sua sufficientia; quas necesse est terminari ad aliquas formas, quarum nulla facit ens completum secundum speciem, sed ens incompletum, quod est via ad speciem aliquam.
          <td>Therefore, it should be said that absolute non-being is here understood to mean matter with the privation joined to some form. Form, however, is of two kinds: one is perfect and completes the species of a natural thing, as in the case of the form of fire or water or man or plant; the other is an incomplete form which neither perfects any natural species nor is the end of the intention of nature, but is something on the road to generation and corruption. For it is plain in the generation of composites, for example, of an animal, that between the principle of generation, which is the seed, and the ultimate form of the complete animal, there are many intermediate generations (as Avicenna says in his <i>Sufficiency</i> [= <i>ash-Shifâ'</i>, Healing]) which have to be terminated to certain forms, none of which makes the being complete in species, but rather an incomplete being which is the road to a certain species.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Similiter etiam ex parte corruptionis sunt multae formae mediae, quae sunt formae incompletae: non enim, separata anima, corpus animalis statim resolvitur in elementa; sed hoc fit per multas corruptiones medias, succedentibus sibi in materia multis formis imperfectis, sicut est forma corporis mortui, et postmodum putrefacti, et sic inde. Quando igitur per corruptionem pervenitur in privationem cui adiungitur talis forma in materia, est corruptio simpliciter: quando vero ex privatione cui adiungitur forma imperfecta, quae erat via generationis, pervenitur ad formam completam, est generatio simpliciter.
          <td>Likewise, on the side of corruption there are many intermediate forms that are incomplete: for the body of an animal is not, as soon as the soul is separated, immediately resolved into the elements; rather this takes place by means of many intermediate corruptions in which many imperfect forms succeed one another in the matter, such as the form of a dead body, then the form of a putrefied body, and so on. When, therefore, through corruption a privation is reached that is joined to such a form in matter, there is absolute corruption in the strict sense; when, from the privation to which is attached an imperfect form which was the road to generation, there is arrival at the complete form, there is absolute generation.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: alio autem modo etc., ponit secundum modum. Et dicit quod alio modo erit quaedam generatio et non simpliciter, <i>qualiscumque materia erit</i>, idest etiam si habet aliqualem naturam id in quod est corruptio, dummodo habeat aliquem defectum. Illud enim cuius differentiae magis significant hoc aliquid, magis est substantia; illud autem cuius differentiae magis significant privationem, magis est non ens; sicut calidum est quoddam <i>praedicamentum</i>, idest quoddam affirmatum, sine privatione, et est <i>species</i>, idest forma, frigiditas autem est privatio. His autem differentiis differunt terra et ignis: nam terra est naturaliter frigida, ignis autem naturaliter calidus. Et ideo ignis est magis substantia, terra autem magis accedit ad non ens.
          <td>61. Then [60] he mentions the second way and says that in another way there will be a certain generation which is not absolute, "no matter what the matter," that is, even if that into which there is corruption has a certain nature, provided it have some defect. For a thing whose [specific] differences signify more a "this something," is more a substance; while a thing whose [specific] differences signify more a privation is more a non-being: for example, "hot" is a certain "predicament," i.e., something affirmative, without a privation, and it is a "species," i.e., a form, while coldness is a privation. Now it is by these differences that earth and fire differ, for earth is naturally cold, and fire naturally hot. Therefore, fire is more substance, and earth approaches more to non-being.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Primo autem oportet considerare quomodo hic dicatur quod frigiditas sit privatio, cum frigidum et calidum contrarie opponantur, contrariorum autem utrumque est natura aliqua: alioquin non essent in eodem genere, nam privatio et non ens non est in genere. Dicendum est autem quod, sicut ostensum est in X Metaphys., oppositio privationis et habitus est principium oppositionis contrariorum: et ideo semper alterum contrariorum est cum defectu et privatione quadam respectu alterius. Dicitur ergo frigidum privatio, non quia sit privatio pura, sicut caecum aut nudum; sed quia est qualitas deficiens respectu calidi. Unde in hoc differt iste modus secundus a primo: nam primus modus accipiebatur secundum differentiam entis et non entis simpliciter, hic autem modus accipitur secundum differentiam entis perfecti et imperfecti.
          <td>62. First one must consider why coldness is here called a privation, since cold and hot are contrarily opposed, and both of two contraries are a certain nature; otherwise, they would not be in the same genus, for privation and non-being are not in any genus. To this it must be said that, as was shown in <i>Metaphysics</i> X, the opposition of privation and having is the basis for the opposition of contraries. Consequently, one contrary is always by way of defect and a certain privation with respect to the other. Therefore coldness is called a privation, not because it is a pure privation, such as to be blind or naked, but because it is a quality that is defective with respect to heat. Hence, in this the present way differs from the first — for the first way was based on the difference between being and non-being absolutely, while the present way is based on the difference between perfect and imperfect being.
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          <td>Secundo oportet considerare quomodo hic dicatur quod terra et ignis differant his differentiis, scilicet frigido et calido. Oportet enim hoc intelligi de differentiis substantialibus: alioquin non pertinerent ad generationem et corruptionem, sed magis ad alterationem. Principia autem differentiarum substantialium, quae sunt constitutivae specierum, oportet esse formas substantiales, quae sunt specificae. Secundum hoc ergo sequitur quod calor et frigus sint formae substantiales ignis et terrae. Quod est omnino impossibile.
          <td>Secondly, it is necessary to consider how it may be said here that earth and fire differ with these differences, namely, in terms of cold and hot. For this must be understood of substantial differences — otherwise they would not pertain to generation and corruption, but rather to alteration. Now the principles of substantial differences, which are constitutive of species, must be substantial forms, which are specific. According to this, therefore, it follows that heat and cold are the substantial forms of fire and earth. This is wholly impossible.
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          <td>Primo quidem quia non est possibile quod idem in uno sit accidens et in alio forma substantialis, nisi aequivoce diceretur: calidum autem et frigidum in aliis corporibus sunt accidentia, de quibus tamen univoce dicuntur cum elementis, ex quorum commixtione in eis huiusmodi qualitates inveniuntur. Non ergo potest esse quod calidum et frigidum in elementis sint formae substantiales.
          <td>This is so, first of all, because it is not possible that the same thing be in one thing an accident and in another a substantial form, unless one speak equivocally. But hot and cold are accidents in other bodies, to which they are referred univocally the same as to the elements, from the admixture of which such qualities are found in them [i.e., in the other, composite, bodies]. Therefore it is not possible that hot and cold in the elements be substantial forms.
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          <td>Secundo quia nulla forma substantialis est per se sensu perceptibilis, sed solum intellectu, cuius obiectum est <i>quod quid est</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima: formae autem quae sunt per se sensu perceptibiles, sunt qualitates tertiae speciei, quae ob id dicuntur <i>passibiles</i>, quia sensibus ingerunt passiones, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Cum igitur calidum ignis et frigidum terrae vel aquae sint sensu perceptibilia, non possunt esse formae substantiales.
          <td>Secondly, this is so because no substantial form is <i>per se</i> perceptible to sense; but to the intellect alone, whose object is the "what something is," as is said in <i>On the Soul</i> III. The forms that are <i>per se</i> perceptible to sense are qualities of the third type, called for this reason, "passible," since they cause passions in the senses, as is said in the <i>Predicaments</i>. Since, therefore, the heat of fire and the cold of earth or water are perceptible to sense, they cannot be substantial forms.
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          <td>Dicendum est ergo quod, sicut habetur ex VIII Metaphys., differentiae substantiales, quia sunt ignotae, per differentias accidentales manifestantur: et ideo multoties utimur differentiis accidentalibus loco substantialium. Et hoc modo philosophus hic dicit calidum et frigidum esse differentias ignis et terrae. Calidum enim et frigidum, cum sint propriae passiones horum corporum, sunt proprii effectus formarum substantialium eorundem: et ideo, sicut aliae causae intelligibiles innotescunt per effectus sensibiles, ita et perfectione calidi et imperfectione frigidi perpendimus quod forma substantialis ignis est perfectior quam forma substantialis terrae. Omnes enim formae substantiales differunt secundum magis et minus perfectum: unde in VIII Metaphys. dicitur quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, quorum species variantur secundum additionem et subtractionem.
          <td>One should say, therefore, that, as is had in <i>Metaphysics</i> VIII, substantial differences, when unknown, are manifested by accidental differences — consequently we frequently use accidental differences in place of substantial. And it is in this way that the Philosopher here says hot and cold to be the differences of fire and earth. For hot and cold, since they are proper passions of these bodies, are the proper effects of the substantial forms of the same. Consequently, just as other intelligible causes are made known through sensible effects, so by the perfection of the hot and the imperfection of the cold we judge that the substantial form of fire is more perfect than the substantial form of earth. For all substantial forms differ according to more and less perfect — hence in <i>Metaphysics</i> VIII there is stated that the species of things are as numbers, whose species vary according to addition and subtraction.
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          <td>Potest etiam dubitari de hoc quod dicit, quod cuius differentiae magis significant hoc aliquid, magis est substantia: cum tamen dicatur in praedicamentis quod substantia non suscipit magis et minus. Sed dicendum quod per hoc non intendit significare intensionem et remissionem substantiae in praedicamento substantiae; sed maiorem vel minorem perfectionem in speciebus substantiae, secundum dictam formarum differentiam.
          <td>Likewise, one could doubt his statement that in the case of the thing whose difference signifies to a greater degree a "this something," such a thing is substance to a greater degree — since he says in the <i>Predicaments</i> that substance is not susceptible of "more" and "less." This should be answered by saying that he does not mean to signify increase and remission of substance in the predicament of substance, but a greater or lesser perfection in the species of substance according to the aforesaid difference of forms.
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          <td>Tertium modum ponit ibi: videtur autem et cetera. Et circa hoc tria facit:
          <td>63. He gives the third way [61], in regard to which he does three things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ponit secundum quem modum aliqui assignant differentiam generationis et corruptionis simplicis et secundum quid;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ostendit huius falsitatem, ibi: quemadmodum igitur etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio comparat hunc modum secundo, ibi: contingit itaque et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he presents the manner according to which some explain the difference between generation and corruption absolutely and in the qualified sense;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he shows that they are mistaken, at 64;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he compares this third way with the second, at 66.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod multis videtur quod simpliciter generatio et secundum quid magis differunt per hoc quod est magis vel minus sensibile, quam secundum perfectionem et imperfectionem differentiarum, sicut in secundo modo dicebatur. Dicunt enim quod quando aliquid transmutatur in materiam quae bene potest sentiri, tunc generatur aliquid simpliciter, puta quando aliquid transmutatur in terram vel in aquam: quando autem transmutatur aliquid in id quod non est manifestum sensui, dicunt illud corrumpi simpliciter, puta in aerem. Et horum rationem inducit per hoc, quod determinabant aliquid ens et non ens, ex hoc quod sentitur vel non sentitur, existimantes id solum quod sentitur esse ens. Et hoc ideo, quia apud eos non differt sensus ab intellectu, sicut quidam posuerunt, ut dicitur in libro de anima: et ideo utuntur sensu ac si haberet virtutem intellectivae scientiae, quae est capax aliqualiter omnium entium: unde scibile est ens, ignotum autem non ens.
          <td>He says therefore first [613 that it seems to many that absolute and qualified generation differ rather in terms of being more or less perceptible to sense, than according to perfection and imperfection of differences, as was explained in the second way. For they say that when something is changed into matter that is easy to sense, then something is generated absolutely — for example, when something is changed into earth or into water; but when something is changed into what is not manifest to sense, e.g., into air, they call this absolute corruption. And he introduces their reason, which was that they determined something to be being and non-being on the basis of whether it is sensed or not sensed, considering only what is sensed to be being. This is because, for them, there is no difference between sense and intellect, as certain ones laid down, and as is stated in <i>On the Soul</i> III. Consequently they use sense observation as though it had the force of intellectual science, which has in some sense a capacity for all things. Hence the knowable is being, and the unknown, non-being.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quemadmodum igitur etc., ostendit falsitatem huius sententiae. Et dicit quod tales, sicut existimabant animalia vivere et esse in hoc quod actu sentiunt vel possunt sentire, ita existimabant res esse in hoc quod sentiuntur vel possunt sentiri; ac si sensus esset perfectio rei sensibilis, sicut est perfectio sentientis. Et in hoc quodammodo prosequebantur et destruebant veritatem rerum. Nam cum verum dicatur aliquid ex eo quod est, si esse rerum consisteret solum in sentiri, nulla veritas esset in rebus, sed in solo sentiente. Hoc autem non est verum, quod nulla veritas sit in rebus. Unde, subtrahentes veritatem rerum, dicunt non verum.
          <td>64. Then [62] he shows the falsity of this opinion. And he says that such men, just as they considered animals to live and exist, because they actually sense or can sense, so they also supposed things to exist because they are sensed or can be sensed — as though sense were the perfection of the sensible thing, just as it is the perfection of the one sensing. And in this they in a certain way pursued and destroyed the truth of things. For since something is said to be true from the fact that it is, then, if the being of things consisted only in being sensed, there would be no truth in things but only in the one sensing them. However, it is not true that no truth is in things. Hence in removing the truth of things, they assert something not true.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: contingit itaque etc., comparat hunc modum secundo. Et dicit quod aliter contingit generari simpliciter et corrumpi <i>secundum opinionem</i>, quae pertinet ad hunc tertium modum, et <i>secundum rei veritatem</i>, quam tangit secundus modus. Quia <i>spiritus</i>, idest ventus, et aer minus sunt <i>secundum sensum</i>, idest si iudicetur esse rei ex hoc quod sentitur. Et ideo quaecumque simpliciter corrumpuntur, dicuntur, secundum tertium modum, corrumpi per transmutationem in ea quae non sentiuntur; generari autem simpliciter, quando transmutantur in aliquod tangibile et palpabile, sicut quando mutantur in terram. Sed secundum rei veritatem accidit contrarium. Quia aer magis est hoc aliquid et species quam terra, et est perfectius ens: et ideo, secundum veritatem, magis est generatio simpliciter si ex terra fiat aer, quam e converso.
          <td>65. Then [63] he compares this way with the second and says that absolute generation and corruption differ as considered "according to opinion," which pertains to this third way, and "according to the truth," which the second way touches. For spirit, i.e., wind, and. air are less "according to sense," that is, judging the being of a thing from its being sensed. And therefore, whatever things are corrupted absolutely, are said to be, according to the third way, corrupted into things that are not sensed, and to be generated absolutely when they are changed into something that can be touched and felt, as when they are changed into earth. But in reality the contrary happens. For air is more a "this something" and a species than earth, and more perfectly a being. Therefore, according to truth there is more of an absolute generation if from earth air is produced than conversely.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: esse quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt. Et dicit quod dicta est causa quare quaedam generatio sit simplex, cum tamen sit corruptio alicuius; et quaedam corruptio simplex, cum tamen sit generatio alicuius. Haec enim differunt per <i>materiam</i>, idest per id in quod aliquid transmutatur per generationem vel corruptionem: aut quia est <i>substantia</i>, idest ens, vel non, sicut dicebatur in primo modo; aut quia hoc <i>magis</i>, hoc vero <i>non</i>, quia scilicet unum est perfectius ens quam aliud, quod pertinet ad secundum modum; aut quia materia ex qua et in quam aliquid transmutatur, est magis vel minus sensibilis, quod pertinet ad tertium modum. Vocat autem hic <i>materiam</i>, non puram, sed rem ex qua aliquid generatur, vel in quam corrumpitur.
          <td>66. Then [64] he summarizes what has been said, and says the cause has been stated why one type of generation is absolute, although it be the corruption of something, and why one type of corruption is absolute, although it be the generation of something. For these differ by reason of the "matter," i.e., by reason of that into which something is changed through generation or corruption: either because it is "substance," i.e., being, or non-being, as was explained in the first way; or because this is "more" and that "not," because, namely, one is more perfect being than the other, which pertains to the second way; or because the matter from which and into which something is changed is more sensible or less sensible, which pertains to the third way. By "matter" he here means, not pure matter, but the thing from which something is generated or into which it is corrupted.
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    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 9<br>
      The cause of the difference between absolute and qualified generation in things not reciprocally generated.
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 3 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τοῦ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς γίνεσθαι λέγεσθαι, τὰ δέ τι μόνον, μὴ τῇ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γενέσει καθ' ὃν εἴπομεν νῦν τρόπον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ τοσοῦτον διώρισται, τί δή ποτε πάσης γενέσεως οὔσης φθορᾶς ἄλλου, καὶ πάσης φθορᾶς οὔσης ἑτέρου τινὸς γενέσεως, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι τοῖς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλουσιν· τὸ δ' ὕστερον εἰρημένον οὐ τοῦτο διαπορεῖ, ἀλλὰ τί ποτε τὸ μανθάνον μὲν οὐ λέγεται ἁπλῶς γίνεσθαι ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι ἐπιστῆμον, τὸ δὲ φυόμενον γίνεσθαι.
            <td>65 (ii) But why are some things said to 'come-to-be' without qualification, and others only to 'come-to-be-so-and-so', in cases different from the one we have been considering where two things come-to-be reciprocally out of one another? For at present we have explained no more than this:—why, when two things change reciprocally into one another, we do not attribute coming-to-be and passing-away uniformly to them both, although every coming-to-be is a passing-away of something else and every passing-away some other thing's coming-to-be. But the question subsequently formulated involves a different problem—viz. why, although the learning thing is said to 'come-to-be-learned' but not to 'come-to-be' without qualification, yet the growing thing is said to 'come-to-be'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ταῦτα δὲ διώρισται ταῖς κατηγορίαις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τόδε τι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ τοιόνδε, τὰ δὲ ποσόν. Ὅσα οὖν μὴ οὐσίαν σημαίνει, οὐ λέγεται ἁπλῶς, ἀλλά τι γίνεσθαι. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐν πᾶσι γένεσις μὲν κατὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συστοιχίᾳ λέγεται, οἷον ἐν μὲν οὐσίᾳ ἐὰν πῦρ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐὰν γῆ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῷ ἐὰν ἐπιστῆμον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅταν ἀνεπιστῆμον.
            <td>66 The distinction here turns upon the difference of the Categories. For some things signify a this somewhat, others a such, and others a so-much. Those things, then, which do not signify substance, are not said to 'come-to-be' without qualification, but only to 'come-to-be-so-and-so'. Nevertheless, in all changing things alike, we speak of 'coming-to-be' when the thing comes-to-be something in one of the two Columns—e.g. in Substance, if it comes-to-be Fire but not if it comes-to-be Earth; and in Quality, if it comes-to-be learned but not when it comes-to-be ignorant.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς γίνεσθαι τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ ὅλως καὶ ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις αὐταῖς, εἴρηται, καὶ διότι τοῦ γένεσιν εἶναι συνεχῶς αἰτία ὡς ὕλη τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὅτι μεταβλητικόν ἐστι εἰς τἀναντία, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ θατέρου γένεσις ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἄλλου φθορὰ καὶ ἡ ἄλλου φθορὰ ἄλλου γένεσις.
            <td>67 We have explained why some things come-to-be without qualification, but not others both in general, and also when the changing things are substances and nothing else; and we have stated that the substratum is the material cause of the continuous occurrence of coming-to-be, because it is such as to change from contrary to contrary and because, in substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a passing-away of another, and the passing-away of one thing is always another's coming-to-be.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ διὰ τί γίνεται ἀεὶ ἀπολλυμένων· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι ἁπλῶς φασιν, ὅταν εἰς ἀναίσθητον ἔλθῃ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὁμοίως καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος φασίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀναισθήτου. Εἴτ' οὖν ὄντος τινὸς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου εἴτε μή, γίνεται ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. Ὥστε ὁμοίως καὶ γίνεται ἐκ μὴ ὄντος καὶ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. Εἰκότως οὖν οὐχ ὑπολείπει· ἡ γὰρ γένεσις φθορὰ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἡ δὲ φθορὰ γένεσις τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.
            <td>68 But there is no need even to discuss the other question we raised—viz. why coming-to-be continues though things are constantly being destroyed. For just as people speak of 'a passing-away' without qualification when a thing has passed into what is imperceptible and what in that sense 'is not', so also they speak of 'a coming-to-be out of a not-being' when a thing emerges from an imperceptible. Whether, therefore, the substratum is or is not something, what comes-to-be emerges out of a 'not-being': so that a thing comes-to-be out of a not-being' just as much as it 'passes-away into what is not'. Hence it is reasonable enough that coming-to-be should never fail. For coming-to-be is a passing-away of 'what is not' and passing-away is a coming-to-be of 'what is not'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ὂν ἁπλῶς ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις πότερον τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, οἷον γῆ καὶ τὸ βαρὺ μὴ ὄν, πῦρ δὲ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον τὸ ὄν, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ γῆ τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν ὕλη ἡ τῆς γῆς, καὶ πυρὸς ὡσαύτως.
            <td>69 But what about that which 'is' not except with a qualification? Is it one of the two contrary poles of the change—e.g. Earth (i.e. the heavy) a 'not-being', but Fire (i.e. the light) a 'being'? Or, on the contrary, does what is 'include Earth as well as Fire, whereas what is not' is matter—the matter of Earth and Fire alike?
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Καὶ ἆρά γε ἑτέρα ἑκατέρου ἡ ὕλη, ἢ οὐκ ἂν (319b.) γίνοιτο ἐξ ἀλλήλων οὐδ' ἐξ ἐναντίων; τούτοις γὰρ ὑπάρχει τἀναντία, πυρί, γῇ, ὕδατι, ἀέρι. Ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἡ αὐτή, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἡ ἑτέρα· ὃ μὲν γάρ ποτε ὂν ὑπόκειται τὸ αὐτό, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
            <td>70 And again, is the matter of each different? Or is it the same, since otherwise they would not come-to-be reciprocally out of one another, i.e. contraries out of contraries? For these things—Fire, Earth, Water, Air—are characterized by 'the contraries'. Perhaps the solution is that their matter is in one sense the same, but in another sense different. For that which underlies them, whatever its nature may be qua underlying them, is the same: but its actual being is not the same. So much, then, on these topics.
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    </blockquote>
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          <td>Postquam philosophus ostendit quare quaedam generantur simpliciter et quaedam secundum quid, eorum quae adinvicem generantur, hic ostendit causam differentiae generationis simpliciter et secundum quid, in his quae non adinvicem generantur.
          <td>67. After explaining why, in the case of things that are reciprocally generated, some are generated absolutely and others in a qualified sense, he [the Philosopher] here shows the reason for the difference between absolute generation and generation in a qualified sense in things that are not reciprocally generated.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo determinat quaestionem principaliter intentam;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo determinat quasdam quaestiones consequentes, ibi: sed nunc quaerere oportet et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he determines the question principally intended;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he determines certain questions connected with this, at 70.
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          <td>Circa primum tria facit:
          <td>With regard to the first he does three things:
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo movet quaestionem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo solvit eam, ibi: haec autem distincta sunt etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt, ibi: de generari igitur et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he raises the question;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he answers it, at 68;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he summarizes, at 69.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod quaedam dicuntur generari simpliciter, quaedam autem solum secundum quid, non secundum generationem ex invicem, ut supra dictum est, ut scilicet unum eorum quae ex invicem generantur, generetur simpliciter, aliud autem secundum quid. Hoc enim est quod supra determinatum est, quare, cum omnis generatio sit corruptio alterius, et omnis corruptio sit generatio alterius, non simili modo attribuitur generari et corrumpi in his quae adinvicem transmutantur, sed unum eorum dicitur generari vel corrumpi simpliciter, aliud autem secundum quid. Quaestio autem quae postmodum determinanda est, non haec erit: sed in his quae non ex invicem transmutantur, quare unum dicitur generari simpliciter et alterum secundum quid: puta, quare discens qui fit sciens, non dicitur simpliciter generari, sed secundum quid, idest sciens; homo autem vel animal, quando nascitur, dicitur generari simpliciter: et tamen manifestum est quod natum et sciens non generantur ex invicem.
          <td>He says therefore first [65] that some things are said to be generated absolutely, some only in a qualified sense, not according to reciprocal generation, as was said above, in such a way, namely, that one of the things reciprocally generated is generated absolutely, the other in a qualified way. For this is what was determined above, namely, why, since every generation is the corruption of another, and every corruption the generation of another, generation and corruption are not attributed in a similar way in those things which are reciprocally generated, but one of them is said to be generated or corrupted absolutely, the other in a qualified way. But that is not the subsequent question, which concerns why it is, in cases in which things are not reciprocally changed, one thing is said to be generated absolutely and the other in a qualified sense: for example, why is the learner who is becoming a knower not said to be absolutely generated, but only in a qualified sense, i.e., as knowing, whereas a man or an animal, when born, is said to be generated absolutely, while it is plain that the learner and the newly-born are not instances of reciprocal generation?
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: haec autem distincta sunt etc., solvit quaestionem nunc motam. Et dicit quod illa quorum quaedam dicuntur generari simpliciter et quaedam secundum quid, sunt distincta secundum praedicamenta; ita quod unum eorum significat <i>hoc aliquid</i>, idest substantiam, aliud autem qualitatem, aliud autem quantitatem, et sic de aliis praedicamentis. Illa ergo quae non significant substantiam, sed qualitatem aut aliquid aliorum, non dicuntur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid: quae vero significant substantiam, dicuntur generari simpliciter.
          <td>68. Then [66] he answers the question now raised and says that those things, some of which are said to be generated absolutely and some in a qualified sense, belong to distinct predicaments, in such a way that one signifies "this something," i.e., substance, another a quantity, another a quality, and so on. Things that do not signify substance, therefore, but quantity or quality or one of the others, are not said to be generated absolutely but in a qualified sense, whereas things that signify substance are said to be generated absolutely.
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          <td>Cuius ratio est, quia generatio est via de non esse ad esse: et ideo illud simpliciter generatur, quod acquirit esse cui non praesupponitur aliud esse. Non enim fit quod est: unde quod iam est, non potest generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et ideo ista quorum esse praesupponit aliud esse, non dicuntur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Esse autem accidentium praesupponit aliud esse, scilicet esse subiecti: esse autem substantiae non praesupponit aliud esse, quia subiectum formae substantialis non est ens actu, sed potentia. Et ideo ex hoc quod aliquid accipit formam substantialem, dicitur generari simpliciter: ex hoc autem quod accipit formam accidentalem, dicitur generari secundum quid.
          <td>The reason for this is that generation is a road from non-being to being. Consequently, that is generated absolutely which acquires a being to which another being is not presupposed. For that which is, is not made. Hence what already exists cannot be generated absolutely but only in a qualified sense. Therefore those things whose being presuppose another being are not said to be generated absolutely, but in a qualified sense. Now the being of accidents presupposes another being, namely, the being of the subject, but the being of the substance does not presuppose another being, because the subject of substantial form is not a being in act, but a being in potency. Consequently, by receiving substantial form a thing is said to be generated absolutely, but in receiving an accidental form it is said to be generated in a qualified sense.
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          <td>In <i>omnibus</i> tamen, scilicet substantiis et accidentibus, diversificatur generatio simpliciter et secundum quid, secundum diversum ordinem vel entis ad non ens, vel entis perfecti ad imperfectum, aut sensibilis ad insensibile. Unde in substantia quodammodo dicitur generatio simpliciter, si generetur ignis, non autem si generetur terra: et in qualitate dicitur generatio simpliciter, si generetur sciens, non autem si generetur nesciens.
          <td>However in "all," namely, in both substances and accidents, absolute and qualified generation are diversified according to a different order, either of being to non-being, or of perfect being to imperfect being or of the sensible to the non-sensible. Hence in the case of substance, in a certain sense there is said to be absolute generation if fire is generated, but not if earth is generated; and in the case of a quality, there is said to be absolute generation if a knower is generated, but not if a non-knower is generated.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: de generari igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt. Et dicit quod dictum est universaliter de accidentibus et in substantiis, de hoc quod quaedam generantur simpliciter, et quaedam secundum quid. Et etiam dictum est quod causa continuitatis generationis, per modum materiae, est subiectum, quod transmutatur in contraria. Ex hoc enim contingit quod semper in substantiis alterius generatio est alterius corruptio, et e converso: nunquam enim materia est sub privatione unius formae, sine alia forma. In quibusdam autem accidentibus hoc contingit: nam corpus diaphanum est sub privatione lucis, absque hoc quod subsit formae contrariae.
          <td>69. Then [67] he summarizes what has been said, stating that there has been a universal discussion of accidents and substances, as to the fact that some things are generated absolutely and others in a qualified sense. It has also been stated that the cause of the continuity in generation, so far as the matter is concerned, is the subject which is changed into contraries. For that is the reason why in substances the generation of one is always the corruption of some other, and vice versa, for matter is never found under the privation of one form without having another form. However, in some accidents that does happen, for a transparent body exists under a privation of light without being subject to a contrary form.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: sed nunc quaerere oportet etc., determinat tres quaestiones consequentes. Quarum prima est, quare semper generatur aliquid ex corruptis: quod supponit in hoc quod dixit, quod generatio unius est corruptio alterius.
          <td>70. Then [68] he determines three consequent questions. The first of these asks why something is always generated from things corrupted, which is implied in his statement that the generation of one is the corruption of another.
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          <td>Et solvit hanc quaestionem, dicens: quia corruptio tendit in non ens, et generatio est ex non ente, ideo oportet quod generatio sit ex corruptis. Et hoc ipse probat etiam ex aliorum opinione: quia, sicut homines dicunt corrumpi aliquid, quando pervenit ad insensibile, quod putant esse non ens, secundum tertium modum supra positum; similiter dicunt aliquid generari, quando ex insensibili et non ente pervenit ad hoc quod sit sensibile. Patet ergo quod, secundum hunc modum, id quod est terminus corruptionis, est principium generationis. Sive ergo sit aliquod subiectum ex quo est generatio, sive non, semper oportet quod generatio eius sit ex non ente, quod est terminus corruptionis: hoc enim est de ratione generationis, quod sit ex non ente; quod autem illud non ens adiungatur alteri existenti, accidit generationi. Quare patet quod simul aliquid generatur ex non ente, et corrumpitur in non ens, qualitercumque dicatur non ens. Sic igitur idem est in quod terminatur corruptio, et ex quo est generatio: et propter hoc generatio est ex corruptis. Convenienter ergo non deficit successio generationis et corruptionis, ut supra dictum est: quia generatio est quaedam corruptio non entis, et corruptio est quaedam generatio non entis; et ita unum eorum semper adiungitur alteri, cum in id ex quo unum incipit, aliud terminetur.
          <td>He answers this question by saying that because corruption tends into non-being, and generation is from non-being, therefore generation must be from things corrupted. This he also proves from the opinions of others: because just as men say that something has been corrupted when it arrives at being imperceptible, which state they regard as non-being, according to the third way posited above, so too they say that something has been generated when it arrives from what is imperceptible and non-being at the state of being perceptible. It is plain, therefore, that, according to this way, that which is the terminus of corruption, is the beginning of generation. Consequently, whether there is, or is not, some subject from which generation arises, the generation of something must always be from non-being which is the terminus of corruption — for it is of the very nature of generation that it proceed from non-being; but the fact that such non-being be joined to something else which exists, is accidental to generation. Wherefore, it is plain that something is simultaneously generated from non-being and corrupted into non-being, no matter how non-being may be said. Consequently that into which corruption is terminated is the very same as that out of which generation proceeds. It is for this reason that generation proceeds from what is corrupted. It is in keeping with this, therefore, that the succession of generation and corruption never fails, as was said above; because generation is a certain corruption of non-being, and corruption a certain generation of non-being. Thus one is always conjoined to the other, since one terminates in that which the other begins.
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          <td>Secundam quaestionem ponit ibi: sed hoc non ens et cetera. Potest enim aliquis quaerere utrum istud non ens ex quo est generatio, et in quod terminatur corruptio simpliciter, quod quidem est quodammodo ens, sit alterum contrariorum: puta quod terra et grave sit non ens, sicut posuit Parmenides, ignis autem et leve sit ens. Et solvit quod non est ita, sed terra est ens: quia scilicet terra fit per hoc quod materia recipit quandam formam, quae facit esse in actu. Non ens ergo est materia terrae et ignis. Non tamen materia est non ens per se, sicut Plato posuit: sed est non ens per accidens, ratione privationis cui adiungitur.
          <td>71. The second question [69] consists in the fact that someone can ask whether the non-being from which generation proceeds and into which absolute corruption is terminated, and which is in some sense being, is one of two contraries. For example, are earth and "heavy" non-being, as Parmenides said, and fire and "light" being? And he solves this by stating that it is not so, but rather earth is being, since, namely, earth comes to be by virtue of matter's receiving a certain form, which makes it to be in act. Non-being, therefore, is the matter of earth and of fire. However, matter is not non-being <i>per se</i>, as Plato believed, but it is non-being <i>per accidens</i>, by reason of the privation to which it is conjoined.
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          <td>Tertiam quaestionem ponit ibi: et an alia utriusque etc.: utrum scilicet istud non ens quod est materia, sit commune his quae adinvicem generantur. Et dicit quod si alia esset utriusque materia, scilicet ignis et terrae, non generarentur adinvicem: sicut accidit illis qui posuerunt et ignem et terram primas materias. Oportet enim ea quae ex invicem generantur, communicare in subiecto, quod suscipiat formam utriusque. Et per consequens non fieret transmutatio ex contrariis invicem, sicut supra dictum est: quia contrarietates existunt primo et per se praedictis elementis, scilicet igni et terrae, aquae et aeri. Unde si nihil transmutaretur ex igne in aquam vel ex aere in terram, aut e converso, nihil etiam transmutaretur ex calido in frigidum vel e converso, ut supra dictum est.
          <td>72. The third question [70] asks whether, namely, the non-being which is matter is common to the things that are reciprocally generated one from another. And he says that if the matter of both, i.e., of fire and of earth, were diverse, they would not be generated one from the other, as happens for those who posited both fire and earth as first matters. For things that are mutually generated one from the other must have a common subject capable of acquiring the form of both. Consequently no change could take place between things mutually contrary, as was said above, since contrarieties exist first and ear se in the above mentioned elements, namely, fire and earth, water and air. Hence if nothing were changed from fire into water or from air into earth, or vice versa, neither would anything be changed from hot to cold, or vice versa, as was said above.
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          <td>Subiungit tamen quod <i>materia</i> eorum quae transmutantur adinvicem, <i>aliqualiter est eadem, et aliqualiter alia</i>. Subiecto enim est eadem: et hoc est quod dicit, <i>quod id quod subiicitur est idem, qualitercumque sit ens</i> (quia scilicet non est ens actu, sed potentia). Non est autem idem secundum esse vel rationem: aliam enim rationem et aliud esse accipit prout est sub diversis formis, et etiam secundum hoc ipsum quod ordinatur ad diversas formas; sicut corpus est aliud ratione secundum quod est aegrotabile, et aliud secundum quod sanabile, licet sit idem subiecto. Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod de his intantum dictum est.
          <td>He adds, however, that the matter of things that are reciprocally changed is in one sense the same, and in another sense other. For they are the same as to subject. And this is what he says, namely, that the subject is the same, whatever its status as being (since, indeed, it is not being in act, but in potency). However, it is not the same according to existence or notion. For it takes on another notion and another existence according as it exists under various forms, and also according as it is ordained to diverse forms, just as body is other as to notion according as it is subject to sickness, and as it is subject to health, although it is the same as to subject. In summary, then, he concludes, saying, "So much for these topics."
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    <blockquote>
      Lecture 10 The difference between generation and alteration
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 4</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ δὲ γενέσεως καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως λέγωμεν τί διαφέρουσιν· φαμὲν γὰρ ἑτέρας εἶναι ταύτας τὰς μεταβολὰς ἀλλήλων.
            <td>71 Next we must state what the difference is between coming-to-be and 'alteration'—for we maintain that these changes are distinct from one another.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐστί τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἕτερον τὸ πάθος ὃ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι πέφυκεν, καὶ ἔστι μεταβολὴ ἑκατέρου τούτων, ἀλλοίωσις μέν ἐστιν, ὅταν ὑπομένοντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, αἰσθητοῦ ὄντος, μεταβάλλῃ ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσιν, ἢ ἐναντίοις οὖσιν ἢ μεταξύ, οἷον τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει καὶ πάλιν κάμνει ὑπομένον γε ταὐτό, καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς στρογγύλος, ὁτὲ δὲ γωνιοειδὴς ὁ αὐτός γε ὤν.
            <td>72 Since, then, we must distinguish (a) the substratum, and (b) the property whose nature it is to be predicated of the substratum; and since change of each of these occurs; there is 'alteration' when the substratum is perceptible and persists, but changes in its own properties, the properties in question being opposed to one another either as contraries or as intermediates. The body, e.g. although persisting as the same body, is now healthy and now ill; and the bronze is now spherical and at another time angular, and yet remains the same bronze.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅταν δ' ὅλον μεταβάλλῃ μὴ ὑπομένοντος αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς ὡς ὑποκειμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐκ τῆς γονῆς αἷμα πάσης ἢ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ ἢ ἐξ ἀέρος παντὸς ὕδωρ,
            <td>73 But when nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes as a whole (when e.g. the seed as a whole is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a whole into water), such an occurrence is no longer 'alteration'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">γένεσις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοῦ δὲ φθορά, μάλιστα δέ, ἂν ἡ μεταβολὴ γίνηται ἐξ ἀναισθήτου εἰς αἰσθητὸν ἢ ἁφῇ ἢ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οἷον ὅταν ὕδωρ γένηται ἢ φθαρῇ εἰς ἀέρα· ὁ γὰρ ἀὴρ ἐπιεικῶς ἀναίσθητον.
            <td>74 It is a coming-to-be of one substance and a passing-away of the other—especially if the change proceeds from an imperceptible something to something perceptible (either to touch or to all the senses), as when water comes-to-be out of, or passes-away into, air: for air is pretty well imperceptible.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἄν τι ὑπομένῃ πάθος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντιώσεως ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ καὶ τῷ φθαρέντι, οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ, εἰ ἄμφω διαφανῆ ἢ ψυχρά, οὐ δεῖ τούτου θάτερον πάθος εἶναι εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσται ἀλλοίωσις, οἷον ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐφθάρη, ἄνθρωπος δ' ἄμουσος ἐγένετο, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ὑπομένει τὸ αὐτό. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τούτου μὴ πάθος ἦν καθ' αὑτὸ ἡ μουσικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀμουσία, τοῦ μὲν γένεσις ἦν ἄν, τοῦ δὲ φθορά· διὸ ἀνθρώπου μὲν ταῦτα πάθη, ἀνθρώπου δὲ μουσικοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀμούσου γένεσις καὶ φθορά· νῦν δὲ πάθος τοῦτο τοῦ ὑπομένοντος. Διὸ ἀλλοίωσις τὰ τοιαῦτα.
            <td>75 If, however, in such cases, any property (being one of a pair of contraries) persists, in the thing that has come-to-be, the same as it was in the thing which has passed-away—if, e.g. when water comes-to-be out of air, both are transparent or cold—the second thing, into which the first changes, must not be a property of this persistent identical something. Otherwise the change will be 'alteration.' Suppose, e.g. that the musical man passed-away and an unmusical man came-to-be, and that the man persists as something identical. Now, if 'musicalness and unmusicalness' had not been a property essentially inhering in man, these changes would have been a coming-to-be of unmusicalness and a passing-away of musicalness: but in fact 'musicalness and unmusicalness' are a property of the persistent identity, viz. man. (Hence, as regards man, these changes are 'modifications'; though, as regards musical man and unmusical man, they are a passing-away and a coming-to-be.) Consequently such changes are 'alteration.'
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅταν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ᾖ ἡ μεταβολὴ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, αὔξη καὶ φθίσις, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τόπον, φορά, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ πάθος καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ἀλλοίωσις, ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν (320a.) ὑπομένῃ οὗ θάτερον πάθος ἢ συμβεβηκὸς ὅλως, γένεσις, τὸ δὲ φθορά.
            <td>76 When the change from contrary to contrary is in quantity, it is 'growth and diminution'; when it is in place, it is 'motion'; when it is in property, i.e. in quality, it is 'alteration': but, when nothing persists, of which the resultant is a property (or an 'accident' in any sense of the term), it is 'coming-to-be', and the converse change is 'passing-away'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐστὶ δὲ ὕλη μάλιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς δεκτικόν, τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ τὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις μεταβολαῖς, ὅτι πάντα δεκτικὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐναντιώσεών τινων.
            <td>77 'Matter', in the most proper sense of the term, is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of coming-to-be and passing-away: but the substratum of the remaining kinds of change is also, in a certain sense, 'matter', because all these substrata are receptive of 'contrarieties' of some kind.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ μὲν οὖν γενέσεως, εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ πῶς ἔστι, καὶ περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
            <td>78 So much, then, as an answer to the questions (i) whether coming-to-be 'is' or 'is not'—i.e. what are the precise conditions of its occurrence and (ii) what 'alteration' is.
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    </blockquote>
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          <td>Postquam philosophus ostendit quare est quaedam generatio simpliciter et quaedam secundum quid, hic inquirit de differentia generationis et alterationis.
          <td>73. After showing why there is a certain absolute generation and a certain qualified generation, the Philosopher here inquires into the difference between generation and alteration.
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          <td>Et primo exponit suam intentionem, dicens quod dicendum est de generatione et alteratione, quomodo differant adinvicem: et hoc ideo, quia superius dictum fuit quod generatio et alteratio sunt diversae transmutationes adinvicem.
          <td>First, he states his intention [71] and says that we must discuss generation and alteration and indicate how they differ, for we have stated above that these are different types of change;
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          <td>Secundo ibi: quoniam igitur est aliud subiectum etc., exequitur propositum.
          <td>Secondly, he carries out his intention, at 74.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ostendit differentiam generationis et alterationis, quantum ad id secundum quod utrumque est transmutatio;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo quantum ad subiectum utriusque, ibi: quando quidem igitur et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First he shows the difference between generation and alteration with respect to that according to which both are changes;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, with respect to the subject of each, at 79.
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          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>Regarding the first he does two things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ostendit differentiam generationis et alterationis;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo removet quandam dubitationem, ibi: in his autem si aliqua et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows the difference between generation and alteration;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he removes a difficulty, at 77.
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          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ostendit in quibus sit alteratio;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo in quibus sit generatio, ibi: quando autem totum et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows in what things alteration occurs;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, in what things generation occurs, at 75.
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          <td>Circa primum duo supponit. Quorum primum est, quod <i>aliud est subiectum, et aliud passio quae nata est dici de subiecto</i>, sicut differunt substantia et accidens. Secundum est, quod contingit <i>in utroque horum esse transmutationem</i>: nam quandoque fit transmutatio in ipsa substantia subiecti, quandoque autem in ipsis accidentibus.
          <td>74. With respect to the first [72] he supposes two things. The first is that the subject is one thing and the passion which is apt to be said of a subject is another, just as in the case of substance and accident. The second is that change occurs in both of these; for sometimes the change is in the very substance of the subject and sometimes in the accidents.
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          <td>His ergo suppositis, subiungit quod alteratio est, quando manet idem subiectum sensibile: scilicet quando, nulla transmutatione in eius substantia facta, fit transmutatio in passionibus eius, scilicet in qualitatibus ipsius. Nec est differentia quantum ad hoc, utrum fiat transmutatio secundum contraria extrema, vel secundum media; puta utrum de albo in nigrum, vel de rubeo in pallidum. Ponit autem duo exempla: primum scilicet cum corpus animalis, idem manens, prius est sanum et postea infirmatur; secundum est, quod aes aut aliud metallum, idem manens, quandoque est rotundum et quandoque angulare, vel angulos habens.
          <td>With these suppositions in mind he says that it is alteration when the same perceptible subject remains, i.e., when, with no change having taken place in the substance, a change occurs in its passions, i.e., in its qualities. And it makes no difference whether the change involves contrary extremes or intermediates — for example, whether it is from white to black or from red to pale. He gives two examples: the first is when the body of an animal, while remaining the same, is first healthy and then sick; the second is when bronze or some other metal, while remaining the same, is now round and now angular, or possessing angles.
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          <td>Et est advertendum quod primum horum exemplorum pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, secundum autem ad quartam: cum tamen philosophus in VII Physic. probet quod in prima et quarta specie qualitatis non est motus alterationis, sed solum in tertia, quae dicitur passio vel passibilis qualitas: et propter hoc forte signanter dixit quod alteratio est transmutatio in <i>passionibus</i>.
          <td>And it should be noted that the first of these examples pertains to the first species of quality and the second example to the fourth species. Yet the Philosopher proved in <i>Physics</i> VII that there is no motion of alteration in the first and fourth species of quality but only in the third, which is called "passion or passible quality" — for which reason he perhaps advisedly said that alteration is a change in the "passions."
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          <td>Sed dicendum est quod alteratio primo et per se est in qualitatibus tertiae speciei, mediantibus quibus ex consequenti fit alteratio etiam in aliis; sicut per aliquam alterationem calidi et frigidi mutatur homo de sanitate in aegritudinem aut e converso, et per alterationem mollis et duri perducitur corpus ad aliquam figuram.
          <td>But it should be said that alteration is primarily and <i>per se</i> in the qualities of the third species, through which alteration subsequently occurs also in the other species. For example, by reason of some change within the sphere of hot and cold a man is changed from healthy to sick, or vice versa; and through a change within the sphere of soft and hard a body is brought to some shape.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quando autem totum etc., ostendit quando fit generatio. Et circa hoc duo facit:
          <td>75. Then [73] he shows when generation occurs. About this he does two things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo assignat quando est generatio;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo quando magis est generatio, ibi: maxime autem generabitur et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he states when there is generation;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, when there is generation <i>par excellence</i>, at 76.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod, quando est transmutatio non solum secundum passiones, sed etiam secundum totam rei substantiam; inquantum scilicet materia accipit aliam formam substantialem; ita scilicet quod non maneat aliquod sensibile, quasi sit idem subiectum numero ens actu; puta quando ex toto semine generatur totus sanguis, aut ex toto aere generatur tota aqua, nulla congregatione aut segregatione interveniente, ut Democritus posuit: talis transmutatio est unius generatio et alterius corruptio.
          <td>He says therefore first [73] that when a change affects not only the passions but the entire substance of a thing, in so far, namely, as the matter acquires another substantial form so that nothing perceptible remains as though the being in act were the same subject as to number — for example, when from the whole seed, there is generated what is wholly blood, or when from what is wholly air there is generated what is wholly water, without any gatherings or separatings playing a part as Democritus posited — such a change is the generation of one thing and the corruption of another.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: maxime autem generabitur etc., ostendit quando maxime fit generatio. Et dicit quod, secundum tertium modum supra positum, qui accipitur secundum opinionem multorum, maxime dicitur aliquid generari, quando fit transmutatio ex aliquo quod non potest bene sentiri, in aliquid quod est bene sensibile, vel secundum tactum, qui est grossior et materialior inter sensus (unde vulgares secundum ipsum maxime iudicant aliquid esse sensibile, inquantum est palpabile), aut etiam secundum alios sensus; sicut cum aqua generatur ex aere, videtur esse, secundum hunc modum, generatio simpliciter; aut quando corrumpitur in aerem, videtur esse corruptio simpliciter. Aer enim est modice sensibilis, tum propter sui raritatem, tum quia non excellit in ipso aliqua qualitas activa, sed passiva, scilicet humidum: in igne autem, qui est rarior aere, excellit qualitas activa quae est calidum: aqua autem et est densior aere, et excellit in ea qualitas activa quae est frigidum: terra vero est densissima omnium elementorum.
          <td>76. Then [74] he explains when there is generation in the highest degree. And he says that according to the third way laid down above and which is taken according to the opinion of many, above all is something said to be generated when the change proceeds from something not easily perceptible to something clearly perceptible, either to touch, which, among the senses, is more gross and material (hence among the people it is according to this sense above all that something is judged as perceptible — in so far as it may be felt), or to the other senses — as, when water is generated from air, there seems to be according to this outlook, generation which is absolute, or when it is corrupted into air there seems to be absolute corruption. For air is only slightly perceptible, both because it is so rarified and because it has no excelling active quality, but only a passive one, namely, moistness; while in fire, which is more rarified than air, an active quality, heat, does excel. But water is both denser than air and there excels in it an active quality, coldness; earth, finally, is the densest of all the elements.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: in his autem si aliqua etc., removet quandam dubitationem. Quia enim dixerat quod subiectum manet, facta transmutatione circa eius passiones, posset aliquis credere quod omne illud circa quod fit transmutatio alio manente, esset passio illius manentis.
          <td>77. Then [75] he removes a difficulty. For since he had said that the subject remains when a change has taken place with respect to its passions, someone could believe that in the case of everything with respect to which something is changed while something other remains, that which is changed is a passion of that which remains.
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          <td>Sed ipse hoc excludit, dicens quod in his corporibus quae adinvicem transmutantur, quandoque manet aliqua passio eadem in generato et corrupto, sicut quando ex aere fit aqua; ambo enim sunt <i>diaphana</i>, idest transparentia, vel frigida (non quod aer sit naturaliter frigidus, sed per accidens): non tamen oportet quod huius permanentis, scilicet diaphani vel frigidi, alterum in quod fit transmutatio, scilicet aer vel aqua, sit passio. Si autem non esset verum quod nunc dicimus, sequeretur quod quando ex aere fit aqua, esset alteratio: semper enim videmus quod, quando id quod transmutatur est passio permanentis, est alteratio; tunc autem generatio, quando id quod transmutatur non est passio permanentis.
          <td>But he excludes this when he says that in those bodies that are reciprocally changed one from the other, sometimes there remains some one and the same passion in the generated and in the corrupted thing, as when from air is produced water — for both are "diaphanous," i.e., transparent, or cold (although air is not cold by nature but accidentally); yet this does not mean that the other thing, in which the change takes place, namely, the air or the water, is a passion of that which remains, namely, the diaphanous or the cold. If what we now say were not so, it would follow that when water comes to be from air, it would be alteration; for we always see that when that which is changed is a passion of what remains, we have alteration, but when that which is changed is not a passion of what remains, it is generation.
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          <td>Et hoc manifestat per quoddam exemplum. Dicitur enim quod homo musicus corruptus est, quando homo amittit habitum musicae; et tunc homo <i>immusicus</i>, idest habens privationem musicae, generatus est: eo quod musica non est passio hominis musici, cum sit de ratione eius, et similiter <i>immusica</i> est de ratione hominis <i>immusici</i>. Unde homo musicus non manet: sed homo manet idem numero. Si ergo musica et <i>immusica</i> non esset passio <i>huius</i>, scilicet hominis, sed esset de ratione eius; tunc per transmutationem musicae et <i>immusicae</i>, fieret unius generatio et alterius corruptio. Et quia hoc non est verum, ideo musica et <i>immusica</i> est passio hominis. Sed hominis musici et <i>immusici</i> est generatio et corruptio: et quia homo manet, ut patet, sequitur quod musica sit passio permanentis. Et ideo alteratio est secundum <i>talia</i>, scilicet secundum passiones permanentium. Si ergo aqua et aer essent passiones diaphani, sicut permanentis, sequeretur quod transmutatio aeris ex aqua esset alteratio.
          <td>He shows this by means of an example. We say that "musical man" has been corrupted when man loses the habit of music, at which time "unmusical man," i.e., man having the privation of music is generated. The reason for this is that music is not a passion of "musical man," since it is of its notion; likewise, unmusical is of the notion of "unmusical man." Hence musical man does not remain; but the same numerical man does remain. Therefore, if music and "lack of music" were not passions of "this," i.e., of man, but were part of his notion, then the change of "musical" and "unmusical" would constitute the generation of one thing and the corruption of another. But because this is not so, therefore music and "lack of music" are passions of man. But there is a generation and corruption of musical and unmusical man; and because man remains, as is evident, it follows that music is a passion of that which remains [namely, man]. Therefore alteration occurs with respect to "such," i.e., the passions of things that are permanent. If, therefore, water and air were passions of the transparent, as of something permanent, it would follow that the change of water from air would be alteration.
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          <td>Sed dubitatur utrum eadem passio numero, quae sit altera pars contrarietatis, possit esse in generato et corrupto, ut supra dictum est. Si enim non remaneat eadem, non erit facilior transitus in invicem eorum quae habent similitudinem: eo quod oportebit utrobique omnia removeri. Similiter videtur sequi quod simile corrumpitur a suo simili: nam generans corrumpit id quod prius erat. Si autem ponatur quod maneat eadem numero, sequitur primo quod, remoto priori, scilicet subiecto, remaneat posterius, scilicet passio: et quod idem numero accidens sit in duobus subiectis.
          <td>78. But there is a problem as to whether the same numerical passion which is at one extreme of a set of contraries could exist in the generated and in the corrupted, as was said above. For if it does not remain the same, then the transition into each other of things that are similar will not be easier, since on both sides it will be necessary to remove everything. Similarly, it seems to follow that like is destroyed by like, for the generator destroys that which previously was present. But if one supposes the same numerical passion to remain, it follows that even though that which was prior, namely, the subject, has been removed, that which was subsequent, namely, the passion, remains. Moreover, the same numerical accident would be in two subjects.
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          <td>Dicendum ergo quod non manet idem numero: sed id quod prius erat, corrumpitur per accidens corruptione subiecti, recedente forma quae erat principium talis accidentis; et advenit simile accidens, consequens formam de novo advenientem. Et quia secundum hoc accidens non erat aliqua repugnantia in agendo et patiendo, facilior fuit transmutatio. Nec est inconveniens quod simile corrumpat suum simile per accidens, corrumpendo subiectum vel materiam: sic enim maior flamma consumit minorem.
          <td>It should be answered, therefore, that the same numerical passion does not remain, but that what existed previously is corrupted ear accidens with the corruption of the subject, when the form which was the principle of that accident departed, and that a similar accident comes, following on the newly-arriving form. And because, with respect to this accident, there was no conflict between agent and patient, the change was easier. Nor is it unacceptable for like to destroy like ear accidens, i.e., by reason of corrupting the subject or matter — this is the same way in —which a larger flame consumes a smaller.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quando quidem igitur etc., ostendit differentiam generationis ad alterationem et ad alias transmutationes, ex parte subiecti.
          <td>79. Then [76] he shows, from the side of the subject, how generation differs from alteration and from other changes.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ostendit qualiter se habeant ad subiectum quod est ens in actu;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo qualiter se habeant ad subiectum quod est ens in potentia, ibi: est autem hyle et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows how all of them are related to the subject which is a being in act;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, how related to the subject which is a being in potency, at 81.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod dictum est quod alteratio est secundum passiones alicuius permanentis: et hoc idem accidit in aliis transmutationibus, quae fiunt secundum accidentia quae adveniunt subiecto existenti in actu. Quando ergo transmutatio est de contrario in contrarium secundum quantitatem, puta de magno in parvum aut e converso, est <i>augmentum</i> vel <i>deminutio</i> eiusdem subiecti permanentis: eo quod quantitas advenit subiecto existenti in actu. Quando autem transmutatio est secundum contrarietatem loci, puta sursum aut deorsum, est <i>latio</i>, idest motus localis, eiusdem corporis permanentis: eo quod esse <i>ubi</i> advenit corpori existenti actu. Quando vero transmutatio est secundum contrarietatem in passionibus (idest in passibilibus qualitatibus principaliter, et in aliis qualitatibus ex consequenti), tunc est <i>alteratio</i> eiusdem permanentis: quia etiam qualitas advenit subiecto actu existenti. Quando vero nihil manet actu existens, cuius alterum quod transmutatur sit passio et accidens quodcumque, est universaliter <i>generatio et corruptio</i>: eo quod forma substantialis, secundum quam est generatio et corruptio, non advenit subiecto actu existenti.
          <td>He says therefore first [76] that, as was said, alteration is according to the passions of something that remains. And this same thing occurs in other changes, which take place with respect to accidents which occur to a subject existing in act. When, therefore, a change is from contrary to contrary according to quantity — for example, from large to small, or vice versa — we have "growth" or "decrease" of the same permanent subject, since quantity occurs to a subject existing in act. But when the change is with respect to contrariety of place — for example, up or down — it is "latio," i.e., local motion, of the same remaining body, since "where" accrues to a body existing in act. When the change is with respect to a contrariety in passions (i.e., primarily in passible qualities, and in other qualities as a consequence), we have "alteration" of the same permanent being, because quality too accrues to a subject existing in act. But when nothing remains existing in act, of which that which is changed might be a passion or some accident, it is universally "generation and corruption," since the substantial form, with respect to which generation and corruption occur, does not accrue to a subject existing in act.
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          <td>Unde patet falsam esse opinionem quam tradit Avicebron in libro fontis vitae, quod in materia est ordo formarum; ita quod primo materiae advenit forma secundum quam est substantia, et postea alia secundum quam est corpus, et postea alia secundum quam est animatum corpus, et sic de aliis. Cum enim idem sit constituere substantiam et facere hoc aliquid, quod pertinet ad substantiam particularem, sequeretur quod prima forma, quae constituit substantiam, faceret hoc aliquid, quod est subiectum actu existens: et ita formae posteriores advenirent subiecto permanenti, et secundum eas esset magis alteratio quam generatio, secundum doctrinam quam hic Aristoteles tradit.
          <td>80. Hence it is evident that the opinion is false which Avicebron handed down in the book <i>Font of Life</i>, namely, that in matter there is an order of forms, in the sense that first matter acquires a form making it a substance, and then another that makes it a body, and then another which makes it living body, and so on. For since it is one and the same thing to constitute a substance and to make a "this something," which pertains to particular substance, it would follow that the first form, which constitutes the substance, would also make it a "this something, which is a subject existing in act. Consequently, the subsequent forms would accrue to a permanent subject, and with respect to them there would be alteration rather than generation, according to the doctrine which Aristotle here transmits.
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          <td>Est ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, formae substantiales differunt secundum perfectius et imperfectius. Quod autem est perfectius, potest quidquid potest imperfectius, et adhuc amplius: unde forma perfectior quae facit animatum, potest etiam facere corpus, quod facit forma imperfectior inanimati corporis. Et sic nulla forma substantialis advenit subiecto in actu existenti: nec praesupponit aliam formam communiorem realiter diversam, quae pertineat ad considerationem naturalis; sed solum secundum rationem, quod pertinet ad considerationem logicam.
          <td>Therefore one should say, as was said above, that substantial forms differ according to more and less perfect. But the more perfect can do all that the less perfect can do, and more; hence the more perfect form that makes a thing "living" can also make it "body," as does the more imperfect form of non-living body. Consequently, no substantial form accrues to a subject existing in act, nor does it presuppose some other common form really distinct from it, which would be the object of Natural Philosophy, but only one distinct according to reason, and which pertains to the consideration of Logic.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: est autem hyle etc., comparat praedictas transmutationes secundum subiectum quod est tantum ens in potentia. Et dicit quod <i>hyle</i>, sive materia prima, est maxime proprium subiectum susceptibile generationis et corruptionis: quia, sicut dictum est, immediate substat formis substantialibus, quae per generationem et corruptionem adveniunt et recedunt. Sed quodammodo, scilicet ex consequenti et mediate, subiicitur omnibus aliis transmutationibus: quia omnia subiecta aliarum transmutationum sunt susceptibilia aliquarum contrarietatum, quae reducuntur in primam contrarietatem, quae est formae et privationis, cuius subiectum est prima materia, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et ideo omnia alia subiecta participant quodammodo materiam primam, inquantum ex materia et forma componuntur.
          <td>81. Then [77] he compares all the above-mentioned changes to the subject which is only being in potency. And he says that it is above all "hyle," or first matter, which is the proper subject of generation and corruption, because, as has been said, it immediately underlies the substantial forms, which come and go by generation and corruption. But in a certain sense, i.e., consequently and mediately, it also underlies all the other changes, because all the subjects of the other changes are susceptible of certain contrarieties which are reduced to the first contrariety, which is that of form and privation, whose subject is first matter, as is said in <i>Physics</i> I. And therefore all the other subjects partake in some sense of first matter in so far as they are composed of matter and form.
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          <td>Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod determinatum sit hoc modo de generatione simpliciter, utrum sit vel non sit; et si est, quomodo est; et similiter etiam de alteratione.
          <td>In summary [78] he concludes that so much, then, has been determined concerning absolute generation, as to whether it exists or not, and what are the precise conditions of its occurrence, and in a like manner concerning alteration.
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    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 11<br>
      Growth differs from generation and alteration both as to subject and to manner
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 5</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ δὲ αὐξήσεως λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, τί τε διαφέρει γενέσεως καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, καὶ πῶς αὐξάνεται τῶν αὐξανομένων ἕκαστον καὶ φθίνει ὁτιοῦν τῶν φθινόντων.
            <td>79 But we have still to treat of growth. We must explain (i) wherein growth differs from coming-to-be and from 'alteration', and ii) what is the process of growing and the sprocess of diminishing in each and all of the things that grow and diminish.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Σκεπτέον δὴ πρῶτον πότερον μόνως ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορά, οἷον ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε μεταβολή, οἷον ἐκ δυνάμει οὐσίας εἰς ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐσίαν, γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ περὶ μέγεθος αὔξησις, ἡ δὲ περὶ πάθος ἀλλοίωσις· ἀμφότερα δὲ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντων εἰς ἐντελέχειαν μεταβολὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστίν,
            <td>80 Hence our first question is this: Do these changes differ from one another solely because of a difference in their respective 'spheres'? In other words, do they differ because, while a change from this to that (viz. from potential to actual substance) is coming-to-be, a change in the sphere of magnitude is growth and one in the sphere of quality is 'alteration'—both growth and 'alteration' being changes from what is-potentially to what is-actually magnitude and quality respectively?
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">ἢ καὶ ὁ τρόπος διαφέρει τῆς μεταβολῆς· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀλλοιούμενον οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μεταβάλλον κατὰ τόπον, οὐδὲ τὸ γινόμενον, τὸ δ' αὐξανόμενον καὶ τὸ φθῖνον,
            <td>81 Or is there also a difference in the manner of the change, since it is evident that, whereas neither what is 'altering' nor what is coming-to-be necessarily changes its place, what is growing or diminishing changes its spatial position of necessity,
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ φερομένου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ φερόμενον ὅλον ἀλλάττει τόπον, τὸ δ' αὐξανόμενον ὥσπερ τὸ ἐλαυνόμενον· τούτου γὰρ μένοντος τὰ μόρια μεταβάλλει κατὰ τόπον,
            <td>82 though in a different manner from that in which the moving thing does so? For that which is being moved changes its place as a whole: but the growing thing changes its place like a metal that is being beaten, retaining its position as a whole while its parts change their places. They change their places,
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ τῆς σφαίρας· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ τόπῳ μεταβάλλει τοῦ ὅλου μένοντος, τὰ δὲ τοῦ αὐξανομένου ἀεὶ ἐπὶ πλείω τόπον, ἐπ' ἐλάττω δὲ τὰ τοῦ φθίνοντος.
            <td>83 but not in the same way as the parts of a revolving globe. For the parts of the globe change their places while the whole continues to occupy an equal place: but the parts of the rowing thing expand over an ever-increasing place and the parts of the diminishing thing contract within an ever-diminishing area.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ μεταβολὴ διαφέρει οὐ μόνον περὶ ὃ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς τοῦ τε γινομένου καὶ ἀλλοιουμένου καὶ αὐξανομένου, δῆλον.
            <td>84 It is clear, then, that these changes—the changes of that which is coming-to-be, of that which is 'altering', and of that which is growing—differ in manner as well as in sphere.
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    </blockquote>
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          <td>Postquam philosophus determinavit de generatione et alteratione, hic determinat de augmentatione et deminutione.
          <td>82. After concluding concerning generation and alteration, the Philosopher here determines concerning growth and diminution.
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          <td>Et primo exponit suam intentionem, dicens quod post generationem et alterationem, reliquum est dicere de augmentatione. De qua duo considerare oportet:
          <td>First he states his intention [79] and says that after generation and corruption, something must be said about growth, about which there are two things to consider:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo, in quo differat a generatione et alteratione;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo, per quem modum augmentatur et deminuitur unumquodque quod augmentatur et deminuitur.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, in what it differs from generation and alteration;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, in what manner augmentation and diminution take place in things augmented and diminished.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: scrutandum itaque primum etc., prosequitur suam intentionem.
          <td>Secondly, he carries out his intention:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ostendit differentiam augmentationis a generatione et alteratione;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo inquirit de modo augmentationis, ibi: circa quid autem est transmutatio et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows how growth differs from generation and alteration;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he inquires how augmentation takes place (L. 12).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo supponit unam differentiam;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo inquirit de alia, ibi: aut etiam modus et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he assumes one difference;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he inquires about another difference, at 84.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod primum eorum quae consideranda sunt circa augmentationem, est quod oportet inquirere utrum differentia augmentationis a generatione et alteratione sit solum <i>in circa quid</i>, idest in genere circa quod est quaelibet istarum transmutationum. Haec enim differentia est manifesta: videlicet quod transmutatio quae est <i>ex hoc in hoc</i>, idest ex substantia ente in potentia in substantiam entem in actu, est generatio; transmutatio autem quae est circa magnitudinem, est augmentatio (per quam aliquid transmutatur de parvo in magnum) et deminutio (per quam aliquid transmutatur de magno in parvum); transmutatio autem quae est circa <i>passiones</i>, idest passibiles qualitates, est alteratio.
          <td>83. He says therefore first [80] that the first point of inquiry about growth is that one must ask whether it differs from generation and alteration only with respect to "that about which," i.e., the genus in which these changes occur. For this difference is plain, namely, that the change which is "from this into this," i.e., from substance that is being in potency into substance which is being in act, is generation; while the change that respects magnitude is growth (through which something is changed from small into large) and diminution (through which something is changed from large into small); while the change that respects "passions," i.e., passible qualities, is alteration.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Et quia dixerat quod generatio est transmutatio ex substantia in potentia in substantiam in actu, ut idem intelligatur etiam de aliis duabus mutationibus supradictis, subiungit quod <i>transmutatio utrorumque praedictorum</i>, scilicet magnitudinis et passionis, est ex potentia in actum: est enim motus actus existentis in potentia, ut dicitur in III Physic.
          <td>And because he had said that generation is a change from substance in potency into substance in act, then, that the same may be understood of the other two changes mentioned above, he adds that the change of both the aforesaid, namely, of magnitude and passions, proceeds from potency to act — for motion is the act of a thing existing in potency, as is said in <i>Physics</i> III.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: aut etiam modus etc., assignat aliam differentiam, ex modo transmutationis.
          <td>84. Then [81] he assigns another difference, i.e., one based on the manner of change.
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ponit differentiam;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo exponit, ibi: alio autem modo et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he mentions the difference;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he explains it, at 85.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod in praedictis mutationibus etiam modus transmutationis differt (non autem refert utrum haec littera legatur interrogative vel remissive). In hoc enim differt modus praedictarum transmutationum, quod id quod alteratur, non ex necessitate transmutatur secundum locum, et similiter etiam neque quod generatur: sed necesse est id quod augmentatur aut deminuitur, secundum locum transmutari. Huius autem differentiae ratio est, quia locus commensuratur locato, et hoc secundum magnitudinem, non autem secundum qualitatem vel substantiam: et ideo necesse est quod, quando mutatur magnitudo locati, quod etiam fiat transmutatio secundum locum; non autem quando transmutatur aliquid secundum substantiam vel secundum qualitatem.
          <td>He says therefore first [81] that in the above-mentioned changes, the manner of change also differs. (And it does not matter whether the statement is read interrogatively or rhetorically.) For the mode of the aforesaid changes differs in that what is altered does not necessarily undergo a change of place and neither does a thing that is generated. But anything that is augmented or diminished must undergo a change in place. The reason for this difference is that place is co-extensive with the thing in place, and this is according to magnitude [size] and not according to quality or substance. Consequently, it is necessary that, when the magnitude [size] of a thing in place is changed, there be a change according to place, but not when something is changed in substance or quality.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Sicut autem commensuratio locati ad locum attenditur secundum magnitudinem, ita connaturalitas attenditur secundum formam substantialem, et ex consequenti secundum aliquam qualitatem, secundum puta gravitatem vel levitatem. Et ideo, licet generatio et alteratio possit esse sine mutatione locali, aliqua tamen generatio et alteratio est causa quod aliquid moveatur naturaliter secundum locum; puta, cum fit ignis vel terra, fit grave vel leve.
          <td>Now just as the commensurateness of that which is in place to the place which contains it is in terms of its size, so the connaturality of the thing is in terms of the substantial form, and consequently, of some quality — for example, of heaviness or lightness. Consequently, although generation and alteration can occur without any change of place, yet in certain cases generation and alteration are the cause of a thing's being moved naturally with respect to place, as, when for example, when fire or earth comes to be, something light or heavy comes to be.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Differentia autem aliarum transmutationum, per comparationem ad motum localem, non est omnino per accidens: ostensum est enim in VIII Physic. quod motus localis est primus motuum et principalior, et causa aliorum motuum.
          <td>But the difference between growth and the other changes, with respect to local motion, is not entirely <i>per accidens</i>, for it has been shows in <i>Physics</i> VIII that local motion is the first and chiefest of motions, as well as the cause of the other motions.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: alio autem modo etc., manifestat quod dixerat, scilicet quod id quod augmentatur vel deminuitur, mutatur secundum locum.
          <td>84. Then [82] he shows what he had said, namely, that whatever is augmented or diminished is changed with respect to place.
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo manifestat hoc per differentiam ad motum localem rectum;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo per differentiam ad motum localem sphaericum, ibi: non quemadmodum quae sphaerae et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he manifests this in rectilinear local motion;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, in spherical local motion, in 86.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod alio modo transmutat locum id quod augmentatur vel deminuitur, quam id quod <i>fertur</i>, idest movetur motu recto. Illud enim quod fertur, motu scilicet recto, <i>universum</i>, idest secundum se totum, variat locum: illud autem quod augmentatur, mutat locum <i>sicut illud quod deducitur</i>, puta metallum per malleationem, vel etiam humidum in vase per infusionem, sive quodcumque huiusmodi corpus; quo quidem in eodem loco manente, partes eius transmutantur secundum locum, vel per extensionem vel quocumque alio modo.
          <td>He says therefore first [82] that a thing which is increased or decreased changes place differently from that which is "carried," i.e., moved with a rectilinear motion. For in the case of that which is carried, namely, in rectilinear motion, the thing "universally," i.e., in its wholeness, changes place. But something changes its place "like that which is drawn out," for example, like metal by beating or also something liquid as poured into a receptacle, or any other body of this sort. In these cases, while the object remains in the same place, its parts are changed with respect to place either by extension or in some other way.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: non quemadmodum quae sphaerae etc., manifestat quod dixerat per differentiam ad motum localem sphaericum. Et dicit quod partes eius quod augmentatur, mutant quidem locum, sed non eodem modo sicut partes sphaerae. Partes enim sphaerae transmutantur, toto manente in eodem loco, scilicet subiecto (quamvis etiam totum mutet locum secundum rationem, ut dicitur in VI Physic.): sed partes variant locum etiam subiecto, sicut pars caeli quae modo est in oriente, postmodum erit in occidente: sed tamen talis transmutatio partium sphaerae fit in <i>simili</i> loco, idest neque maiori neque minori. Sed partes corporis quod augetur, semper extenduntur in maiorem locum: partes autem eius quod deminuitur, semper retrahuntur in minorem locum.
          <td>86. Then [83] he manifests what he had said by the difference with respect to spherical local motion. And he says that the parts of a thing which grows do indeed change their place, but not in the same way as the parts of a sphere. For the parts of a sphere are changed while the whole remains in the same place, namely, as to subject (although the whole too changes its place conceptually, as is said in <i>Physics</i> VI, but the parts change their place even as to subject, as when the part of the heaven which is now in the east, comes to be in the west. However, such a change of the parts of a sphere takes place in a place that is "similar," i.e., neither larger nor smaller. But the parts of a body that is growing are always extending into a larger place, while the parts of a body that is diminishing are always being contracted so as to occupy a smaller place.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod manifestum est ex praedictis, quod transmutatio eius quod generatur et alteratur et augmentatur, differunt non solum <i>in circa quid</i>, idest ex parte generis in quo sunt istae mutationes, sed <i>sic</i>, idest ex parte modi transmutandi.
          <td>In summary he concludes [84] that it is clear from the aforesaid that these changes — the changes of that which is generated and altered and grows — differ not only with respect to "that about which," i.e., the genus in which the changes take place, but "thus," i.e., in the manner of the changing.
    </table>
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 12<br>
      The subject of growth is not something incorporeal or lacking size
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            <td colspan="2">
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 5 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ δὲ ὅ ἐστιν ἡ μεταβολὴ ἡ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ ἡ τῆς φθίσεως (περὶ μέγεθος δὲ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ φθίνειν),
            <td>85 But how are we to conceive the 'sphere' of the change which is growth and diminution? The sphere' of growing and diminishing is believed to be magnitude.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">ποτέρως ὑποληπτέον, πότερον ἐκ δυνάμει μὲν μεγέθους καὶ σώματος, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ' ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀμεγέθους γίνεσθαι σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, καὶ τούτου διχῶς ἐνδεχομένου λέγειν, ποτέρως ἡ αὔξησις γίνεται;
            <td>86 Are we to suppose that body and magnitude come-to-be out of something which, though potentially magnitude and body, is actually incorporeal and devoid of magnitude? And since this description may be understood in two different ways, in which of these two ways are we to apply it to the process of growth? Is the matter, out of which growth takes place, (i) 'separate' and existing alone by itself, or (ii) 'separate' but contained in another body?
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">πότερον ἐκ κεχωρισμένης αὐτῆς καθ' αὑτὴν τῆς ὕλης, ἢ ἐνυπαρχούσης ἐν ἄλλῳ σώματι; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἀμφοτέρως. Χω(320b.) ριστὴ μὲν γὰρ οὖσα ἢ οὐδένα καθέξει τόπον, [ἢ] οἷον στιγμή τις, ἢ κενὸν ἔσται καὶ σῶμα οὐκ αἰσθητόν. Τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔν τινι εἶναι· ἀεὶ γάρ που ἔσται τὸ γινόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε κἀκεῖνο, ἢ καθ' αὑτὸ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
            <td>87 Perhaps it is impossible for growth to take place in either of these ways. For since the matter is 'separate', either (a) it will occupy no place (as if it were a point), or (b) it will be a 'void', i.e. a non-perceptible body. But the first of these alternatives is impossible. For since what comes-to-be out of this incorporeal and sizeless something will always be 'somewhere', it too must be 'somewhere'—either intrinsically or indirectly.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γ' ἔν τινι ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὲν κεχωρισμένον οὕτως ὥστε μὴ ἐκείνου καθ' αὑτὸ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τι εἶναι, συμβήσεται πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα. Λέγω δ' οἷον εἰ γίνεται ἀὴρ ἐξ ὕδατος, οὐ τοῦ ὕδατος ἔσται μεταβάλλοντος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγγείῳ τῷ ὕδατι ἐνεῖναι τὴν ὕλην αὐτοῦ.
            <td>88 And the second alternative necessarily implies that the matter is contained in some other body. But if it is to be 'in' another body and yet remains 'separate' in such a way that it is in no sense a part of that body (neither a part of its substantial being nor an 'accident' of it), many impossibilities will result. It is as if we were to suppose that when, e.g. air comes-to-be out of water the process were due not to a change of the but to the matter of the air being 'contained in' the water as in a vessel. This is impossible.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀπείρους γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει ὕλας εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐντελεχείᾳ.
            <td>89 For (i) there is nothing to prevent an indeterminate number of matters being thus 'contained in' the water, so that they might come-to-be actually an indeterminate quantity of air;
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔτι δ' οὐδ' οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενος ἀὴρ ἐξ ὕδατος, οἷον ἐξιὼν ὑπομένοντος.
            <td>90 and (ii) we do not in fact see air coming-to-be out of water in this fashion, viz. withdrawing out of it and leaving it unchanged.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Βέλτιον τοίνυν ποιεῖν πᾶσιν ἀχώριστον τὴν ὕλην ὡς οὖσαν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μὴ μίαν.
            <td>It is therefore better to suppose that in all instances of coming-to-be the matter is inseparable, being numerically identical and one with the 'containing' body, though isolable from it by definition.
      </table>
    </blockquote>
    <table cellpadding="12">
      <tbody>
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          <td>Postquam philosophus ostendit differentiam augmenti a generatione et alteratione, hic incipit inquirere de modo augmenti.
          <td>87. After showing how growth differs from generation and alteration, the Philosopher here begins to inquire into the manner in which growth takes place.
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo quantum ad subiectum quod augetur;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo quantum ad id quo aliquid augetur, ibi: suscipiendum itaque et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, with respect to the subject which grows;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, with respect to that by which something grows (L. 14).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo movet quaestionem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo inquirit quaestionis veritatem, ibi: aut impossibile et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he raises a question;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he investigates the truth of the question, at 88
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit.
          <td>About the first he does two things:
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Primo proponit quid ex praedictis sit manifestum circa augmentum: et quaerit circa quid sit transmutatio augmenti et deminutionis. Et respondet quod motus augmenti et deminutionis videtur esse circa magnitudinem.
          <td>First [85], he sets forth what is evident about growth and asks around what the change of growth and diminution occurs. And he answers that the motion of growth and diminution is seen to be concerned with magnitude [size].
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo ibi: et qualiter etc., ostendit quid restet inquirendum. Et dicit quod accipiendum est de cetero qualiter fiat augmentum vel deminutio. Et quantum ad subiectum augmenti, primo movet hanc quaestionem: utrum contingat quod per augmentum generetur magnitudo et corpus, ex eo quod est in potentia ad magnitudinem et corporeitatem (ita scilicet quod sit actu incorporeum et sine magnitudine), vel non. Et subdividit primum membrum quaestionis. Dupliciter enim potest dici quod sit aliqua materia actu existens sine corporeitate et magnitudine. Unde rationabiliter quaeritur, si talis materia sit subiectum augmenti, qualiter ex ea augmentatio fiat: utrum scilicet ita quod ipsa materia sine corporeitate et magnitudine existens, sit secundum seipsam separata existens; aut ita quod sit in aliquo corpore, non tamen pars eius (nam si esset pars eius, esset subiecta corporeitati et magnitudini ipsius).
          <td>Secondly [86], he shows what still remains to be investigated and says that we must further decide how growth and diminution take place. And as to the subject of growth, he first raises this question: Are we to suppose that by growth there is produced both magnitude and body out of that which is in potency to magnitude and corporeity, in such a way, namely, that it [this source] is incorporeal in act and without magnitude? Then he subdivides the first part of the question. For there are two ways in which there may be said to be some matter existing in act without corporeity and magnitude. Hence it is reasonable to ask, if such matter is the subject of growth, how growth is produced from it. Does the matter that exists without corporeity and magnitude have a separate existence by itself, or is it in some body but not a part of it (for if it were a part, it would be subjected to its corporeity and magnitude)?
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: aut impossibile etc., determinat quaestionem motam.
          <td>88. Then [87] he answers the question he raised:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ratione accepta ex parte materiae vel subiecti;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ratione accepta ex parte augmenti, ibi: amplius autem talis et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, with an argument based on the matter or subject;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, with an argument based on growth (L. 13).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo determinat praedictam quaestionem, ratione sumpta ex parte materiae,
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundum quod ab ipso consideratur; secundo secundum quod consideratur a Platonicis, ibi: sed neque puncta et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First he answers the aforesaid question with a reason based on matter, as he views it;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, based on matter as viewed by the Platonists (L. 13).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum tria facit:
          <td>Concerning the first he does three things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo excludit primum membrum secundae divisionis, scilicet quod materia sine quantitate secundum se separata existat;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo excludit secundum membrum secundae divisionis, scilicet quod materia sine magnitudine existens sit in aliquo corpore; ibi: sed si in aliquo existit etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio concludit propositum, ibi: melius ergo et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he rejects the first member of the second division, namely, that matter without quantity should exist as an isolated entity;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he rejects the second member of the second division, namely, that matter existing without magnitude be present in some body, at 89.
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he concludes to his proposition, at 90.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod utrumque membrum secundae divisionis est impossibile. Et primo hoc ostendit quantum ad hoc, quod impossibile est materiam sine magnitudine existentem per se separatam existere. Quia si sit separata, oportet alterum duorum esse. Quorum unum est quod nullum possideat locum, sicut punctus, cuius non est aliquis locus, eo quod omnis locus aliquam dimensionem habet. Aut oportet, si materia sine quantitate existens occupet aliquem locum, quod sit aliquis locus vacuus (nam vacuum dicimus locum non repletum sensibili corpore): vel etiam oportet quod sit quoddam corpus non sensibile (nam vacuum dicebant nihil aliud esse nisi corpus non sensibile). Oportet enim dicere vacuum corpus, propter dimensionem spatii: non sensibile autem, propter vacuitatem. Horum autem duorum alterum est impossibile, scilicet quod sit vacuum vel corpus non sensibile.
          <td>He says therefore first [87] that both members of the second division are impossible. First he shows this as to the impossibility of matter existing without magnitude, having a separated existence. If it were separated, one of two things would have to follow. One is that it would possess no place, as in the case of a point, which has no place, since every place has some dimension. Or else, if the matter existing without quantity should occupy a place, it would have to be an empty place (for we call "void" a place not filled with a perceptible body); or it would have to be a certain imperceptible body (for some hold that the void is nothing but an imperceptible body). It is indeed necessary to call the void a body on account of the dimensions of space, yet an imperceptible one, on account of the emptiness. Of these two, one is impossible, namely, that there be a void or an imperceptible body.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Similiter impossibile est quod materia separata existens nullum possideat locum. Materia enim est ex qua generantur corpora sensibilia: hoc autem ex quo corpora sensibilia generantur, necesse est in aliquo loco esse. Semper enim videmus quod id quod generatur ex eo, est <i>alicubi</i>, idest in aliquo loco determinato: ibidem autem est quod generatur ex aliquo, ubi fuit id ex quo generatur. Ergo oportet illud ex quo generatur aliquid, scilicet materiam, esse alicubi, vel per se vel per accidens: per se quidem secundum opinionem antiquorum philosophorum, ponentium materiam corporum naturalium esse aliquod corpus actu, puta ignem aut aerem aut aquam; per accidens autem secundum opinionem Platonis et suam, qui ponebat materiam esse ens in potentia.
          <td>Likewise, it is impossible for separately existing matter to possess no place. For matter is that from which sensible bodies are generated. But that from which sensible bodies are generated must exist in some place. For we always observe that whatever is generated from it is "somewhere," i.e., in some definite place: that which is generated out of something is in the same place where that out of which it is generated was. Therefore that from which something is generated, namely, matter, must be somewhere, either <i>per se</i> or <i>per accidens</i>: <i>per se</i>, indeed, according to the opinion of the early philosophers who posited the matter of natural bodies to be some body in act, such as fire or air or water; <i>per accidens</i>, however, according to the opinion of Plato and his own, who assumed that matter is being in potency.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: sed si in aliquo existit etc., excludit secundum membrum, ostendens quod materia separata a magnitudine non sit in aliquo. Et primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit quod, si materia sine magnitudine existens ita sit in aliquo corpore separata a substantia eius, quod non sit aliquid eius per se vel per accidens, contingunt multa impossibilia. Et manifestat hunc modum ponendi: puta si ponamus quod, quando generatur aer ex aqua, non fiat hoc per transmutationem aquae, ita scilicet quod materia aquae amittat formam aquae et recipiat formam aeris, sed sicut si materia aeris esset in aqua sicut in vase.
          <td>89. Then [88] he rejects the second member by showing that matter separated from magnitude is not present in anything. First he states his intention and says that, if matter existing without magnitude should be in a body separated from the substance of the body in such a way as not to pertain to the body either <i>per se</i> or <i>per accidens</i>, then many impossibilities follow. And he gives an example of this manner of assumption: for example, we might posit that when air is generated from water, this does not take place by means of a change of the water, in such a way that the matter of the water loses the form of water and receives the form of air, but as though the matter of air were in the water as in a container.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: infinitas enim etc., ponit rationes deducentes ad inconveniens. Quarum prima est quod, si in aqua, praeter materiam propriam, est etiam materia aeris, pari ratione potest etiam esse in aqua alia, et sic in infinitum, praesertim quia ex uno possibile est infinita generari successive: et ita sequeretur quod nihil prohibeat esse infinitas materias in aqua. Sed ex materia qualibet potest aliquid actu generari. Ergo sequeretur quod infinita possint actu generari ex una et eadem aqua; ita scilicet quod quidquid potest generari in potentia, simul potest generari actu.
          <td>Secondly [89], he presents arguments that lead to impossibility. The first is that, if there is in the water not only its own matter but also the matter of air, then for the same reason other matter could be there, and so on <i>ad infinitum</i>, especially since it is possible from one to generate an infinitude successively. Consequently, there would be nothing to prevent an infinitude of matters in water. But given any matter whatsoever, something can be generated in act. Therefore, it would follow that an infinitude of things could be generated in act out of one and the same water, on the basis, namely, that whatever is able to be generated in potency, can be all at one time generated in act.
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          <td>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius neque et cetera. Et dicit quod non videmus aliquid sic generari ex aliquo, puta aerem ex aqua, sicut quod exit ex aliquo permanente, puta cum vinum exit a dolio non transmutato: videmus enim quod aliquid generatur ex corrupto, sicut supra dictum est. Oportet autem id quod sensibiliter apparet, accipere ut principium in scientia naturali.
          <td>The second argument is at [90]. And he says that we do not observe anything being so generated out of anything (for example, air out of water) as that which comes out of something permanent, in the way, for example, that wine flows out of a cask that remains unchanged. For we see things being generated from what has been corrupted, as was said above. But one must take that which is evident to sense as the principle [starting-point] in natural science.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: melius ergo etc., concludit veritatem: dicens quod melius est dicere quod materia ita insit omnibus, quod non separetur ab eis, tanquam nihil eorum existens; sed quod una et eadem numero sit materia omnium, et differat solum ratione, sicut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc non erit separata a magnitudine, sed in unoquoque actu magnitudini subiecta.
          <td>90. Then [91] he concludes to the truth and says that it is better to say that matter is present in all things, in such a way as not to be separated from them, as though being no part of them, and that the matter of all things is numerically one and the same and differs only in conception, as was said above. According to this-, it will not be separated from magnitude but will be subject to magnitude in act in each and every thing.
    </table>
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 13<br>
      Matter, even as conceived by Platonists, cannot lack size and be the subject of growth
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 5 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ στιγμὰς θετέον οὐδὲ γραμμὰς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὕλην διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας.
            <td>92 But the same reasons also forbid us to regard the matter, out of which the body comes-to-be, as points or lines.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὗ ταῦτα ἔσχατα ἡ ὕλη,
            <td>93 The matter is that of which points and lines are limits,
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">ἣν οὐδέποτ' ἄνευ πάθους οἷόν τε εἶναι οὐδ' ἄνευ μορφῆς.
            <td>94 and it is something that can never exist without quality and without form.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Γίνεται μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται, καὶ ὑπό τινος δὲ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος, ἢ ὁμοιοειδοῦς ἢ ὁμογενοῦς, οἷον πῦρ ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου, ἢ ὑπ' ἐντελεχείας· σκληρὸν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπὸ σκληροῦ γίνεται.
            <td>95 Now it is no doubt true, as we have also established elsewhere, that one thing 'comes-to-be' (in the unqualified sense) out of another thing: and further it is true that the efficient cause of its coming-to-be is either (i) an actual thing (which is the same as the effect either generically—or the efficient cause of the coming-to-be of a hard thing is not a hard thing or specifically, as e.g. fire is the efficient cause of the coming-to-be of fire or one man of the birth of another), or (ii) an actuality.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὐσίας ὕλη σωματικῆς, σώματος δ' ἤδη τοιουδί (σῶμα γὰρ κοινὸν οὐδέν), ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μεγέθους καὶ πάθους ἐστί, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ χωριστή, τόπῳ δ' οὐ χωριστή, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ πάθη χωριστά. Φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν διηπορημένων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὔξησις μεταβολὴ ἐκ δυνάμει μεγέθους, ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἔχοντος μέγεθος· χωριστὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ κενόν, τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀδύνατον, εἴρηται ἐν ἑτέροις πρότερον.
            <td>96 Nevertheless, since there is also a matter out of which corporeal substance itself comes-to-be (corporeal substance, however, already characterized as such-and-such a determinate body, for there is no such thing as body in general), this same matter is also the matter of magnitude and quality—being separable from these matters by definition, but not separable in place unless Qualities are, in their turn, separable. It is evident, from the preceding development and discussion of difficulties, that growth is not a change out of something which, though potentially a magnitude, actually possesses no magnitude. For, if it were, the 'void' would exist in separation; but we have explained in a former work' that this is impossible.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔτι δ' ἥ γε τοιαύτη μεταβολὴ οὐκ αὐξήσεως ἴδιος ἀλλὰ γενέσεως ὅλως. Ἡ γὰρ αὔξησίς ἐστι τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους ἐπίδοσις, ἡ δὲ φθίσις μείωσις. Διὸ δὴ ἔχειν τι δεῖ μέγεθος τὸ αὐξανόμενον, ὥστ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀμεγέθους ὕλης δεῖ εἶναι τὴν αὔξησιν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν μεγέθους· γένεσις γὰρ ἂν εἴη σώματος μᾶλλον, οὐκ αὔξησις.
            <td>97 Moreover, a change of that kind is not peculiarly distinctive of growth, but characterizes coming-to-be as such or in general. For growth is an increase, and diminution is a lessening, of the magnitude which is there already—that, indeed, is why the growing thing must possess some magnitude. Hence growth must not be regarded as a process from a matter without magnitude to an actuality of magnitude: for this would be a body's coming-to-be rather than its growth.
      </table>
    </blockquote>
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          <td>Supra philosophus ostendit quod non est possibile subiectum augmenti esse id quod nullam habet quantitatem actu, sed in potentia tantum, sicut est materia. Et quia quidam posuerunt materiam corporum esse aliquid mathematicum, ideo philosophus hic ostendit quod nihil tale quod caret magnitudine, potest esse subiectum augmenti.
          <td>91. Above [in the previous lecture] the Philosopher showed that it is not possible for the subject of growth to be something having no quantity in act but only in potency as in the case of matter. And since some philosophers posited the matter of bodies to be something mathematical, the Philosopher therefore here shows that no such thing which lacks magnitude can be the subject of growth.
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          <td>Caret autem quantitate, in genere mathematicorum, punctus quidem simpliciter, linea vero secundum dimensionem latitudinis et profunditatis, superficies autem secundum dimensionem profunditatis: corpus autem habet magnitudinem secundum omnem dimensionem; unde est perfecta magnitudo, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Ostendit ergo quod nihil talium quod quocumque modo caret magnitudine, potest poni materia quae sit subiectum augmenti, tripliciter.
          <td>Now, in the genus of mathematical things, a point lacks quantity absolutely, a line does so according to the dimensions of width and depth, a surface according to depth. Body, however, has magnitude in every dimension: hence it is a perfect magnitude, as is said in <i>On the Heavens</i> I. He shows therefore that none of the things lacking magnitude in any whatsoever way can be assumed to be the matter which is the subject of growth, in three ways.
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          <td>Primo quidem propter rationes praemissas. Unde dicit quod neque ponendum est puncta, quae carent omnino magnitudine, esse corporis materiam, quae scilicet sit subiectum augmenti; neque etiam lineas, quae secundum aliquid carent magnitudine. Et hoc propter <i>easdem causas</i>, idest propter rationes superius assignatas: quia necesse esset puncta et lineas separatim per se existere, aut in aliquo corpore esse; et sic sequerentur eadem quae prius.
          <td>First of all, for the reasons given above. Whence he says [92] that neither should points, which entirely lack size, be posited as the matter of body which is, namely, the subject of growth, nor should lines, which lack size in some respect. And this for the "same reasons," i.e., the reasons presented above — for points and lines either have to exist separately by themselves or be in some body. Consequently the same things as before would follow.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: illud autem etc., improbat hoc per ipsam positionem Platonicorum, qui ponebant quod mathematica erant substantia corporum naturalium. Et quia puncta et lineae sunt termini dimensionum, sicut forma est terminus materiae, ponebant quod illud quod per huiusmodi terminatur, esset materia corporum: ipsi autem termini magis se habent in ratione formae. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod <i>illud</i>, scilicet dimensio vel magnitudo, cuius <i>haec</i>, scilicet puncta et lineae, sunt ultima, erat materia secundum Platonicos.
          <td>92. Secondly [93], he disproves this by the very position of the Platonists, who asserted that mathematical things were the substance of natural bodies. And since points and lines are the termini of dimensions, as form is the terminus of matter, they posited that whatever was bounded by things of this sort would be the matter of bodies, while the termini themselves are more in the order of form. And this is what he says, namely, that "that," namely, dimension or magnitude, of which "these," namely, points and lines, are the extremes, was matter according to the Platonists.
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          <td>Tertio ibi: quam nunquam etc., ostendit communiter quod nihil horum potest esse materia corporum. Quia scilicet, secundum eos, mathematica sunt separata a formis naturalibus et passionibus sensibilibus, sicut secundum intellectum, ita et secundum esse; sed materia non potest separari a formis naturalibus et passionibus sensibilibus; ergo impossibile est quod aliquid mathematicorum sit materia corporum naturalium.
          <td>93. Thirdly [94], he shows in common that none of these can be the matter of bodies: namely, because according to them, mathematical things exist separated from natural forms and sensible passions — as they are according to the intellect, so they are according to reality. But matter cannot be separated from natural forms and sensible passions. Therefore it is impossible that any of those mathematical things be the matter of natural bodies.
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          <td>Primo ergo proponit medium suae rationis, dicens: <i>quam</i>, scilicet materiam, neque possibile est esse sine <i>passione</i>, idest passibili qualitate, neque sine <i>forma</i>, vel morphe, quod idem est: sine quibus tamen, secundum Platonicos, sunt mathematica.
          <td>First of all, therefore, he presents the middle term of his argument, when he says that "it," namely, matter, cannot be without "passion," i.e., passible quality, or without form, or "morphe" (which is the same thing), without which, however, according to the Platonists, mathematical things do exist.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: generatur quidem etc., probat quod supposuerat:
          <td>94. Secondly, he proves what he had supposed.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">et primo quod materia non possit esse sine forma;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo quod non possit esse sine passione, ibi: quoniam autem est et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, that matter cannot be without form;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, that it cannot be without passion, at 95.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod, sicut etiam in aliis libris determinatum est, puta in I Physic., simpliciter generatur alterum ex altero. Fit enim unumquodque ex subiecto, quod est materia. Oportet etiam quod id quod generatur, generetur ab aliquo agente ente in actu aut <i>homogeneos</i>, idest quod sit saltem unius generis, aut <i>homoideos</i>, idest quod sit unius formae vel speciei (et exemplificat quod ignis generatur ab igne sicut ab agente unius speciei, et sicut homo generatur ab homine): aut oportet quod saltem ab aliquo actu existente, sive ab actione alicuius actu existentis, aliquid generetur, etiam si generans non sit simile generato in genere seu specie, sicut durum generatur a non duro, puta cum lac induratur per ignem.
          <td>He says therefore first [95] that as was determined in other books, for example, in <i>Physics</i> I, one thing is generated absolutely out of some other things. For each thing comes to be from a subject which is matter. Morover, that which is generated has to be generated by some agent in act which is either "homogeneos", i.e., of one form or species (and he gives the example that fire is generated by fire as by an agent of one species, and as man is generated by man). Or else it is required at least that something be generated by something existing in act, or by the action of something existing in act, even though the agent be not akin to the thing generated in genus or species, as when something hard is generated by something not hard — for example, when milk is solidified by fire.
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          <td>Contingit autem quod aliquod factum non assimilatur in forma agenti, uno quidem modo, quia illud factum non primo et per se respondet facienti, sed per accidens, sive per posterius. Per accidens quidem, sicut musicus sanat, non inquantum est musicus, sed inquantum est medicus: sanitatis enim similitudo non est in musico inquantum est musicus, sed inquantum est medicus, qui per formam sanitatis quam habet in anima, facit sanitatem in corpore.
          <td>Now, it comes about that something produced is not akin to the agent in respect of form, in one way, because the thing produced does not primarily and <i>per se</i> correspond to the agent, but <i>per accidens</i>, or subsequently. One has <i>per accidens</i> generation, for example, when the musician causes health, not in so far as he is a musician but in so far as he is a doctor — for the likeness of health does not belong to musician as musician, but in so far as he is a doctor, who, through the form of health which he has in his mind, produces health in a body.
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          <td>Per posterius autem, sicut cum qualitas effecta est effectus consequens aliquam primarum qualitatum; sicut sanitas causatur ex aliqua medicina calida, per calorem quem facit in corpore, quamvis in ipsa medicina non sit forma sanitatis.
          <td>One has "subsequent" generation, for example, when the quality produced is consequent upon one of the primary qualities, as when health is caused by some hot medication, through the heat it produces in the body, although the form of health is not in the medication itself.
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          <td>Secundo, per hoc quod agens agit instrumentaliter. Instrumentum enim non agit in virtute propriae formae, sed inquantum movetur a principali agente, quod per suam formam agit. Unde effectus assimilatur in forma, non quidem instrumento, sed principali agenti; sicut domus quae fit in materia, assimilatur domui quae est in mente aedificantis, non autem securi aut asciae; et homo generatus assimilatur in specie patri generanti, non autem semini.
          <td>In a second way this [absence of likeness] occurs because the agent acts through instruments. For an instrument does not act in virtue of its own form but in so far as it is moved by the principal agent, which acts through its own form. Hence the effect is akin in form not, indeed, to the instrument, but to the principal agent — as a house which is produced in matter is assimilated to the house in the mind of the builder and not to the axe or hatchet, and as a man who is generated is assimilated in species to the father generating and not to the seed.
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          <td>Tertio, quando materia patientis non est proportionata ad recipiendum formam agentis, propter illius excellentiam, sed recipit aliquid minus; sicut patet in animalibus quae generantur sine semine ex virtute solis. Et inde est etiam quod effectus non assimilatur in specie agenti remoto, sed propinquo; ut homo homini, non autem soli, quamvis homo generet hominem et sol, ut dicitur in II Physic.
          <td>One has a third way, when the matter of the patient is not proportionate to receiving the form of the agent, because of its excellence, but receives something less, as is evident in the case of animals generated without seed by the power of the sun. Hence it is also that the effect is not assimilated in species to the remote, but to the proximate, agent, as man is assimilated to man but not to the sun, although "man is begotten by man and by the sun as well," as is said in <i>Physics</i> II.
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          <td>Sicut autem unumquodque generatur ab agente aliqualiter simili secundum formam, ita corrumpitur aliquid a contrario. Et quia generatur aliquid ex corrupto, sicut supra dictum est, necesse est materiam ex qua aliquid generatur, et in quam aliquid corrumpitur, semper habere aliquam formam, per quam assimiletur vel contrarietur generanti vel corrumpenti.
          <td>Now, just as each thing is generated by an agent in some way similar as to form, so something is corrupted by an agent that is contrary. And because a thing is generated from what has been corrupted, as was said above, the matter from which something is generated and into which something is corrupted, must always have some form through which it is similar or contrary to that which generates or corrupts.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem est etc., ostendit quod materia non sit sine passione. Non enim materia est nisi substantiae corporeae: substantiae enim incorporeae immateriales sunt. Unde sequitur quod omnis materia sit <i>talis</i> corporis, scilicet individualis: non enim potest esse aliquod corpus commune, quod non sit determinatum ad aliquam speciem et ad aliquod individuum. Omne autem tale corpus necesse est habere aliquam passionem, vel consequentem formam specificam, qualis est propria passio, vel qualitercumque aliter advenientem, sicut sunt accidentia individualia. Ergo necesse est quod eadem materia quae est subiectum magnitudinis, sit etiam subiectum passionis: ita quidem quod materia quae est subiectum magnitudinis, sit ratione separata a passione (sicut est alia ratio hominis et albi), <i>loco</i> autem, idest subiecto, non separantur: nisi quis dicat quod passiones sunt separabiles a substantiis, quod est impossibile.
          <td>95. Then [96] he shows that matter is not without some passion. For matter belongs only to corporeal substance, incorporeal substances being immaterial. Hence it follows that all matter belongs to "such" a body, i.e., an individual body; for there cannot be a common body which is not determined to some species and to some individual. But every such body must have some passion, either following on its specific form, as in the case of a proper passion, or occurring in any other way, as in the case of individual accidents. Therefore, the same matter that is the subject of magnitude must also be the subject of passion, in such a way, indeed, that the matter which is the subject of magnitude is conceptually distinct from the passion (as the notion of "man" differs from that of "white"), while they are not distinct "locally," i.e., as to subject — unless one were to maintain that passions are separable from substances, which is impossible.
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          <td>Et quia philosophus videbatur digressionem quandam a proposito fecisse, colligit propositum ex omnibus praemissis, dicens manifestum esse ex omnibus quae inquisita sunt, quod augmentum non est transmutatio ex aliquo quod sit in potentia ad magnitudinem, ita quod actu nullam habeat magnitudinem. Sequeretur enim quod commune subiectum, scilicet materia prima, esset separatum per se existens absque omni forma: quod et nunc ostensum est esse impossibile, et etiam prius in aliis libris, puta in I Physic.
          <td>And because the Philosopher appeared to have somewhat digressed from his proposition, he collects it from all the foregoing and says that it is plain from everything investigated that growth is not a change produced out of something which is in potency to magnitude, in such a way as to have no magnitude in act. For it would follow that the common subject, namely, first matter, would be separated <i>per se</i>, existing without any form. And this is something which has been proved impossible both now, and also previously in other books, as, for example, in <i>Physics</i> I.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: amplius autem talis etc., ostendit propositum ratione sumpta ex parte augmenti. Et dicit quod talis transmutatio, quae scilicet fieret ex eo quod esset solum in potentia ad magnitudinem, non proprie pertineret ad augmentum, sed magis ad generationem. Quia de ratione augmenti est, quod fiat additio ad praeexistentem magnitudinem: dicitur enim aliquid augeri, ex eo quod fit maius; quod non esset nisi aliquid prius esset magnum. Et per oppositum, de ratione deminutionis est, quod fiat quaedam minoratio magnitudinis praeexistentis. Unde patet quod oportet id quod augetur, habere aliquam magnitudinem. Et sic oportet quod augmentatio fiat, non quidem ita quod materia quae erat sine magnitudine in actu, perveniat ad hoc quod habeat magnitudinem in actu: hoc enim non esset augmentatio corporis, sed generatio, ad cuius rationem pertinet quod fiat aliquid in actu, quod prius fuit in potentia.
          <td>96. Then [97] he shows his proposition with an argument based on growth. And he says that such a change, one, namely, that would be produced out of that which was solely in potency to magnitude would not properly pertain to growth, but more to generation. For it is of the very nature of growth that addition be made to pre-existing magnitude: for a thing is said to grow, because it acquires greater magnitude, which would not be the case if it did not first have magnitude. On the other hand, it is the nature of diminution that a lessening of a pre-existing magnitude occur. Hence it is plain that what grows must have some magnitude. Consequently, when growth takes place, it cannot be in such a way that matter having previously no magnitude in act now arrives at having magnitude in act — for that would be not growth of a body, but generation, to whose notion it pertains that something be produced in act which previously was in potency.
    </table>
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 14<br>
      Problems on the nature of that by which something grows
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 5 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ληπτέον δὴ μᾶλλον οἷον ἁπτομένους (321a.) τῆς ζητήσεως ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ποίου τινὸς ὄντος τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ φθίνειν τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦμεν.
            <td>98 We must therefore come to closer quarters with the subject of our inquiry. We must grapple' with it (as it were) from its beginning, and determine the precise character of the growing and diminishing whose causes we are investigating.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Φαίνεται δὴ τοῦ αὐξανομένου ὁτιοῦν μέρος ηὐξῆσθαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ φθίνειν ἔλαττον γεγονέναι, ἔτι δὲ προσιόντος τινὸς αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ ἀπιόντος φθίνειν.
            <td>99 It is evident (i) that any and every part of the growing thing has increased, and that similarly in diminution every part has become smaller: also (ii) that a thing grows by the accession, and diminishes by the departure, of something.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀναγκαῖον δὴ ἢ ἀσωμάτῳ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ σώματι· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀσωμάτῳ, ἔσται χωριστὸν τὸ κενόν· ἀδύνατον δὲ μεγέθους ὕλην εἶναι χωριστήν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. Εἰ δὲ σώματι, δύο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματα τόπῳ ἔσται, τό τε αὐξόμενον καὶ τὸ αὖξον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον.
            <td>100 Hence it must grow by the accession either (a) of something incorporeal or (b) of a body. Now, if (a) it grows by the accession of something incorporeal, there will exist separate a void: but (as we have stated before)' is impossible for a matter of magnitude to exist 'separate'. If, on the other hand (b) it grows by the accession of a body, there will be two bodies—that which grows and that which increases it—in the same place: and this too is impossible.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' οὕτως ἐνδέχεται λέγειν γίνεσθαι τὴν αὔξησιν ἢ τὴν φθίσιν, ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐξ ὕδατος ἀήρ· τότε γὰρ μείζων ὁ ὄγκος γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ αὔξησις τοῦτο ἀλλὰ γένεσις μὲν τοῦ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει ἔσται, φθορὰ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, αὔξησις δὲ οὐδετέρου, ἀλλ' ἢ οὐδενὸς ἢ εἴ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τῷ γινομένῳ καὶ τῷ φθαρέντι, οἷον εἰ σῶμα. Τὸ δ' ὕδωρ οὐκ ηὔξηται οὐδ' ὁ ἀήρ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀπόλωλε τὸ δὲ γέγονεν· τὸ σῶμα δέ, εἴπερ, ηὔξηται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον· δεῖ γὰρ σώζειν τῷ λόγῳ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ αὐξανομένῳ καὶ φθίνοντι. Ταῦτα δὲ τρία ἐστίν, ὧν ἓν μέν ἐστι τὸ ὁτιοῦν μέρος μεῖζον γίνεσθαι τοῦ αὐξανομένου μεγέθους, οἷον εἰ σὰρξ τῆς σαρκός, καὶ προσιόντος τινός, καὶ τρίτον σωζομένου τοῦ αὐξανομένου καὶ ὑπομένοντος· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἁπλῶς ἢ φθείρεσθαι οὐχ ὑπομένει, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἢ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ φθίνειν ὑπομένει τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐξανόμενον καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον. Ἀλλ' ἔνθα μὲν τὸ πάθος ἔνθα δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μένει. Εἰ δὴ ἔσται ἡ εἰρημένη αὔξησις, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν μηδενός γε προσιόντος μηδὲ ὑπομένοντος αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς ἀπιόντος φθίνειν καὶ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὸ αὐξανόμενον. Ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο σώζειν· ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡ αὔξησις τοιοῦτον.
            <td>101 But neither is it open to us to say that growth or diminution occurs in the way in which e.g. air is generated from water. For, although the volume has then become greater, the change will not be growth, but a coming-to-be of the one—viz. of that into which the change is taking place—and a passing-away of the contrasted body. It is not a growth of either. Nothing grows in the process; unless indeed there be something common to both things (to that which is coming-to-be and to that which passed-away), e.g. 'body', and this grows. The water has not grown, nor has the air: but the former has passed-away and the latter has come-to-be, and—if anything has grown—there has been a growth of 'body.' Yet this too is impossible. For our account of growth must preserve the characteristics of that which is growing and diminishing. And these characteristics are three: (i) any and every part of the growing magnitude is made bigger (e.g. if flesh grows, every particle of the flesh gets bigger), (ii) by the accession of something, and (iii) in such a way that the growing thing is preserved and persists. For whereas a thing does not persist in the processes of unqualified coming-to-be or passing-away, that which grows or 'alters' persists in its identity through the 'altering' and through the growing or diminishing, though the quality (in 'alteration') and the size (in growth) do not remain the same. Now if the generation of air from water is to be regarded as growth, a thing might grow without the accession (and without the persistence) of anything, and diminish without the departure of anything—and that which grows need not persist. But this characteristic must be preserved: for the growth we are discussing has been assumed to be thus characterized.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ τί ἐστι τὸ αὐξανόμενον, πότερον ᾧ προστίθεταί τι, οἷον εἰ τὴν κνήμην αὐξάνει, αὕτη μείζων, ᾧ δὲ αὐξάνει, ἡ τροφή, οὔ. Διὰ τί δὴ οὖν οὐκ ἄμφω ηὔξηται; μεῖζον γὰρ καὶ ὃ καὶ ᾧ, ὥσπερ ὅταν μίξῃς οἶνον ὕδατι· ὁμοίως γὰρ πλεῖον ἑκάτερον.
            <td>102 One might raise a further difficulty. What is 'that which grows'? Is it that to which something is added? If, e.g. a man grows in his shin, is it the shin which is greater—but not that 'whereby' he grows, viz. not the food? Then why have not both 'grown'? For when A is added to B, both A and B are greater, as when you mix wine with water; for each ingredient is alike increased in volume.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἢ ὅτι τοῦ μὲν μένει ἡ οὐσία, τοῦ δ' οὔ, οἷον τῆς τροφῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν (321b.) τῇ μίξει, οἷον ὅτι οἶνος· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἔργον ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ συνόλον μίγμα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' ἀλλοιώσεως, εἰ μένει σὰρξ οὖσα καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, πάθος δέ τι ὑπάρχει τῶν καθ' αὑτό, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ ὑπῆρχεν, ἠλλοίωται τοῦτο· ᾧ δ' ἠλλοίωται, ὁτὲ μὲν οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ὁτὲ δὲ κἀκεῖνο. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἐν τῷ αὐξανομένῳ καὶ τῷ ἀλλοιουμένῳ· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ εἰσελθὸν γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε μεῖζον, καὶ τὸ ἀπολαῦσαν αὐτοῦ σῶμα, οἷον εἰ εἰσελθὸν γένοιτο πνεῦμα. Ἀλλ' ἔφθαρταί γε τοῦτο παθόν, καὶ τὸ κινοῦν οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ.
            <td>103 Perhaps the explanation is that the substance of the one remains unchanged, but the substance of the other (viz. of the food) does not. For indeed, even in the mixture of wine and water, it is the prevailing ingredient which is said to have increased in volume. We say, e.g. that the wine has increased, because the whole mixture acts as wine but not as water. A similar principle applies also to 'alteration'. Flesh is said to have been 'altered' if, while its character and substance remain, some one of its essential properties, which was not there before, now qualifies it: on the other hand, that 'whereby' it has been 'altered' may have undergone no change, though sometimes it too has been affected. The altering agent, however, and the originative source of the process are in the growing thing and in that which is being 'altered': for the efficient cause is in these. No doubt the food, which has come in, may sometimes expand as well as the body that has consumed it (that is so, e.g. if, after having come in, a food is converted into wind), but when it has undergone this change it has passed-away: and the efficient cause is not in the food.
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          <td>Postquam philosophus determinavit de augmento ex parte eius quod augetur, hic inquirit de eo quo aliquid augetur.
          <td>97. After discussing growth from the viewpoint of that which grows, the Philosopher here inquires into that by which something grows.
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          <td>Et primo proponit de quo est intentio. Et dicit quod, cum de ratione augmenti sit quod sit additamentum magnitudinis, hoc magis videtur esse suscipiendum ad praesentem considerationem, sicut difficilius, quasi aliquod principium quaestionis facientes, quale sit id quod aliquid augetur vel deminuitur; ut sic augmenti et deminutionis causas convenientes inquiramus.
          <td>First he states his intention [98] and says that, since it is of the notion of growth that it be an addition of magnitude, what would seem to be more appropriately taken up in the present inquiry, as being more difficult and affording some beginning for the question, would be to inquire into the nature of that by which something grows or diminishes, so as to find appropriate causes for growth and diminution.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: videtur itaque eius etc., exequitur propositum.
          <td>Secondly [99], he pursues his inquiry:
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo proponit dubitationem principaliter intentam;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo inquirendo interponit aliam quaestionem, ibi: quaeret autem aliquis etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio solvit quaestionem principalem, ibi: quoniam autem de his quaesitum est et cetera.
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he states the main question;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, in the course of this investigation he proposes another question, at 102;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he resolves the main question (L. 15).
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          <td>Circa primum tria facit:
          <td>About the first he does three things:
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo proponit duas suppositiones;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo movet dubitationem, ibi: necesse autem augmentari etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio excludit quandam obviationem, ibi: sed nec sic contingit et cetera.
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he proposes two suppositions;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he raises the doubt, at 99;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he excludes an objection, at 100.
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          <td>Prima ergo suppositio, quam primo proponit, est haec: scilicet quod eius quod augetur, quaelibet pars videtur esse augmentata; et similiter de deminutione, quaelibet pars eius quod deminuitur, videtur esse facta minor. Cuius ratio apparet ex eo quod dicitur in V Physic. Illud enim cuius aliqua pars movetur, dicitur moveri secundum partem, et non simpliciter; sicut homo dicitur vulnerari secundum partem, cuius manus est vulnerata.
          <td>98. The first supposition which he proposes, therefore, [99] is this: When something grows, every part of it grows; likewise, in diminution, every part of that which is diminished is seen to have become smaller. The reason for this is apparent from what is said in <i>Physics</i> V. For that whose part is being moved is said to be moved with respect to a part and not absolutely, as for example, a man whose hand has been wounded is said to be wounded with respect to a part.
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          <td>Ad hoc ergo quod aliquid per se et simpliciter moveatur, requiritur quod quaelibet pars eius moveatur. Quod quidem etiam in augmento, et in omnibus aliis motibus, observari oportet.
          <td>But in order that a thing be moved or se and absolutely, it is required that each and every part be moved. This must also be observed in growth and in all other motions, as our senses testify.
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          <td>Secunda suppositio est, quod omne quod augetur, augetur adveniente aliquo: et similiter deminuitur aliquo recedente. Cuius ratio est, quia oportet aliquid in actum reduci per id quod est actu: unde illud quod est in potentia ad maiorem quantitatem, reducitur in actum illius quantitatis per aliquid quod habet actu quantitatem illam; et hoc est quod adiicitur ei quod augetur.
          <td>The second supposition is that whatever grows, grows by reason of something added to it; similarly, something is diminished by reason of something's leaving it. The reason for this is that things must be reduced into act by something already in act. Hence, that which is in potency to a greater quantity is brought into the act of that quantity by something that has that quantity in act. And this is what is added to the thing that grows.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicitur: necesse autem augmentari etc., proponit dubitationem, quae sequitur ex duabus praemissis suppositionibus. Si enim eius quod augetur oportet quamlibet partem augeri, et omne augmentum fit per alicuius additionem, consequens est quod cuilibet parti eius quod augetur, oporteat aliquid addi. Necesse est ergo illud quod additur, quo dicitur aliquid augeri, aut esse incorporeum aut corporeum. Et si dicitur quod sit incorporeum, sequitur quod <i>commune</i> omnium generabilium et corruptibilium, scilicet materia prima, sit separatum ab omni quantitate corporali. Sed sicut supra ostensum est, impossibile est quod materia sit separata a magnitudine: unde patet quod illud quo aliquid augetur, non potest esse incorporeum. Et iterum, si esset incorporeum, non esset quantum in actu: unde sui appositione non faceret maius secundum quantitatem.
          <td>99. Then [100] he presents the difficulty which follows from these two suppositions. For if every part of a growing thing has to grow and all growth is produced by the addition of something, then something has to be added to each and every part of the growing thing. Therefore whatever is added, by which a thing is said to grow, has to be either incorporeal or corporeal. If it should be said to be incorporeal, then it follows that the "common" [base] of all generable and corruptible things, namely, first matter, exists separated from all corporeal quantity. But, as was shown above, it is impossible for matter to be separated from magnitude. Consequently, that by which something grows cannot be incorporeal. Moreover, if it were incorporeal, it would not be quantified in act and consequently it would not make the thing to which it was added larger according to quantity.
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          <td>Si autem dicatur illud quod addito aliquid augetur, esse corporeum, sequeretur duo corpora simul esse in eodem loco, scilicet corpus quod augetur, et corpus additum quod auget. Non enim potest dici quod seorsum collocetur corpus quod augetur et corpus quod auget: quia oportet additamentum fieri cuilibet parti eius quod augetur, quod ex supra dictis suppositionibus sequitur. Et hoc etiam est impossibile, scilicet quod duo corpora sint simul in eodem loco: et sic sequitur inconveniens ad utramque partem quaestionis.
          <td>On the other hand, if that by whose addition something grows should be said to be corporeal, it would follow that two bodies are occupying the same place at the same time, namely, the body which is increased and the body added which does the increasing. For it cannot be held that the body increased and the body which increases are set separately side by side, because addition must be made to each and every part of the increased body, as follows from the suppositions stated above. But this also is impossible, namely, that two bodies occupy the same place at the same time. Consequently, an impossibility follows from both alternatives.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: sed nec sic contingit etc., excludit quandam obviationem. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod augmentum fit nullo alio apposito; sicut quando ex aqua generatur aer, videtur esse quoddam augmentum, quia fit maior quantitas. Sed per hunc modum non contingit fieri augmentum seu deminutio. Talis enim transmutatio non est augmentum, sed est generatio eius in quod transmutatur, scilicet aeris, et corruptio eius quod transmutatur, scilicet aquae, quae contrariatur aeri, scilicet contrarietate frigidi et calidi: non autem potest dici augmentatio neque aeris neque aquae.
          <td>100. Then [101] he rejects a certain solution. For someone could say that growth occurs without anything being added, just as, when air is generated from water, there appears to be a certain growth, since a greater quantity is produced. But that is not the way growth and decrease take place. For such a change [as that mentioned in the example) is not growth. It is rather the generation of that into which the change is made, namely, air, and the corruption of that which is changed, namely, water, which is contrary to air, by the contrariety, namely, of coldness and warmth. It cannot therefore be called growth either of air or of water.
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          <td>Sed nec ullius est augmentatio, vel erit augmentatio illius quod est commune utrique (si tamen aliquid sit tale), sicut corpus videtur commune esse aeri et aquae: ut dicatur quod aqua non est augmentata neque aer, quia aqua corrupta est, et aer generatus est; sed corpus est quod augetur, si aliquid ibi augmentatum est. Sed hoc est impossibile. Oportet enim, ad hoc quod aliquid dicatur augeri, quod salventur ea quae sunt de ratione eius quod augetur et deminuitur. Quae quidem sunt tria.
          <td>But if it is not growth of either, it will perhaps be growth of that which is common to both (if there be such a thing) as, for example, of body, which seems to be common to air and water, so that it could be said that the water has not grown nor the air, since the water has been corrupted and the air generated, but that it is body that grows, if anything has grown there. But this is impossible. For in order that something be said to grow, those things must be accounted for which pertain to what grows and diminishes. These are three.
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          <td>Quorum primum est, quod etiam supra positum est, scilicet quod quaelibet pars magnitudinis quae augetur, fiat maior; puta, si caro augetur, quod quaelibet pars carnis fit maior. Secundum etiam supra positum est, scilicet quod aliquo adveniente aliquid augetur. Tertium autem est quod nunc ponit de novo, ut scilicet illud quod augetur, salvetur et permaneat in suo esse. Quia enim generatio et corruptio sunt transmutationes circa substantiam, cum simpliciter aliquid generatur vel corrumpitur, non permanet eius substantia. Sed aliae mutationes non sunt circa substantiam, sed circa ea quae adveniunt substantiae, puta circa quantitatem aut qualitatem: et ideo, cum aliquid alteratur, seu augetur vel deminuitur, manet idem numero secundum substantiam quod augetur et alteratur, sed <i>hic</i> quidem, scilicet in alteratione, non manet eadem passio, <i>hic</i> autem, scilicet in augmento et deminutione, non manet eadem magnitudo, sed fit maior vel minor. Si ergo praedicta transmutatio, qua ex aqua fit aer, esset augmentatio, sequerentur duo contraria praedictis positionibus.
          <td>The first of these, which was also posited above, is that each part of the magnitude which grows must become larger — for example, if flesh is increased, each part must become larger. Secondly, as was also posited above, the thing must grow by something's being added. The third requirement is something which he now posits for the first time and it is that the thing increased be preserved and remain in its being. For, since generation and corruption are changes with respect to substance, when a thing is generated or corrupted absolutely, its substance does not remain. But other changes are not with respect to substance, but with respect to things that occur to the substance — for example, changes regarding quantity or quality. Therefore, when something is altered, or grows or is diminished, that which grows or is altered remains the same in number as to substance, but "here," namely, in alteration, the passion does not remain the same, and "here," namely, in growth and decrease, the magnitude does not remain the same, but becomes larger or smaller. If, therefore, the aforesaid change, by which out of water air is produced, were growth, two things contrary to the aforesaid suppositions would follow.
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          <td>Quorum unum est quod aliquid augetur nullo adveniente, et deminuitur nullo recedente. Aliud autem est, quod id quod augetur non manet: quia neque aqua manet, neque corpus quod videtur esse commune, manet idem numero. Unde etiam signanter supra dixit, <i>si aliquid est commune</i>: quia scilicet nihil actu ens, idem numero existens secundum substantiam, est commune ei quod corrumpitur et generatur. Oportet autem praedictas positiones salvare in omni eo quod augetur: hoc enim supponitur quasi principium, quod augmentatio sit talis transmutatio, qualis supra dicta est.
          <td>First of all something would grow without anything's being added and be diminished without anything's leaving. The other is that that which grows does not remain, since neither does the water remain nor does body, which appears to be common, remain the same in number. Hence he designedly said above, "If there be such a common thing" — since, namely, nothing which is being in act, remaining the same in number as to substance, is common to that which is corrupted and generated. But it is necessary for the aforesaid suppositions to be accounted for in everything which grows — it being supposed, in the manner of a principle, that growth is a change of the sort that has been stated above.
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          <td>Sed videtur nihil prohibere aliquid augeri nullo adveniente. Probat enim philosophus in IV Physic. quod, sicut aliquid fit albius non superaddito alio albo, sed per intensionem albedinis praeexistentis, inquantum scilicet subiectum reducitur in actum perfectioris albedinis; ita etiam potest aliquid fieri maius, absque additione alicuius corporis magnitudinem habentis, per hoc quod materia quae prius erat subiectum parvis dimensionibus, postea fit subiectum magnis dimensionibus; nam idem est subiectum magni et parvi, sicut albi et nigri. Et hoc manifeste apparet in rarefactione: rarefactio enim contingit non solum transmutata specie, puta cum ex aqua generatur aer, de quo hic loquitur Aristoteles; sed etiam eadem specie manente, sicut si aer rarefiat vel condensetur.
          <td>101. But nothing seems to prevent something from growing without anything's being added. For in <i>Physics</i> IV the Philosopher proves that just as a thing becomes whiter not by some other white's being added to it, but by the previous whiteness' being intensified, namely, through the subject's being reduced too a state of more perfect whiteness, so also something can become larger without the addition of some body possessing magnitude, through the matter, which previously was subject to small dimensions, being afterward made subject to large dimensions. For the same thing is the subject of large and small and of white and black. And this is clearly apparent in rarefaction, for rarefaction takes place not only when there is a change of species, as when air is generated from water, which Aristotle speaks about here, but also when the same species remains, as when air is rarified or condensed.
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          <td>Dicendum est autem quod talis transmutatio non potest proprie dici augmentum, sed alteratio. Fit enim secundum transmutationem passibilium qualitatum, scilicet rari et densi, variatio autem quantitatis se habet ex consequenti: sicut ex motu qui est secundum locum, variatur motus secundum dextrum vel sinistrum, non tamen dicitur motus secundum situm, quia variatio situs consequenter se habet ad variationem loci.
          <td>However, it should be replied that such a change cannot be properly called "growth," but is alteration. For it takes place in terms of a change of passible qualities, namely, of rarity and density, with a variation of quantity being consequent upon this — just as when, as the result of a motion with respect to place, there is a change in motion according to right or left; this is nevertheless not referred to as a motion according to position — since the change of position is consequent upon the changing of place.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quaeret autem aliquis etc., ante solutionem praedictae dubitationis movet aliam quaestionem.
          <td>102. Then [102], before solving the aforesaid difficulty, he raises another question.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo proponit eam;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo solvit eam, ibi: aut quoniam huius et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he proposes the question;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he solves it, at 103.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod, cum augmentum fiat aliquo superaddito, remanet quaestio, quid illud est quod augetur: utrum scilicet solum illud cui aliquid apponitur, non autem illud quod apponitur; vel potius augetur utrumque. Verbi gratia, cruri alicuius animalis apponitur aliquid, scilicet cibus: utrum ergo crus augetur et fit maius, cibus autem qui apponitur vel additur, non augetur, sed auget? Quare ergo ambo non augmentata sunt? Utrumque enim fit maius, et illud quod apponitur et illud cui apponitur; sicut quando cum vino miscetur aqua, videtur utrumque augeri, quia utrumque fit maius eodem modo.
          <td>He says therefore first [102] that, since a thing grows by the addition of something, the question still remains as to what it is that is increased: whether only that to which something is added, but not what is added, or whether both are increased. For example, if something, namely, food, is added to the leg of an animal, does the leg grow and become larger while the food which is brought in and added does not grow but causes growth? Why have not both grown? For both become larger, both what is added and that to which it is added, just as, when water is mixed with wine, both are seen to be increased, because both become larger in the same way.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: aut quoniam huius etc., solvit quaestionem per illud quod supra positum est, scilicet quod oportet id quod augetur, manere secundum substantiam. Ideo ergo unum dicitur augeri et non aliud, quoniam huius, puta cruris, cui additur, manet substantia, huius autem quod additur, puta cibi, non manet substantia: convertitur enim cibus in substantiam eius quod nutritur et augetur. Et quia in obiectione fiebat mentio de mixtione, ostendit etiam in mixtione simile esse. Nam id cuius substantia manet, dicitur esse dominans in mixtione, sicut dicitur esse vinum, quando parum de aqua admiscetur multo vino: et hoc apparet ex propria operatione, quae est evidens signum speciei; tota enim mixtura facit operationem vini, scilicet calefaciendo et confortando, non autem facit opus aquae. Et simile est de alteratione: quia si permaneat caro in sua substantia et <i>quod quid est</i>, idest quidditas seu species eius, aliqua autem passio de numero per se accidentium adveniat, quae prius non inerat, illud quod permanet dicitur esse alteratum. Et similiter oportet illud quod augetur, permanere.
          <td>103. Then at [103] he answers this question in the light of what has been set down above, namely, that the thing which grows must remain the same in substance. Therefore the one is said to be increased and not the other, because the substance of "that," namely, the leg, to which addition is made, remains, while the substance of what is added, namely, the food, does not remain - for the food is converted into the substance of what is nourished and increased. But because in the objection mention of a mixture was made, he shows that the same is true in a mixture. For that whose substance remains is said to be dominant in the mixture — as we say something to be wine, when only a little, water is added to much wine. And this appears from the proper operation, which is an evident sign of the species — for the whole mixture performs the operation of wine, namely, by warming and giving strength, and does not do the work of water. A like situation occurs in alteration: for if the flesh remains in its substance and "what something is," i.e., its essence or species, and some passion, of the number of <i>per se</i> accidents, occurs to it, which was previously not present, that which remains is said to be altered. Similarly, that which grows must remain.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Id autem quo aliquid alteratur, scilicet alterans, quandoque in nullo transmutatum est, neque secundum passionem neque secundum substantiam, sicut contingit in his quae agunt et non patiuntur, sicut corpora caelestia: quandoque vero et ipsum alterans patitur et transmutatur, sicut est in corporibus inferioribus, quae agunt et patiuntur adinvicem, ut infra patebit. Sed in motu augmenti, virtus alterans, et quae est principium motus, se habet ex parte augmentati: quod tamen ita alterat, quod etiam alteratur. In his enim quae augentur, est principium motus augmenti, scilicet ad alterandum et convertendum cibum qui additur. Quia si hoc non esset, cibus ingrediens corpus sic magis generaretur, et acciperet ad suam naturam illud corpus quod ingreditur: puta cum <i>spiritus</i>, idest ventus seu aer, ingreditur utrem et facit eum maiorem: vel <i>spiritus</i>, idest anima, ingreditur corpus et conformat ipsum sibi. Sed non est ita: quinimmo cibus ingrediens corpus, patiendo a corpore animalis, corrumpitur, conversus in corpus animalis; et principium mutationis non est in hoc quod additur, sed in eo cui additur.
          <td>But that by which something is altered, namely, that which alters, sometimes undergoes no change, either in quality or substance, as occurs in thins that act and do not undergo, such as heavenly bodies; but sometimes that which alters itself-undergoes and is changed, as occurs in the lower bodies, which mutually act and undergo, as will be manifest later. However, in the motion of growth, the alterating power, and that which is the starting-point of motion, is on the part of that which grows — which, however, alters in a way that also involves its own alteration. For in things that grow, exists a principle of the motion of growth, namely to alter and convert the food which is added. If this were not so, the food entering the body would thus be generated greater and would take into its nature the body into which it was entering — as, for example, when spirit, i.e., air, enters a bladder and makes it larger, or when "spirit," i.e., a soul enters a body and conforms it to itself. But that is not what happens. Rather the food enters the body and, after being acted upon by the body of the animal, is converted into the body of the animal; and the origiuative source of this change is not in that which is added, but in that to which the addition is made.
    </table>
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 15<br>
      Solution of the difficulty proposed in the previous lecture
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 5 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δὲ διηπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς, δεῖ καὶ τῆς ἀπορίας πειρᾶσθαι λύσιν εὑρεῖν, σώζοντας τὸ ὑπομένοντός τε τοῦ αὐξανομένου καὶ προσιόντος τινὸς αὐξάνεσθαι, ἀπιόντος δὲ φθίνειν, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν ἢ μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον γεγονέναι, καὶ μήτε κενὸν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα μήτε δύο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ μεγέθη μήτε ἀσωμάτῳ αὐξάνεσθαι.
            <td>104 We have now developed the difficulties sufficiently and must therefore try to find a solution of the problem. Our solution must preserve intact the three characteristics of growth—that the growing thing persists, that it grows by the accession (and diminishes by the departure) of something, and further that every perceptible particle of it has become either larger or smaller. We must recognize also (a) that the growing body is not 'void' and that yet there are not two magnitudes in the same place, and (b) that it does not grow by the accession of something incorporeal.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ληπτέον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον διορισαμένοις πρῶτον ἓν μὲν ὅτι τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ αὐξάνεται τῷ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ αὐξάνεσθαι (σύγκειται γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἕκαστον), ἔπειθ' ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων μορίων ἐστὶ διττόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἶδος ἐχόντων· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη λέγεται καὶ τὸ εἶδος σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν.
            <td>105 Two preliminary distinctions will prepare us to grasp the cause of growth. We must note (i) that the organic parts grow by the growth of the tissues (for every organ is composed of these as its constituents); and (ii) that flesh, bone, and every such part—like every other thing which has its form immersed in matter—has a twofold nature: for the form as well as the matter is called 'flesh' or 'bone'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὸ οὖν ὁτιοῦν μέρος αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ προσιόντος τινὸς κατὰ μὲν τὸ εἶδός ἐστιν ἐνδεχόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην οὐκ ἔστιν·
            <td>106 Now, that any and every part of the tissue qua form should grow—and grow by the accession of something—is possible, but not that any and every part of the tissue qua matter should do so.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">δεῖ γὰρ νοῆσαι ὥσπερ εἴ τις μετροίη τῷ αὐτῷ μέτρῳ ὕδωρ· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο τὸ γινόμενον. Οὕτω δ' αὐξάνεται ἡ ὕλη τῆς σαρκός, καὶ οὐχ ὁτῳοῦν παντὶ προσγίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὑπεκρεῖ τὸ δὲ προσέρχεται, τοῦ δὲ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ.
            <td>107 For we must think of the tissue after the image of flowing water that is measured by one and the same measure: particle after particle comes-to-be, and each successive particle is different. And it is in this sense that the matter of the flesh grows, some flowing out and some flowing in fresh; not in the sense that fresh matter accedes to every particle of it. There is, however, an accession to every part of its figure or 'form'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν τοῦτο μᾶλλον δῆλον, οἷον χειρός, ὅτι ἀνάλογον ηὔξηται· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἑτέρα οὖσα δήλη μᾶλλον τοῦ εἴδους ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐπὶ σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν· διὸ καὶ τεθνεῶτος μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ἔτι σὰρξ καὶ ὀστοῦν ἢ χεὶρ καὶ βραχίων.
            <td>108 That growth has taken place proportionally, is more manifest in the organic parts—e.g. in the hand. For there the fact that the matter is distinct from the form is more manifest than in flesh, i.e. than in the tissues. That is why there is a greater tendency to suppose that a corpse still possesses flesh and bone than that it still has a hand or an arm.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁτιοῦν τῆς σαρκὸς ηὔξηται, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. Κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος ὁτῳοῦν προσελήλυθεν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην οὔ.
            <td>109 Hence in one sense it is true that any and every part of the flesh has grown; but in another sense it is false. For there has been an accession to every part of the flesh in respect to its form, but not in respect to its matter.
      </table>
    </blockquote>
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          <td>Postquam philosophus movit dubitationem de eo quo aliquid augetur, et solvit dubitationem interpositam, hic accedit ad solvendum dubitationem principalem.
          <td>104. After raising a question concerning that by which something is increased, and solving this question, which he had interposed, the Philosopher here undertakes to solve the main question.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo solvit dubitationem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ostendit, dubitatione remota, quomodo fiat augmentum, ibi: maius autem totum et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he solves the question;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, the difficulty having been removed, he shows how growth takes place (L. 16).
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ostendit qualis debeat esse solutio;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ponit solutionem, ibi: suscipienda et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows what is required in the solution;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he presents the solution, at 105.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Oportet autem quod vera solutio salvet omnia quae sunt de ratione rei, et omnia impossibilia excludat: et ideo primo ostendit quomodo intendit salvare omnia quae sunt de ratione augmenti. Et dicit quod, quia sufficienter quaesitum est de praedictis, oportet <i>tentare</i>, idest ad hoc conatum apponere, ut inveniatur talis solutio quaestionis, qua salventur tria quae supra dicta sunt de ratione augmenti.
          <td>A true solution must preserve whatever belongs to the notion of a thing in question and exclude all impossibilities. Consequently, he first shows how he intends to save everything that pertains to the notion of growth [1043. And he says that, since we have paid sufficient attention to the foregoing, it is time now to "try," i.e., to apply effort, to find a solution to our question such as will preserve the three things stated above of the notion of growth.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Quorum primum est quod id quod augetur, permaneat: secundum est quod augmentum fiat adveniente aliquo, et deminutio aliquo recedente: tertium est quod quodlibet <i>signum sensatum</i>, idest quaelibet pars sensibilis, eius quod augetur, fiat maior in augmento, aut minor in deminutione.
          <td>The first of these is that the thing increased remain; the second is that growth take place by means of something coming, and diminution by means of something departing; the third is that each "sensed sign," i.e., each perceptible part, of that which grows, become larger in the case of growth, and smaller in the case of diminution.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo ostendit quomodo intendit tria impossibilia vitare: primo quidem ut non ponamus corpus quod augetur esse vacuum; secundo ut non ponamus duas <i>magnitudines</i>, idest duo corpora, esse simul; tertio ut non ponamus augmentum fieri per additionem alicuius incorporei. Videtur enim, suppositis praedictis suppositionibus, alterum horum inconvenientium ex necessitate sequi. Si enim augetur quaelibet pars eius quod augetur, et nihil augetur nisi adveniente aliquo, oportet quod cuilibet parti eius quod augetur, aliquid adveniat: si ergo illud quod advenit, non est incorporeum, oportet duo corpora esse simul, nisi ponatur corpus quod augetur esse vacuum.
          <td>Secondly, he shows how he intends to avoid three impossibilities: first, that we not posit the body which grows to be void; secondly, that we not posit two "magnitudes," i.e., two bodies, to be in the same place; thirdly, that we not posit growth as taking place by the addition of something incorporeal. For it seems that after one has laid down the aforesaid suppositions, some one of the impossibilities will necessarily follow. For if every part grows of that which grows, and nothing grows save by something coming to it, it is necessary that, to every part of that which grows, something come. If, then, that which comes is not incorporeal, two bodies must be in the same place — unless the body which grows is assumed to be void.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: suscipienda etc., solvit dubitationem.
          <td>105. Then at [105] he solves the difficulty.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo praemittit quaedam necessaria ad quaestionis solutionem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ponit solutionem, ibi: quamlibet igitur partem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he states certain things needed for solving the question;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he gives the solution, at 106.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Circa primum duo proponit. Circa quorum primum dicit quod oportet suscipere causam, per quam et praedicta tria salventur, et inconvenientia vitentur, ita tamen quod determinemus quaedam prius. Quorum unum est quod <i>anomoeomera</i>, idest membra dissimilium partium, puta manus aut pes aut similia, augentur per hoc quod partes consimiles augentur (quas <i>homoeomera</i> vocat), sicut sunt caro et os et alia huiusmodi. Et huius rationem assignat, quia unumquodque membrum dissimilium partium componitur ex his quae sunt similium partium, sicut manus ex carne et osse et nervo: et ideo oportet quod per augmentum partium augeatur totum.
          <td>In regard to the first he proposes two things. As to the first of these, he says that a cause that will both preserve the three things aforesaid and avoid impossibilities must be taken. But we must do this after first determining certain things. One of these is that "anomoemera," i.e., members having dissimilar parts, for example, the hand or foot, or similar things, grow by means of the growth of their respective similar parts, which he calls "homoeomera," such as bone and flesh and other such. He gives the reason for this, which is that each member of the dissimilar parts is composed of those things which have similar parts as, for example, a hand is composed of flesh and bone and sinew. Therefore, the whole must be increased by the increase of the parts.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Secundo ponit quod caro et os et unaquaeque talium partium, quae primum dicit augeri, est duplex, sicut contingit in omnibus quae habent speciem in materia: nam caro vel os potest dici vel ut materia carnis, vel ut species carnis.
          <td>Secondly, he posits that flesh and bone, and each of such parts that he says to grow first, are twofold, as occurs in all things that have a species in matter: for flesh and bone can be considered either as the matter or flesh or the species of flesh.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Hoc autem quidam sic intellexerunt, quod alia caro signata esset quae est secundum materiam, et alia quae est secundum speciem. Dicunt enim quod caro et os et quidquid est huiusmodi, dicitur esse secundum speciem, ex eo quod est generatum ex primo humido seminali, in quo primo fuit virtus speciei: caro autem et os secundum materiam dicitur, ex eo quod generatur ex humido nutrimentali; quod quidem advenit primo humido seminali sicut materia quaedam eius, prout primum humidum extenditur per alia membra, admixto sibi secundo humido, ad hoc ut compleatur quantitas rei viventis et omnium partium eius. Et haec fuit opinio Alexandri, ut dicit Averroes in expositione huius loci, quem plures postmodum secuti sunt.
          <td>Now some look at this statement as meaning that there is one signate flesh which is according to matter and another which is according to species. For they say that flesh and bone and whatever is such, are said to be according to species in so far as they are generated from the prime seminal moisture in which the power of the species was, but flesh and bone are said to be according to matter in so far as they are generated from the nutritive moisture. This latter comes to the first seminal moisture as a certain matter thereof, in that the first moisture is extended through the other members, the second moisture having been mixed with it, in order to complete the quantity of the living thing and of all its parts. This was the view of Alexander (as Averroes says in his explanation of this passage), and several later followed him.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Sed hoc non potest stare cum verbis Aristotelis, quae hic dicuntur. Dicit enim quod <i>caro et os et unaquaeque talium partium, est duplex, quemadmodum et aliorum in materia speciem habentium</i>. Manifestum est autem quod speciem in materia habent non solum ista quae generantur ex semine et quae nutriuntur, in quibus praedictus intellectus aliqualiter posset sustineri, sed etiam corpora inanimata, sicut sunt lapides, aurum et argentum: vult ergo Aristoteles quod in carne et osse dicitur species et materia, sicut in lapide et auro, in quibus non est humidum seminale et nutrimentale. Et ideo dicendum est quod, secundum intentionem Aristotelis, eadem caro dicitur secundum speciem, prout in ea consideratur illud quod pertinet ad speciem carnis; et secundum materiam, prout in ea consideratur illud quod est materiae. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis compositis ex materia et forma.
          <td>But such a view does not agree with the words Aristotle uses here. For he says that "flesh, bone, and every such part has a twofold nature as do other things whose form [species] is immersed in matter." Now it is plain that not only things that are generated from seed and are nourished, in which the aforesaid meaning could be to some extent sustained, but also inanimate things, such as stones, gold and silver, have their form immersed in matter. Therefore, Aristotle intends that "species" and "matter" be taken in flesh and bone, just as in stone and gold, in which there is no seminal and nutritive moisture. Therefore, it should be said that, according to Aristotle's intention, one and the same flesh is stated according to species in so far as there is considered in it that which pertains to the species of flesh, and according to matter in so far as we consider in it that which is of matter. And the same goes for all other things composed of matter and form.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quamlibet igitur partem etc., ponit solutionem.
          <td>106. Then at [106] he presents the solution:
        <tr style="margin-left:0.5in" valign="top">
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ponit eam;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi: oportet autem intelligere etc.;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">tertio concludit epilogando summam solutionis, ibi: quapropter est quidem et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he presents it;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he manifests it with an example, at 107;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Thirdly, he concludes by summarizing the solution, at 109.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod hoc quod supra dictum est, quod quaelibet pars augetur eius quod augetur, et quod unumquodque augetur adveniente aliquo, est verum si accipiatur pars secundum speciem: nam cuilibet parti secundum speciem consideratae additur aliquid tanquam permanenti, et ita quaelibet pars secundum speciem considerata augetur. Non autem cuilibet parti secundum materiam consideratae fit additio, nec quaelibet pars secundum materiam considerata augetur: dictum enim est quod id quod augetur oportet permanere, non autem permanet quaelibet pars secundum materiam considerata, sed solum secundum speciem.
          <td>He says therefore first [106] that the statement made above, namely, that each part grows of that which grows, and that each thing grows by the advent of something, is true if "part" is considered from the aspect of the species. For to each part considered according to species something is added as to something permanent. Consequently each part considered under the aspect of species is increased. But an addition is not made to each part considered according to matter; nor does each part, considered according to matter, grow. For it was said that what grows must remain. But each part considered according to matter does not remain, but only as considered according to species.
        <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
          <td>Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem intelligere etc., manifestat solutionem propositam per exempla.
          <td>107. Then [107] he manifests the proposed solution by examples.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ponit manifestationem;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo ostendit in quibus partibus dicta solutio sit magis manifesta, ibi: in anomoeomeris et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he gives the examples;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he shows in which parts the aforesaid solution is more evident, at 108.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod oportet intelligere illud quod dictum est de carne secundum speciem et secundum materiam, sicut si quis mensuret aquam eadem mensura, ita tamen quod semper sit alia et alia aqua, puta si ex vase pleno aqua guttatim aqua effluat, et guttatim semper infundatur: erit enim semper idem quantum ad mensuram aquae, non tamen quantum ad materiam aquae. Sic autem comparatur species ad materiam, sicut mensura ad mensuratum, eo quod forma est finis materiae, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sic ergo oportet intelligere quod species carnis permaneat eadem, tanquam mensura quaedam; non tamen semper permaneat eadem materia in qua talis species suscipitur. Est etiam simile de fluvio, qui semper manet idem quantum ad speciem fluvii; materialis tamen aqua semper est alia et alia. Simile est etiam in igne, cuius species et figura semper manet, licet ligna in quibus materialiter ignis ardet, consumantur, et iterum alia apponantur. Idem etiam apparet in populo civitatis, qui semper manet idem secundum illud quod est speciei, quamvis hominum ex quibus constituitur populus, quidam moriantur et quidam succedant. Et sic semper manet id quod pertinet ad speciem carnis, licet materia in qua talis species fundatur, paulatim consumatur per actionem caloris, et alia de novo adveniat per nutrimentum.
          <td>He says therefore first [107] that what has been said about flesh according to species and according to matter should be understood as though someone were to measure water with the same measure, but in such a way, however, that the water was always other and other — for example, if from a vessel full of water, water were to flow out drop by drop and were to be constantly poured in drop by drop. It will always be the same so far as the measure of the water is concerned, but not, however, as to the matter of the water. Now species is compared to matter as the measure to what is measured, because the form is the end of matter, as is said in <i>Physics</i> It. Therefore, we must understand that the species of flesh remains the same, as a certain measure, but the matter in which such species is received does not remain the same. The case of a river is similar — it always remains the same so far as the species of river is concerned, but the material water is always other and other. Fire is also similar — whose species and figure always remains the same, although the pieces of wood in which the fire burns materially, are consumed and other and other pieces are added. The same also appears in the populace of a city which always remains the same as to that which is of its species, although, of the men who constitute the populace, some die and others take their place. In like manner, that which pertains to the species of flesh always remains, although the matter in which that species is based is little by little consumed by the action of heat and other matter newly arrives through food.
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          <td>Sic ergo quando aliquod corpus augetur, augmentatur quidem materia carnis: quia plus generatur per nutrimentum, quam perdatur per actionem caloris; et ita, multiplicata materia, vis augmentativa, quae pertinet ad speciem, extendit proportionaliter totam materiam in maiorem quantitatem. Non tamen ita augmentatur materia carnis, quod cuilibet parti materiae aliquid addatur: quia neque quaelibet pars materiae manet, sed quaedam defluit, consumpta scilicet per calorem, et quaedam advenit, restituta scilicet per nutrimentum. Et ita non oportet neque incorporeo augeri, neque duo corpora esse simul, neque corpus quod augetur esse vacuum. Quia si non plus fuit id quod restituitur per alimentum, quam id quod fuit per calorem consumptum, virtus naturalis, quae pertinet ad speciem, restituit id quod advenit, in locum eius quod periit. Si autem fuerit plus quod ex alimento generatum est, virtus naturalis extendit illud in maiorem quantitatem secundum aliquam dimensionem, et ita occupat maiorem locum. Sed quia species semper manet, necesse est dicere quod cuilibet parti formae vel speciei proportionaliter aliquid advenit, et quaelibet augeatur. Neque propter hoc sequitur duo corpora esse in eodem loco: quia formae et speciei non debetur locus nisi ratione materiae in qua fundatur, quae est proprie subiectum quantitatis dimensivae.
          <td>Thus, therefore, when a body grows, so indeed does the matter of the flesh, since more is generated by food than is lost by the action of heat, and so, as the matter is multiplied, the augmentative power, which pertains to the species, proportionally spreads out the whole matter into greater quantity. Yet the matter of flesh is not increased in such a way that to each part of the matter something is added — for not every part of the matter remains but some falls away, having been consumed by heat, and some comes, having been restored by food. Therefore, there is no need for things to be increased by something incorporeal, nor for two bodies to be in the same place, nor for the body that grows to be void. For if what is renewed through food does not exceed what has been consumed by heat, the natural power, which pertains to the species, restores what comes in the place of that which was lost. But if what is generated from the food exceeds, the natural power extends it into a larger quantity according to some dimension, and thus it occupies a greater place. But because the species remains constant, we must say that something comes proportionally to each part of the form or species and that each part is increased proportionally. But it does not follow from this that there are two bodies in the same place, because place is not assigned to form or species except by reason of the matter in which it is based and which is properly the subject of dimensive quantity.
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          <td>Si autem intelligatur caro secundum speciem, quae est generata ex humido seminali, caro autem secundum materiam, quae est generata ex humido nutrimentali, ut Alexander posuit; videtur hoc verbum Aristotelis, scilicet quod caro secundo materiam defluit et adveniat, non autem caro secundum speciem, magis esse dictum probabiliter quam secundum aliquam necessariam rationem. Cum enim necesse sit utrumque humidum in unam massam coniungi, ad perficiendum quantitatem totius corporis et omnium partium eius, non potest ex necessitate probari quod calor ita consumat unum, altero permanente semper. Non est autem credibile quod Aristoteles in tali re aliquid sine ratione necessaria dixisset, ut Averroes dicit in expositione huius loci.
          <td>But if one should understand by "flesh according to species" that which is generated from the seminal moisture, and by "flesh according to matter" that which is generated from the nutritive moisture, as Alexander posited, then this statement of Aristotle, namely, that flesh according to matter flows out and comes in, but not flesh according to species, appears to be more in the nature of something probable, than as having any necessary foundation. For, since it is necessary for both moistures to be combined into one mass in order to perfect the quantity of the whole body and all its parts, one cannot prove with necessity that heat so consumes the one in such a way as to leave the other always remaining. But it is not easy to think that Aristotle in such a matter would state something without a necessary reason, as Averroes says in his exposition of this passage.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: in anomoeomeris etc., ostendit in quibus partibus praedicta solutio sit magis manifesta. Et dicit quod id quod dictum est, magis est manifestum in <i>anomoeomeris</i>, idest in membris dissimilium partium, puta in manu, quam videmus proportionaliter augeri: proportionabiliter enim augetur tota manus et quilibet digitus, et etiam quilibet articulus. Et hoc ideo, quia magis manifesta est distinctio speciei et materiae in huiusmodi membris, quam in carne et osse et aliis membris similibus. Quanto enim sunt propinquiora toti, tanto plenius recipiunt perfectionem formae, quae principaliter est actus totius: unde et operationes animae magis manifestae sunt in membris dissimilium partium, quam similium. Et ideo licet post mortem, per quam separatur anima a corpore, non solum non remaneat animal, sed etiam nulla pars animalis, nisi aequivoce, ut dicitur II de anima; tamen videtur quod magis post mortem animalis remaneat caro aut os, quam manus aut brachium, in quibus magis apparent operationes animae.
          <td>108. Then [108] he points out the parts in which this solution is more evident. And he says that what has been stated is more evident in "anomoeomera," i.e., members that possess unlike parts, such as the hand, which we observe to grow proportionally — for the entire hand and each finger and also each joint grow proportionally. The reason is that the distinction between species and matter is more plain in these members than in flesh and bone and other similar members. For the closer the members are to the whole the more fully they receive the perfection of the form which is principally the act of the whole. Consequently, the operations of the soul are more evident in members whose parts are unlike than in those that are alike. And therefore, although after death (in which the soul is separated from the body) not only does the animal not remain but no part of the animal remains, except equivocally, as is said in <i>On the Soul</i> II; yet flesh and bone would seem to remain more after death than-hand or arm, in which the operations of the soul are more evident.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quapropter est quidem etc., concludit epilogando summam solutionis: scilicet quod quodammodo quaelibet pars carnis est aucta, scilicet accipiendo carnem secundum speciem; et quodammodo non, scilicet accipiendo carnem secundum materiam.
          <td>109. Then [109] he concludes by giving a summary of the solution, namely, that in a certain sense each part of flesh is increased, i.e. if flesh is considered according to species; but in another sense each part is not increased, i.e., if flesh is considered according to matter.
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    <blockquote>
      Lecture 16<br>
      How growth takes place. Its difference from generation.
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 5 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Μεῖζον μέντοι τὸ ὅλον γέγονε προσελθόντος μέν τινος, ὃ κα(322a.) λεῖται τροφὴ καὶ ἐναντίον, μεταβάλλοντος δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, οἷον εἰ ξηρῷ προσίοι ὑγρόν, προσελθὸν δὲ μεταβάλοι καὶ γένοιτο ξηρόν· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς τὸ ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ αὐξάνεται, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἀνομοίῳ.
            <td>110 The whole, however, has become larger. And this increase is due (a) on the one hand to the accession of something, which is called 'food' and is said to be 'contrary' to flesh, but (b) on the other hand to the transformation of this food into the same form as that of flesh as if, e.g. 'moist' were to accede to 'dry' and, having acceded, were to be transformed and to become 'dry'. For in one sense 'Like grows by Like', but in another sense 'Unlike grows by Unlike'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις ποῖόν τι δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ᾧ αὐξάνεται. Φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι δυνάμει ἐκεῖνο, οἷον εἰ σάρξ, δυνάμει σάρκα.
            <td>111 One might discuss what must be the character of that 'whereby' a thing grows. Clearly it must be potentially that which is growing—potentially flesh, e.g. if it is flesh that is growing. Actually, therefore, it must be 'other' than the growing thing. This 'actual other', then, has passed-away and come-to-be flesh.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐντελεχείᾳ ἄρα ἄλλο· φθαρὲν δὴ τοῦτο σὰρξ γέγονεν. Οὐκοῦν οὐ τοῦτο αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό· γένεσις γὰρ ἂν ἦν, οὐκ αὔξησις· ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐξανόμενον τούτῳ. Τί οὖν παθὸν ὑπὸ τούτου [ηὐξήθη]; ἢ μιχθέν, ὥσπερ οἴνῳ εἴ τις ἐπιχέοι ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ δύναιτο οἶνον ποιεῖν τὸ μιχθέν; καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ ἁψάμενον τοῦ καυστοῦ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ αὐξανομένῳ καὶ ὄντι ἐντελεχείᾳ σαρκὶ τὸ ἐνὸν αὐξητικὸν προσελθόντος δυνάμει σαρκὸς ἐποίησεν ἐντελεχείᾳ σάρκα. Οὐκοῦν ἅμα ὄντος· εἰ γὰρ χωρίς, γένεσις. Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτω πῦρ ποιῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐπιθέντα ξύλα. Ἀλλ' οὕτω μὲν αὔξησις, ὅταν δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ξύλα ἁφθῇ, γένεσις.
            <td>112 But it has not been transformed into flesh alone by itself (for that would have been a coming-to-be, not a growth): on the contrary, it is the growing thing which has come-to-be flesh (and grown) by the food. In what way, then, has the food been modified by the growing thing? Perhaps we should say that it has been 'mixed' with it, as if one were to pour water into wine and the wine were able to convert the new ingredient into wine. And as fire lays hold of the inflammable, so the active principle of growth, dwelling in the growing thing that which is actually flesh), lays hold of an acceding food which is potentially flesh and converts it into actual flesh. The acceding food, therefore, must be together with the growing thing: for if it were apart from it, the change would be a coming-to-be. For it is possible to produce fire by piling logs on to the already burning fire. That is 'growth'. But when the logs themselves are set on fire, that is 'coming-to-be'.
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          <td>Solutis dubitationibus quae erant circa augmentum, hic philosophus determinat modum augmenti.
          <td>110. Having solved the questions which concerned the nature of growth, the Philosopher here determines the manner of growth.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo determinat qualiter fiat augmentum;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo determinat qualiter fiat deminutio, ibi: hoc autem species sine materia et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he determines how growth takes place;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, how diminution takes place (end of L. 17).
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          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ostendit qualiter se habeat id quod advenit, ad id quod augetur eo adveniente;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo comparat augmentum aliis operationibus animae vegetabilis, ibi: quaeret autem aliquis et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows how that which comes is related to that which is increased by its coming;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, he compares growth to the other operations of the vegetative soul, at 111.
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          <td>Dicit ergo primo quod, soluta quaestione de partibus eius quod augetur, utrum quaelibet augeatur vel non, manifestum est quod totum fit maius aliquo adveniente, puta cibo. Licet autem adveniens in principio sit ei contrarium cui advenit, secundum aliquam contrarietatem passionum, sed tamen postmodum transmutatur in eandem speciem; puta si sicco adveniat id quod est a principio humidum, quod cum advenerit, transmutatur et fit siccum. Et ita quodammodo verum est dicere quod simile augetur simili, quodammodo autem verum est dicere quod aliquid augetur dissimili: nam id quo aliquid augetur, in principio quidem est dissimile, in fine autem simile, ut dictum est.
          <td>He says therefore first [110] that after settling the question of the parts of that which grows, namely, whether each part grows or not, it is now plain that the whole becomes larger as a result of something coming to it — for example, food. Now although that which comes is in the beginning contrary to what it comes to, yet later it is converted into the same species. For example, if something originally moist comes to what is dry, it is changed and made dry. Consequently it is in a sense true to say that like is increased by like; but it is also in a sense true to say that something is increased by what is unlike, For that by which something is increased is in the beginning unlike but at the end like, as has been said.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: quaeret autem aliquis etc., comparat augmentum aliis operationibus animae vegetabilis; cuius operationes sunt tres, ut dicitur in II de anima, scilicet generatio, nutrimentum et augmentum.
          <td>111. Then [111] he compares growth with the other operations of the soul, whose operations are three, as is stated in <i>On the Soul</i> II, namely, generation, nutrition and growth.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Primo ergo comparat augmentum generationi;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo nutrimento, ibi: quantum autem universale et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, therefore, he compares growth to generation;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, to nutrition (L. 17).
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          <td>Circa primum duo facit:
          <td>About the first he does two things:
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            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">primo ostendit similitudinem augmenti et generationis;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo differentiam, ibi: non igitur hoc ipsum et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows how growth and generation are alike;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, how they differ, at 112.
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          <td>Movet igitur quaestionem circa primum, <i>quale</i> oporteat esse, idest cuius formae, id quo augetur. Et concludit manifestum esse ex praemissis quod id quo aliquid augetur, est in potentia ad id quod augetur; puta, si caro est quod augetur, id quo augetur oportet esse in potentia carnem: quia, sicut supra dictum est, id quo aliquid augetur, est in principio dissimile, in fine autem simile. Et quia nihil est in potentia ad unum, quin sit in actu aliquid aliud, oportet id quo augetur caro, quod est in potentia ad carnem, esse actu aliquid aliud quam carnem, puta panis. Quod autem est actu aliquid, non fit aliud nisi per prioris corruptionem et sequentis generationem: oportet igitur augmentum fieri corrupto eo quod prius erat actu, puta pane, et generato eo quod augetur, puta carne. Et sic manifestum est quod in augmento aliqualiter concurrit generatio.
          <td>Therefore [111] he asks, concerning the first, "of what sort," i.e., of what form, must that be by which something is increased. And he concludes that it is plain from the foregoing that that by which something is increased is in potency to what is increased; for example, if flesh is what is increased, that by which it is increased must be flesh in potency, because, as was said above, that by which it is increased must be unlike in the beginning, but like at the end. And since nothing is in potency to one thing without being something else in act, then that by which flesh is increased and which is in potency to flesh, must be in act something other than flesh, e.g., bread. But what is something in act does not become something other but by the corruption of the former and the generation of the latter. Therefore growth must take place following the corruption of that which previously existed in act, e.g., bread, and the generation of that which grows, e.g., flesh. Thus it is plain that, in some manner, generation concurs in growth.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: non igitur hoc ipsum etc., ostendit differentiam augmenti et generationis: dicens quod, cum in augmento sit quaedam generatio carnis, cum aliud sit augmentatio a generatione, sequitur quod non generetur <i>secundum seipsum</i>, idest separatim, quando aliquid generatur (quia sic non esset augmentum, sed generatio); sed oportet generari carnem in carnem quae augetur. Sic igitur hoc quod fit caro in eo quod augetur, est patiens, inquantum scilicet transmutatur in similitudinem eius quod augetur; et ab hoc, scilicet passo et transmutato, augmentatum est vel id cui additur, vel totum mixtum. Et est simile sicut si aliquis vino praeexistenti superinfundat aquam hoc modo, quod vinum sua virtute potest aquam commixtam convertere in sui naturam: tunc enim dicitur esse augmentum vini, non generatio. Cum autem liquor aliquis secundum se in vinum convertitur, puta uva, est vini generatio.
          <td>112. Then [112] he shows how growth and generation differ. And he says that, since growth involves a certain generation of flesh, but growth is different from generation, it follows that there is not generation of a thing "according to itself," i.e., separately, when something is thus generated (for that would make it generation and not growth). Rather flesh must be generated into the flesh which grows. Consequently that which becomes flesh in the growing thing, undergoes, in so far, namely, as it is made like that which is increased, and by means of this, namely, of what has undergone and been changed, that to which it is added, or the whole compound, is increased. A similar situation occurs when water is poured into pre-existing wine in such a way that the wine, by its power, is able to convert the added water into its own nature; in such a case there is said to be an increase of wine, but not generation. But when some liquid is converted into wine according to itself, for example, the juice of grapes, there is then generation of wine.
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          <td>Aliud autem exemplum ponit de igne, qui adurit corpora ustibilia sibi coniuncta. Et ita contingit in eo quod augetur, quod est actu caro, cuius virtus augmentativa id quod advenit, existens in potentia ad carnem, facit actu carnem; ita tamen quod sit simul cum carne praeexistente. Si enim ex aliquo quod est in potentia caro, seorsum fieret caro, esset generatio carnis, non augmentum; sicut accidit cum ex virtute seminis sanguis menstruus in carnem convertitur. Et hoc etiam accidit circa ignem: contingit enim quandoque quod ligna igniuntur adiuncta igni praeexistenti, et hoc est augmentatio ignis: quando vero ipsa ligna incenduntur seorsum, non adiuncta aliis lignis adustis, tunc est generatio.
          <td>He gives another example, that of fire which burns combustible material added to it. For that is what happens in a growing thing, which is flesh in act, and whose augmentative power makes that which comes, and which is flesh in potency, to be flesh in act — in such a way, however, that it is with the pre-existing flesh. For if, out of something potentially flesh, flesh were produced separately, there would be generation of flesh, not growth. This is what happens when, by the power of the seed, the menstrual blood is changed into flesh. This also happens in the case of fire: sometimes pieces of wood are ignited upon being added to an already-existing fire — and this is an increase of fire; but sometimes the pieces of wood are ignited apart, not added to other burning pieces — then there is generation.
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    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      Lecture 17<br>
      Comparison of growth, to food. How diminution occurs
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            <td colspan="2"><b>Chapter 5 cont.</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ποσὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν καθόλου οὐ γίνεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ζῷον ὃ μήτ' ἄνθρωπος μήτε τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα· ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνταῦθα τὸ καθόλου, κἀκεῖ τὸ ποσόν. Σὰρξ δὲ ἢ ὀστοῦν ἢ χεὶρ καὶ τούτων τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ.
            <td>113 'Quantum-in-general' does not come-to-be any more than 'animal' which is neither man nor any other of the specific forms of animal: what 'animal-in-general' is in coming-to-be, that 'quantum-in-general' is in growth. But what does come-to-be in growth is flesh or bone—or a hand or arm (i.e. the tissues of these organic parts).
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Προσελθόντος μὲν δή τινος ποσοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐ σαρκὸς ποσῆς.
            <td>114 Such things come-to-be, then, by the accession not of quantified-flesh but of a quantified-something.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἧι μὲν οὖν δυνάμει τὸ συναμφότερον, οἷον ποσὴ σάρξ, ταύτῃ μὲν αὔξει· καὶ γὰρ ποσὴν δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ σάρκα· ᾗ δὲ μόνον σάρξ, τρέφει· ταύτῃ γὰρ διαφέρει τροφὴ καὶ αὔξησις τῷ λόγῳ.
            <td>115 In so far as this acceding food is potentially the double result e.g. is potentially so-much-flesh—it produces growth: for it is bound to become actually both so-much and flesh. But in so far as it is potentially flesh only, it nourishes: for it is thus that 'nutrition' and 'growth' differ by their definition.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Διὸ τρέφεται μὲν ἕως ἂν σώζηται καὶ φθῖνον, αὐξάνεται δὲ οὐκ ἀεί,
            <td>116 That is why a body's' nutrition' continues so long as it is kept alive (even when it is diminishing), though not its 'growth';
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">καὶ ἡ τροφὴ τῇ αὐξήσει τὸ αὐτὸ μέν, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἄλλο· ᾗ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ προσιὸν δυνάμει ποσὴ σάρξ, ταύτῃ μὲν αὐξητικὸν σαρκός, ᾗ δὲ μόνον δυνάμει σάρξ, τροφή.
            <td>117 and why nutrition, though 'the same' as growth, is yet different from it in its actual being. For in so far as that which accedes is potentially 'so much-flesh' it tends to increase flesh: whereas, in so far as it is potentially 'flesh' only, it is nourishment.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄνευ ὕλης, οἷον αὐλός, δύναμίς τις ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστίν. Ἐὰν δέ τις προσίῃ ὕλη, οὖσα δυνάμει αὐλός, ἔχουσα καὶ τὸ ποσὸν δυνάμει, οὗτοι ἔσονται μείζους αὐλοί. Ἐὰν δὲ μηκέτι ποιεῖν δύνηται, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕδωρ οἴνῳ ἀεὶ πλεῖον μιγνύμενον τέλος ὑδαρῆ ποιεῖ καὶ ὕδωρ, τότε φθίσιν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποσοῦ, τὸ δ' εἶδος μένει.
            <td>118 The form of which we have spoken is a kind of power immersed in matter—a duct, as it were. If, then, a matter accedes—a matter, which is potentially a duct and also potentially possesses determinate quantity the ducts to which it accedes will become bigger. But if it is no longer able to act—if it has been weakened by the continued influx of matter, just as water, continually mixed in greater and greater quantity with wine, in the end makes the wine watery and converts it into water—then it will cause a diminution of the quantum; though still the form persists.
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          <td>Postquam philosophus comparavit augmentum generationi, hic comparat augmentum alimento.
          <td>113. After comparing growth with generation, the Philosopher here compares growth with food.
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          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Et primo ostendit quomodo se habet id quod auget ad illud quod nutrit;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">secundo quomodo se habet augmentum ad nutrimentum, ibi: et nutrimentum et cetera.
          <td>
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">First, he shows how that which grows is related to that which nourishes;
            <p style="margin-left:.4in;text-indent:-.2in;margin-top:0">Secondly, how growth is related to nourishment, at 117.
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          <td>Circa primum tria facit.
          <td>With regard to the first he does three things:
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          <td>Primo ostendit quid sit id quod augetur, idest quod sit quantum. Et dicit quod quantum universale non generatur nec fit, sicut nec animal universale nec homo universalis nec <i>aliquid singularium</i>, idest nec aliqua specierum, puta nec leo universalis nec bos universalis: sed sicut in illis generatur universale, scilicet in aliquo particulari, puta cum generatur hoc animal aut hic homo, ita et <i>illic</i>, scilicet in augmento, generatur quantum, non quidem in universali, sed in aliquo determinato, sicut cum fit quanta caro aut os aut manus, et his similia.
          <td>First he shows what is the nature of that which is increased, namely, that it is something quantified. And he says [113] that there is not generated or produced a universal quantum, any more than a universal animal or a universal man or "any of the singulars," i.e., any of the singular species — for example, neither a universal lion, nor a universal ox. But just as the universal is generated in these, namely, in some individual — for example, when this animal or this man is generated — so too here, i.e., in growth, a quantum is generated, not in the universal, but in something determinate, as when there is produced a certain quantity of flesh or bone or hand, and similar things.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: adveniente quidem etc., ostendit quid sit illud quod auget: fit enim augmentum adveniente aliquo, ut supra dictum est. Sed si per augmentum fieret quantum in universali, oporteret illud quod advenit esse quantum in potentia, et nullo modo in actu: sed quia non generatur quantum in universali, sed hoc quantum, puta caro, oportet illud quod advenit esse quidem aliquid quantum in actu, non autem carnem quantam, sed solum in potentia.
          <td>114. Secondly, at [114] he shows what that is which causes increase - for increase comes about by the accession of something, as was said above. But if by growth there were produced quantity in a universal way, the acceding thing would have had to have been quantified in potency and in no way in act. But because there is not generated quantity in a universal way, but this quantified thing — for example, flesh — the acceding thing has to be something quantified in act, but not, however, quantified flesh, except potentially.
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          <td>Tertio ibi: secundum id igitur etc., concludit differentiam eius quod auget et eius quod nutrit. Et primo ponit differentiam. Et dicit quod inquantum illud quod advenit est in potentia ad utrumque, puta ad hoc quod sit <i>quanta caro</i>, ut scilicet non solum sit aptum recipere speciem carnis, sed etiam in maiorem quantitatem produci, secundum hoc auget. Ad hoc enim quod sit augmentum, oportet fieri et quantum, ut scilicet fiat maior quantitas, et carnem: quia oportet id quod advenit, in fine assimilari, ut supra dictum est. Inquantum vero illud quod advenit est in potentia solum ad hoc quod sit caro, secundum hoc nutrit. Sic enim differunt secundum rationem cibus et augmentatio: nam cibus nutriens est inquantum convertitur in carnem, inquantum autem suscipit maiorem quantitatem, est augens.
          <td>115. Thirdly [115], he concludes to the difference between that which increases and that which nourishes. First he sets down the difference and says that in so far as the acceding thing is in potency to both — for example, to being a "quantity of flesh," so that it is not only capable of receiving the species of flesh, but also of being extended to a greater quantity — in this respect it increases. For in order for growth to take place, there must be produced both quantity (so as, namely, to produce a greater quantity), and flesh (since the acceding thing must become "like" at the end, as was said above.) But in so far as the acceding thing is in potency only to become flesh, in this respect it nourishes. Thus do food and growth differ according to notion: for food nourishes in so far as it is converted into flesh, but in so far as it takes on a greater quantity, i.e., produces it in the thing nourished, it increases.
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          <td>Secundo ibi: ideo nutritur etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex eo quod dictum est, videlicet quod aliquis nutritur <i>quousque salvatur</i>, idest quandiu conservatur in vita: quia semper oportet restitui per nutrimentum id quod continue solvitur; idest, id quod deminuitur oportet nutriri. Non autem semper animal augetur: sed quandiu cibus conversus in carnem potest extendi in maiorem quantitatem.
          <td>116. Secondly [116] he states a certain corollary flowing from what has been said, namely, that a thing is nourished "so long as it is preserved," i.e., so long as it is kept alive. For it is always necessary to restore by nourishment that which is continuously lost — that is, that which diminishes has to be nourished. But an animal is not always growing, but only so long as the food converted into flesh can be extended into a greater quantity.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: et nutrimentum etc., ostendit differentiam inter ipsum augmentum et nutrimentum. Et dicit quod nutrimentum est idem quod ipsum augmentum, esse autem est eis aliud: quasi dicat: sunt idem subiecto, sed differunt ratione. Inquantum enim illud quod advenit est in potentia ad utrumque, idest ad hoc quod sit quanta caro, secundum hoc est augmentum carnis: inquantum vero est in potentia solum ad hoc quod sit caro, secundum hoc est nutrimentum aut cibus, ut supra expositum est.
          <td>117. Then [117] he shows the difference between growth and nourishment. And he says that nourishment is the same thing as growth, but they differ in being — as if to say: they are the same as to subject but differ in notion. For in so far as the acceding thing is in potency to both, i.e., to quantity and to flesh, in this respect there is growth of flesh; but in so far as it is in potency only to flesh, it is nourishment or food, as was explained above.
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          <td>Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem species sine materia etc., ostendit quomodo fiat deminutio. Ad evidentiam autem horum quae hic dicuntur, considerandum est quod virtus speciei aliter se habet in rebus viventibus, quae proprie nutriuntur et augentur, et in rebus carentibus vita, quae neque nutriuntur neque augentur. Corpora enim viventia movent seipsa, non solum secundum motum localem, sed etiam secundum motum alterationis, puta cum animal naturaliter sanatur; et etiam secundum motum augmentationis et generationis, praesertim secundum quod nutrimentum est generatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est, inquantum scilicet, etsi non generetur caro secundum se, aggeneratur tamen carni praeexistenti.
          <td>118. Then [118] he shows how diminution occurs. And the better to understand what is said here, we should reflect that the power of the species is otherwise in living things which are properly nourished and grow, and in things without life which are neither nourished nor grow. For living bodies move themselves not only with respect to local motion but also with respect to the motion of alteration, as when an animal is naturally healed, and with respect to the motions of growth and generation, especially in the sense in which nourishment is a certain generation, as was said above, in so far, namely, as, although flesh is not generated in itself, it is generated into the already existing flesh.
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          <td>Omne autem movens seipsum, ut probatum est in VIII Physic., dividitur in duo, quorum unum est movens, aliud vero motum. Unde oportet quod in re vivente sit aliquid motum, quod scilicet convertitur in naturam speciei, et aliquid movens, scilicet ipsa virtus speciei convertens. Et inde est quod virtus speciei in rebus viventibus non determinat sibi aliquam materiam signatam, cum una pars effluat et alia adveniat, ut supra dictum est. Non potest tamen virtus speciei esse absque omni materia, sed indeterminate in hac vel in illa: quia, ut probatur in VII Metaphys., virtus generantis est forma quae est in his carnibus et in his ossibus.
          <td>Now whatever moves itself is, as was proved in <i>Physics</i> VIII, divided into two: one of which is the mover, and the other is moved. Consequently, it is necessary that in a living thing there be something moved, namely, whatever is converted into the nature of the species; and something moving, namely, the power of the species, which does the converting. This explains why the virtue of the species in living things does not appropriate to itself some certain signate matter, since one part flows out and another arrives, as was said above. Yet the virtue of the species cannot be without any matter, but indeterminately in this or that, since, as was proved in <i>Metaphysics</i> VII, the virtue of the thing that generates is a form existing in this flesh and in these bones.
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          <td>In rebus autem inanimatis nihil tale invenitur: nisi forte inquantum est in eis aliqua similitudo augmenti et nutrimenti, puta in igne et vino, propter efficaciam virtutis activae in eis. Sic igitur virtus speciei carnis vel cuiuscumque huiusmodi, inquantum non determinat sibi aliquam materiam signatam, sed nunc salvatur in hac nunc in illa, est sicut species immaterialis.
          <td>Now, in non-living things no such condition is found except perhaps in so far as there is in them some likeness of growth and nourishment, as, for example, in fire and in wine because of the efficacy of their active power. Consequently, the virtue of the species in flesh or in anything similar, in so far as it does not designate for itself any signate matter, but is now preserved in this, now in that, is as a certain immaterial species.
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          <td>Hoc est ergo quod hic philosophus ostendit, quod <i>hoc</i>, scilicet virtus speciei carnis, est species sine materia, ac si sit quaedam immaterialis potentia, quantum ad hoc quod non determinat sibi materiam signatam: est tamen semper in aliqua materia.
          <td>This, therefore, is what the Philosopher here shows, namely, that "this," i.e., the virtue of the species of flesh, is a species without matter, as though it were a certain immaterial potency in the respect that it does not determine for itself signate matter. Yet it is always in some matter.
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          <td>Et eadem ratio est de quocumque alio organo, puta de osse aut nervo aut quocumque huiusmodi. Si ergo advenerit aliqua materia quae sit in potentia, non solum ad hanc speciem, quae quodammodo est immaterialis, sed etiam sit in potentia ad maiorem quantitatem, <i>hae erunt maiores immateriales</i>, idest, ipsae virtutes speciei quae sunt in carne et osse et huiusmodi, extenduntur in maiorem quantitatem.
          <td>What has been said applies also to every other organ, such as bone or sinew and anything similar. Consequently, if there should accede some matter which is in potency not only to this species which is in a sense immaterial, but also to greater quantity, then there will be "greater immaterialities," i.e., the virtues of the species that exist in flesh and bone and so on are extended to a greater quantity.
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          <td>Sed hoc non semper potest fieri: quia virtus speciei debilitatur, cum sit in materia contrarietati subiecta, per continuam actionem et passionem, et per adiunctionem materiae extraneae, quae non ita perfecte recipit virtutem speciei sicut prius erat. Quando ergo non potest hoc amplius virtus speciei facere, ut scilicet tantum convertat de nutrimento, quod sit in potentia, non solum ad speciem et ad maiorem quantitatem, sed nec etiam ad aequalem, tunc fit deminutio quantitatis, et tamen conservatur species in quantitate minori. Et finaliter etiam species cessat: sicut si aqua magis et magis vino misceatur, fiet vinum aquatum, et finaliter corrumpetur vinum et fiet totaliter aqua.
          <td>But this cannot always occur: for the virtue of the species becomes weakened (since it is present in a matter subject to contrariety), by continually acting and being acted upon, and by the accession of extraneous matter which does not receive the virtue of the species as perfectly as before. Consequently, when the virtue of the species cannot do this any longer, i.e., convert, of the food which is in potency, not only not as much as is required for the species and a greater quantity, but not even so much as is required for an equal quantity, then diminution of quantity occurs, although the virtue of the species is still preserved in the smaller quantity. But at last even the species ceases, just as, if more and more water should be mixed with wine, it will become watered wine, and then finally the wine will be corrupted, and there will be wholly water.
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    <h2 align="center" style="color:blue"><a href="GenCorrup.htm#2.12"></a> <a name="18" id="18">HERE ENDS THE EXPOSITION OF ST. THOMAS.</a></h2><a name="18" id="18">
    <p align="center">An anonymous commentator continues:
    <hr>
    <p align="center"><b>Lectio 18</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">6
            <td>6
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">(322b.) Ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτον δεῖ περὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων εἰπεῖν, εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ πότερον ἀίδιον ἕκαστον ἢ γίνεταί πως, καὶ εἰ γίνεται, πότερον ἐξ ἀλλήλων γίνεται πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἤ τι πρῶτον ἓν αὐτῶν ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη δὴ πρότερον εἰπεῖν περὶ ὧν ἀδιορίστως λέγεται νῦν.
            <td>(In discussing the causes of coming-to-be) we must first investigate the matter, i.e. the so-called 'elements'. We must ask whether they really are clements or not, i.e. whether each of them is eternal or whether there is a sense in which they come-to-be: and, if they do come-to-be, whether all of them come-to-be in the same manner reciprocally out of one another, or whether one amongst them is something primary. Hence we must begin by explaining certain preliminary matters, about which the statements now current are vague.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Πάντες γὰρ οἵ τε τὰ στοιχεῖα γεννῶντες καὶ οἱ τὰ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων διακρίσει χρῶνται καὶ συγκρίσει καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. Ἔστι δ' ἡ σύγκρισις μίξις· πῶς δὲ μίγνυσθαι λέγομεν, οὐ διώρισται σαφῶς. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δυνατόν, οὐδὲ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, μηδενὸς ποιοῦντος μηδὲ πάσχοντος· καὶ γὰρ οἱ πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες γεννῶσι τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀνάγκη λέγειν τὴν ποίησιν, καὶ τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς λέγει Διογένης, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἦν ἅπαντα, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν ψύχεσθαι καὶ τοῦτο θερμαίνεσθαι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥστε ἐν οἷς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐστι καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τούτων μίαν εἶναι τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντα εἶναι τοιαῦτα φάσκειν οὐκ ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν καὶ περὶ μίξεως θεωρητέον, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς· οὔτε γὰρ ποιεῖν ταῦτα καὶ πάσχειν δύναται κυρίως ἃ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅψασθαι ἀλλήλων, οὔτε μὴ ἁψάμενά πως ἐνδέχεται μιχθῆναι πρῶτον. Ὥστε περὶ τριῶν τούτων διοριστέον, τί ἁφὴ καὶ τί μίξις καὶ τί ποίησις. Ἀρχὴν δὲ λάβωμεν τήνδε. Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ὅσοις ἐστὶ μίξις, εἶναι ταῦτ' ἀλλήλων ἁπτικά· κἂν εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ πάσχει κυρίως, καὶ τούτοις ὡσαύτως. Διὸ πρῶτον λεκτέον περὶ ἁφῆς.
            <td>For all (the pluralist philosophers)—those who generate the 'elements' as well as those who generate the bodies that are compounded of the elements—make use of 'dissociation' and 'association', and of 'action' and 'passion'. Now 'association' is 'combination'; but the precise meaning of the process we call 'combining' has not been explained. Again, (all the monists make use of 'alteration': but) without an agent and a patient there cannot be 'altering' any more than there can be 'dissociating' and 'associating'. For not only those who postulate a plurality of elements employ their reciprocal action and passion to generate the compounds: those who derive things from a single element are equally compelled to introduce 'acting'. And in this respect Diogenes is right when he argues that 'unless all things were derived from one, reciprocal action and passion could not have occurred'. The hot thing, e.g. would not be cooled and the cold thing in turn be warmed: for heat and cold do not change reciprocally into one another, but what changes (it is clear) is the substratum. Hence, whenever there is action and passion between two things, that which underlies them must be a single something. No doubt, it is not true to say that all things are of this character: but it is true of all things between which there is reciprocal action and passion. But if we must investigate 'action-passion' and 'combination', we must also investigate 'contact'. For action and passion (in the proper sense of the terms) can only occur between things which are such as to touch one another; nor can things enter into combination at all unless they have come into a certain kind of contact. Hence we must give a definite account of these three things—of 'contact', 'combination', and 'acting'. Let us start as follows. All things which admit of 'combination' must be capable of reciprocal contact: and the same is true of any two things, of which one 'acts' and the other 'suffers action' in the proper sense of the terms. For this reason we must treat of 'contact' first.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὁμωνύμως τὰ δὲ θάτερα ἀπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων καὶ τῶν προτέρων, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς. Ὅμως δὲ τὸ κυρίως λεγόμενον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἔχουσι θέσιν, θέσις δ' οἷσπερ (323a.) καὶ τόπος· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ὁμοίως ἀποδοτέον ἁφὴν καὶ τόπον, εἴτ' ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἴτ' ἄλλον τρόπον. Εἰ οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ διωρίσθη πρότερον, τὸ ἅπτεσθαι τὸ τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχειν ἅμα, ταῦτα ἂν ἅπτοιτο ἀλλήλων ὅσα διωρισμένα μεγέθη καὶ θέσιν ἔχοντα ἅμα ἔχει τὰ ἔσχατα. Ἐπεὶ δὲ θέσις μὲν ὅσοις καὶ τόπος ὑπάρχει, τόπου δὲ διαφορὰ πρώτη τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἅπαντα τὰ ἀλλήλων ἁπτόμενα βάρος ἂν ἔχοι ἢ κουφότητα, ἢ ἄμφω ἢ θάτερον. Τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα παθητικὰ καὶ ποιητικά· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα ἅπτεσθαι πέφυκεν ἀλλήλων, ὧν διῃρημένων μεγεθῶν ἅμα τὰ ἔσχατά ἐστιν, ὄντων κινητικῶν καὶ κινητῶν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων.
            <td>Every term which possesses a variety of meaning includes those various meanings either owing to a mere coincidence of language, or owing to a real order of derivation in the different things to which it is applied: but, though this may be taken to hold of 'contact' as of all such terms, it is nevertheless true that contact' in the proper sense applies only to things which have 'position'. And 'position' belongs only to those things which also have a Place': for in so far as we attribute 'contact' to the mathematical things, we must also attribute 'place' to them, whether they exist in separation or in some other fashion. Assuming, therefore, that 'to touch' is—as we have defined it in a previous work'—'to have the extremes together', only those things will touch one another which, being separate magnitudes and possessing position, have their extremes 'together'. And since position belongs only to those things which also have a 'place', while the primary differentiation of 'place' is the above' and 'the below' (and the similar pairs of opposites), all things which touch one another will have 'weight' or 'lightness' either both these qualities or one or the other of them. But bodies which are heavy or light are such as to 'act' and 'suffer action'. Hence it is clear that those things are by nature such as to touch one another, which (being separate magnitudes) have their extremes 'together' and are able to move, and be moved by, one another.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινοῦν οὐχ ὁμοίως κινεῖ τὸ κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀνάγκη κινούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖν, τὸ δ' ἀκίνητον ὄν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐροῦμεν ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν τί φασι καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν κινεῖν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διαφέρει γε καὶ δεῖ διορίζειν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ ποιοῦν ἀντιθήσομεν τῷ πάσχοντι, τοῦτο δ' οἷς ἡ κίνησις πάθος.
            <td>The manner in which the 'mover' moves the moved' not always the same: on the contrary, whereas one kind of 'mover' can only impart motion by being itself moved, another kind can do so though remaining itself unmoved. Clearly therefore we must recognize a corresponding variety in speaking of the 'acting' thing too: for the 'mover' is said to 'act' (in a sense) and the 'acting' thing to 'impart motion'. Nevertheless there is a difference and we must draw a distinction. For not every 'mover' can 'act', if (a) the term 'agent' is to be used in contrast to 'patient'
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Πάθος δὲ καθ' ὅσον ἀλλοιοῦται μόνον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ θερμόν· ἀλλὰ τὸ κινεῖν ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ ποιεῖν ἐστιν. Ἐκεῖνο δ' οὖν φανερόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὰ κινοῦντα τῶν κινητῶν ἅπτοιτ' ἄν, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. Ἀλλ' ὁ διορισμὸς τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι καθόλου μὲν ὁ τῶν θέσιν ἐχόντων καὶ τοῦ μὲν κινητικοῦ τοῦ δὲ κινητοῦ, πρὸς ἄλληλα δὲ κινητικοῦ καὶ κινητοῦ, ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ἁπτόμενον ἁπτομένου ἁπτόμενον· καὶ γὰρ κινεῖ κινούμενα πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ ἐμποδών, ὅσοις ἀνάγκη καὶ φαίνεται τὸ ἁπτόμενον ἅπτεσθαι ἁπτομένου· ἔστι δ' ὡς ἐνίοτέ φαμεν τὸ κινοῦν ἅπτεσθαι μόνου τοῦ κινουμένου, τὸ δ' ἁπτόμενον μὴ ἅπτεσθαι ἁπτομένου· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κινεῖν κινούμενα τὰ ὁμογενῆ, ἀνάγκη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἁπτομένου ἅπτεσθαι. Ὥστε εἴ τι κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἂν ἅπτοιτο τοῦ κινητοῦ, ἐκείνου δὲ οὐδέν· φαμὲν γὰρ ἐνίοτε τὸν λυποῦντα ἅπτεσθαι ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὶ ἐκείνου. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἁφῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
            <td>and (b) 'patient' is to be applied only to those things whose motion is a 'qualitative affection'—i.e. a quality, like white' or 'hot', in respect to which they are moved' only in the sense that they are 'altered': on the contrary, to 'impart motion' is a wider term than to 'act'. Still, so much, at any rate, is clear: the things which are 'such as to impart motion', if that description be interpreted in one sense, will touch the things which are 'such as to be moved by them'—while they will not touch them, if the description be interpreted in a different sense. But the disjunctive definition of 'touching' must include and distinguish (a) 'contact in general' as the relation between two things which, having position, are such that one is able to impart motion and the other to be moved, and (b) 'reciprocal contact' as the relation between two things, one able to impart motion and the other able to be moved in such a way that 'action and passion' are predicable of them. As a rule, no doubt, if A touches B, B touches A. For indeed practically all the 'movers' within our ordinary experience impart motion by being moved: in their case, what touches inevitably must, and also evidently does, touch something which reciprocally touches it. Yet, if A moves B, it is possible—as we sometimes express it—for A 'merely to touch' B, and that which touches need not touch a something which touches it. Nevertheless it is commonly supposed that 'touching' must be reciprocal. The reason of this belief is that 'movers' which belong to the same kind as the 'moved' impart motion by being moved. Hence if anything imparts motion without itself being moved, it may touch the 'moved' and yet itself be touched by nothing—for we say sometimes that the man who grieves us 'touches' us, but not that we 'touch' him. The account just given may serve to distinguish and define the 'contact' which occurs in the things of Nature.
      </table>
    </blockquote>
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de generatione et corruptione in communi, et de aliis sequentibus, scilicet de augmentatione et alteratione, incipit determinare de quibusdam quae ad haec requiruntur. Et primo dat intentionem suam; secundo prosequitur intentum, ibi: fere quidem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo determinat intentionem suam; secundo ostendit necessitatem suae intentionis, ibi: omnes enim qui et elementa et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, cum oporteat dicere de materia circa quam est transmutatio elementorum; et de ipsis elementis, secundum contrarietates quae sunt in eis: utrum scilicet sint aut non; et utrum unum eorum sit sempiternum et intransmutabile, sicut supra dicit Empedocles, aut generantur; et si generantur, qualiter generantur: utrum scilicet generantur adinvicem aut moventur, aut est aliquod principium eorum, ex quo generantur, et in quod resolvuntur, sicut diversi dixerunt, ut Democritus atomos, Anaxagoras infinita secundum speciem; quia, inquam, illa determinare debemus, oportet prius determinare de quibusdam antecedentibus ad illa, <i>de quibus dicitur indeterminate nunc</i>; quod quidem potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo, quod philosophi sui temporis indeterminate et insufficienter dixerunt de ipsis, alio modo, quia de generatione indeterminate et confuse dictum est de ipsis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: omnes enim qui et elementa etc., ostendit necessitatem determinandi, dicens quod omnes philosophi tangentes elementa vel ex elementis generata, utuntur congregatione et segregatione. Quae enim ex elementis generantur, ex congregatione elementorum generantur, quae vero corrumpuntur, ex segregatione elementorum corrumpuntur; quae etiam dicebant agere et pati adinvicem. Cum ergo congregatio sit quaedam mixtura, oportet de mixtura determinare. Qualiter enim fiat mixtio et quid sit, non est adhuc manifeste determinatum. Cum autem nec alteratio nec congregatio vel segregatio possint fieri sine actione et passione, oportet prius determinare de actione et passione. Illi enim qui ponunt plura principia, dicunt esse generationem per actionem et passionem elementorum adinvicem. Similiter et illi qui ex uno materiali principio dicunt alia fieri, necesse habent ponere agere et pati. Ideo recte dixit Diogenes, cum dixit quod, nisi ex uno materiali principio fierent omnia, impossibile esset aliqua adinvicem transmutari. Aliter enim non posset calidum frigefieri, nec frigidum calefieri, nisi subesset una materia: impossibile est enim quod frigiditas sit caliditas, vel e converso; sed oportet quod habeant unum commune subjectum, per quod possint adinvicem transmutari. Quapropter quae agunt et patiuntur adinvicem, necesse est habere unam subiectam materiam, quae sit susceptiva contrariorum. Non tamen omnia agentia et patientia sunt <i>talia</i>, scilicet habentia unam materiam, sed solum illa quae agunt et patiuntur adinvicem. Sunt enim aliqua quae agendo non patiuntur, sicut substantiae separatae, et corpora caelestia; quae scilicet corpora, licet patiantur, utpote quae moventur, tamen non patiuntur ab his quae moventur ab eis. Ulterius autem, cum mixtio et facere et pati non possint fieri sine tactu (nam ea quae adinvicem non se tangunt, non possunt adinvicem agere et pati), ideo determinando de ipsis oportet de tactu tractare. Inter ista autem tria prius determinandum de tactu, quia tactus prior est: sequitur enim ad ista duo, sed non e converso. Necesse enim est quod ista quae miscentur, adinvicem se tangant, sed non convertitur. Similiter si aliquid agit et patitur ab eo, necesse est etiam quod ista se tangant, sed non convertitur. Cum ergo primum sit, a quo non convertitur consequentia, primum inter tria dicendum de tactu.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: fere quidem igitur etc., prosequitur intentum. Et circa hoc tria facit, secundum quod de tribus determinat. Primo determinat de tactu; secundo de facere et pati, ibi: de facere et pati etc.; tertio de mixtione, ibi: reliquum autem videndum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo distinguit hoc nomen tactus; secundo incipit agere de ipso, ibi: sed tamen principaliter et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod tactus dicitur multipliciter, sicut fere unumquodque aliorum nominum: quaedam enim dicuntur aequivoce, quaedam analogice et transumptive, sive metaphorice; ita etiam tactus dicitur proprie et transumptive. Dicit autem <i>fere</i>, quia forte non omnia dicuntur multipliciter.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen etc., prosequitur de tactu: et primo de tactu proprie sumpto; secundo de tactu sumpto transumptive, ibi: est autem ut aliquando et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo investigat definitionem tactus; secundo investigatam concludit, ibi: sed determinatio et cetera. Circa primum ponit conditiones quae requiruntur ad tactum. Est autem tactus, ut infra ponet, in habentibus positionem, quorum ultima sunt simul, moventibus et motis, activis et passivis adinvicem. Primo ergo manifestum supponit concludens primam conditionem, dicens quod tactus proprie et principaliter dictus est in habentibus positionem. Positio autem non est nisi in habentibus locum. Et ideo cum mathematica habeat positionem, sive sint separata secundum rem sive secundum rationem tantum, habent etiam locum. Nam sicut dicit Commentator super loco isto, licet mathematica abstrahantur ab aliis accidentibus, scilicet a motu et materia, impossibile est tamen ea imaginari sine loco, cum corpus naturale non sit in loco nisi secundum suas dimensiones, et non per alia accidentia. Locus ergo inseparabilis est a mathematicis corporibus. Ipsis tamen non convenit locus et tactus nisi per quandam similitudinem ad naturalia. Nulla enim vere sunt in loco, nisi naturalia secundum esse accepta; in quibus sunt mathematica secundum esse suum: et ideo etiam in ipsis habent locum et tactum. Nec accipiuntur hic secundum abstractionem ab esse, quia talis consideratio non est naturalis, sed mathematica; et ideo locus et tactus convenit eis, secundum quod talia, per posterius.
    <p>Secundo ibi: si igitur est ut determinatum etc., ponit secundam conditionem, dicens quod si ita est, ut dictum est in V Physic., quod tangere est habere ultima simul, illa se tangunt quae habent determinatas magnitudines et positionem, et quorum ultima sunt simul. Et inest secunda conditio, scilicet habere ultima simul.
    <p>Tertio ibi: quoniam autem positio etc., investigat tertiam conditionem, scilicet quod tactus est in moventibus et motis, dicens quod positio est in habentibus locum; et quia primae differentiae loci sunt sursum et deorsum ut dicitur in II de caelo, necesse est ut quae se tangunt, sint sursum aut deorsum. Ideo quae se tangunt, sunt gravia aut levia: aut ambo, sicut elementa media, quae sunt gravia et levia secundum diversos respectus ut dicitur in IV de caelo, aut alterum eorum, sicut extrema, quorum alterum est simpliciter grave, et alterum simpliciter leve. Omnia autem talia dum tangunt se, agunt et patiuntur adinvicem. Quapropter concludit manifestum esse quod illa proprie se tangunt, quorum diversae sunt magnitudines, et simul habent ultima, quae movent et moventur adinvicem per virtutem illorum ultimorum.
    <p>Quarto ibi: quoniam autem movens etc., investigat quartam conditionem, quae est quod tactus est in activis et passivis. Et dicit, quia non omne movens movetur, sed quoddam est movens motum, quoddam autem movens immobile (et hoc dupliciter: aliquid enim simpliciter nullo modo movetur, sicut movens primum, aliquod autem movens non movetur a moto, licet moveatur ab aliquo), secundum quorundam existimationem agens etiam invenitur in istis duobus modis: quia quidam dicunt quod actus moventis est quoddam facere, et e converso quod actus facientis est quoddam movere. Quod tamen falsum est: differunt enim movens et faciens; quorum differentiam oportet nos determinare. Si enim nos dicimus quod faciens opponitur secundum suam speciem patienti, tunc, cum contraria nata sint fieri circa idem, oportet quod faciens patiatur cum tangat ipsum. Haec autem sunt <i>quibus motus est passio</i>, idest quae movendo patiuntur secundum alterationem aliquam. Alteratio autem sola est secundum passiones, idest passibiles qualitates, ut secundum calidum vel frigidum. Cum ergo calidum contrarietur frigido, et album nigro, et sic in aliis, duo possunt concludi: primum scilicet, quod agens et patiens habent contrarias qualitates; secundum est quod, cum non omne movens sit tale, non omne movens est agens. In plus ergo erit movere quam agere. Ex his ergo quae dicta sunt concludit corollarium quoddam, dicens quod moventia immobilia tangunt ipsa mobilia; est autem ut sic, est autem ut non sic: quia tangunt per ultimum virtutis egredientis ab esse eorum, sed non tangunt per ultimum suae quantitatis tantum. Quia si sunt immobilia simpliciter, ut substantiae separatae, non habent ultimum; si vero sint ab his quae movent, immobilia, sicut astra non moventur a terra quam movent, et tunc non habent ultima simul cum ultimis illorum quae moventur. Ad evidentiam illorum quae hic dicuntur considerandum est, quod agens sive faciens potest sumi dupliciter. Uno modo communiter, prout scilicet virtus alicuius procedit quocumque modo in id quod subiicitur sibi: et hoc modo superius est ad movens. Alio modo potest sumi naturaliter sive physice: et hoc modo in minus est quam movens, et opponitur secundum suam speciem patienti.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed determinatio tangere etc., concludit investigatam definitionem tactus, dicens quod determinatur vel definitur ipsum tangere universaliter, quod est in habentibus positionem, moventibus et motis, a se invicem activis et passivis. Et ex hoc concludit ulterius quoddam corollarium, quod frequentius et fortius dicitur esse tactum omne agens naturale quod tangendo tangitur: quia fere omnia quae sunt in conspectu nostro circa locum activorum et passivorum, movent mota, in quibus necessario videtur esse tactus.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: est autem etc., determinat de tactu improprie dicto, dicens quod sicut <i>inquimus</i>, idest dicimus, quoddam est movens quod solum tangit id quod movetur, sed id quod tangitur, scilicet ipsum motum, non tangit <i>tangens</i>, idest movens. Et in talibus est tactus improprie sumptus; et ista sunt quae non sunt unius generis physici. Sed illa quae sunt <i>homogenea</i>, idest unius generis naturalis, mota movent; et in talibus necesse est quod tactum tangat tangens. Et si est aliquod movens immobile, tangit id quod movetur, sed non tangitur ab eo. Et est simile sicut <i>inquimus</i>, idest dicimus, aliquando, quod contristans tetigit nos, et nos non tetigimus contristantem: ut quando aliquis dicit verbum iniuriosum, unde contristamur, sed nos non tetigimus contristantem. Ulterius epilogat, dicens quod de tactu in naturalibus dictum est hoc modo.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="18" id="18"></a> <b><a name="19" id="19">Lectio 19</a></b> <a name="19" id="19"></a>
    <blockquote>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">7
            <td>7
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">(323b.) Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς· παρειλήφαμεν δὲ παρὰ τῶν πρότερον ὑπεναντίους ἀλλήλοις λόγους. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖστοι τοῦτό γε ὁμονοητικῶς λέγουσιν, ὡς τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πᾶν ἀπαθές ἐστι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ποιητικὸν ἢ παθητικὸν εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου (πάντα γὰρ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ταὐτὰ τοῖς ὁμοίοις), τὰ δ' ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ διάφορα ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἰς ἄλληλα πέφυκεν.
            <td>Next in order we must discuss 'action' and 'passion'. The traditional theories on the subject are conflicting. For (i) most thinkers are unanimous in maintaining (a) that 'like' is always unaffected by 'like', because (as they argue) neither of two 'likes' is more apt than the other either to act or to suffer action, since all the properties which belong to the one belong identically and in the same degree to the other; and (b) that 'unlikes', i.e. 'differents', are by nature such as to act and suffer action reciprocally.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Καὶ γὰρ ὅταν τὸ ἔλαττον πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλείονος φθείρηται, διὰ τὴν ἐναντίωσιν τοῦτό φασι πάσχειν· ἐναντίον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ. Δημόκριτος δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἰδίως ἔλεξε μόνος· φησὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅμοιον εἶναι τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· οὐ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖν τὰ ἕτερα καὶ ιαφέροντα πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἕτερα ὄντα ποιῇ τι εἰς ἄλληλα, οὐχ ᾗ ἕτερα ἀλλ' ᾗ ταὐτόν τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτῃ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν αὐτοῖς.
            <td>For even when the smaller fire is destroyed by the greater, it suffers this effect (they say) owing to its 'contrariety' since the great is contrary to the small. But (ii) Democritus dissented from all the other thinkers and maintained a theory peculiar to himself. He asserts that agent and patient are identical, i.e. 'like'. It is not possible (he says) that 'others', i.e. 'differents', should suffer action from one another: on the contrary, even if two things, being 'others', do act in some way on one another, this happens to them not qua 'others' but qua possessing an identical property.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἐοίκασι δὲ οἱ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγοντες ὑπεναντία φαίνεσθαι λέγειν. Αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιολογίας ὅτι δέον ὅλον τι θεωρῆσαι μέρος τι τυγχάνουσι λέγοντες ἑκάτεροι· τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ πάντῃ πάντως ἀδιάφορον εὔλογον μὴ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου μηθέν· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον θάτερον ἔσται ποιητικὸν ἢ θάτερον; εἴ τε ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τι πάσχειν δυνατόν, καὶ αὐτὸ ὑφ' αὑτοῦ· καίτοι τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἄφθαρτον οὔτε ἀκίνητον, εἴπερ τὸ ὅμοιον ᾗ ὅμοιον ποιητικόν· αὐτὸ γὰρ αὑτὸ κινήσει πᾶν, τό τε παντελῶς ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηθαμῇ ταὐτὸν ὡσαύτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν πάθοι λευκότης ὑπὸ γραμμῆς ἢ γραμμὴ ὑπὸ λευκότητος, πλὴν εἰ μή που κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ συμβέβηκε λευκὴν ἢ μέλαιναν εἶναι τὴν γραμμήν· οὐκ ἐξίστησι γὰρ ἄλληλα τῆς φύσεως ὅσα μήτ' ἐναντία μήτ' ἐξ ἐναντίων ἐστίν.
            <td>Such, then, are the traditional theories, and it looks as if the statements of their advocates were in manifest conflict. But the reason of this conflict is that each group is in fact stating a part, whereas they ought to have taken a comprehensive view of the subject as a whole. For (i) if A and B are 'like'—absolutely and in all respects without difference from one another —it is reasonable to infer that neither is in any way affected by the other. Why, indeed, should either of them tend to act any more than the other? Moreover, if 'like' can be affected by 'like', a thing can also be affected by itself: and yet if that were so—if 'like' tended in fact to act qua 'like'—there would be nothing indestructible or immovable, for everything would move itself. And (ii) the same consequence follows if A and B are absolutely 'other', i.e. in no respect identical. Whiteness could not be affected in any way by line nor line by whiseness—except perhaps 'coincidentally', viz. if the line happened to be white or black: for unless two things either are, or are composed of, 'contraries', neither drives the other out of its natural condition.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ τυχὸν πέφυκε πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἢ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἢ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτό, τῷ δ' εἴδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον· πέφυκε γὰρ σῶμα μὲν ὑπὸ σώματος, χυμὸς δ' ὑπὸ χυμοῦ, χρῶμα δ' ὑπὸ χρώματος πάσχειν, (324a.) ὅλως δὲ τὸ ὁμογενὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς. Τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τἀναντία ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει πάντα, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ πάσχει τἀναντία ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. Ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πῶς μὲν εἶναι ταὐτὰ τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, πῶς δ' ἕτερα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πάσχον καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν τῷ μὲν γένει ταὐτὰ καὶ ὅμοια τῷ δ' εἴδει ἀνόμοια, τοιαῦτα δὲ τἀναντία, φανερὸν ὅτι παθητικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ τά τ' ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ· καὶ γὰρ ὅλως φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἐν τούτοις. Διὸ καὶ εὔλογον ἤδη τό τε πῦρ θερμαίνειν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ψύχειν, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιητικὸν ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὸ πάσχον· τό τε γὰρ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἐναντία ἐστί, καὶ ἡ γένεσις εἰς τοὐναντίον. Ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸ πάσχον εἰς τὸ ποιοῦν μεταβάλλειν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται εἰς τοὐναντίον ἡ γένεσις. Καὶ κατὰ λόγον δὴ τὸ μὴ ταὐτὰ λέγοντας ἀμφοτέρους ὅμως ἅπτεσθαι τῆς φύσεως.
            <td>But (iii) since only those things which either involve a 'contrariety' or are 'contraries'—and not any things selected at random—are such as to suffer action and to act, agent and patient must be 'like' (i.e. identical) in kind and yet 'unlike' (i.e. contrary) in species. (For it is a law of nature that body is affected by body, flavour by flavour, colour by colour, and so in general what belongs to any kind by a member of the same kind—the reason being that 'contraries' are in every case within a single identical kind, and it is 'contraries' which reciprocally act and suffer action.) Hence agent and patient must be in one sense identical, but in another sense other than (i.e. 'unlike') one another. And since (a) patient and agent are generically identical (i.e. 'like') but specifically 'unlike', while (b) it is 'contraries' that exhibit this character: it is clear that 'contraries' and their 'intermediates' are such as to suffer action and to act reciprocally—for indeed it is these that constitute the entire sphere of passing-away and coming-to-be. We can now understand why fire heats and the cold thing cools, and in general why the active thing assimilates to itself the patient. For agent and patient are contrary to one another, and coming-to-be is a process into the contrary: hence the patient must change into the agent, since it is only thus that coming-to be will be a process into the contrary. And, again, it is intelligible that the advocates of both views, although their theories are not the same, are yet in contact with the nature of the facts.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Λέγομεν γὰρ πάσχειν ὁτὲ μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον ὑγιάζεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ τἆλλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὁτὲ δὲ θερμαίνεσθαι μὲν τὸ ψυχρόν, ὑγιάζεσθαι δὲ τὸ κάμνον· ἀμφότερα δ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπόν φαμεν θερμαίνειν, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ θερμόν· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡ ὕλη πάσχει, ἔστι δ' ὡς τοὐναντίον. Οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐκεῖνο βλέψαντες ταὐτόν τι δεῖν ᾠήθησαν τὸ ποιοῦν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, οἱ δ' εἰς θάτερα τοὐναντίον. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ὑποληπτέον εἶναι περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὅνπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κινεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι·
            <td>For sometimes we speak of the substratum as suffering action (e.g. of 'the man' as being healed, being warmed and chilled, and similarly in all the other cases), but at other times we say 'what is cold is 'being warmed', 'what is sick is being healed': and in both these ways of speaking we express the truth, since in one sense it is the 'matter', while in another sense it is the 'contrary', which suffers action. (We make the same distinction in speaking of the agent: for sometimes we say that 'the man', but at other times that 'what is hot', produces heat.) Now the one group of thinkers supposed that agent and patient must possess something identical, because they fastened their attention on the substratum: while the other group maintained the opposite because their attention was concentrated on the 'contraries'. We must conceive the same account to hold of action and passion as that which is true of 'being moved' and 'imparting motion'.
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    </blockquote><a name="19" id="19">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de tactu, quod est unum de tribus necessariis ad principale propositum, hic incipit determinare de facere et pati. Et est rectus ordo: quia sicut tactus praecedit actionem et passionem, eo quod agentia et patientia necesse est quod adinvicem se tangant, ita agere et pati praecedit mixtionem, eo quod ad mixtionem necesse est quod aliquid agat et aliquid patiatur ut infra dicetur; et ideo ante mixtionem determinat de agere et pati. Circa hoc duo facit: primo determinat de agere et pati; secundo de modis agendi et patiendi, ibi: quomodo autem contingat et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit quae et qualia sunt activa et passiva; secundo determinat de modis eorum, ibi: eodem modo suscipiendum est etc.; tertio ostendit ad quas causas ipsa activa et passiva reducantur, ibi: est autem factivum causa ut unde principium et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ponit opiniones aliorum de ipso facere et pati; secundo manifestat, ostendendo causas contrarietatis ipsius, ibi: videntur autem hoc modo etc.; tertio ponit opinionem suam, ibi: <i>sed quoniam non quodcumque natum est</i> et cetera.
    <p>Circa primum ponit unam opinionem, dicens quod postquam determinatum est de tactu, dicendum est de facere et pati. Prius tamen videndum est quid de ipso dixere priores philosophi; videntur enim eorum opiniones de facere et pati esse contrariae. Nam multi concordaverunt in hoc, quod ea quae agunt et patiuntur adinvicem, necesse est penitus esse dissimilia. Cuius rationem assignabant, dicentes quod inter similia unum non habet magis rationem agentis quam aliud, nec e converso; unde non habet magis rationem patientis quam aliud; omnia enim haec, scilicet agere et pati, similiter eodem modo insunt his quae sunt similia. Sed illa quae sunt dissimilia et differunt in formis et qualitatibus, nata sunt agere et pati adinvicem. Si quis autem obiiceret contra eos, dicens quod similia et agunt et patiuntur adinvicem, sicut multus sive magnus ignis corrumpit parvum ignem, quia sunt similes et unius naturae: respondetur quod hoc non est propter similitudinem quam habent, sed est propter contrarietatem in quantitate ipsorum: magnum enim contrariatur parvo.
    <p>Secundo cum dicit: Democritus autem etc., ponit aliam opinionem, quae primae videtur esse contraria. Et est opinio Democriti, qui in hac opinione fuit singularis et solus. Dixit enim quod agens et patiens est omnino idem et simile: quia quae sunt diversa et dissimilia, nec agunt nec patiuntur adinvicem. Sed si contingat quod aliqua diversa et dissimilia agant et patiantur adinvicem, hoc non est inquantum diversa, sed inquantum aliquo modo sunt idem et similia. Haec ergo sunt quae accepimus ab antiquis de ipso facere et pati.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: videntur autem hoc modo etc., manifestat primas opiniones ostendendo causam contrarietatis in ipsis, dicens quod antiqui philosophi videntur dicere <i>subcontrarios</i> sermones; qui ideo dicuntur <i>subcontrarii</i>, quia quodammodo sunt veri, et quodammodo falsi: unde aliqualiter compatiuntur se adinvicem, sicut subcontrariae propositiones. Causa autem diversitatis et contrarietatis istarum opinionum est, quia cum oporteat considerare naturam activorum et passivorum ex utraque parte, scilicet tam ex parte terminorum quam ex parte subiecti, sive tam ex parte materiae quam ex parte formae, quod idem est, consideraverunt tantum unam partem; et ideo in parte verum dixerunt, et in parte falsum. Primi enim qui dixerunt activa et passiva omnino dissimilia, consideraverunt ea tantum ex parte terminorum, sive formarum. Et in hoc bene dixerunt: quia non est conveniens quod omnino simile in materia et in forma, patiatur ab omnino sibi simili in materia et in forma; quoniam sicut antiqui dicebant, nullum corpus est dignius agere in alterum quam alterum. Alia etiam ratione inducebantur ad hoc ponendum: quod si simile agit in simile, ubi maior est similitudo, magis ibi est ratio actionis et passionis; sed cum nihil sit similius alteri quam idem sibi ipsi, idem a seipso patietur, et seipsum corrumpet: nihil ergo incorruptibile, nihil immobile erit. Qui vero dixerunt activa et passiva esse similia, consideraverunt ea solum secundum materiam. Et quantum ad hoc bene dixerunt: quia id quod est omnino alterum et nullatenus idem, non aget in alterum, nec patietur ab eo; impossibile est enim quod ea quae non communicant in materia, agant et patiantur mutuo. Et ponit exemplum de linea et albedine: quae cum non communicant in materia, impassibilia sunt adinvicem; nisi forte per accidens adinvicem patiantur, sicut quando linea fit alba vel nigra. Et quod talia non sint adinvicem activa et passiva, patet ex hoc, quod illa quae non sunt contraria, nec ex contrariis, <i>non faciunt seipsa adinvicem exterius a natura</i>, idest non transmutant se adinvicem vel corrumpuntur. Cum enim illud quod corrumpitur vel generatur induat aliam formam, dicitur fieri exterius a <i>natura</i>, idest a forma quam prius habebat, quae dicitur natura, ut dicitur in II Physic.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed quoniam non quodcumque etc., ponit opinionem propriam. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia primo ponit eam; secundo redit iterum super opiniones antiquorum ostendendo quod in parte bene dixerunt et in parte erraverunt, et causam erroris ipsorum, ibi: et secundum rationem autem non eadem dicentes et cetera. Dicit ergo quod, quia non quaecumque apta nata sunt agere et pati adinvicem, sed solum illa quae sunt contraria, vel habent contrarietatem, necesse est quod agens et patiens in genere sint idem et similia, et diversa specie et contraria. Et non sumitur hic genus logice: quia hoc modo alia corpora essent ejusdem generis; sed sumitur genus naturaliter: et hoc modo omnia quae communicant in materia, sunt eiusdem generis. Quod autem activa et passiva sint talia, dupliciter probat. Primo per inductionem, dicens quod agens et patiens esse eiusdem generis et diversa specie, patet inducendo in singulis. Corpus enim natum est pati a corpore quod est eiusdem generis in substantia (si tamen communicent in materia: quod dico propter corpora caelestia, quae non habent eandem materiam cum inferioribus), sapor autem natus est pati a sapore, et color a colore, quae sunt eiusdem generis in qualitate, et universaliter res ejusdem generis ab <i>homogeneis</i>, idest a rebus naturalibus eiusdem generis.
    <p>Secundo ibi: huius autem causa etc., ostendit idem similiter sic. Quaecumque agunt et patiuntur adinvicem, sunt contraria; contraria autem sunt in eodem genere, ut probatur in X Metaphys.; ergo activa et passiva sunt in eodem genere; et ideo necesse est ipsa <i>qualiter</i>, idest quodammodo, esse similia, quia eadem et similia genere, et <i>qualiter</i>, idest quodammodo, altera et dissimilia specie, ut dixerunt antiqui. Hanc autem rationem convertit de conclusione faciens alteram praemissarum, hoc modo: illa quae sunt similia in genere et diversa specie, sunt contraria; sed activa et passiva sunt talia; ergo sunt contraria; et etiam ipsorum media, quae ad extrema comparata, quodammodo contrariantur. Si ergo secundum istam viam poterit esse generatio et corruptio, quod fiunt solum per contraria, sic etiam ignis poterit calefacere, et frigidum infrigidare, et universaliter faciens poterit sibi assimilare patiens, cum habeat unum commune subiectum susceptivum contrariorum: faciens enim et patiens sunt contraria, et faciens poterit transmutari in patiens, et e converso. Sic enim fit generatio et corruptio, scilicet de contrario in contrarium.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: et secundum rationem autem non eadem etc., redit ad praedictas antiquorum opiniones, ostendendo causam contrarietatis ipsorum (quod quidem supra licet idem fecerit, non sic tamen aperte manifestavit). Dicit ergo quod antiqui philosophi sibi invicem contradicere videntur, non eadem dicentes, quia non habuerunt eandem <i>rationem</i>, idest considerationem; utraque tamen pars tetigit naturam activorum et passivorum; vel secundum aliam litteram: ambo tetigerunt verum. Dicimus enim aliquando pati subiectum, sicut quando dicimus hominem sanari vel calefieri vel infrigidari; et ideo Democritus solum respiciens ad subiectum, dixit activa et passiva esse similia: et in hoc bene dixit. Dicimus etiam aliquando et contrarium pati, sicut calidum frigefieri, et frigidum calefieri; et ideo etiam alii solum terminos intuentes, dixerunt ipsa activa et passiva esse omnino dissimilia.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="19" id="19"></a> <b><a name="20" id="20">Lectio 20</a></b> <a name="20" id="20"></a>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ τὸ κινοῦν· ἐν ᾧ τε γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, δοκεῖ τοῦτο κινεῖν (ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ πρώτη τῶν αἰτίων), καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἔσχατον πρὸς τὸ κινούμενον καὶ τὴν γένεσιν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἰατρόν φαμεν ὑγιάζειν καὶ τὸν οἶνον. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μὲν κινήσει ἀκίνητον εἶναι· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀεὶ κινεῖν κινούμενον. Ἐπὶ δὲ ποιήσεως τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπαθές, τὸ δ' ἔσχατον καὶ αὐτὸ πάσχον· ὅσα γὰρ μὴ ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην, ποιεῖ ἀπαθῆ ὄντα, οἷον ἡ ἰατρική· αὐτὴ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ὑγίειαν οὐδὲν πάσχει (324b.) ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιαζομένου. Τὸ δὲ σιτίον ποιοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ πάσχει τι· ἢ γὰρ θερμαίνεται ἢ ψύχεται ἢ ἄλλο τι πάσχει ἅμα ποιοῦν. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὡς ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ σιτίον τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ ἁπτόμενον. Ὅσα μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ ἔχει τὴν μορφήν, ταῦτα μὲν ἀπαθῆ τῶν ποιητικῶν, ὅσα δ' ἐν ὕλῃ, παθητικά. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὕλην λέγομεν ὁμοίως ὡς εἰπεῖν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἀντικειμένων ὁποτερουοῦν, ὥσπερ γένος ὄν, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον θερμὸν εἶναι παρόντος τοῦ θερμαντικοῦ καὶ πλησιάζοντος ἀνάγκη θερμαίνεσθαι· διό, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὰ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπαθῆ τὰ δὲ παθητικά. Καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ κινήσεως τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν ἀπαθές.
            <td>For the 'mover', like the 'agent', has two meanings. Both (a) that which contains the originative source of the motion is thought to 'impart motion' (for the originative source is first amongst the causes), and also (b) that which is last, i.e. immediately next to the moved thing and to the coming-to-be. A similar distinction holds also of the agent: for we speak not only (a) of the doctor, but also (b) of the wine, as healing. Now, in motion, there is nothing to prevent the firs; mover being unmoved (indeed, as regards some 'first' movers' this is actually necessary) although the last mover always imparts motion by being itself moved: and, in action, there is nothing to prevent the first agent being unaffected, while the last agent only acts by suffering action itself. For agent and patient have not the same matter, agent acts without being affected: thus the art of healing produces health without itself being acted upon in any way by that which is being healed. But (b) the food, in acting, is itself in some way acted upon: for, in acting, it is simultaneously heated or cooled or otherwise affected. Now the art of healing corresponds to an 'originative source', while the food corresponds to 'the last' (i.e. 'continuous') mover. Those active powers, then, whose forms are not embodied in matter, are unaffected: but those whose forms are in matter are such as to be affected in acting. For we maintain that one and the same 'matter' is equally, so to say, the basis of either of the two opposed things—being as it were a 'kind'; and that that which can he hot must be made hot, provided the heating agent is there, i.e. comes near. Hence (as we have said) some of the active powers are unaffected while others are such as to be affected; and what holds of motion is true also of the active powers. For as in motion 'the first mover' is unmoved, so among the active powers 'the first agent' is unaffected.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ὡς ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. Τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα οὐ ποιητικόν. Διὸ ἡ ὑγίεια οὐ ποιητικόν, εἰ μὴ κατὰ μεταφοράν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ποιοῦντος ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ, γίνεταί τι τὸ πάσχον, τῶν δ' ἕξεων παρουσῶν οὐκέτι γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἤδη· τὰ δ' εἴδη καὶ τὰ τέλη ἕξεις τινές, ἡ δ' ὕλη ᾗ ὕλη παθητικόν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πῦρ ἔχει ἐν ὕλῃ τὸ θερμόν· εἰ δέ τι εἴη θερμὸν χωριστόν, τοῦτο οὐθὲν ἂν πάσχοι. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἀδύνατον εἶναι χωριστόν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια τοιαῦτα, ἐπ' ἐκείνων ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές. Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τίσιν ὑπάρχει καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς, διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
            <td>The active power is a 'cause' in the sense of that from which the process originates: but the end, for the sake of which it takes place, is not 'active'. (That is why health is not 'active', except metaphorically.) For when the agent is there, the patient be-comes something: but when 'states' are there, the patient no longer becomes but already is—and 'forms' (i.e. lends') are a kind of 'state'. As to the 'matter', it (qua matter) is passive. Now fire contains 'the hot' embodied in matter: but a 'hot' separate from matter (if such a thing existed) could not suffer any action. Perhaps, indeed, it is impossible that 'the hot' should exist in separation from matter: but if there are any entities thus separable, what we are saying would be true of them. We have thus explained what action and passion are, what things exhibit them, why they do so, and in what manner.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Πῶς δὲ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, πάλιν λέγωμεν.
            <td>We must go on to discuss how it is possible for action and passion to take place.
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    </blockquote><a name="20" id="20">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit naturam activorum et passivorum, ostendendo quae et qualia sint, hic inquirit de modis eorum. Et primo distinguit agentia abinvicem; secundo assignat causam diversitatis ipsorum, ibi: quaecumque enim non habent et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod suscipiendum est quod facere et pati dicuntur multipliciter, ut movere et moveri; utrumque enim dicitur dupliciter sicut movens, quoniam in utroque est primum et ultimum. Id enim est primum movens, in quo est primum principium motus, quod verissime movere videtur: principium enim movendi est prima causa causarum, virtutem habens movendi a seipso, non ab alio. Ultimum autem movens est id quod movet per aliud, et post quod non est aliud movens, sed post ipsum est solum id quod movetur ad generationem. Similiter autem duplex est faciens: quoddam primum, sicut medicus, qui est prima causa sanitatis, et quoddam ultimum, sicut vinum vel potio, quae etiam est causa movens ad sanitatem. Inter haec autem duo moventia haec est differentia, quia primum movens potest esse immobile, sicut medicus, qui non movetur ab aliquo dum sanat, nisi forte per accidens (in quibusdam tamen necesse est primum movens esse omnino immobile, sicut in his quae sunt omnino separata a materia; et hoc dupliciter: quia vel est omnino immobile, si nullam habeat materiam penitus, aut est immobile ab eo quod movetur ab ipso, et hoc quando non habet eiusdem rationis materiam cum eo quod movetur); ultimum autem movens, post quod non est aliud nisi id quod movetur tantum, necesse est semper movere, motum ab eo priore. Et similiter est in actione; quia quoddam est agens primum, quod est impassibile, et quoddam agens quod patitur.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quaecumque enim non habent etc., assignat causam diversitatis ipsorum, dicens quod causa quare quoddam agens est quod agendo patitur, quoddam autem non, est ista: quia quaedam non habent eandem materiam; et talia agentia faciunt vel agunt <i>existentia impassibilia</i>, idest ipsis non patientibus ab his in quae agunt. Verbi gratia: medicina faciens sanitatem nihil patitur a sanato, quia non communicat cum eo in materia. Quaedam autem habent eandem materiam, sicut cibus vel potio, et id quod sanatur, et ideo cibus agendo patitur, quia aut calefit, aut infrigidatur. Inter haec autem duo agentia, scilicet medicinam et cibum, medicina est principium in quo primo est actio, cibus autem est agens ultimum, quod agit per tactum. Quaecumque igitur agentia non habent eandem formam in materia quae sit eiusdem rationis cum passibilibus, haec cum sint de numero agentium sive activorum, sunt impassibilia; quaecumque autem habent formam in materia eiusdem rationis, agendo patiuntur. Subiungit ad horum declarationem, quae dicatur materia una aliquorum. Et dicit quod dicitur esse una materia cuilibet, quae est susceptiva contrariorum; quae licet sit una subiecto, differt tamen secundum esse: et propter hoc dixit <i>ut ita dicam</i>. Et ipsa materia dicitur ut genus, non quidem praedicabile, sed dicitur genus secundum quod genus dicitur subiectum primum, quod substat duobus contrariis aut pluribus; contrariorum autem unum est in activo, alterum est in passivo: et ideo una materia est activi et passivi. Et quod per naturam potest esse calidum, necessario calefit, quando appropinquat calidum calefaciens ipsum. Hoc ergo quod dictum est, causa est quare quaedam agentia sunt passibilia, et quaedam impassibilia. Et sicut dictum est in motione, ita dictum est in actione, quia sicut in moventibus primum movens est immobile, ita in effectivis primum efficiens est impassibile.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: est autem factivum etc., ostendit ad quam causam reducatur agens, et ad quam patiens, dicens quod agens est unum primum principium motus, et est diversum a causa formali et finali, et non dicitur finalis nisi secundum metaphoram. Et quod non sit formalis nec finalis, sic probat: quia quando faciens est secundum actum faciens, tunc aliquid generatur in patiente; sed talibus habitibus sive formis, sicut est sanitas quae est finis operationis medicinae, praesentibus, non generatur aliquid nec fit, sed iam est: species enim et fines sunt habitus quidam quiescentes, nam habito fine quiescit motor.
    <p>Secundo cum dicit: materia autem etc., ostendit ad quam causam reducatur patiens, dicens quod reducitur ad materiam, quia materia secundum quod materia passiva est; et ideo quae patiuntur, patiuntur per materiam. Quae autem sunt activa et passiva, habent speciem in materia; sicut ignis habet esse calidum in materia. Si autem esset aliquod calidum separatum a materia, hoc nihil pateretur; sed forsan impossibile est esse aliquid tale separatum, licet quidam hoc dixerunt; si autem aliqua sint talia, quae sint a materia separata, in illis verum est quod dicitur, scilicet quod nihil patiuntur. Sed de hoc in prima philosophia locus erit determinare. Ex hoc manifeste patet, quod omnis potentia passiva et omnis passio est per materiam, et omnis actio est per formam. Ultimo epilogat, et est planum in littera.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="20" id="20"></a> <b><a name="21" id="21">Lectio 21</a></b> <a name="21" id="21"></a>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">8
            <td>8
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ πάσχειν ἕκαστον διά τινων πόρων εἰσιόντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐσχάτου καὶ κυριωτάτου, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν ἡμᾶς φασι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσας, ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶσθαι διά τε ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος καὶ τῶν διαφανῶν, διὰ τὸ πόρους ἔχειν ἀοράτους μὲν διὰ μικρότητα, πυκνοὺς δὲ καὶ κατὰ στοῖχον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔχειν τὰ διαφανῆ μᾶλλον. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπί τινων οὕτω διώρισαν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ποιούντων καὶ πασχόντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ μίγνυσθαί φησιν ὅσων οἱ πόροι σύμμετροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰσίν. Ὁδῷ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ (325a.) πάντων ἑνὶ λόγῳ διωρίκασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος, ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἥπερ ἐστίν.
            <td>Some philosophers think that the 'last' agent—the 'agent' in the strictest sense—enters in through certain pores, and so the patient suffers action. It is in this way, they assert, that we see and hear and exercise all our other senses. Moreover, according to them, things are seen through air and water and other transparent bodies, because such bodies possess pores, invisible indeed owing to their minuteness, but close-set and arranged in rows: and the more transparent the body, the more frequent and serial they suppose its pores to be. Such was the theory which some philosophers (induding Empedocles) advanced in regard to the structure of certain bodies. They do not restrict it to the bodies which act and suffer action: but 'combination' too, they say, takes place 'only between bodies whose pores are in reciprocal symmetry'. The most systematic and consistent theory, however, and one that applied to all bodies, was advanced by Leucippus and Democritus: and, in maintaining it, they took as their starting-point what naturally comes first.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔδοξε τὸ ὂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἓν εἶναι καὶ ἀκίνητον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κενὸν οὐκ ὄν, κινηθῆναι δ' οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι μὴ ὄντος κενοῦ κεχωρισμένου. Οὐδ' αὖ πολλὰ εἶναι μὴ ὄντος τοῦ διείργοντος· τοῦτο δὲ μηδὲν διαφέρειν, εἴ τις οἴεται μὴ συνεχὲς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ἀλλ' ἅπτεσθαι διῃρημένον, τοῦ φάναι πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἓν εἶναι καὶ κενόν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ πάντῃ διαιρετόν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἕν, ὥστε οὐδὲ πολλά, ἀλλὰ κενὸν τὸ ὅλον· εἰ δὲ τῇ μὲν τῇ δὲ μή, πεπλασμένῳ τινὶ τοῦτ' ἐοικέναι· μέχρι πόσου γὰρ καὶ διὰ τί τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει τοῦ ὅλου καὶ πλῆρές ἐστι, τὸ δὲ διῃρημένον; ἔτι ὁμοίως φάναι ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν. Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν λόγων, ὑπερβάντες τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ παριδόντες αὐτὴν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ δέον ἀκολουθεῖν, ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ πᾶν εἶναί φασι καὶ ἄπειρον ἔνιοι· τὸ γὰρ πέρας περαίνειν ἂν πρὸς τὸ κενόν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτως καὶ διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἀπεφήναντο περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων δοκεῖ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων μανίᾳ παραπλήσιον εἶναι τὸ δοξάζειν οὕτως· οὐδένα γὰρ τῶν μαινομένων ἐξεστάναι τοσοῦτον ὥστε τὸ πῦρ ἓν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα διὰ συνήθειαν, ταῦτ' ἐνίοις διὰ τὴν μανίαν οὐθὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν.
            <td>For some of the older philosophers thought that 'what is' must of necessity be 'one' and immovable. The void, they argue, 'is not': but unless there is a void with a separate being of its own, 'what is' cannot be moved—nor again can it be 'many', since there is nothing to keep things apart. And in this respect, they insist, the view that the universe is not 'continuous' but 'discretes-in-contact' is no better than the view that there are 'many' (and not 'one') and a void. For (suppose that the universe is discretes-in-contact. Then), if it is divisible through and through, there is no 'one', and therefore no 'many' either, but the Whole is void; while to maintain that it is divisible at some points, but not at others, looks like an arbitrary fiction. For up to what limit is it divisible? And for what reason is part of the Whole indivisible, i.e. a plenum, and part divided? Further, they maintain, it is equally necessary to deny the existence of motion. Reasoning in this way, therefore, they were led to transcend sense-perception, and to disregard it on the ground that 'one ought to follow the argument': and so they assert that the universe is 'one' and immovable. Some of them add that it is 'infinite', since the limit (if it had one) would be a limit against the void. There were, then, certain thinkers who, for the reasons we have stated, enunciated views of this kind as their theory of 'The Truth'.... Moreover, although these opinions appear to follow logically in a dialectical discussion, yet to believe them seems next door to madness when one considers the facts. For indeed no lunatic seems to be so far out of his senses as to suppose that fire and ice are 'one': it is only between what is right and what seems right from habit, that some people are mad enough to see no difference.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Λεύκιππος δ' ἔχειν ᾠήθη λόγους οἵ τινες πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναιρήσουσιν οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων Ὁμολογήσας δὲ ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς φαινομένοις, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἓν κατασκευάζουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν κίνησιν οὖσαν ἄνευ κενοῦ τό τε κενὸν μὴ ὄν, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν φησιν εἶναι.
            <td>Leucippus, however, thought he had a theory which harmonized with sense-perception and would not abolish either coming-to-be and passing-away or motion and the multiplicity of things. He made these concessions to the facts of perception: on the other hand, he conceded to the Monists that there could be no motion without a void. The result is a theory which he states as follows: 'The void is a "not being", and no part of "what is" is a "not-being";
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὸ γὰρ κυρίως ὂν παμπλῆρες ὄν· ἀλλ' εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων. Ταῦτα δ' ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι (κενὸν γὰρ εἶναι), καὶ συνιστάμενα μὲν γένεσιν ποιεῖν, διαλυόμενα δὲ φθοράν. Ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ πάσχειν ᾗ τυγχάνουσιν ἁπτόμενα· ταύτῃ γὰρ οὐχ ἓν εἶναι. Καὶ συντιθέμενα δὲ καὶ περιπλεκόμενα γεννᾶν· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἑνὸς οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι πλῆθος, οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἀληθῶς πολλῶν ἕν, ἀλλ' εἶναι τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' (325b.) ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινές φασι πάσχειν διὰ πόρων, οὕτω πᾶσαν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ πάσχειν τοῦτον γίνεσθαι τὸν τρόπον, διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ γινομένης τῆς διαλύσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως, ὑπεισδυομένων στερεῶν. Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν, ὥσπερ καὶ Λεύκιππός φησιν· εἶναι γὰρ ἄττα στερεά, ἀδιαίρετα δέ, εἰ μὴ πάντῃ πόροι συνεχεῖς εἰσιν. Τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔσται ἕτερον στερεὸν παρὰ τοὺς πόρους, ἀλλὰ πᾶν κενόν. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὰ μὲν ἁπτόμενα εἶναι ἀδιαίρετα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν κενά, οὓς ἐκεῖνος λέγει πόρους. Οὕτως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος λέγει περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.
            <td>for what "is" in the strict sense of the term is an absolute plenum. This plenum, however, is not "one": on the contrary, it is a many" infinite in number and invisible owing to the minuteness of their bulk. The "many" move in the void (for there is a void): and by coming together they produce "coming-to-be", while by separating they produce "passing-away". Moreover, they act and suffer action wherever they chance to be in contact (for there they are not "one"), and they generate by being put together and becoming intertwined. From the genuinely-one, on the other hand, there never could have come-to-be a multiplicity, nor from the genuinely-many a "one": that is impossible. But' (just as Empedocles and some of the other philosophers say that things suffer action through their pores, so) 'all "alteration" and all "passion" take place in the way that has been explained: breaking-up (i.e. passing-away) is effected by means of the void, and so too is growth—solids creeping in to fill the void places.' Empedocles too is practically bound to adopt the same theory as Leucippus. For he must say that there are certain solids which, however, are indivisible—unless there are continuous pores all through the body. But this last alternative is impossible: for then there will be nothing solid in the body (nothing beside the pores) but all of it will be void. It is necessary, therefore, for his 'contiguous discretes' to be indivisible, while the intervals between them—which he calls 'pores'—must be void. But this is precisely Leucippus' theory of action and passion.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι καθ' οὓς τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ δὲ πάσχει σχεδὸν οὗτοι λέγονται· καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων, καὶ πῶς λέγουσι, δῆλον, καὶ πρὸς τὰς αὐτῶν θέσεις αἷς χρῶνται σχεδὸν ὁμολογουμένως φαίνεται συμβαῖνον. Τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἧττον, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις οὐ δῆλον. Τοῖς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀδιαίρετα τὰ πρῶτα τῶν σωμάτων, σχήματι διαφέροντα μόνον, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων σύγκειται καὶ εἰς ἃ ἔσχατα διαλύεται· Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φανερὸν ὅτι μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πῶς γίνεται καὶ φθείρεται τὸ σωρευόμενον μέγεθος, οὔτε δῆλον οὔτε ἐνδέχεται λέγειν αὐτῷ μὴ λέγοντι καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς εἶναι στοιχεῖον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραφε Πλάτων.
            <td>Such, approximately, are the current explanations of the manner in which some things 'act' while others 'suffer action'. And as regards the Atomists, it is not only clear what their explanation is: it is also obvious that it follows with tolerable consistency from the assumptions they employ. But there is less obvious consistency in the explanation offered by the other thinkers. It is not clear, for instance, how, on the theory of Empedocles, there is to be 'passing-away' as well as 'alteration'. For the primary bodies of the Atomists—the primary constituents of which bodies are composed, and the ultimate elements into which they are dissolved—are indivisible, differing from one another only in figure. In the philosophy of Empedocles, on the other hand, it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away. Nor is it possible for Empedocles to explain how they do so, since he does not assert that Fire too (and similarly every one of his other 'elements') possesses 'elementary constituents' of itself. Such an assertion would commit him to doctrines like those which Plato has set forth in the Timaeus.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τοσοῦτον γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον Λευκίππῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν στερεὰ ὁ δ' ἐπίπεδα λέγει τὰ ἀδιαίρετα, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπείροις ὡρίσθαι σχήμασι τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων στερεῶν ἕκαστον ὁ δὲ ὡρισμένοις, ἐπεὶ ἀδιαίρετά γε ἀμφότεροι λέγουσι καὶ ὡρισμένα σχήμασιν. Ἐκδὴ τούτων αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ διακρίσεις Λευκίππῳ μὲν δύο τρόποι ἂν εἶεν, διά τε τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς (ταύτῃ γὰρ διαιρετὸν ἕκαστον), Πλάτωνι δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν μόνον· κενὸν γὰρ οὐκ εἶναί φησιν· καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων ἐπιπέδων εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον λόγοις· περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων στερεῶν τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον θεωρῆσαι τὸ συμβαῖνον ἀφείσθω τὸ νῦν,
            <td>For although both Plato and Leucippus postulate elementary constituents that are indivisible and distinctively characterized by figures, there is this great difference between the two theories: the 'indivisibles' of Leucippus (i) are solids, while those of Plato are planes, and (ii) are characterized by an infinite variety of figures, while the characterizing figures employed by Plato are limited in number. Thus the 'comings-to-be' and the 'dissociations' result from the 'indivisibles' (a) according to Leucippus through the void and through contact (for it is at the point of contact that each of the composite bodies is divisible), but (b) according to Plato in virtue of contact alone, since he denies there is a void. Now we have discussed 'indivisible planes' in the preceding treatise.' But with regard to the assumption of 'indivisible solids', although we must not now enter upon a detailed study of its consequences.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="21" id="21">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de natura activorum et passivorum, et de modis eorum, et ostendit ad quas causas reducantur, hic determinat de modis agendi et patiendi, quomodo scilicet contingat agere vel pati. Et primo secundum opinionem aliorum; secundo secundum opinionem propriam, ibi: quo autem modo existat et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit opiniones aliorum; secundo reprobat eas, ibi: ut autem parum digredientes et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit opiniones aliorum; secundo comparat eas adinvicem, ibi: Leucippus autem existimavit et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit opiniones aliorum in generali; secundo in speciali, ibi: hi igitur in quibusdam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod dicendum est rursus, quomodo contingat agere et pati. Dicit autem <i>rursus</i>, quia iam dixit quendam modum actionis et passionis in genere; nunc descendit ad speciales modos, sumptos ex parte activorum et passivorum, scilicet qualiter veniat agens ad patiens, ut imprimat ei suam formam per quam intendit ipsum patiens transmutare. Circa hoc autem fuerunt diversae opiniones. Quibusdam enim visum fuit quod unumquodque quod patitur, patitur per quosdam poros qui sunt in ipso patiente, per quos ipsum agens quod est proximum patienti, ingreditur in patiens per illos poros, et undique contangit ipsum, et undique patitur patiens, et non in uno loco tantum. Et per hunc modum dicunt quod videmus, et sentimus secundum alios sensus omnes: quia enim secundum eos visus et auditus effunduntur super visibile per media, ideo dixerunt quod per poros illorum corporum quae sunt media sensuum, videmus et audimus. Dicunt etiam quod ideo plus videmus per aerem et aquam et per alia corpora diaphana, sicut est vitrum et crystallum, quia illa corpora habent plures poros aliis; qui pori sunt invisibiles propter parvitatem, sed magis spisse positi, et melius ordinati quia directi. Et ideo videt melius per transparens visus, si reperit rectam lineam per quam videat. Et quia magis transparens habet poros spissiores et directius ordinatos, ideo quanto fuerit magis transparens, tanto per ipsum melius videmus.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: hi igitur in quibusdam etc., ponit opiniones eorum in speciali. Et dividitur in tres partes, secundum tres opiniones. Et primo ponit opinionem Empedoclis, dicens quod quidam magis ad speciem descendentes, dicunt ipsos poros non solum in activis et passivis, sed etiam illa dicunt adinvicem bene admisceri, quorum pori sunt commensurabiles ut unum in aliud ingredi possit, ita quod plurimum unius sit in plurimo alterius, et e converso.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: compendiose autem etc., ponit opinionem Leucippi et Democriti, dicens quod breviter et compendiose dicamus, quod uno et simili sermone dixerunt Leucippus et Democritus. Ambo enim posuerunt principium quod est secundum naturam: per ipsum enim sicut infra dicitur, reddebant causam generationis et corruptionis, et ad sensum apparentia confitentur; et ideo dicitur <i>secundum naturam</i> magis quam positio aliorum qui de naturis rerum per sua principia causas assignare non possunt.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quidam enim antiquorum etc., ponit opinionem Parmenidis et Melissi, qui opinati sunt esse tantum unum principium, et illud esse immobile et continuum. Quod autem sit immobile sic probabant. Motus non potest esse nisi sit vacuum; sed vacuum non est; ergo motus non est; ergo est tantum unum et immobile. Quod vero sit tantum unum sic probabant. Multa non possunt esse nisi sit aliquid separans et dividens ea; nihil autem potest esse segregans et dividens, nisi vacuum; sed vacuum non est; ergo non possunt esse multa segregata: et sic omnia unum sunt. Et quia posset dici eis quod multa sunt se tangentia, ita quod inter ea non sit vacuum segregans: dicunt quod hoc nihil differt; quia continuum et contangens idem dicebant esse: nam secundum eos continui partes se contangebant. Dixerunt etiam quod nihil differt quod sint multa, et quod non sit unum, et quod dicatur esse vacuum: quia continuum et contiguum sunt idem secundum istos, nec multa sunt nisi sint divisa; et quod non dividebantur nisi per vacuum. Sed non est vacuum; ergo nec multa, sed omnia continua. Si enim dicatur quod ens <i>ubique</i>, idest in omni puncto, sit divisibile, tunc potest dici quod nihil sit unum; sed multitudo componitur ex multis unis; ergo nec multitudo erit; ergo totum erit vacuum. Si autem dicatur totum ens esse continuum, <i>tum quidem</i>, idest secundum aliquid esse divisibile, <i>tum autem non</i>, idest secundum aliquid esse indivisibile, hoc utique videbitur esse fictitium, cum non sit magis ratio quare in uno puncto dividatur quam in alio. Usque ad quantum enim erit divisibile, ita quod ibi stet divisio? Et quare aliquid de universo ita se habet, quod dividitur et separatur per vacuum, aliud autem se habet quod est plenum et non dividitur, ita quod unum ab alio separetur per vacuum, non videtur horum posse ratio assignari. Amplius autem sequitur ex necessitate quod nihil movebitur, per istas rationes. Ergo transcenderunt et dimiserunt sensum et ea quae per sensum apparent, opinantes quod magis debemus sequi rationem quam sensum. Quod autem totum ens sit infinitum sic probabant. Si ens finitur, aut finitur ad plenum, aut ad vacuum. Sed ad plenum non potest finiri, quia plenum est ens: idem enim finiretur ad seipsum; vel eadem ratione illud plenum finiretur ad aliud plenum: et sic esset abire in infinitum. Ergo oportet quod finiatur ad vacuum; sed vacuum non est; ergo ad nihil finitur; ergo oportet quod ens sit infinitum. Isti ergo propter tales causas sic enuntiaverunt de veritate. Adhuc in <i>sermone</i> per ipsorum rationem sophisticam videtur hoc sequi quod dictum est, non tamen in rei veritate contingit. Si autem res ipsae inspiciantur, dementiae videtur esse simile dictum eorum; nullus enim demens intantum egreditur a iudicio veritatis, quod dicat ignem et glaciem esse unum: quod illi dicebant, ponentes omnia esse unum. Licet aliquis propter consuetudinem vel propter apparentiam putet mala in sensibus esse bona: hoc enim quibusdam propter dementiam accidit; unde aliquando inter bona et mala nullam differentiam esse putant.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: Leucippus autem etc., comparat praedictas opiniones adinvicem. Et primo comparat opinionem Leucippi et Democriti ad opinionem Parmenidis et Melissi; secundo comparat eam ad opinionem Empedoclis, ibi: sed ut Empedocles etc.; tertio ad opinionem Platonis, ibi: similiter autem aliorum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo comparat opinionem Leucippi ad opinionem Parmenidis et Melissi penes convenientiam; secundo penes differentiam, ibi: sed esse tale et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod Leucippus putavit habere sermones meliores aliis, in hoc quod confitetur ea quae sunt manifesta ad sensum. Unde neque destruit generationem, neque corruptionem, neque motum, neque multitudinem rerum, sed confitetur ea quae sunt omnibus manifesta ad sensum. In hoc tamen dixit eadem cum Parmenide et Melisso, <i>constituentibus</i>, idest dicentibus, quod omne quod est, est tantum unum et immobile; quia dicit quod bene sequitur, quod non erit motus nisi sit vacuum. Sed in hoc differt ab eis, quia illi destruxerunt consequens, idest vacuum esse, et concluserunt oppositum antecedentis, scilicet motum non esse; sed Leucippus ponit antecedens et infert consequens: scilicet motum, et ex hoc concludit vacuum esse. Vacuum autem dicit esse sicut privationem; et ideo simpliciter est non ens: quia non est aliquid entium, sicut nec privatio; tamen est ens: quia est entis, sicut privatio habitus. Unde plenum dicebat principaliter ens.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed esse tale etc., comparat dictas opiniones circa differentiam, dicens quod, licet principaliter ens sit plenum, tamen non omne quod est plenum est unum, sicut dixit Parmenides et Melissus, sed sunt multa, et infinita, et invisibilia propter parvitatem suae quantitatis. Haec enim sunt quae ipsi appellant <i>atomos</i>, sive corpora indivisibilia, quae moventur in vacuo; quod vacuum ipse Leucippus dicit esse. Quomodo autem fiat generatio et corruptio, et alia quae apparent, ex istis atomis, subiungit, dicens quod per ipsorum congregationem et conglutinationem fit generatio; cum autem dividuntur, fit corruptio; cum vero undique se contingunt, faciunt actionem et passionem; cum autem penetrant se et unum subintrat in alterum, fit augmentum; cum permutaverint ordinem et situm, tunc fit alteratio. Secundum enim quod dicit et confitetur, necesse est ponere non esse unum solum, ex quo generantur ista composita et complicata; quia ex eo quod est <i>vere unum</i>, impossibile est fieri multa, nec ex <i>vere multis</i> fieri vere unum. Dicitur autem <i>vere unum</i>, quod omnino est indivisibile actu et potentia: <i>vere</i> autem <i>multa</i>, quae omnino distincta sunt, nec actu nec potentia coniunguntur, sicut indivisibilia.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed ut Empedocles etc., comparat opinionem Leucippi ad opinionem Empedoclis. Et primo penes convenientiam, dicens quod Democritus et Leucippus dicunt, quod res patitur per poros, sicut dixit Empedocles et quidam alii de antiquis philosophis. Et dicunt quod omne pati et omne alterari hoc modo generatur et fit quod fit, ita quod fiat rei dissolutio per interpositionem vacui; quia vacuum interponitur ipsis rebus, ita quod pars huc pars illuc feratur. Similiter augmentationem fieri, per subintrationem ipsorum solidorum atomorum adinvicem. Empedoclem autem fere necesse est dicere sicut Leucippus dixit, esse scilicet indivisibilia corpora. Dicit autem <i>fere</i>, quia Empedocles non confitebatur expresse esse aliqua corpora indivisibilia, sed quia hoc sequitur ad opinionem eius. Ponebat enim poros in ipsis corporibus: ex quibus actio et passio causabatur secundum eum. Aut ergo illi pori sunt in toto corpore ita quod non sit aliquid medium inter eos, aut est aliquod corpus solidum dividens eos. Si sunt in toto corpore ita quod nihil sit medium, tunc totum corpus erit vacuum: quod est impossibile. Necesse est ergo esse aliquod corpus solidum <i>extra poros</i>, idest praeter poros, quod ipsos dividat et distinguat. Et talia corpora necesse est esse divisibilia; media autem istorum sunt vacua, sive foramina, quae scilicet Empedocles dicit poros. Nulla enim, ut dicit Commentator, est differentia inter utramque opinionem, nisi quod secundum Leucippum inter haec corpora est vacuum, et apud istos ista foramina sunt plena corporibus subtilibus. Conveniunt igitur in duobus, scilicet in positione vacuitatis, et positione corporis indivisibilis; et ideo fere ita dicit Leucippus de facere et pati sicut Empedocles. Et ideo dicit, quod modi agendi e patiendi secundum utrosque fere sunt idem. Dicit <i>fere</i>, propter praedictam causam.
    <p>Secundo cum dicit: et de his quidem etc., ponit differentiam inter utramque opinionem, dicens quod istorum differentia de modis agendi manifesta erit ex eorum positionibus sequentibus. Nam Leucippus magis potest dare ex sua opinione causam eorum quae manifeste videntur; Empedocles autem minus: quia secundum eius fundamentum non est manifestum, quomodo accidat generatio et corruptio et alteratio in omnibus entibus naturalibus. Sed Democritus et Leucippus possunt assignare causam generationis et corruptionis non solum mixtorum, sed etiam quatuor elementorum, ex corporibus indivisibilibus; quia secundum istos diversitas istorum corporum, tam simplicium quam mixtorum, causatur ex diversitate corporum atomorum, quae differunt positione, ordine, et forma, et figura, sicut dicitur in I Metaphys. Empedocles vero ex sui positione non potest dare causam generationis et corruptionis, nisi solum istorum mixtorum usque ad elementa. Ponit enim alia fieri ex quatuor elementis, sed in elementis non potest dare causam generationis et corruptionis. Non enim posuit alia elementa priora istis quatuor elementis; unde non potest dicere propter quid vel quomodo generentur ex aliis, aut corrumpantur in alia.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem aliorum omnium etc., comparat opinionem Leucippi ad opinionem Platonis. Et primo penes convenientiam, dicens quod, sicut Leucippus potest dare causam generationis omnium ex sua positione, ita et Plato, secundum quod scripsit in Timaeo.
    <p>Secundo cum dicit: intantum enim differt etc., ponit differentiam, dicens quod, quamvis Leucippus et Plato conveniat in hoc quod uterque posuit indivisibilia principia, tamen in tribus differunt. Primo quia Leucippus dixit illa indivisibilia esse corpora solida; Plato autem ea dixit esse superficies. Secundo quia figurae indivisibilium corporum, quibus figuratur et terminatur unumquodque compositorum, sunt infinitae apud Leucippum; sed secundum Platonem sunt finitae: posuit enim Plato figuras triangulares esse primas omnium figurarum, quae finitae sunt. Tertio differunt, quia cum uterque istorum dicat generationem et corruptionem fieri per congregationem et segregationem atomorum, secundum Leucippum erunt duo modi quibus fit actio et passio, scilicet per tactum agentis et patientis, et per vacuum, quod est porus; secundum Platonem vero erit tantum unus modus, scilicet per contactum, et non per vacuum. Vacuum enim secundum eum non est de indivisibilibus superficiebus, ut dictum est in III de caelo et mundo. Quod autem contingit dicere de indivisibilibus corporibus, relinquatur nunc.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="21" id="21"></a> <b><a name="22" id="22">Lectio 22</a></b> <a name="22" id="22"></a>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">ὡς δὲ μικρὸν παρεκβᾶσιν εἰπεῖν, (326a.) ἀναγκαῖον ἀπαθές τε ἕκαστον λέγειν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων (οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πάσχειν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ) καὶ μηθενὸς ποιητικὸν πάθους· οὔτε γὰρ ψυχρὸν οὔτε σκληρὸν οἷόν τ' εἶναι. Καίτοι τοῦτό γε ἄτοπον, τὸ μόνον ἀποδοῦναι τῷ περιφερεῖ σχήματι τὸ θερμόν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τοὐναντίον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἄλλῳ τινὶ προσήκειν τῶν σχημάτων. Ἄτοπον δὲ κἂν εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, λέγω δὲ θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, βαρύτης δὲ καὶ κουφότης καὶ σκληρότης καὶ μαλακότης μὴ ὑπάρξει· καίτοι βαρύτερόν γε κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν φησιν εἶναι Δημόκριτος ἕκαστον τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ θερμότερον. Τοιαῦτα δ' ὄντα μὴ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀδύνατον, οἷον ὑπὸ τοῦ πολὺ ὑπερβάλλοντος θερμοῦ τὸ ἠρέμα θερμόν.
            <td>The following criticisms fall within the compass of a short digression: i. The Atomists are committed to the view that every 'indivisible' is incapable alike of receiving a sensible property (for nothing can 'suffer action' except through the void) and of producing one—no 'indivisible' can be, e.g. either hard or cold. Yet it is surely a paradox that an exception is made of 'the hot'—'the hot' being assigned as peculiar to the spherical figure: for, that being so, its 'contrary' also ('the cold') is bound to belong to another of the figures. If, however, these properties (heat and cold) do belong to the 'indivisibles', it is a further paradox that they should not possess heaviness and lightness, and hardness and softness. And yet Democritus says 'the more any indivisible exceeds, the heavier it is'—to which we must clearly add 'and the hotter it is'. But if that is their character, it is impossible they should not be affected by one another: the 'slightly-hot indivisible', e.g. will inevitably suffer action from one which far exceeds it in heat.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ σκληρόν, καὶ μαλακόν. Τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν ἤδη τῷ πάσχειν τι λέγεται· τὸ γὰρ ὑπεικτικὸν μαλακόν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄτοπον καὶ εἰ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον σχῆμα· καὶ εἰ ὑπάρχει, ἓν δὲ μόνον, οἷον τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν τὸ δὲ θερμόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μία τις εἴη ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν. Ὁμοίως δὲ ἀδύνατον καὶ εἰ πλείω τῷ ἑνί· ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ὂν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἕξει τὰ πάθη, ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν πάσχῃ ᾗπερ ψύχεται, ταύτῃ τι καὶ ἄλλο ποιήσει ἢ πείσεται. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τοῖς στερεὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐπίπεδα λέγουσιν ἀδιαίρετα συμβαίνει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· οὔτε γὰρ μανότερα οὔτε πυκνότερα οἷόν τε γίνεσθαι κενοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαιρέτοις.
            <td>Again, if any 'indivisible' is 'hard', there must also be one which is 'soft': but 'the soft' derives its very name from the fact that it suffers a certain action—for 'soft' is that which yields to pressure. II. But further, not only is it paradoxical (i) that no property except figure should belong to the 'indivisibles': it is also paradoxical (ii) that, if other properties do belong to them, one only of these additional properties should attach to each—e.g. that this 'indivisible' should be cold and that 'indivisible' hot. For, on that supposition, their substance would not even be uniform. And it is equally impossible (iii) that more than one of these additional properties should belong to the single 'indivisible'. For, being indivisible, it will possess these properties in the same point—so that, if it 'suffers action' by being chilled, it will also, qua chilled, 'act' or 'suffer action' in some other way. And the same line of argument applies to all the other properties too: for the difficulty we have just raised confronts, as a necessary consequence, all who advocate 'indivisibles' (whether solids or planes), since their 'indivisibles' cannot become either 'rarer' or 'derser' inasmuch as there is no void in them.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔτι δ' ἄτοπον καὶ τὸ μικρὰ μὲν ἀδιαίρετα εἶναι, μεγάλα δὲ μή· νῦν μὲν γὰρ εὐλόγως τὰ μείζω θραύεται μᾶλλον τῶν μικρῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ διαλύεται ῥᾳδίως, οἷον τὰ μεγάλα· προσκόπτει γὰρ πολλοῖς· τὸ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον ὅλως διὰ τί μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τῶν μεγάλων τοῖς μικροῖς; ἔτι δὲ πότερον μία πάντων ἡ φύσις ἐκείνων τῶν στερεῶν, ἢ διαφέρει θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὰ μὲν εἴη πύρινα, τὰ δὲ γήινα τὸν ὄγκον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μία φύσις ἐστὶν ἁπάντων, τί τὸ χωρίσαν; ἢ διὰ τί οὐ γίνεται ἁψάμενα ἕν, ὥσπερ ὕδωρ ὕδατος ὅταν θίγῃ; οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ὕστερον τοῦ προτέρου. Εἰ δ' ἕτερα, ποῖα ταῦτα; καὶ δῆλον ὡς ταῦτα θετέον ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας τῶν (326b.) συμβαινόντων μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σχήματα. Ἔτι δὲ διαφέροντα τὴν φύσιν, κἂν ποιοῖ κἂν πάσχοι θιγγάνοντα ἀλλήλων. Ἔτι δὲ τί τὸ κινοῦν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον, παθητικόν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, ἢ διαιρετὸν ἔσται, κατ' ἄλλο μὲν κινοῦν κατ' ἄλλο δὲ κινούμενον, ἢ κατὰ ταὐτὸ τἀναντία ὑπάρξει, καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὐ μόνον ἀριθμῷ ἔσται μία ἀλλὰ καὶ δυνάμει.
            <td>III. It is a further paradox that there should be small 'indivisibles', but not large ones. For it is natural enough, from the ordinary point of view, that the larger bodies should be more liable to fracture than the small ones, since they (viz. the large bodies) are easily broken up because they collide with many other bodies. But why should indivisibility as such be the property of small, rather than of large, bodies? IV. Again, is the substance of all those solids uniform, or do they fall into sets which differ from one another—as if, e.g. some of them, in their aggregated bulk, were 'fiery', others earthy'? For (i) if all of them are uniform in substance, what is it that separated one from another? Or why, when they come into contact, do they not coalesce into one, as drops of water run together when drop touches drop (for the two cases are precisely parallel)? On the other hand (ii) if they fall into differing sets, how are these characterized? It is clear, too, that these, rather than the 'figures', ought to be postulated as 'original reals', i.e. causes from which the phenomena result. Moreover, if they differed in substance, they would both act and suffer action on coming into reciprocal contact. V. Again, what is it which sets them moving? For if their 'mover' is other than themselves, they are such as to 'suffer action'. If, on the other hand, each of them sets itself in motion, either (a) it will be divisible ('imparting motion' qua this, 'being moved' qua that), or (b) contrary properties will attach to it in the same respect—i.e. 'matter' will be identical in-potentiality as well as numerically-identical.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅσοι (6) μὲν οὖν διὰ τῆς &lt;�διὰ&gt; τῶν πόρων κινήσεώς φασι τὰ πάθη συμβαίνειν, εἰ μὲν καὶ πεπληρωμένων τῶν πόρων, περίεργον οἱ πόροι· εἰ γὰρ ταύτῃ τι πάσχει τὸ πᾶν, κἂν μὴ πόρους ἔχον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ συνεχὲς ὂν πάσχοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Ἔτι δὲ πῶς ἐνδέχεται περὶ τοῦ διορᾶν συμβαίνειν ὡς λέγουσιν; οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ἁφὰς ἐνδέχεται διιέναι διὰ τῶν διαφανῶν, οὔτε διὰ τῶν πόρων, εἰ πλήρης ἕκαστος· τί γὰρ διοίσει τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν πόρους; πᾶν γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔσται πλῆρες.
            <td>As to the thinkers who explain modification of property through the movement facilitated by the pores, if this is supposed to occur notwithstanding the fact that the pores are filled, their postulate of pores is superfluous. For if the whole body suffers action under these conditions, it would suffer action in the same way even if it had no pores but were just its own continuous self. Moreover, how can their account of 'vision through a medium' be correct? It is impossible for (the visual ray) to penetrate the transparent bodies at their 'contacts'; and impossible for it to pass through their pores if every pore be full. For how will that differ from having no pores at all? The body will be uniformly 'full' throughout.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ καὶ κενὰ μὲν ταῦτα, ἀνάγκη δὲ σώματα ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχειν, ταὐτὸ συμβήσεται πάλιν. Εἰ δὲ τηλικαῦτα τὸ μέγεθος ὥστε μὴ δέχεσθαι σῶμα μηδέν, γελοῖον τὸ μικρὸν μὲν οἴεσθαι κενὸν εἶναι, μέγα δὲ μὴ μηδ' ὁπηλικονοῦν, ἢ τὸ κενὸν ἄλλο τι οἴεσθαι λέγειν πλὴν χώραν σώματος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παντὶ σώματι τὸν ὄγκον ἴσον ἔσται κενόν.
            <td>But, further, even if these passages, though they must contain bodies, are 'void', the same consequence will follow once more. And if they are 'too minute to admit any body', it is absurd to suppose there is a 'minute' void and yet to deny the existence of a 'big' one (no matter how small the 'big' may be), or to imagine 'the void' means anything else than a body's place—whence it clearly follows that to every body there will correspond a void of equal cubic capacity.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅλως δὲ τὸ πόρους ποιεῖν περίεργον· εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν ποιεῖ κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν πόρων ποιήσει διιόν· εἰ δὲ τῷ ἅπτεσθαι, καὶ μὴ πόρων ὄντων τὰ μὲν πείσεται τὰ δὲ ποιήσει τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πεφυκότων.
            <td>As a general criticism we must urge that to postulate pores is superfluous. For if the agent produces no effect by touching the patient, neither will it produce any by passing through its pores. On the other hand, if it acts by contact, then—even without pores—some things will 'suffer action' and others will 'act', provided they are by nature adapted for reciprocal action and passion.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτως λέγειν τοὺς πόρους, ὥς τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἢ ψεῦδος ἢ μάταιον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ἐστίν· διαιρετῶν δ' ὄντων πάντῃ τῶν σωμάτων πόρους ποιεῖν γελοῖον· ᾗ γὰρ διαιρετά, δύναται χωρίζεσθαι.
            <td>Our arguments have shown that it is either false or futile to advocate pores in the sense in which some thinkers conceive them. But since bodies are divisible through and through, the postulate of pores is ridiculous: for, qua divisible, a body can fall into separate parts.
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    </blockquote><a name="22" id="22">
    <p>Postquam philosophus posuit opinionem aliorum de principiis rerum naturalium, et de modis quibus agunt et patiuntur adinvicem, nunc in parte ista reprobat eas. Et primo reprobat opiniones eorum quantum ad positionem atomorum, quae dicebant esse principia; secundo quantum ad modos agendi quos ponebant, ibi: quicumque quidem igitur per pororum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit indivisibilia corpora non esse principia; secundo quod non moventur a vacuo, ibi: amplius quid est quod movet et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes; secunda ibi: amplius autem utrum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit rationem; secundo removet quandam instantiam quam adversarii possent dare, ibi: amplius autem inconveniens et cetera. Quod ergo indivisibilia corpora non possunt esse principia probat, ducendo ad impossibile quod contradictoria erunt simul vera. Et hoc tali ratione. Si indivisibilia corpora sunt principia, nec agent nec patientur adinvicem; item si sunt principia, agent et patientur adinvicem; ergo agent et non agent, patientur et non patientur: quod est impossibile. Circa rationem istam sic procedit. Primo probat quod non agent nec patientur, duplici ratione; quarum prima talis est. Actio et passio fit per vacuum, ut ipsi dicunt; sed in talibus atomis non est vacuum; ergo nec agunt nec patiuntur. Secunda talis est. Omne quod est causa actionis vel passionis, est durum, vel molle, vel aliqua qualitatum dispositum; sed nullum corpus indivisibile est tale: ergo nec est activum nec passivum.
    <p>Secundo cum dicit: quamvis hoc inconveniens etc., ostendit oppositum, scilicet quod corpora indivisibilia agant et patiantur. Et hoc triplici ratione; quarum prima talis est. Secundum praedictos philosophos indivisibilia corpora quae sunt circularis figurae, sunt calida; ergo oportet aliquod alterius figurae esse frigidum: quia inconveniens est ponere unum contrariorum in natura sine reliquo. Si autem duae qualitates sunt in atomis, necesse est ponere aliquas qualitates consequentes esse in eis: quae sunt gravitas, durities, levitas, mollities, at aliae huiusmodi qualitates; cum concedant in atomis unum esse gravius alio sicut apparet in radio solis, quod una atomus magis descendit quam alia. Si autem unus est gravior alio, unus etiam est et levior alio, et unus calidior alio. Cum autem sint talia, impossibile est ea non pati adinvicem et agere cum sibi appropinquant: patitur enim leviter calidum ab excedenti calido, non inquantum sunt similia in calido, sed inquantum excedens est magis calidum, et illud quod exceditur est magis frigido permixtum.
    <p>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: sed tamen si durum etc.; quae talis est. Si Democritus dicit in ipsis atomis esse durum, necesse est quod dicat etiam esse in eis molle, per supra dictam rationem; quia si unum contrariorum fuerit in natura, et reliquum, ut dicitur II de caelo. Molle autem naturali impotentia resistendi tactui passivum est; licet inquantum est infusum humido sit <i>subactivum</i> (dicitur autem molle <i>subactivum</i>, quia agit per humidum, quod non est simpliciter activum sicut calidum vel frigidum). Et per hoc dictum sequitur iterum atomos esse activas et passivas. Sic ergo secundum quod deducit Commentator, quomodocumque componant ea contingit eis impossibile. Quoniam si ponunt ea non esse receptiva passionum, sequitur quod non sit aliqua causa actionis et passionis; et si ponunt ea receptibilia, contingit ut non sint receptibilia. Sic ergo ex illorum positione contingit ut sint illorum receptibilia. Et sicut diximus, licet hoc sequatur ex dictis Democriti et Leucippi, tamen hoc est impossibile et inconveniens. In atomis enim aut est figura sola, aut cum figura qualitas activa et passiva. Si ponatur in eis sola figura, tunc non erunt activa nec passiva, quia figura nec est activa, nec passiva: aliter enim mathematica agerent et paterentur. Si autem cum figura in atomis ponatur qualitas aliqua, aut una erit in qualibet atomo aut plures. Si autem una, nec propria fuerit in qualibet atomo, et hoc quidem sit calidum, hoc autem frigidum, tunc eorum natura non erit eadem. Si ergo differunt in naturis, sunt divisibilia. Ergo indivisibilia sunt divisibilia. Si autem plures qualitates insunt uni atomo, quae quidem activae sunt et passivae, illae erunt contrariae: quia actio et passio sunt inter contraria ut supra dictum est. Ergo contraria sunt in eodem indivisibili. Sequitur etiam quod sint in eodem secundum idem: quod est impossibile. Sequitur etiam quod si atomus infrigidatur, quod secundum hoc calefiat: quod falsum est. Et eodem modo est de aliis qualitatibus activis et passivis, quae sunt durum et molle.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: hoc enim et solida etc., reprobat opinionem Platonis, dicens quod non tantum Democrito et huiusmodi istud inconveniens sequitur, sed et ad opinionem Platonis, dicentis superficies indivisibiles esse principia. Dicit enim Plato quod in illis superficiebus non est vacuum. Quia secundum eos impossibile est fieri rarum, nisi per interpositionem vacui in partibus corporis, sequitur quod non existente vacuo, non generatur aliquid rarius vel densius. Cum autem rarum et densum sint primae contrariae qualitates ex parte materiae, istis non existentibus aliae consequentes non erunt: quia ablato priori aufertur et posterius. Sic ergo in corpore nullae sunt qualitates activae et passivae. Ergo nec agit nec patitur aliquod indivisibilium, non existente vacuo ipso.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: amplius autem inconveniens etc., removet quandam instantiam sive falsam responsionem quae posset dari ad rationes suas. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod atomi parvi sunt indivisibiles, magni autem divisibiles; unde removet, dicens quod hoc est inconveniens. Verum enim est quod rationabilius et facilius magna dividuntur quam parva: quia magna facilius dissolvuntur; et hoc ideo, quia magna componuntur ex multis. Non tamen parvitas vel magnitudo est causa divisibilitatis vel indivisibilitatis. Ipsa vero atoma de natura sua et universaliter sunt indivisibilia, et non propter magnitudinem vel parvitatem.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: amplius autem utrum una etc., ponit secundam rationem principalem ad probandum atomos, quos illi ponebant, non esse principia; quae talis est. Aut illa corpora sunt unius naturae, sicut si essent omnia ignea, vel omnia terrea: vel differunt adinvicem in naturis, ut si essent alia terrea, alia ignea. Si autem sunt omnia unius naturae et unius speciei secundum quantitatem, quid erit tunc dividens et discontinuans ipsos atomos? Quasi diceret: nihil. Cum enim sint unius naturae, non est in eis aliquid invenire per quod abinvicem discontinuentur. Quare ergo non accidit sicut in aqua, cuius partes quando adinvicem se tangunt statim continuantur, et non differt posterior pars aquae a priori? Cum autem ipsa corpora atoma nec sic adinvicem continuentur, non erunt unius naturae. Nec diversarum naturarum: quia si illa corpora sunt alia et alia ut dictum est, quales sunt illae diversae species vel naturae? Cum enim illae naturae faciant atomos diversos et discontinuos, oportet quod sint omnes secundum naturas diversae. Ergo illae naturae magis sunt ponendae causae et principia rerum quae fiunt ex atomis, quam figurae atomorum quos Democritus dixit esse principia. Et praeterea: quae differunt in natura et forma, agunt et patiuntur adinvicem cum approximantur, illa vero quae sunt diversa in figura, non sic agunt et patiuntur adinvicem. Ergo magis illae diversae naturae debent poni principia actionis et passionis quam diversae figurae.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: amplius quid est quod movet etc., ostendit quod corpora indivisibilia non moventur in vacuo sicut dicebat Democritus, tali ratione. Si ista indivisibilia moventur in vacuo, quaerendum est quid movet ea: aut enim moventur a se, aut ab alio. Si ab alio, tunc ipsum indivisibile est passivum. Ergo non est primum principium actionis, sed potius ipsum movens. Si autem movetur a seipso: aut erit divisibile, cum secundum unam partem moveat et secundum aliam moveatur; aut in eodem secundum idem existent contraria: movere enim et moveri sunt contrariorum. Utrumque autem istorum est impossibile. Sic etiam non solum esset materia contrariorum una numero, sed etiam potentia esset una: quod est impossibile; si enim in materia contrariorum esset una potentia solum, non haberent ipsa contraria diversas naturas. Sic etiam non esset multitudo rerum, sed omnia essent unum: quia omnia essent ab eadem materia et ab eadem potentia numero; cum enim actus et potentia non diversificent speciem, si esset tantum una potentia, esset tantum una species. Est autem hoc intelligendum de potentia propinqua ad formas contrarias, quae non est una numero, sed diversa. Est enim alia potentia remota, quae est una et eadem contrariorum; et haec est prima materia, quae secundum se est in potentia, et ipsa est sua potentia.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quicumque quidem igitur per pororum etc., reprobat praedictas opiniones quantum ad modos agendi et patiendi quos ponebant. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod ad actionem et passionem non sunt necessarii pori; secundo quod nec quantum ad divisionem corporum, ibi: divisibilibus autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quod pori non sunt necessarii ad actionem et passionem; secundo removet quoddam dubium, ibi: sed et si vacua et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes; quarum prima talis est. Quicumque dicunt contingere passiones ex hoc quod activum movetur in poris passivi, sicut isti dicunt quod res patitur cum impleti sunt pori, necesse est eos concedere quod pori sunt superflui. Si enim aliquod corpus patitur quia activum tangit ipsum in poris, tunc illud patitur per tactum activi et non per poros; etiam si non haberet poros sed sit totum continuum, patietur eodem modo propter tactum activi. Superflui ergo sunt pori.
    <p>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius autem quomodo contingit etc., dicens quod isti non possunt dicere quomodo videre et inspicere fiat, quando iste sensus fit per transparentia, sicut per vitrum vel per crystallum. Manifestum enim est quod sentiens secundum tactum non transit per transparentia ut ad rem sensatam perveniat, quia illi sensus fiunt per distantiam. Nec iterum possunt dicere quod sensus fiat per poros, si plenus est unusquisque pororum sicut ipsi dicunt; nihil enim differt habere poros plenos, et non habere poros: quia totum corpus transparens sic erit plenum.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed et si vacua etc., removet quoddam dubium, sive quandam falsam responsionem quae posset dari: posset enim aliquis dicere quod pori et foramina sunt vacua. Et hoc removet, dicens quod si sint vacua, aut possunt in se recipere corpus implens ipsa, aut non. Si possunt, ponatur ergo quod recipiant: possibili enim posito in esse, quod ex eo accidit non est impossibile. Sequitur ergo id quod prius, scilicet quod non semper contingat videre per transparens: quia impletis poris nihil videtur. Si autem pori tales sunt quod non possint recipere corpus implens, eo quod sunt parvi, hoc ridiculum est dicere, scilicet quod parvum foramen quod porus dicitur, sit vacuum, magnum autem spatium non sit vacuum, sed plenum corpore subintrante ipsum: quia qualitercumque est vacuum illud, sive magnum sive parvum, habet corpus sibi aequale implens ipsum. Quod quidem patet per definitionem vacui. Vacuum enim nihil aliud est, nisi <i>regio</i> sive spatium alicuius corporis susceptivum. Quapropter manifestum est, quod omni corpori in tumore suae quantitatis est aequale vacuum, si vacuum esse ponatur. Universaliter autem superfluum est dicere poros esse propter actionem. Aut enim agens agit secundum tactum, aut non. Si non agit per tactum: ergo non agit intrinsecus in poris tangens; ergo pori non sunt causa passionis. Si autem agit secundum tactum: etiam non existentibus poris, dummodo activum tangat passivum, quae sunt innata agere et pati adinvicem, fiet actio et passio. Ulterius autem epilogat, quod ita ponere poros ut quidam existimant, aut est mendacium, aut inutile est ad actionem et passionem. Et hoc est manifestum ex supra dictis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: divisibilibus autem, etc., ostendit quod pori non sunt necessarii ad corporis divisionem, dicens quod cum omne corpus sit divisibile, tam physicum quam mathematicum, ridiculum est ponere poros causam divisionis. Quia corpora possunt separari secundum id quod divisibilia sunt; in talibus autem non est vacuum in poris; pori ergo non sunt causa divisionis, quia aliter mathematica non essent divisibilia.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="22" id="22"></a> <b><a name="23" id="23">Lectio 23</a></b> <a name="23" id="23"></a>
    <blockquote>
      <table cellpadding="12">
        <tbody>
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">9
            <td>9
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσι γεννᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, λέγωμεν λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τὴν πολλάκις εἰρημένην.
            <td>Let explain the way in which things in fact possess the power of generating, and of acting and suffering action: and let us start from the principle we have often enunciated.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δ' ἐντελεχείᾳ τοιοῦτον, πέφυκεν οὐ τῇ μὲν τῇ δ' οὐ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, ἧττον δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ᾗ τοιοῦτον μᾶλλόν ἐστι καὶ ἧττον· καὶ ταύτῃ πόρους ἄν τις λέγοι μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς μεταλλευομένοις διατείνουσι τοῦ παθητικοῦ φλέβες (327a.) συνεχεῖς. Συμφυὲς μὲν οὖν ἕκαστον καὶ ἓν ὂν ἀπαθές.
            <td>For, assuming the distinction between (a) that which is potentially and (b) that which is actually such-and-such, it is the nature of the first, precisely in so far as it is what it is, to suffer action through and through, not merely to be susceptible in some parts while insusceptible in others. But its susceptibility varies in degree, according as it is more or less; such-and such, and one would be more justified in speaking of 'pores' in this connexion: for instance, in the metals there are veins of 'the susceptible' stretching continuously through the substance. So long, indeed, as any body is naturally coherent and one, it is insusceptible.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ θιγγάνοντα μήτε αὑτῶν μήτ' ἄλλων, ἃ ποιεῖν πέφυκε καὶ πάσχειν. Λέγω δ' οἷον οὐ μόνον ἁπτόμενον θερμαίνει τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄποθεν ᾖ· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀέρα τὸ πῦρ, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ τὸ σῶμα θερμαίνει, πεφυκὼς ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.
            <td>So, too, bodies are insusceptible so long as they are not in contact either with one another or with other bodies which are by nature such as to act and suffer action. (To illustrate my meaning: Fire heats not only when in contact, but also from a distance. For the fire heats the air, and the air—being by nature such as both to act and suffer action—heats the body.)
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὸ δὲ τῇ μὲν οἴεσθαι πάσχειν τῇ δὲ μή, διορίσαντας ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦτο λεκτέον. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ πάντῃ διαιρετὸν τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλ' ἔστι σῶμα ἀδιαίρετον ἢ πλάτος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πάντῃ παθητικόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συνεχὲς οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος καὶ πᾶν σῶμα διαιρετόν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει διῃρῆσθαι μὲν ἅπτεσθαι δέ, ἢ διαιρετὸν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ διακρίνεσθαι δύναται κατὰ τὰς ἁφάς, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, κἂν μήπω ᾖ διῃρημένον, ἔσται διῃρημένον· δυνατὸν γὰρ διαιρεθῆναι· γίνεται γὰρ οὐθὲν ἀδύνατον.
            <td>But the supposition that a body is 'susceptible in some parts, but insusceptible in others' (is only possible for those who hold an erroneous view concerning the divisibility of magnitudes. For us) the following account results from the distinctions we established at the beginning. For (i) if magnitudes are not divisible through and through—if, on the contrary, there are indivisible solids or planes—then indeed no body would be susceptible through and through:but neither would any be continuous. Since, however, (ii) this is false, i.e. since every body is divisible, there is no difference between 'having been divided into parts which remain in contact' and 'being divisible'. For if a body 'can be separated at the contacts' (as some thinkers express it), then, even though it has not yet been divided, it will be in a state of dividedness—since, as it can be divided, nothing inconceivable results.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅλως δὲ τὸ τοῦτον γίνεσθαι τὸν τρόπον μόνον σχιζομένων τῶν σωμάτων ἄτοπον· ἀναιρεῖ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀλλοίωσιν, ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα συνεχὲς ὂν ὁτὲ μὲν ὑγρὸν ὁτὲ δὲ πεπηγός, οὐ διαιρέσει καὶ συνθέσει τοῦτο παθόν, οὐδὲ τροπῇ καὶ διαθιγῇ, καθάπερ λέγει Δημόκριτος· οὔτε γὰρ μεταταχθὲν οὔτε μετατεθὲν τὴν φύσιν πεπηγὸς ἐξ ὑγροῦ γέγονεν· οὐδ' ἐνυπάρχει τὰ σκληρὰ καὶ πεπηγότα ἀδιαίρετα τοὺς ὄγκους· ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἅπαν ὑγρόν, ὁτὲ δὲ σκληρὸν καὶ πεπηγός ἐστιν.
            <td>And (iii) the suposition is open to this general objection—it is a paradox that 'passion' should occur in this manner only, viz. by the bodies being split. For this theory abolishes 'alteration': but we see the same body liquid at one time and solid at another, without losing its continuity. It has suffered this change not by 'division' and composition', nor yet by 'turning' and 'intercontact' as Democritus asserts; for it has passed from the liquid to the solid state without any change of 'grouping' or 'position' in the constituents of its substance. Nor are there contained within it those 'hard' (i.e. congealed) particles 'indivisible in their bulk': on the contrary, it is liquid—and again, solid and congealed uniformly all through.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔτι δ' οὐδ' αὔξησιν οἷόν τ' εἶναι καὶ φθίσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ἔσται γεγονὸς μεῖζον, εἴπερ ἔσται πρόσθεσις, καὶ μὴ πᾶν μεταβεβληκός, ἢ μιχθέντος τινὸς ἢ καθ' αὑτὸ μεταβαλόντος.
            <td>This theory, it must be added, makes growth and diminution impossible also. For if there is to be opposition (instead of the growing thing having changed as a whole, either by the admixture of something or by its own transformation), increase of size will not have resulted in any and every part.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ γεννᾶν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τίνα φασὶ μέν τινες οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δέ, διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
            <td>So much, then, to establish that things generate and are generated, act and suffer action, reciprocally; and to distinguish the way in which these processes can occur from the (impossible) way in which some thinkers say they occur.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="23" id="23">
    <p>Postquam philosophus posuit opiniones aliorum de agere et pati, sive de modis agendi vel patiendi, et reprobationes earum, in parte ista ponit opinionem propriam et veram. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo dat intentionem suam; secundo prosequitur intentum, ibi: si enim est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod postquam positae et reprobatae sunt opiniones aliorum de actione et passione, dicendum secundum rei veritatem quomodo existat vel fiat generatio, et quomodo existat agere et pati in his quae agunt et patiuntur. Ad hoc autem perfecte videndum, accipiendum est pro principio actionis et passionis illud quod multoties dictum est.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: si enim est hoc etc., prosequitur intentum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit duas conditiones quae requiruntur ad actionem et passionem; secundo probat primam conditionem, ibi: existimare autem et cetera. Circa primum ponit primo primam conditionem, quae est quod patiens quod est in potentia, non patitur secundum quasdam partes, sed secundum omnes. Primo ergo praemittit quoddam principium manifestum, et est quod entium quoddam est in potentia, et illud est passivum: quoddam est in actu, et illud est activum. Et cum ita sit, non est alia causa passionis, nisi quia receptivum alicuius formae recipit illam ab aliquo agente. Impossibile est ergo quod illud tale corpus quod est in potentia, sit receptivum alicuius formae <i>tum quidem</i>, idest secundum aliquas partes, <i>tum autem non</i>, idest secundum quasdam non, sed oportet quod sit <i>omnino</i> passibile, idest in omni parte, inquantum est in potentia. Potest tamen secundum aliquas partes magis recipere passionem ab agentis virtute causatam, et secundum quasdam minus; quia forte passivum magis est dispositum in una parte quam in alia, ad recipiendum formam quam agens intendit inducere. Si autem aliquis dicat quod magis passiva sunt magis porosa, sicut videmus in venis metallorum quod quae sunt rariores, magis sunt dispositae ad recipiendum formam metalli, et sic videtur quod pori sunt causa passionis: dico quod hoc non est verum: quod foramina non sunt causa passionis, sed potius dispositionis materiae, quae a tali activo passibilis est et non ab alio.
    <p>Secundo cum dicit: continuum igitur unumquodque etc., ponit secundam conditionem. Et est quod agens et patiens debent esse divisa et non continua: quia id quod est continuum non est passibile. Veritas autem huius propositionis ex hoc est, quia nihil patitur a seipso: quia non est magis ratio quare una pars eius agat et alia patiatur, quam alia, cum partes continui sint similis naturae. Ista autem agentia et patientia licet sint divisa, oportet quod sint in debita propinquitate. Omnia enim agentia naturalia habent determinatam virtutem, quae si ultra suae virtutis proportionem elongentur a patientibus, nullum effectum causare poterunt, sed cum fiunt propinqua, in se vel in aliis, tunc agens aget, et patiens patietur. Dico autem appropinquare sibi ipsis, quando primum agens et ultimum patiens sunt immediata; appropinquare vero in aliis est, quando inter primum agens et ultimum patiens est aliquid quod agit et patitur, agit autem in virtute primi. Verbi gratia, ignis non solum calefacit nos quando tangit, sed etiam quando est longe: calefacit enim aerem qui natus est calefieri ab igne, aer autem calefactus calefacit corpus nostrum.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: existimare autem etc., probat primam conditionem, dicens quod existimare sicut quidam existimant, quod res quae patitur, <i>tum</i>, idest secundum aliquam partem patitur, et <i>tum non</i>, idest secundum aliquam non patitur, hic determinandum est, et dicendum quod hoc falsum est. Si enim concederetur quod corpus et magnitudo non ubique esset divisibilis, sed dividitur in indivisibilia corpora sicut dixit Democritus, vel in indivisibiles superficies sicut dixit Plato, tunc verum esset quod corpus non <i>ubique</i>, idest in omni parte sua, esset passibile. Sic etiam esset verum quod nihil esset continuum: licet continuetur ad indivisibile, non tamen componitur ex indivisibilibus. Si autem est mendacium hoc quod dicunt, immo quia mendacium est: quia omne corpus est divisibile; nihil differt dicere quod dividatur vel quod sit divisibile, vel quod tangatur vel quod sit tangibile. Licet enim in poros dividatur secundum Democritum, tamen etiam est divisibile in partibus quae poris interponuntur, quia istae non sunt indivisibiles; quae tamen partes ponebantur indivisibiles ab eis. Et similiter est tangibile in illis. Et ita secundum totum est tangibile et divisibile et passibile. Si enim potest segregari secundum <i>tactus</i>, idest secundum superficies in quibus est tactus, ut dicunt quidam Platonici, etsi nondum est divisum, est tamen divisibile. Posito ergo in esse possibili, non accidit impossibile. Similiter etiam si divisibile sit in partes, posita divisione in actu non sequitur impossibile. Secundum ergo totum et quamlibet sui partem est divisibile et passibile.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: universaliter autem etc., ostendit quod praedicta opinio non est sufficiens ad actionem et passionem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod non est sufficiens ad alterationem, immo destruit ipsam; secundo quod nec sufficiens ad augmentum, ibi: amplius autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod universaliter passionem hoc modo fieri in rebus quo quidam dicunt quod generatio fit, scissis sive separatis corporibus per poros, est inconveniens. Destruit enim hic modus alterationem, in qua tamen salvatur passio et actio. Videmus enim quod idem corpus continuum manens, quandoque quidem est humidum et liquidum, et quandoque coagulatum, sicut glacies et aqua fluida, et tamen talis alteratio fit sine divisione ipsius corporis continui, et sine aliqua alia compositione, et sine conversione suarum partium, et absque tactu diverso in ordine componentium partium sicut dicit Democritus. Cum enim aliquod humidum coagulatur, non transducitur extra naturam suam ita quod mutet substantiam, nec transponuntur partes mutando ordinem vel situm, neque transmittitur per liquefactionem, neque etiam <i>nunc</i>, quando scilicet humidum coagulatur, oportet quod in aqua corpora indivisibilia <i>tumoribus</i>, idest secundum quantitatem, subintrent ad causandam coagulationem, sed ipsum humidum quod coagulatur, et e converso, semper similiter se habet quantum ad hoc, quod neque componuntur partes, neque adduntur vel dividuntur, neque mutant ordinem vel situm. Patet ergo quod praedicta opinio destruit alterationem.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: amplius autem neque etc., ostendit quod destruit et augmentum. In augmentatione enim oportet quod augeatur quaelibet pars eius quod augetur, ut supra dictum est. Sed si augmentum fiat per additionem atomorum ut ipsi dicunt, non erit augmentatio, sed quaedam appositio corporis ad corpus, non ex hoc quod quaelibet pars istius compositi augmentatur. Item in augmentatione oportet quod augmentans sive adveniens augmentato transmutetur in naturam eius, et quod ipsum totum quod augetur, transmutetur ab eo quod sibi advenit, de minori quantitate in maiorem quantitatem. Sed per additionem corporum atomorum ipsum totum non erit transmutans, idest non transmutabitur <i>alio mixto</i>, idest aliquo corpore indivisibili sibi addito, non transmutante ipsum de minori quantitate in maiorem. Et ipsum totum non erit secundum se transmutans, idest non transmutabit corpora indivisibilia, quae sibi adveniunt et remanent incorrupta. Unde signanter dixit <i>alio mixto</i>: quia talia corpora non miscentur adinvicem, sicut grana frumenti in modio. Ultimo epilogat, et patet in littera.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="23" id="23"></a> <b><a name="24" id="24">Lectio 24</a></b> <a name="24" id="24"></a>
    <blockquote>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">10
            <td>10
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι περὶ μίξεως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τρίτον τῶν προτεθέντων ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Σκεπτέον δὲ τί τ' ἐστὶν ἡ μίξις καὶ τί τὸ μικτόν, καὶ τίσιν ὑπάρχει τῶν ὄντων καὶ πῶς, ἔτι δὲ πότερον ἔστι μίξις ἢ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι μιχθῆναί τι ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες· ὄντων μὲν γὰρ ἔτι τῶν (327b.) μιχθέντων καὶ μὴ ἠλλοιωμένων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον νῦν μεμίχθαι φασὶν ἢ πρότερον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχειν, θατέρου δὲ φθαρέντος οὐ μεμίχθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ μίξιν ὁμοίως ἐχόντων εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κἂν εἰ ἀμφοτέρων συνελθόντων ἔφθαρται τῶν μιγνυμένων ἑκάτερον· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι μεμιγμένα τά γε ὅλως οὐκ ὄντα. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἔοικε ζητεῖν διορίσαι τί διαφέρει μίξις γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ τί τὸ μικτὸν τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς δεῖ διαφέρειν, εἴπερ ἔστιν. Ὥστε τούτων ὄντων φανερῶν τὰ διαπορηθέντα λύοιντ' ἄν.
            <td>But we have still to explain 'combination', for that was the third of the subjects we originally proposed to discuss. Our explanation will proceed on the same method as before. We must inquire: What is 'combination', and what is that which can 'combine'? Of what things, and under what conditions, is 'combination' a property? And, further, does 'combination' exist in fact, or is it false to assert its existence? For, according to some thinkers, it is impossible for one thing to be combined with another. They argue that (i) if both the 'combined' constituents persist unaltered, they are no more 'combined' now than they were before, but are in the same condition: while (ii) if one has been destroyed, the constituents have not been 'combined'—on the contrary, one constituent is and the other is not, whereas 'combination' demands uniformity of condition in them both: and on the same principle (iii) even if both the combining constituents have been destroyed as the result of their coalescence, they cannot 'have been combined' since they have no being at all. What we have in this argument is, it would seem, a demand for the precise distinction of 'combination' from coming-to-be and passing-away (for it is obvious that 'combination', if it exists, must differ from these processes) and for the precise distinction of the 'combinable' from that which is such as to come-to-be and pass-away. As soon, therefore, as these distinctions are clear, the difficulties raised by the argument would be solved.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ὕλην τῷ πυρὶ μεμίχθαι φαμὲν οὐδὲ μίγνυσθαι καιομένην, οὔτ' αὐτὴν αὑτῆς τοῖς μορίοις οὔτε τῷ πυρί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πῦρ γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ φθείρεσθαι. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον οὔτε τῷ σώματι τὴν τροφὴν οὔτε τὸ σχῆμα τῷ κηρῷ μιγνύμενον σχηματίζειν τὸν ὄγκον· οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ λευκὸν οὐδ' ὅλως τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἕξεις οἷόν τε μίγνυσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν· σωζόμενα γὰρ ὁρᾶται. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λευκόν γε καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐνδέχεται μιχθῆναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν μὴ χωριστῶν οὐδέν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ πάντα ποτὲ ὁμοῦ φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ μεμίχθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν ἅπαντι μικτόν, ἀλλ' ὑπάρχειν δεῖ χωριστὸν ἑκάτερον τῶν μιχθέντων· τῶν δὲ παθῶν οὐθὲν χωριστόν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν δυνάμει τὰ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδέχεται τὰ μιχθέντα εἶναί πως καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ἑτέρου ὄντος τοῦ γεγονότος ἐξ αὐτῶν, δυνάμει δ' ἔτι ἑκατέρου ἅπερ ἦσαν πρὶν μιχθῆναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολωλότα· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ λόγος διηπόρει πρότερον· φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μιγνύμενα πρότερόν τε ἐκ κεχωρισμένων συνιόντα καὶ δυνάμενα χωρίζεσθαι πάλιν· οὔτε διαμένουσιν οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ ὥσπερ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ λευκόν, οὔτε φθείρονται, οὔτε θάτερον οὔτ' ἄμφω· σώζεται γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν. Διὸ ταῦτα μὲν ἀφείσθω·
            <td>Now (i) we do not speak of the wood as 'combined' with the fire, nor of its burning as a 'combining' either of its particles with one another or of itself with the fire: what we say is that 'the fire is coming-to-be, but the wood is 'passing-away'. Similarly, we speak neither (ii) of the food as 'combining' with the body, nor (iii) of the shape as 'combining' with the wax and thus fashioning the lump. Nor can body 'combine' with white, nor (to generalize) 'properties' and 'states' with 'things': for we see them persisting unaltered. But again (iv) white and knowledge cannot be 'combined' either, nor any other of the 'adjectivals'. (Indeed, this is a blemish in the theory of those who assert that 'once upon a time all things were together and combined'. For not everything can 'combine' with everything. On the contrary, both of the constituents that are combined in the compound must originally have existed in separation: but no property can have separate existence.) Since, however, some things are-potentially while others are-actually, the constituents combined in a compound can 'be' in a sense and yet 'not-be'. The compound may be-actually other than the constituents from which it has resulted; nevertheless each of them may still be-potentially what it was before they were combined, and both of them may survive undestroyed. (For this was the difficulty that emerged in the previous argument: and it is evident that the combining constituents not only coalesce, having formerly existed in separation, but also can again be separated out from the compound.) The constituents, therefore, neither (a) persist actually, as 'body' and 'white' persist: nor (b) are they destroyed (either one of them or both), for their 'power of action' is preserved. Hence these difficulties may be dismissed:
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    </blockquote><a name="24" id="24">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de tactu et de facere et pati, quae sunt necessaria ad generationem, hic determinat de mixtione, quae fuit tertium eorum de quibus supra promiserat se dicturum. Est enim etiam mixtio necessaria ad generationem eorum quae ex elementis generantur; quando enim fit generatio simplicis elementi, tunc nulla fit mixtio. Circa hoc ergo duo facit: primo manifestat intentionem suam; secundo prosequitur intentum, ibi: impossibile est enim alterum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post praedicta restat nos videre de mixtione secundum eundem modum methodi, et ideo, quia mixtio erat tertium eorum quae posuit tractanda. Quid autem intendat per hoc quod dixit, <i>secundum eundem modum methodi</i>, declarat cum subdit, quod perscrutandum est quid est mixtio, et quid miscibile, et <i>quibus existit entium</i>, idest quae contingit misceri, et videndum quomodo fiat, et si sit mixtio, vel utrum sit mendacium mixtionem fieri; quia hoc modo supra quaesivit de aliis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: impossibile est enim etc., prosequitur intentum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo pertractat ultimam quaestionem, scilicet an mixtio sit; secundo penultimam quaestionem, scilicet quomodo mixtio fiat, ibi: continuam autem his et cetera. Alias autem quaestiones non prosequitur, quia ex cognitione istarum reliquae innotescunt. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit rationes ostendentes mixtionem non esse; secundo solvit eas, ibi: hic quidem videtur sermo et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sunt quidam dicentes non esse possibile mixtionem fieri. Et ad hoc probandum utebantur tali ratione. Quando miscibilia veniunt ad mixtionem, aut manent sicut prius in forma et specie, aut non manent, sed corrumpuntur ambo vel alterum. Si ambo manent in forma et specie sicut prius et non alterantur, tunc non sunt magis mixta quam prius, sed consimiliter se habent; si autem alterum corrumpatur, nec etiam tunc erit mixtio, sed corruptio unius et conservatio alterius non corrupti; si autem ambo invicem corrumpuntur, tunc etiam non erit mixtio: quia non possunt esse mixta quae nullo modo sunt entia.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: hic quidem videtur sermo etc., determinat propositam quaestionem. Et quia ratio negantium mixtionem esse quaerit differentias mixtionis et generationis, et miscibilis et generabilis, ideo philosophus primo ostendit differentiam eorum adinvicem, et mixtionis ad alios motus; secundo solvit secundum propriam opinionem, ibi: quoniam autem sunt haec quidem potentia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit differentiam mixtionis et generationis; secundo mixtionis ad augmentum et alterationem, ibi: secundum autem modum eundem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod sermo eorum qui negant mixtionem fieri, videtur quaerere differentiam mixtionis et generationis; quaerit etiam in quo differt miscibile a generabili et corruptibili. Manifestum enim est quod si est mixtio, oportet eam differre ab alteratione et augmento et generatione, quae sunt mutationes ad formam; et quando ista differentia erit manifesta, tunc solvetur quaestio.
    <p>Ponit ergo differentiam mixtionis et generationis cum dicit: at vero neque materiam etc., dicens quod materia non dicitur misceri generabili, sed potius effici actu per formam: nihil enim aliud ad generationem requiritur secundum Aristotelem in V Metaphys., nisi agens reducens materiam praeexistentem in potentia ad actum. Unde in VIII Metaphys. dicit, quod non est alia causa quare partes definitionis sunt vere unum, nisi agens quod reduxit ad actum quod prius erat in potentia. Materia enim in qua generatur ignis, non dicitur misceri igni, nec etiam formae ipsius. Similiter non dicimus ignem misceri lignis cum ardet ea; nec etiam dicimus quod materia ignis misceatur particulis ignis, neque ipsi igni, sicut dicimus quod unum miscibile miscetur particulis alterius miscibilis et ipsi miscibili. Sed dicimus materiam ignis, sicut ligna vel aliud, corrumpi, ignem autem generari. Ex quo manifeste potest concludi, quod mixtio non est generatio neque corruptio.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: secundum autem modum eundem etc., ponit differentiam mixtionis ad alios motus, et primo ad augmentum; dicens quod secundum eundem modum non dicimus cibum misceri corpori cibato: quia cibus transit in dominans corpus, quod manet secundum formam, sed neutrum miscibilium ita manet sicut corpus cibatum, scilicet indivisum et specie nullo modo alteratum. Et sic patet quod mixtio differt ab augmento. Differt etiam ab alteratione; sicut primo patet in artibus. Non enim dicimus figuram misceri cerae, nec figuram misceri quantitati sive tumori: quia utrumque manet indivisum et specie nullo modo alteratum. Idem ostendit in alterationibus naturalibus. Non enim dicimus quod albedo misceatur corpori quando corpus fit album; et universaliter nulla passio et nullus habitus miscetur aliis rebus, sed sunt in eis sicut in subiecto. Et ratio huius est, quia ambo, scilicet tam accidens quam subiectum, videntur esse salvata, et non altera. Similiter nullum accidens miscetur alii accidenti. Et universaliter nullum quod non contingit separari et per se existere, potest misceri: quia omnia miscibilia primo sunt separata, et post mixtionem separari possunt. Et propter hoc non bene dixerunt, aliquando omnia fuisse simul, sicut dicitur in I Physic.; non enim omne cuilibet miscetur, sed oportet miscibilia esse talia quorum utrumque possit separari. Passio autem nulla est separabilis: et ideo nec miscibilis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem sunt haec quidem potentia etc., solvit praedictam quaestionem, dicens quod entium quaedam sunt entia in potentia, et quaedam in actu; unde mixta, postquam mixta sunt, contingit aliqualiter esse et aliqualiter non esse in mixto: sunt enim ibi in potentia, salvata tamen virtute eorum, sed non sunt ibi actu. Ipsum enim generatum est aliud ab ipsis miscibilibus sive mixtis, et est in potentia ipsa miscibilia, quae ante mixtionem sunt separata; ita contingit post mixtionem separari, licet in mixto non sint abinvicem divisa. Et hoc est quod <i>sermo</i> habitus, sive ratio negantium mixtionem, quaesivit, scilicet quomodo elementa manerent in mixto. Videmus enim quod ea quae miscentur, conveniunt ex prius separatis, et postquam conveniunt rursus separabuntur: quia levia aliquando ascendent, et gravia descendent. Cum enim elementa quae sunt in mixto sint ibi praeter naturam, quia sunt extra propriam regionem ut dicitur II de caelo, quod autem est praeter naturam non potest esse sempiternum, necesse est ipsa separari. Non ergo manent elementa in mixto actu sine aliqua alteratione, sicut corpus album; nec ambo nec alterum corrumpuntur omnino, sicut in generatione et corruptione: salvatur enim virtus eorum.
    <p>Ad evidentiam autem huius quaestionis duo sunt consideranda, super quae ista quaestio est fundata. Primum est, qualiter elementa veniant ad mixtionem. Secundum est, quomodo elementa sunt in mixto. Circa primum sciendum est, quod secundum dicta philosophorum primum movens elementa ad mixtionem est immiscibile; et hoc est ipsum caelum sive astra lata in ipso, quod est diversum a natura quatuor elementorum, ut probatum est in I de caelo et mundo. Nam sicut ostendit philosophus in I Meteororum, iste mundus quatuor elementorum est de necessitate <i>continuus</i>, idest contiguus, superioribus motibus, ut omnis ipsius virtus gubernetur inde; quia illud oportet putare primam causam, quod omnibus est principium motus: tale autem est ipsum caelum. Et ideo ibidem subdit, quod causa eorum quae accidunt circa ignem, terram et alia elementa, est virtus eorum quae semper moventur. Unde in eodem dicit quod sphaera ignis movetur circulariter, et etiam sphaera aeris, licet non tota, per raptum firmamenti. Habent etiam aliae stellae specialem effectum in aliquibus elementis: sicut sphaera solis in qua est effectus caloris, est nata movere ignem, et sphaera lunae est nata movere aquam, sicut ad sensum patet. Aliae autem sphaerae quinque planetarum natae sunt movere aerem: et ideo aer tot diversis motibus movetur. Est enim in aere frigus congelativum ex sphaera Saturni, et aestus ex sphaera Martis, et temperies in calido ex sphaera Iovis, et temperies in frigido ex sphaera Veneris, commiscibilitas et passibilitas facilis ex sphaera Mercurii. Sphaera autem stellarum fixarum quae est octava, in qua sunt multae imagines et figurae, movet terram; unde et in ipsa figurantur imagines multae in generatis. Licet ergo elementa levia non descendant ex se, nec gravia ascendant ex se, tamen ex motoribus universalibus ordinantibus motum aliquando descendunt levia et ascendunt gravia. Huiusmodi autem conveniens exemplum est in qualitatibus activis et passivis corporis animati. Non enim in animali semper movetur calidum secundum naturam ignis, nec agit actum ignis omnino, sed potius movetur in id ad quod dirigitur ab anima, et agit ad terminum et finem intentum ab ea, sicut philosophus dicit contra Empedoclem in II de anima. Cum autem motus caeli et opus naturae sit opus intelligentiae ut dicit philosophus, non semper sequuntur elementa proprium impetum sui motus, sed aliquando movebuntur in id ad quod per voluntatem intelligentiae dirigentur, sive per virtutem stellarum, si de propinquo sive instrumentali motore loquamur. Hoc autem manifestum est per exemplum de vapore terrestri elevato a terra, sicut dicitur in I Meteororum, qui per virtutem solis ascendit ad calidam regionem aeris, et de vapore humido et aquoso similiter ascendente. Unde cum in aere sint quaedam partes ignitae et aereae et aqueae et terreae, moventur a se invicem ascendendo et descendendo. Quod autem ignis sit in aere, patet per philosophum in I Meteororum: dicit enim quod ambitus ignis per aerem frequenter spargitur <i>motu</i>, idest per virtutem caelestis motus, et fertur violentia deorsum. Et ideo sunt aliquae partes ignis et in rore et in vaporibus pluvialibus descendentes, quas vapores accipiunt in regione aeris calefacta: et ideo aquae pluviales sunt vaporosae et calidae. Et haec etiam est causa quod, nive descendente, non est tanta intensio frigoris sicut in aliis hiemalibus temporibus. Sic ergo cum pluvia et rore et aliis huiusmodi descendunt partes ignitae ad locum mixtionis. Ex his patet quod ad mixtionem non movet violentia sed natura; et ideo mixtio non est violenta sed naturalis. Circa secundum autem diversi diversimode opinantur. Sunt enim quidam, dicentes quod qualitatibus activis et passivis ad medium redactis aliqualiter per alterationem, formae generales elementorum manent in mixto, quia si non manerent, corruptio quaedam erit et non mixtio. Rursus etiam, quia aliter simplicia corpora elementorum rationem amitterent: elementum enim est ex quo componitur aliquid et est in eo, ut dicitur V Metaphys. Sed ista opinio est impossibilis. Impossibile enim materiam secundum idem diversas formas elementorum suscipere. Si igitur in corpore mixto formae substantiales elementorum salvarentur, oportebit diversis partibus materiae eas inesse. Materiae autem diversas partes accipere est impossibile, nisi praeintellecta quantitate in materia: sublata enim quantitate materia indivisibilis permanet, sicut patet in I Physic. Ex materia autem sub quantitate existentes et forma substantiali adveniente, corpus physicum constituitur. Diversae igitur partes materiae formis elementorum subsistentes plurium corporum rationem suscipiunt. Multa autem corpora impossibile est esse simul. Non igitur in qualibet parte corporis mixti erunt quatuor elementa; et sic non erit vera mixtio, sed ad sensum, sicut accidit in congregatione corporum, insensibilium propter parvitatem. Praeterea quaelibet forma substantialis propriam dispositionem requirit in materia, sine qua esse non potest: unde altera est via ad alterationem et altera ad corruptionem. Impossibile autem est eandem esse dispositionem quam requirit forma ignis, et quam requirit forma aeris vel aquae: sed sunt contrariae. Contraria autem esse non possunt in eodem subiecto. Impossibile est igitur, quod in eadem parte mixti sint formae substantiales ignis et aquae. Si igitur mixtio fiat remanentibus formis simplicium corporum, sequitur quod non sit mixtio, sed solum ad sensum, quasi iuxta se positis partibus insensibilibus propter parvitatem. Quidam utriusque rationes vitare volentes in maius inconveniens inciderunt. Ut enim mixtionem ab elementorum corruptione distinguerent, dixerunt formas substantiales elementorum aliqualiter remanere in mixto; sed rursus, ne cogerentur mixtionem ad sensum et non secundum veritatem ponere, posuerunt quod formae elementorum non manent in mixto secundum suum complementum, sed in quoddam medium reducuntur. Dicunt enim quod formae elementorum suscipiunt magis et minus, et habent contrarietatem adinvicem. Et quia haec manifeste repugnant communi opinioni et dictis Aristotelis, dicentis in praedicamentis, quod substantiae nihil est contrarium, et quod non recipit magis et minus, ulterius procedunt, dicentes quod formae elementorum sunt imperfectissimae, utpote materiae primae propinquiores: unde sunt mediae inter formas substantiales et accidentales; et sic inquantum accedunt ad naturam formarum accidentalium, magis et minus suscipere possunt. Haec autem positio multipliciter improbabilis est. Primo quia esse aliquid medium inter substantiam et accidens est omnino impossibile; esset enim aliquid medium inter affirmationem et negationem: proprium enim accidentis est in subiecto esse, substantiae vero in subiecto non esse. Formae autem substantiales sunt quidem in materia, sed non in subiecto; nam subiectum est hoc aliquid, forma autem substantialis est quae facit hoc aliquid, non autem praesupponit ipsum. Item ridiculum est dicere, medium esse inter ea quae non sunt unius generis, ut probatur in X Metaphys.: medium enim et extrema ex eodem genere esse oportet. Nihil ergo medium esse potest inter substantiam et accidens. Unde impossibile est formas elementorum suscipere magis et minus. Omnis enim forma recipiens magis et minus est divisibilis per accidens, inquantum scilicet subiectum potest eam participare vel magis vel minus. Secundum autem id quod est divisibile, vel per accidens vel per se, contingit esse motum continuum, ut patet in VI Physic. Si igitur formae substantiales elementorum suscipiunt magis et minus, tam generatio quam corruptio erit motus continuus; quod est impossibile: nam motus continuus non est nisi in tribus generibus, scilicet in quantitate, qualitate et ubi. Oportet igitur alium modum invenire, quo et veritas mixtionis salvetur, et tamen elementa non totaliter corrumpantur, sed aliqualiter in mixto remaneant. Considerandum est igitur quod qualitates activae et passivae elementorum contrariae sunt adinvicem, et magis et minus recipiunt: ex contrariis autem qualitatibus quae suscipiunt magis et minus, constitui potest media qualitas, quae sapit utriusque extremi naturam, sicut pallidum inter album et nigrum. Sic igitur remissis excellentiis elementarium qualitatum, constituitur ex eis quaedam qualitas media, quae est propria qualitas corporis mixti, differens tamen in diversis secundum diversam mixtionis proportionem. Et haec quidem qualitas est propria dispositio ad formam corporis mixti, sicut qualitas simplex ad formam corporis simplicis. Sicut igitur extrema inveniuntur in medio, quod participat naturam utriusque, sic qualitates simplicium corporum inveniuntur in qualitate corporis mixti. Qualitas autem simplicis corporis est quidem aliud a forma substantiali ipsius, agit tamen virtute formae substantialis; alioquin calor calefaceret tantum, non autem forma substantialis educeretur in actum, cum nihil agat supra suam speciem. Sunt igitur virtutes formarum substantialium simplicium corporum in corporibus mixtis non actu, sed virtute. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus, <i>non manent igitur elementa</i>, scilicet in mixto, <i>actu, ut corpus album, nec corrumpuntur, nec alterum nec ambo: salvatur enim virtus eorum</i>.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="24" id="24"></a> <b><a name="25" id="25">Lectio 25</a></b> <a name="25" id="25"></a>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς τούτοις ἀπόρημα διαιρετέον, πότερον ἡ μίξις πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν τί ἐστιν. Ὅταν γὰρ οὕτως εἰς μικρὰ διαιρεθῇ τὰ μιγνύμενα, καὶ τεθῇ παρ' ἄλληλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὥστε μὴ δῆλον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, τότε μέμικται (328a.) ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥστε ὁτιοῦν εἶναι μόριον τῶν μιχθέντων; λέγεται μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως, οἷον κριθὰς μεμίχθαι πυροῖς, ὅταν ἡτισοῦν παρ' ὁντινοῦν τεθῇ. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶ πᾶν σῶμα διαιρετόν, εἴπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα σώματι μικτὸν ὁμοιομερές, ὁτιοῦν ἂν δέοι μέρος γίνεσθαι παρ' ὁτιοῦν. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς τἀλάχιστα διαιρεθῆναι, &lt;�οὐδὲ&gt; σύνθεσις ταὐτὸ καὶ μίξις ἀλλ' ἕτερον, δῆλον ὡς οὔτε κατὰ μικρὰ σωζόμενα δεῖ τὰ μιγνύμενα φάναι μεμίχθαι. Σύνθεσις γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐ κρᾶσις οὐδὲ μίξις, οὐδ' ἕξει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μόριον.
            <td>but the problem immediately connected with them—whether combination is something relative to perception must be set out and discussed. When the combining constituents have been divided into parts so small, and have been juxtaposed in such a manner, that perception fails to discriminate them one from another, have they then 'been combined Or ought we to say 'No, not until any and every part of one constituent is juxtaposed to a part of the other'? The term, no doubt, is applied in the former sense: we speak, e.g. of wheat having been 'combined' with barley when each grain of the one is juxtaposed to a grain of the other. But every body is divisible and therefore, since body 'combined' with body is uniform in texture throughout, any and every part of each constituent ought to be juxtaposed to a part of the other. No body, however, can be divided into its 'least' parts: and 'composition' is not identical with 'combination', but other than it. From these premises it clearly follows (i) that so long as the constituents are preserved in small particles, we must not speak of them as 'combined'. (For this will be a 'composition' instead of a 'blending' or 'combination': nor will every portion of the resultant exhibit the same ratio between its constituents as the whole.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Φαμὲν δ', εἴπερ δεῖ μεμίχθαι τι, τὸ μιχθὲν ὁμοιομερὲς εἶναι, καὶ ὥσπερ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ μέρος ὕδωρ, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ κραθέντος. Ἂν δ' ᾖ κατὰ μικρὰ σύνθεσις ἡ μίξις, οὐθὲν συμβήσεται τούτων, ἀλλὰ μόνον μεμιγμένα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν (καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ μὲν μεμιγμένον, ἐὰν μὴ βλέπῃ ὀξύ, τῷ Λυγκεῖ δ' οὐθὲν μεμιγμένον), &lt;�οὐδὲ&gt; τῇ διαιρέσει, ὥστε ὁτιοῦν παρ' ὁτιοῦν μέρος, ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὕτω διαιρεθῆναι. Ἢ οὖν οὐκ ἔστι μίξις, ἢ λεκτέον τοῦτο πῶς ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι πάλιν.
            <td>But we maintain that, if 'combination' has taken place, the compound must be uniform in texture throughout—any part of such a compound being the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water: whereas, if 'combination' is 'composition of the small particles', nothing of the kind will happen. On the contrary, the constituents will only be 'combined' relatively to perception: and the same thing will be 'combined' to one percipient, if his sight is not sharp, (but not to another,) while to the eye of Lynceus nothing will be 'combined'.) It clearly follows (ii) that we must not speak of the constituents as 'combined in virtue of a division such that any and every part of each is juxtaposed to a part of the other: for it is impossible for them to be thus divided. Either, then, there is no 'combination', or we have still to explain the manner in which it can take place.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔστι δή, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ποιητικὰ τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τούτων παθητικά. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀντιστρέφει, ὅσων ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ ποιητικὰ ἀλλήλων καὶ παθητικὰ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· τὰ δὲ ποιεῖ ἀπαθῆ ὄντα, ὅσων μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη. Τούτων μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι μίξις· διὸ οὐδ' ἡ ἰατρικὴ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια μιγνυμένη τοῖς σώμασιν. Τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν καὶ παθητικῶν ὅσα εὐδιαίρετα, πολλὰ μὲν ὀλίγοις καὶ μεγάλα μικροῖς συντιθέμενα οὐ ποιεῖ μίξιν, ἀλλ' αὔξησιν τοῦ κρατοῦντος· μεταβάλλει γὰρ θάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν, οἷον σταλαγμὸς οἴνου μυρίοις χοεῦσιν ὕδατος οὐ μίγνυται· λύεται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ πᾶν ὕδωρ. Ὅταν δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἰσάζῃ πως, τότε μεταβάλλει μὲν ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν ἐκ τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως, οὐ γίνεται δὲ θάτερον, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ καὶ κοινόν.
            <td>Now, as we maintain, some things are such as to act and others such as to suffer action from them. Moreover, some things—viz. those which have the same matter—'reciprocate', i.e. are such as to act upon one another and to suffer action from one another; while other things, viz. agents which have not the same matter as their patients, act without themselves suffering action. Such agents cannot 'combine'—that is why neither the art of healing nor health produces health by 'combining' with the bodies of the patients. Amongst those things, however, which are reciprocally active and passive, some are easily-divisible. Now (i) if a great quantity (or a large bulk) of one of these easily-divisible 'reciprocating' materials be brought together with a little (or with a small piece) of another, the effect produced is not 'combination', but increase of the dominant: for the other material is transformed into the dominant. (That is why a drop of wine does not 'combine' with ten thousand gallons of water: for its form is dissolved, and it is changed so as to merge in the total volume of water.) On the other hand (ii) when there is a certain equilibrium between their 'powers of action', then each of them changes out of its own nature towards the dominant: yet neither becomes the other, but both become an intermediate with properties common to both.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ταῦτ' ἐστὶ μικτὰ ὅσα ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει τῶν ποιούντων· ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ παθητικά. Καὶ μικρὰ δὲ μικροῖς παρατιθέμενα μίγνυται μᾶλλον· ῥᾷον γὰρ καὶ θᾶττον ἄλληλα μεθίστησιν.
            <td>Thus it is clear that only those agents are 'combinable' which involve a contrariety—for these are such as to suffer action reciprocally. And, further, they combine more freely if small pieces of each of them are juxtaposed.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὸ δὲ πολὺ καὶ ὑπὸ πολλοῦ χρονίως τοῦτο δρᾷ. Διὸ τὰ (328b.) εὐόριστα τῶν διαιρετῶν καὶ παθητικῶν μικτά (διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς μικρὰ ταῦτα ῥᾳδίως· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ εὐορίστῳ εἶναι), οἷον τὰ ὑγρὰ μικτὰ μάλιστα τῶν σωμάτων· εὐόριστον γὰρ μάλιστα τὸ ὑγρὸν τῶν διαιρετῶν, ἐὰν μὴ γλίσχρον ᾖ· ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ πλείω καὶ μείζω μόνον ποιεῖ τὸν ὄγκον.
            <td>For in that condition they change one another more easily and more quickly; whereas this effect takes a long time when agent and patient are present in bulk. Hence, amongst the divisible susceptible materials, those whose shape is readily adaptable have a tendency to combine: for they are easily divided into small particles, since that is precisely what 'being readily adaptable in shape' implies. For instance, liquids are the most 'combinable' of all bodies—because, of all divisible materials, the liquid is most readily adaptable in shape, unless it be viscous. Viscous liquids, it is true, produce no effect except to increase the volume and bulk.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅταν δ' ᾖ θάτερον μόνον παθητικὸν ἢ σφόδρα, τὸ δὲ πάμπαν ἠρέμα, ἢ οὐθὲν πλεῖον τὸ μιχθὲν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἢ μικρόν, ὅπερ συμβαίνει περὶ τὸν καττίτερον καὶ τὸν χαλκόν. Ἔνια γὰρ ψελλίζεται πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζει· φαίνεται γάρ πως καὶ μικτὰ ἠρέμα, καὶ ὡς θάτερον μὲν δεκτικὸν θάτερον δ' εἶδος. Ὅπερ ἐπὶ τούτων συμβαίνει· ὁ γὰρ καττίτερος ὡς πάθος τι ὢν ἄνευ ὕλης τοῦ χαλκοῦ σχεδὸν ἀφανίζεται καὶ μιχθεὶς ἄπεισι χρωματίσας μόνον. Ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων.
            <td>But when one of the constituents is alone susceptible—or superlatively susceptible, the other being susceptible in a very slight degree—the compound resulting from their combination is either no greater in volume or only a little greater. This is what happens when tin is combined with bronze. For some things display a hesitating and ambiguous attitude towards one another—showing a slight tendency to combine and also an inclination to behave as 'receptive matter' and 'form' respectively. The behaviour of these metals is a case in point. For the tin almost vanishes, behaving as if it were an immaterial property of the bronze: having been combined, it disappears, leaving no trace except the colour it has imparted to the bronze. The same phenomenon occurs in other instances too.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι ἔστι μίξις καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ ποῖα μικτὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἐπείπερ ἐστὶν ἔνια τοιαῦτα οἷα παθητικά τε ὑπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ εὐόριστα καὶ εὐδιαίρετα· ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτ' ἐφθάρθαι ἀνάγκη μεμιγμένα οὔτ' ἔτι ταὐτὰ ἁπλῶς εἶναι, οὔτε σύνθεσιν εἶναι τὴν μίξιν αὐτῶν, οὔτε πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν· ἀλλ' ἔστι μικτὸν μὲν ὃ ἂν εὐόριστον ὂν παθητικὸν ᾖ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ τοιούτῳ μικτόν (πρὸς ὁμώνυμον γὰρ τὸ μικτόν), ἡ δὲ μίξις τῶν μικτῶν ἀλλοιωθέντων ἕνωσις.
            <td>It is clear, then, from the foregoing account, that 'combination' occurs, what it is, to what it is due, and what kind of thing is 'combinable'. The phenomenon depends upon the fact that some things are such as to be (a) reciprocally susceptible and (b) readily adaptable in shape, i.e. easily divisible. For such things can be 'combined' without its being necessary either that they should have been destroyed or that they should survive absolutely unaltered: and their 'combination' need not be a 'composition', nor merely 'relative to perception'. On the contrary: anything is 'combinable' which, being readily adaptable in shape, is such as to suffer action and to act; and it is 'combinable with' another thing similarly characterized (for the 'combinable' is relative to the 'combinable'); and 'combination' is unification of the 'combinables', resulting from their 'alteration'.
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    </blockquote><a name="25" id="25">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit mixtionem esse, hic determinat quomodo fiat mixtio. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit opiniones aliorum de modo mixtionis; secundo ponit opinionem propriam, ibi: sunt itaque ut diximus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit opiniones aliorum; secundo reprobat eas, ibi: si autem est omne corpus et cetera. Circa primum sciendum est, quod de modo mixtionis duplex fuit opinio. Una fuit quod tunc solum mixtio fiat, quando miscibilia dividuntur in tam minima secundum quantitatem, quod sensus ea percipere non potest; et quando illa minima fuerint secus invicem posita, non alterata, tunc dicunt fieri mixtionem. Et hanc opinionem primo ponit philosophus.
    <p>Secundam opinionem ponit ibi: aut non sunt etc., quae fuit talis: quod cum miscibilia sunt divisa, non ita ut sistat divisio in minima secundum sensum, sed sistat in minima secundum materiam, scilicet quod non sit accipere minus quod servet materiam et operationem miscibilis. Conveniunt enim ambae istae opiniones, quod dicunt mixtionem esse secundum minima, sed differunt, quia prima ponit minima quoad sensum, secunda minima secundum materiam. Dicit ergo philosophus quod dicendum est et determinandum continuam quaestionem, scilicet si ita sit ut dicit prima opinio, vel sicut dicit secunda, quae dicit scilicet quod diviso corpore in minima simpliciter, quaelibet pars eius est secus quamcumque partem alterius. Dicitur enim sic a quibusdam; verbi gratia, sicut si diceremus hordeum mixtum cum frumento: licet enim ista discernantur, tamen sunt minima sui generis. Et ad similitudinem istorum dicunt fieri mixtionem elementorum, quando in minima simpliciter diviso elemento, quaelibet pars unius est iuxta partem alterius.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: si autem est omne etc., destruit praedictas opiniones. Et primo per rationem communem ambabus; secundo per rationem propriam, ibi: et idem huic et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, si omne corpus est divisibile, si corpus corpori est miscibile, de ratione mixturae est quod quaelibet pars unius miscibilis sit <i>homoeomera</i>, et oportet quod quaelibet pars sit iuxta quamlibet partem alterius miscibilis. Quoniam autem mixtio non est compositio divisorum in minima latentia sensum, sicut dicebat prima opinio, nec etiam sicut dicebat secunda, manifestum est quod non erit mixtio secundum parva salvata in specie et virtute: quia tunc esset potius quaedam compositio et non mixtio, nec haberet quaelibet pars eandem rationem cum toto. Nos autem dicimus quod si est aliquod mixtum, oportet ipsum esse <i>homoeomerum</i>, idest eiusdem rationis in parte et in toto, et sicut quaelibet pars aquae est aqua, ita quaelibet pars mixti est mixtum; si autem mixtio esset compositio secundum parva, ut dicebat utraque opinio, licet differenter, nihil horum contingeret, sed solum mixtio ad sensum et non secundum veritatem.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: et idem huic etc., ponit proprias rationes. Et primo contra primam opinionem, dicens quod si hoc modo fiat mixtio sicut prima opinio dicebat, illud quod esset uni mixtum, puta ei qui non videt acute, esset alteri non mixtum, puta lynceo videnti acute.
    <p>Secundo arguit contra secundam opinionem, ibi: neque divisione etc., dicens quod mixtio non est ex divisione minimorum: quia in minima simpliciter impossibile est dividere corpus, ita quod in eis stet divisio. Si autem minima essent physica, tunc esset congregatio et non mixtio. Aut igitur mixtio non est, cum hi duo modi esse non possint: aut rursus dicendum est quomodo contingit mixtionem fieri.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sunt itaque ut diximus etc., determinat de modo mixtionis secundum propriam opinionem. Et primo praemittit quandam divisionem necessariam ad propositum ostendendum, dicens quod sicut supra dictum est, entium quaedam sunt activa, quaedam passiva ab his, scilicet activis. Sed istorum quaedam communicant in materia: et talia in agendo et patiendo adinvicem convertuntur; quaedam vero sunt quorum non eadem materia est: et talium licet unum agat et reliquum patiatur, non tamen in hoc convertuntur adinvicem.
    <p>Secundo ibi: horum quidem igitur non est mixtio etc., prosequitur intentum. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ostendit quae non sunt miscibilia, sive ex quibus non potest fieri mixtio; secundo ostendit quando et ex quibus fiat mixtio, ibi: quando autem potentiis adaequantur etc.; tertio redit iterum super primum, ut melius manifestet quae nullo modo sunt miscibilia, ibi: quando autem alterum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod eorum quae non communicant in materia, non potest esse mixtio; et ideo licet medicina faciat sanitatem, non tamen patitur a sanitate: et ideo misceri ibi non potest; neque sanitas vel aliud accidens miscetur corporibus. Et talia immiscibilia sunt ex sui natura. Quaedam autem licet sint miscibilia ex sui natura, tamen per accidens misceri non possunt. Et quae sint ista declarat ibi: activorum autem et passivorum etc., dicens quod si multa de genere activorum et passivorum componantur paucis et magna parvis, non faciunt mixtionem, sed faciunt augmentum praedominantis, per cuius virtutem alterum, scilicet paucum vel parvum, transmutatur in alterum praedominans. Et ideo gutta vini in mille millibus amphoris aquae non miscetur cum ipsa aqua: quia forma sive species eius transmutatur et corrumpitur in totam aquam.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quando autem potentiis etc., ostendit ex quibus et quando fiat mixtio. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ostendit quando et ex quibus fiat mixtio; secundo ostendit quae faciliter miscentur, ibi: et parva autem etc.; tertio quae difficulter, ibi: multum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quando potentiae miscibilium adaequantur, tunc unumquodque miscibilium aequaliter dominatur, et unumquodque ad alterum tanquam ad dominans transmutatur, et unumquodque ex sui ipsius natura secundum aliquid transmutatur. Nec tamen uno corrupto aliud generatur, sed fit medium inde commune quod participat omnium virtutes miscibilium coniunctorum. Manifestum est ergo quod haec sunt miscibilia, quaecumque sunt de numero facientium sive agentium et habent contrarietatem, quia haec sunt adinvicem passiva; et hoc est primum quod requiritur in miscibilibus. Contra hoc autem quod hic dicitur, obiicitur a quibusdam. Quia si miscibilium potentiae adaequantur, tanta est virtus resistendi quanta est virtus ad agendum, et ita nec agent nec patientur adinvicem. Item obiiciunt Avicenna et Algazel, dicentes quod si miscibilia adaequantur in mixto, non magis inclinabitur illud mixtum sursum quam deorsum, vel ad aliquam aliam loci differentiam, cum nullum sit in ipso praedominans elementorum. Et adhuc sequitur quod quilibet motus secundum triplum magis est violentus quam naturalis; et similiter est de loco. Sequeretur etiam quod omnis mixtio esset una; et ita ex similibus in quantitate et qualitate essent caro, et ossa, et lapis, et cetera mixta: quod est impossibile. Ad quod dicendum est, quod cum omnis mixtio naturalis sit propter generationem, non sic sunt intelligenda verba philosophi, quod in mixto sit aequalitas virtutum et potentiarum ut prima ratio procedebat, nec etiam oportet quod ibi sit aequalitas quantitatis ipsorum miscibilium, sed est intelligendum quod ibi sit aequalitas proportionis, quam requirit forma rei generandae propter quam est mixtio. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: et parva autem etc., ostendit quae faciliter et bene miscentur, dicens quod quando parva miscentur parvis, tunc facilius fit mixtio, quia talia facilius et citius transeunt per se invicem alterando.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: multum autem etc., ostendit quae tarde et de difficili commiscentur, dicens quod, quando multum miscetur multo, tunc tardius et difficilius commiscentur: et hoc ideo, quia difficilius adinvicem alterantur, et tardius transeunt per se invicem. Requiritur etiam ad facilem mixtionem, quod miscibilia sint bene terminabilia et adinvicem passiva. Et hoc ideo, quia bene terminabilia, cum sint subtilia et humida, facilius dividuntur in parva, quae facilius commiscentur quam magna. Hoc enim est bene terminabile quod est bene divisibile in parva. Verbi gratia, humida, quae sunt inter cetera corpora bene miscibilia: et hoc ideo, quia humidum inter alia corpora est magis divisibile in parva; nisi illud humidum sit viscosum: quia sicut dicitur in IV Meteororum, partes humidi viscosi coniacent sicut catenae, propter mixtum eis subtiliter siccum, quod apprehendit undique humidum et non sinit elabi humidum, sicut quando oleum aquae admiscetur; quia lubrica simul iuncta, vel lubricum humido compositum, auget tumorem sive quantitatem, sed non miscetur ei, sic quod quaelibet pars eius alteret et alteretur ab eo ad mediam naturam mixti.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quando autem alterum etc., ostendit iterum primum, ut melius declaret quae sunt quae nullo modo misceri possunt, dicens quod, quando solum alterum est passivum ita quod non agat in alterum, talia nullo modo miscentur; et hoc est quando miscibilia non communicant in materia. Quando vero communicant in materia, sed unum vehementer agit, et alterum vehementer patitur et non tantum agit quantum primum, neque talium potest esse mixtio: vel si est aliqua, parum relinquetur de eo quod vehementer patitur; sicut patet in stanno et aere: si enim in aere liquefacto miscetur modicum de stanno, tunc stannum per vehementiam actionis aeris evaporat, et nihil forte remanet nisi color quidam. Et est simile balbutientibus, qui una littera prolata aliam distincte non proferunt; idem etiam contingit in multis aliis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: manifestum igitur etc., recapitulat quae dicta sunt de mixtione, per quod etiam quarta quaestio declaratur, quae fuit primo proposita in principio huius capituli; dicens manifestum esse ex his quae dicta sunt, et quod est mixtio, et quid est, et quare est: quia propter passionem et actionem contrariorum. Et dictum est etiam quae sunt miscibilia: quoniam passiva adinvicem et bene terminabilia; et talia sunt bene divisibilia. Dictum est etiam quod ad hoc quod sit mixtio, necessarium est quod miscibilia non sint simpliciter corrupta, nec sint simpliciter eadem ut prius: sunt enim corrupta quantum ad formas et remanent quantum ad virtutem, ut supra ostensum est. Adhuc etiam ostensum est, quod mixtio non est compositio minimorum secundum naturam sicut dicebat una opinio, nec minimorum secundum sensum ut dicebat alia: talia enim minima non sunt miscibilia. Sed illud est miscibile, quod cum sit bene determinabile, est activum et passivum; et illud quod admiscetur cum tali miscibili, est miscibile ad <i>homoeomerum</i>, idest facit cum alio mixtum quod est eiusdem rationis in toto et in partibus. Patet etiam quod mixtio est miscibilium alteratorum unio. Quae quidem alteratio solum est intelligenda in virtutibus sive qualitatibus eorum; sed si etiam alteratio sumatur improprie, mixtio est miscibilium <i>alteratorum</i>, idest corruptorum secundum formas, unio.
    <hr>
    <blockquote>
      <h2 align="center">Β<br>
      BOOK 2</h2>
      <p align="center"><b>Lectio 1</b>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">1
            <td>1
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ μὲν οὖν μίξεως καὶ ἁφῆς καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἴρηται πῶς ὑπάρχει τοῖς μεταβάλλουσι κατὰ φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ἁπλῆς, τίνος καὶ πῶς ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως εἴρηται, τί τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ τίν' ἔχει διαφορὰν αὐτῶν.
            <td>WE have explained under what conditions 'combination', 'contact', and 'action-passion' are attributable to the things which undergo natural change. Further, we have discussed 'unqualified' coming-to-be and passing-away, and explained under what conditions they are predicable, of what subject, and owing to what cause. Similarly, we have also discussed 'alteration', and explained what 'altering' is and how it differs from coming-to-be and passing-away.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων. Γένεσις μὲν γὰρ καὶ φθορὰ πάσαις ταῖς φύσει συνεστώσαις οὐσίαις οὐκ ἄνευ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων.
            <td>But we have still to investigate the so-called 'elements' of bodies. For the complex substances whose formation and maintenance are due to natural processes all presuppose the perceptible bodies as the condition of their coming-to-be and passing-away.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τούτων δὲ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην οἱ μέν φασιν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἀέρα τιθέντες ἢ πῦρ ἤ τι μεταξὺ τούτων, σῶμά τε ὂν καὶ χωριστόν, (329a.) οἱ δὲ πλείω τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἑνός, οἱ μὲν πῦρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ ἀέρα τρίτον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ τούτων τέταρτον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· ἐξ ὧν συγκρινομένων καὶ διακρινομένων ἢ ἀλλοιουμένων συμβαίνειν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν τοῖς πράγμασιν.
            <td>But philosophers disagree in regard to the matter which underlies these perceptible bodies. Some maintain it is single, supposing it to be, e.g. Air or Fire, or an 'intermediate' between these two (but still a body with a separate existence). Others, on the contrary, postulate two or more materials—ascribing to their 'association' and 'dissociation', or to their 'alteration', the coming-to-be and passing-away of things. (Some, for instance, postulate Fire and Earth: some add Air, making three: and some, like Empedocles, reckon Water as well, thus postulating four.)
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ πρῶτα ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ἔστω συνομολογούμενον, ἐξ ὧν μεταβαλλόντων ἢ κατὰ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν ἢ κατ' ἄλλην μεταβολὴν συμβαίνει γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθοράν. Ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ποιοῦντες μίαν ὕλην παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, ταύτην δὲ σωματικὴν καὶ χωριστήν, ἁμαρτάνουσιν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο αἰσθητῆς· ἢ γὰρ κοῦφον ἢ βαρὺ ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον τοῦτο, ὃ λέγουσί τινες εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν. Ὡς δ' ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραπται, οὐδένα ἔχει διορισμόν· οὐ γὰρ εἴρηκε σαφῶς τὸ πανδεχές, εἰ χωρίζεται τῶν στοιχείων. Οὐδὲ χρῆται οὐδέν, φήσας εἶναι ὑποκείμενόν τι τοῖς καλουμένοις στοιχείοις πρότερον, οἷον χρυσὸν τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς χρυσοῖς. Καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς λέγεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λεγόμενον, ἀλλ' ὧν μὲν ἀλλοίωσις, ἐστὶν οὕτως, ὧν δὲ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀδύνατον ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεσθαι ἐξ οὗ γέγονεν. Καίτοι γέ φησι μακρῷ ἀληθέστατον εἶναι χρυσὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ τῶν στοιχείων ὄντων στερεῶν μέχρι ἐπιπέδων ποιεῖται τὴν ἀνάλυσιν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὴν τιθήνην καὶ τὴν ὕλην τὴν πρώτην τὰ ἐπίπεδα εἶναι. Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμὲν μὲν εἶναί τινα ὕλην τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην οὐ χωριστὴν ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἐναντιώσεως, ἐξ ἧς γίνεται τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα.
            <td>Now we may agree that the primary materials, whose change (whether it be 'association and dissociation' or a process of another kind) results in coming-to-be and passing-away, are rightly described as 'originative sources, i.e. elements'. But (i) those thinkers are in error who postulate, beside the bodies we have mentioned, a single matter—and that corporeal and separable matter. For this 'body' of theirs cannot possibly exist without a 'perceptible contrariety': this 'Boundless', which some thinkers identify with the 'original real', must be either light or heavy, either cold or hot. And (ii) what Plato has written in the Timaeus is not based on any precisely-articulated conception. For he has not stated clearly whether his 'Omnirecipient" exists in separation from the 'elements'; nor does he make any use of it. He says, indeed, that it is a substratum prior to the so-called 'elements'—underlying them, as gold underlies the things that are fashioned of gold. (And yet this comparison, if thus expressed, is itself open to criticism. Things which come-to-be and pass-away cannot be called by the name of the material out of which they have come-to-be: it is only the results of 'alteration' which retain the name of the substratum whose 'alterations' they are. However, he actually says' that the truest account is to affirm that each of them is "gold"'.) Nevertheless he carries his analysis of the 'elements'—solids though they are—back to 'planes', and it is impossible for 'the Nurse' (i.e. the primary matter) to be identical with 'the planes'. Our own doctrine is that although there is a matter of the perceptible bodies (a matter out of which the so-called 'clements' come-to-be), it has no separate existence, but is always bound up with a contrariety.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑτέροις ἀκριβέστερον. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης τὰ σώματα τὰ πρῶτα, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ πρώτην οἰομένοις εἶναι τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἀχώριστον μέν, ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὕλη τῷ ψυχρῷ οὔτε τοῦτο τῷ θερμῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφοῖν. Ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἀρχή, δεύτερον δ' αἱ ἐναντιώσεις, λέγω δ' οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, τρίτον δ' ἤδη πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, καὶ οὐχ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ (329b.) ἕτεροι λέγουσιν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀλλοίωσις), αἱ δ' ἐναντιώσεις οὐ μεταβάλλουσιν.
            <td>A more precise account of these presuppositions has been given in another work': we must, however, give a detailed explanation of the primary bodies as well, since they too are similarly derived from the matter. We must reckon as an 'originative source' and as 'primary' the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from, the contrary qualities: for the hot' is not matter for 'the cold' nor 'the cold' for 'the hot', but the substratum is matter for them both. We therefore have to recognize three 'originative sources': firstly that which potentially perceptible body, secondly the contrarieties (I mean, e.g. heat and cold), and thirdly Fire, Water, and the like. Only 'thirdly', however: for these bodies change into one another (they are not immutable as Empedocles and other thinkers assert, since 'alteration' would then have been impossible), whereas the contrarieties do not change.
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    <p>Postquam philosophus in primo libro determinavit de generatione et corruptione in communi, et de motibus consequentibus, scilicet de alteratione et augmento, nunc in secundo libro determinat de generatione et corruptione in speciali, scilicet de generatione et corruptione elementorum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo recapitulat ea quae dicta sunt in primo libro, et continuat dicta dicendis dando intentionem suam; secundo prosequitur intentum, ibi: horum autem subiectam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod dictum est iam in primo libro de mixtione et de tactu, et de facere et pati, quomodo existunt his quae transmutantur secundum naturam; amplius etiam dictum est de generatione et corruptione quomodo existat, et propter quam causam; similiter etiam dictum est de alteratione quid est, et in quo differt a generatione et corruptione. Relinquitur autem in hoc secundo libro considerare de corporibus quae elementa vocantur, antequam consideremus in particularibus libris de generatione et corruptione corporum specialium, sicut lapidum et metallorum et plantarum et animalium; et hoc ideo, quia omnes substantiae quae generantur et corrumpuntur, non sunt sine istis sensibilibus corporibus, scilicet quatuor elementis. Dicuntur autem elementa antonomastice sensibilia, quia eorum differentiae sive principia quae sunt quatuor qualitates, scilicet calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, sunt causae omnium aliarum qualitatum tangibilium.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: horum autem subiectam etc., prosequitur intentum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo inquirit de substantia et numero eorum; secundo de mutua ipsorum generatione et corruptione, ibi: quoniam autem determinatum est et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo determinat de materiali principio et formali elementorum; secundo de numero eorum, ibi: quoniam autem quatuor sunt elementa et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo determinat de principio materiali; secundo de formali, ibi: sed non minus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo determinat de materia elementorum secundum opinionem aliorum; secundo secundum opinionem propriam, ibi: nos autem dicimus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit opiniones aliorum; secundo reprobat eas, ibi: quoniam igitur prima et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quidam fuerunt qui posuerunt tantum unam materiam elementorum. Sed isti diversificati sunt: quidam enim dixerunt quod illa materia erat aer, quidam vero quod ignis, quidam autem posuerunt quoddam corpus medium, igne quidem densius, aere autem subtilius. Conveniunt omnes isti in hoc, quod dixerunt ipsam materiam elementorum esse corpus separabile actu et per se existens. Alii vero fuerunt, qui dixerunt materiam elementorum esse plurificatam per numerum; et isti etiam diversificati sunt: quia quidam dixerunt ipsam esse ignem et terram, quidam vero addunt tertium, scilicet aerem, quidam addunt quartum, scilicet aquam, sicut Empedocles. Dicunt autem tam ponentes duo quam ponentes plura duobus, quod per congregationem et segregationem ipsorum fit generatio et corruptio in rebus.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam igitur etc., reprobat praedictas opiniones: et hoc primo; secundo quasi incidenter reprobat opinionem Platonis, ibi: ut autem in Timaeo scriptum est et cetera. Advertendum autem est circa primum, quod non reprobat opinionem ponentium plura elementa, sed ad praesens concedit eam tanquam propinquam aliqualiter veritati. Unde dicit quod sit concessum illis qui ponunt plura elementa esse principia, per quorum transmutationem fit generatio et corruptio, sive ista transmutatio sit congregatio et disgregatio sive quaecumque alia transmutatio; nam isti quodammodo bene dicunt. Reprobat autem opinionem. Unde dicit: facientes unam materiam, et hanc corpoream et separabilem ab omni contrarietate et ab omni forma elementali, sicut quod est medium inter ignem et aerem, peccant, quia impossibile est quod corpus sensibile sit sine contrarietate. Oportet enim quod illud corpus infinitum, quod ipsi dicunt esse principium, sit aut grave aut leve: et si quidem erit leve, movebitur ad locum ignis, si autem grave, movebitur ad locum terrae; cuius autem motus est et locus, illius est et forma, quam motus et locus sequuntur; ergo est terra vel ignis; et sic per consequens est calidum aut frigidum; et sic non erit separabile a contrarietate et a forma elementali, ut ipsi ponebant.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: ut autem in Timaeo etc., reprobat opinionem Platonis de principio elementorum, dicens quod illud quod dixit Plato in Timaeo, nullam habet determinationem, quia nihil dixit determinate et manifeste. Non enim dixit manifeste et determinate, si illud principium quod vocavit <i>pandeches</i>, idest receptaculum omnium, separatur ab elementis, ita quod sit aliquando actu existens sub forma elementi, vel non; neque etiam dixit quod esset aliquod materiale principium ipsorum elementorum. Sed dicit quod subiectum elementorum se habet ad elementa, sicut aurum se habet ad opera operata ex auro. Sed certe hoc non bene dicitur: quia impossibile est, quod id quod est subiectum generationis sicut materia, dicatur de ipso generato, sicut non dicimus quod caro sit terra, sed terrea. Similiter illud quod alteratur, non recipit praedicationem passionis in recto: non enim potest dici quod homo sit albedo, sed albus. Plato tamen dicit, quod verius est dicere unumquodque opus factum ex auro esse aurum, quam ipsum esse tale: sicut verius est dicere phialam factam ex auro esse aurum, quam esse phialam; ita etiam verius erit dicere, ignem vel aquam vel aliud generatum esse ipsum subiectum, quam esse ignem vel aquam. Potest ergo breviter sic ratio formari. Impossibile est quod subiectum generationis praedicetur in recto de generato; sed subiectum quod ponit Plato praedicatur in recto de elementis; ergo impossibile est quod sit subiectum generationis et corruptionis ipsorum. Adhuc etiam peccat Plato, quia cum elementa sint corpora solida, dicit tamen quod materia eorum dissolvitur usque ad superficiem, ut patet in III de caelo et mundo: impossibile enim est quod materia prima, quae est sicut mater, sit superficies.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: nos autem dicimus etc., determinat de materia secundum propriam opinionem, dicens quod est aliqua una materia sensibilium corporum, scilicet elementorum, quae non est separabilis simul ab omni forma elementi, nec ab omni contrarietate, sed semper est sub aliqua forma et aliquibus qualitatibus consequentibus ipsam formam: et ex ista materia generantur sensibilia corpora quae vocantur elementa. Excusando autem se a maiori declaratione, dicit quod determinatum est in aliis certius, scilicet in III caeli et mundi. Sed quia ibi non est plene determinatus modus secundum quem ex materia generantur corpora prima, determinandum est hic quomodo generentur. Ad horum autem manifestationem dicit, sumendum esse pro principio hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod est materia una subiecta contrariis, inseparabilis ab eis, quia semper est cum altero contrariorum. Et hoc probat per hoc, quod caliditas non potest esse materia frigiditatis, nec e converso, sed oportet aliquod esse tertium, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys. et in I Physic., quod est subiectum amborum contrariorum, et de uno transmutatur in aliud. Et ideo primum principium est id, quod est potentia corpus sensibile: et illud est materia iam dicta. Secundum vero principium sunt contrarietates qualitatum distinguentes et determinantes potentiam materiae, verbi gratia caliditas et frigiditas, et huiusmodi. Tertium iam erit elementum constitutum ex his, puta ignis, vel aqua, vel huiusmodi. Et illa elementa transmutantur adinvicem, dum eorum communis materia mutatur de una forma in aliam, ut de igne in formam aeris, et similiter de aliis. Unde non est verum quod Empedocles dixit et quidam alii, scilicet quod elementa non transmutantur. Si enim immutabilia sunt, ut quod semel fuit ignis semper sit ignis, tunc nunquam esset generatio nec alteratio: quod est manifeste falsum, quia secundum contrarietatem transmutantur; sicut videmus ad sensum, quod eadem materia quae nunc est sub frigiditate aquae, aliquando est sub caliditate aeris: et quod erat sub caliditate aeris, aliquando est sub caliditate ignis. Cum ergo huiusmodi qualitates consequantur formas substantiales elementorum sicut effectus causam, sequitur quod si fiat transmutatio ipsarum qualitatum, quod etiam fit transmutatio in formis substantialibus.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="25" id="25"></a> <b><a name="2.2" id="2.2">Lectio 2</a></b> <a name="2.2" id="2.2"></a>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ὣς σώματος ποίας καὶ πόσας λεκτέον ἀρχάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι ὑποθέμενοι χρῶνται, καὶ οὐδὲν λέγουσι διὰ τί αὗται ἢ τοσαῦται.
            <td>Nevertheless, even so the question remains: What sorts of contrarieties, and how many of them, are to be accounted 'originative sources' of body? For all the other thinkers assume and use them without explaining why they are these or why they are just so many.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">2
            <td>2
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ οὖν ζητοῦμεν αἰσθητοῦ σώματος ἀρχάς, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἁπτοῦ, ἁπτὸν δ' οὗ ἡ αἴσθησις ἁφή, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐναντιώσεις σώματος εἴδη καὶ ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν· κατ' ἐναντίωσίν τε γὰρ διαφέρουσι, καὶ κατὰ ἁπτὴν ἐναντίωσιν. Διὸ οὔτε λευκότης καὶ μελανία οὔτε γλυκύτης καὶ πικρότης, ὁμοίως δ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐναντιώσεων οὐδὲν ποιεῖ στοιχεῖον. Καίτοι πρότερον ὄψις ἁφῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρότερον.
            <td>Since, then, we are looking for 'originative sources' of perceptible body; and since 'perceptible' is equivalent to 'tangible', and 'tangible' is that of which the perception is touch; it is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute 'forms' and 'originative sources' of body, but only those which correspond to touch. For it is in accordance with a contrariety—a contrariety, moreover, of tangible qualities—that the primary bodies are differentiated. That is why neither whiteness (and blackness), nor sweetness (and bitterness), nor (similarly) any quality belonging to the other perceptible contrarieties either, constitutes an 'element'. And yet vision is prior to touch, so that its object also is prior to the object of touch.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι σώματος ἁπτοῦ πάθος ᾗ ἁπτόν, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕτερον, καὶ εἰ ἔτυχε τῇ φύσει πρότερον. Αὐτῶν δὴ πρῶτον τῶν ἁπτῶν διαιρετέον ποῖαι πρῶται διαφοραὶ καὶ ἐναντιώσεις. Εἰσὶ δ' ἐναντιώσεις κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν αἵδε, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, βαρὺ κοῦφον, σκληρὸν μαλακόν, γλίσχρον κραῦρον, τραχὺ λεῖον, παχὺ λεπτόν. Τούτων δὲ βαρὺ μὲν καὶ κοῦφον οὐ ποιητικὰ οὐδὲ παθητικά· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιεῖν τε ἕτερον ἢ πάσχειν ὑφ' ἑτέρου λέγονται. Δεῖ δὲ ποιητικὰ καὶ παθητικὰ εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ στοιχεῖα· μίγνυται γὰρ καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα. Θερμὸν δὲ καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν τὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητικὰ εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῷ παθητικὰ λέγεται· θερμὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ συγκρῖνον τὰ ὁμογενῆ (τὸ γὰρ διακρίνειν, ὅπερ φασὶ ποιεῖν τὸ πῦρ, συγκρίνειν ἐστὶ τὰ ὁμόφυλα· συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐξαιρεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια), ψυχρὸν δὲ τὸ συνάγον καὶ συγκρῖνον ὁμοίως τά τε συγγενῆ καὶ τὰ μὴ ὁμόφυλα, ὑγρὸν δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον οἰκείῳ ὅρῳ εὐόριστον ὄν, ξηρὸν δὲ τὸ εὐόριστον μὲν οἰκείῳ ὅρῳ, δυσόριστον δέ. Τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν καὶ παχὺ καὶ γλίσχρον καὶ κραῦρον καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακὸν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ἐκ τούτων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀναπληστικόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑγροῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ ὡρίσθαι μὲν εὐόριστον δ' εἶναι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ (330a.) ἁπτομένῳ, τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν ἀναπληστικόν (λεπτομερὲς γάρ, καὶ τὸ μικρομερὲς ἀναπληστικόν· ὅλον γὰρ ὅλου ἅπτεται· τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν μάλιστα τοιοῦτον), φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν λεπτὸν ἔσται τοῦ ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ παχὺ τοῦ ξηροῦ. Πάλιν δὲ τὸ μὲν γλίσχρον τοῦ ὑγροῦ (τὸ γὰρ γλίσχρον ὑγρὸν πεπονθός τί ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ ἔλαιον), τὸ δὲ κραῦρον τοῦ ξηροῦ· κραῦρον γὰρ τὸ τελέως ξηρόν, ὥστε καὶ πεπηγέναι δι' ἔλλειψιν ὑγρότητος.
            <td>The object of vision, however, is a quality of tangible body not qua tangible, but qua something else—qua something which may well be naturally prior to the object of touch. Accordingly, we must segregate the tangible differences and contrarieties, and distinguish which amongst them are primary. Contrarieties correlative to touch are the following: hot-cold, dry-moist, heavy-light, hard-soft, viscous-brittle, rough-smooth, coarse-fine. Of these (i) heavy and light are neither active nor susceptible. Things are not called 'heavy' and 'light' because they act upon, or suffer action from, other things. But the 'elements' must be reciprocally active and susceptible, since they 'combine' and are transformed into one another. On the other hand (ii) hot and cold, and dry and moist, are terms, of which the first pair implies power to act and the second pair susceptibility. 'Hot' is that which 'associates' things of the same kind (for 'dissociating', which people attribute to Fire as its function, is 'associating' things of the same class, since its effect is to eliminate what is foreign), while 'cold' is that which brings together, i.e. 'associates', homogeneous and heterogeneous things alike. And moise is that which, being readily adaptable in shape, is not determinable by any limit of its own: while 'dry' is that which is readily determinable by its own limit, but not readily adaptable in shape. From moist and dry are derived (iii) the fine and coarse, viscous and brittle, hard and soft, and the remaining tangible differences. For (a) since the moist has no determinate shape, but is readily adaptable and follows the outline of that which is in contact with it, it is characteristic of it to be 'such as to fill up'. Now 'the fine' is 'such as to fill up'. For the fine' consists of subtle particles; but that which consists of small particles is 'such as to fill up', inasmuch as it is in contact whole with whole—and 'the fine' exhibits this character in a superlative degree. Hence it is evident that the fine derives from the moist, while the coarse derives from the dry.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔτι τὸ μὲν μαλακὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ (μαλακὸν γὰρ τὸ ὑπεῖκον εἰς ἑαυτὸ καὶ μὴ μεθιστάμενον, ὅπερ ποιεῖ τὸ ὑγρόν· διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ὑγρὸν μαλακόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μαλακὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ), τὸ δὲ σκληρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ· σκληρὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ πεπηγός, τὸ δὲ πεπηγὸς ξηρόν. Λέγεται δὲ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν πλεοναχῶς· ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῷ ξηρῷ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ διερόν, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ὑγρῷ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ πεπηγός· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῶν πρώτως λεχθέντων.
            <td>Again (b) the viscous' derives from the moist: for 'the viscous' (e.g. oil) is a 'moist' modified in a certain way. 'The brittle', on the other hand, derives from the dry: for 'brittle' is that which is completely dry—so completely, that its solidification has actually been due to failure of moisture. Further (c) 'the soft' derives from the moist. For 'soft' is that which yields to pressure by retiring into itself, though it does not yield by total displacement as the moist does—which explains why the moist is not 'soft', although 'the soft' derives from the moist. 'The hard', on the other hand, derives from the dry: for 'hard' is that which is solidified, and the solidified is dry. The terms 'dry' and 'moist' have more senses than one. For 'the damp', as well as the moist, is opposed to the dry: and again 'the solidified', as well as the dry, is opposed to the moist. But all these qualities derive from the dry and moist we mentioned first.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀντίκειται τῷ διερῷ τὸ ξηρόν, καὶ διερὸν μέν ἐστι τὸ ἔχον ἀλλοτρίαν ὑγρότητα ἐπιπολῆς, βεβρεγμένον δὲ τὸ εἰς βάθος, ξηρὸν δὲ τὸ ἐστερημένον ταύτης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν διερὸν ἔσται τοῦ ὑγροῦ, τὸ δ' ἀντικείμενον ξηρὸν τοῦ πρώτως ξηροῦ. Πάλιν δὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ πεπηγὸς ὡσαύτως· ὑγρὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἔχον οἰκείαν ὑγρότητα, βεβρεγμένον δὲ τὸ ἔχον ἀλλοτρίαν ὑγρότητα ἐν τῷ βάθει, πεπηγὸς δὲ τὸ ἐστερημένον ταύτης. Ὥστε καὶ τούτων ἔσται τὸ μὲν ξηροῦ τὸ δὲ ὑγροῦ. Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ἀνάγονται εἰς τὰς πρώτας τέτταρας. Αὗται δὲ οὐκέτι εἰς ἐλάττους· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὅπερ ὑγρὸν ἢ ὅπερ ξηρόν, οὔτε τὸ ὑγρὸν ὅπερ θερμὸν ἢ ὅπερ ψυχρόν, οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν οὔθ' ὑπ' ἄλληλ' οὔθ' ὑπὸ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν εἰσιν ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τέτταρας εἶναι ταύτας.
            <td>For (i) the dry is opposed to the damp: i.e. 'damp' is that which has foreign moisture on its surface ('sodden' being that which is penetrated to its core), while 'dry' is that which has lost foreign moisture. Hence it is evident that the damp will derive from the moist, and 'the dry' which is opposed to it will derive from the primary dry. Again (ii) the 'moist' and the solidified derive in the same way from the primary pair. For 'moist' is that which contains moisture of its own deep within it ('sodden' being that which is deeply penetrated by foreign mosture), whereas 'solidified' is that which has lost this inner moisture. Hence these too derive from the primary pair, the 'solidified' from the dry and the 'solidified' from the dry the 'liquefiable' from the moist. It is clear, then, that all the other differences reduce to the first four, but that these admit of no further reduction. For the hot is not essentially moist or dry, nor the moist essentially hot or cold: nor are the cold and the dry derivative forms, either of one another or of the hot and the moist. Hence these must be four.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="2.2" id="2.2">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de principio materiali elementorum, hic determinat de principio formali. Et primo dat intentionem suam; secundo prosequitur intentum, ibi: quoniam igitur quaerimus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non minus debemus dicere de principio formali elementorum quam de materiali. Et intelligit per formale principium ipsas sensibiles qualitates potentiam materiae vel materiam distinguentes, secundum quas illa corpora qualia sunt. Inquirit enim hic philosophus principium corporum sensibilium inquantum sensibilia sunt, ut ipse dicit in littera. Si autem dicatur quod velit inquirere principia formalia substantialia, tunc dicendum est quod, quia formae substantiales sunt nobis ignotae quia insensibiles, ideo per istas qualitates quae sunt immediata principia transmutationis substantialis, dat intelligere ipsa formalia principia substantialia; et ideo dicit quod etiam oportet dicere quales et quot sunt istae qualitates. Ideo autem de istis determinare oportet, quia alii philosophi non reddunt causam quare sunt, sed solum ex suppositione utuntur eis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam igitur quaerimus etc., prosequitur intentum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod non omnes contrarietates sunt formae elementorum perfectivae, sed solum tangibiles; secundo quod non omnes tangibiles sed solum primae: et ostendit quae sunt primae, ibi: ipsorum autem tangibilium et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, quia nos quaerimus principia corporis sensibilis, et non omnis sensibilis sed solum tangibilis, tangibile autem solum est sensus tactus, manifestum est quod non omnes contrarietates faciunt species sive formas corporis sensibilis, sed solum illae quae sunt sensibiles secundum tactum; et ideo nec albedo et nigredo, nec dulcedo et amaritudo, nec aliqua alia sensibilis qualitas quae non est tangibilis, facit elementa. Et huius causa est, quia non sunt primae, nec activae nec passivae adinvicem, cuiusmodi oportet esse principia primorum corporum, scilicet elementorum, et ideo non transmutant ea quae tangunt, et propterea non valent ad generationem et corruptionem elementorum.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quamvis prior etc., removet quoddam dubium. Cum enim quaerat hic philosophus formas perfectivas corporum elementorum, et cum visus sit prior tactu, et ideo obiectum visus sit prius obiecto tactus, potius videtur quod formae perfectivae elementorum sint quaerendae penes differentias visus quam tactus. Sed hoc removet, dicens quod quamvis visus sit uno modo prior tactu, quia forma et dignitate prior est omnibus sensibus, et ideo obiectum visus prius est obiecto tactus, tamen qualitas quae est obiectum visus non est corpus tangibile secundum quod tangibile, etiamsi visum contingat esse secundum naturam primum: prior enim forma est et dignitate et fine omnibus sensibus. Et si est ut dictum est, et obiectum visus prius est obiectis aliorum sensuum, non tamen omne visibile sed solum lumen sive lux: quia per ipsam movet caelum materiam generabilium et corruptibilium ad omnem formam. Tactus autem subiecto prior est, quia substernitur omnibus sensibus, ut patet II de anima, et suae contrarietates sunt causae omnium contrarietatum. Et hoc patet, quia non sentimus secundum tactum, nisi id quod excellit qualitates complexionantes medium tactus quod est caro, et illae sunt calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, quarum nulla est in caelo: et ideo caelum secundum naturam non est sensibile tactu sed solum elementa, in quibus sunt quatuor qualitates ex quibus fit complexio et tactus.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: ipsorum autem tangibilium etc., ostendit quod non omnes qualitates tangibiles sunt formae perfectivae elementorum, sed solum primae activae et passivae sunt adinvicem. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo dividit qualitates tangibiles; secundo ostendit quod solum hae quatuor, scilicet calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, sunt activae et passivae, ibi: horum autem etc.; tertio ostendit quod ipsae sunt primae, quia ad eas omnes aliae reducuntur, ibi: subtile autem et grossum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod dividendae sunt tangibiles qualitates sive contrarietates, ut videamus quae earum sint primae. Sunt autem contrarietates secundum tactum haec: calidum frigidum, humidum siccum, grave leve, durum molle, lubricum aridum, asperum lene, grossum subtile. Rarum autem et densum, ut in IV Physic. dicitur, non sunt qualitates physicae, sed positio partium materiae, secundum propinquum in denso et secundum remotum in raro. Deinde cum dicit: horum autem grave etc., ostendit quod hae solum quatuor qualitates sunt activae et passivae adinvicem, et per consequens quod sunt formae elementorum. Sed quia grave et leve sunt propriae qualitates elementorum, de quibus posset videri quod essent ipsorum formalia principia, ideo primo dicitur quod non sunt activa nec passiva. Et hoc declarat per modum significandi ipsorum: quia non significant actionem vel passionem, cum non sint nomina verbalia. Cum autem elementa misceantur et transmutentur adinvicem, oportet quod sint activa vel passiva: talia autem esse non possunt nisi per formalia sua principia. Ex his igitur manifeste sequitur, quod nec grave nec leve sunt formalia principia elementorum.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: calidum autem etc., ostendit quod hae quatuor qualitates, scilicet calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, sunt activae et passivae. Et primo ostendit hoc de calido et frigido, dicens quod calidum et frigidum sunt activa, humidum et siccum sunt passiva: sic <i>dicuntur</i>, idest sic consignificant eorum nomina; et hoc praecipue secundum Graecos, qui forte habent nomina verbalia actiones et passiones consignificantia. Deinde declarat hoc idem per definitiones ipsorum. Calidum enim est quod congregat homogenea sibi, quia subtile quod calido est conveniens, attrahit; licet enim calidum segreget, sicut dicunt quidam ignem facere, tamen illud segregare est congregare, quia congregando homogenea segregat heterogenea per accidens. Quod autem frigidum sit activum patet etiam per hoc, quia congregat omnia, tam quae sunt eiusdem naturae quam illa quae sunt diversae: aliquando enim aqua, terra, palea et huiusmodi, per coagulationem factam a frigido congregantur.
    <p>Secundo ibi: humidum autem etc., ostendit quod humidum et siccum sunt passiva, per definitiones eorum: definiuntur enim per passiones eorum. Humidum enim est indeterminatum proprio termino, bene terminabile termino alieno; siccum autem terminatur termino proprio, difficulter autem est terminabile termino alieno.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: subtile autem etc., ostendit quod praedictae quatuor qualitates sunt primae, quia ad eas omnes aliae reducuntur: et hoc primo facit; secundo ostendit quod illae non reducuntur ad alias, ibi: hae autem non amplius et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quod istae sunt primae; secundo distinguit siccum et humidum, quia non omne humidum nec etiam siccum est prima qualitas, ibi: dicuntur autem siccum et humidum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit quod omnes aliae qualitates sunt ex his, dicens quod subtile et grossum, et lubricum et aridum, et durum et molle, et omnes aliae differentiae sensibilium qualitatum sunt ex his.
    <p>Secundo ibi: quoniam enim repletivum etc., probat propositum. Et circa hoc tria facit: quia primo reducit ad istas quatuor hanc contrarietatem, subtile et grossum; secundo lubricum et aridum, ibi: et rursus lubricum etc.; tertio molle et durum, ibi: amplius molle quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod subtile est ex humido. Quod patet ex definitione humidi: quia humidum, eo quod non bene terminatur termino proprio sed bene terminatur termino alieno, est repletivum, quia sequitur undique tangens ipsum, eo quod fluit usque ad ipsum tangens. Subtile autem est repletivum, eo quod ipsum sua subtilitate quodlibet minimum subintrat. Unde manifestum est quod subtile est effectus humidi. Per oppositum autem grossum erit effectus sicci; grossum autem est cuius partes faciliter non disiunguntur, et excedit capacitatem eius quod natum est repleri. Sed videtur quod haec ratio philosophi non valeat, cum sit ex duabus affirmativis in secunda figura. Dicit enim: humidum est repletivum, subtile est repletivum, ergo subtile est humidum. Sed est dicendum, quod cum in quolibet genere sit devenire ad unum primum quod est causa sequentium, ut dicitur II Metaphys., oportet quod in genere repletivorum sit unum primum quod per se sit repletivum, et a quo alia replentia participant; tale autem est primum humidum, quod supra definitum est. Unde licet ratio philosophi non teneat ratione ordinationis terminorum in figura, valet tamen ex habitudine causae et effectus.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: et rursus lubricum etc., reducit aliam contrarietatem ad praedictas quatuor qualitates, scilicet lubricum et aridum, dicens quod lubricum reducitur ad humidum, quia lubricum est humidum aliquid passum. Cum enim humidum patitur commixtionem subtilis terrei, et est unctuosum, tunc fit lubricum: quia subtile terreum sibi commixtum non sinit separari partes eius, sicut apparet in oleo et aliis unctuosis. Aridum autem est quod est perfecte siccum, non retinens nec subtile terreum nec etiam humidum unctuosum: et ideo quae coagulantur, calido primo humiditatem propriam extrahente, postea vero frigido faciente partes constare sibi, coagulantur.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: amplius molle etc., reducit tertiam contrarietatem, scilicet molle et durum, dicens quod molle est effectus humidi: molle enim est quod cedit tangenti. Differt tamen ab humido: quia humidum transmutat tangens quia humectat, sed molle inquantum tale non transmutat tangens; et ideo molle non est humidum, sed est effectus humidi. Durum autem reducitur ad siccum, sicut effectus ad suam causam. Durum est enim quod tangenti non cedit, quia est coagulatum: coagulatum autem est effectus sicci, ut prius dictum est.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: dicuntur autem siccum et humidum etc., distinguit humidum et siccum, dicens quod siccum et humidum dicuntur multis modis. Est enim quoddam humidum quod habet humiditatem in profundo; et hoc potest esse dupliciter: quia si habet propriam humiditatem, quemadmodum uva, proprie dicitur humidum; si autem habet extraneam, sicut spongia, dicitur humidum infusum. Et est quoddam humidum, vel <i>udum</i> secundum aliam litteram, quod habet humiditatem in superficie, quod Commentator nominat irroratum. Et omnibus istis modis elementum humidum opponitur sicco. Sed sciendum etiam quod multipliciter dicitur siccum. Uno enim modo dicitur siccum, corpus grossum et aridum in superficie: et hoc proprie opponitur humido in superficie; alio autem modo dicitur siccum, coagulatum quod non habet humiditatem in profundo: et huic sicco proprie opponitur humidum infusum. Omnia autem haec, scilicet humidum istis modis dictum, et siccum aridum et siccum coagulatum, sunt effectus primi humidi et primi sicci. De aspero autem et leni non facit philosophus mentionem, quia manifestum est quod ad illas quatuor reducuntur. Asperum enim est quod habet siccitatem in superficie, quae inaequaliter partes eius constare facit; lene autem in superficie habet humorem, qui aequaliter facit fluere partem ad partem. Et ideo unum horum est effectus sicci, scilicet asperum, et aliud est effectus humidi, scilicet lene. Concludit igitur ex praedictis, manifestum esse quod omnes aliae differentiae tangibilium qualitatum ad illas quatuor reducuntur.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: hae autem non amplius etc., ostendit quod illae non reducuntur ad alias, nec in pauciores, nec ad se invicem, quia calidum non est siccum, ita quod caliditas sit siccitas quaedam vel effectus eius. Nec frigiditas est caliditas vel siccitas vel humiditas quaedam; nec humiditas est caliditas vel frigiditas; nec frigiditas est siccitas. Nec calidum est frigidum vel e converso, sicut sub causa; nec etiam frigiditas et caliditas sunt sub humido et sicco vel e converso. Necesse est igitur has quatuor qualitates esse primas. Sed videtur hoc non esse verum: quia in I Meteororum dicitur, quod stellae per motum suum et per reflexionem radiorum causant calorem in istis inferioribus, et maxime sol; et ita videtur quod non omne calidum sit effectus primi calidi, cum ipsae stellae non sint calidae, nec per tales qualitates effectae calidae. Saturnus etiam dicitur causare frigiditatem in aere: et ita non omne frigidum erit effectus primi frigidi. Ad quod dicendum est, quod philosophus hic loquitur de qualitatibus activis et passivis adinvicem, inter quas sunt praedictae quatuor qualitates, ut ostensum est. Qualitates autem stellarum, puta lux vel aliqua alia virtus earum, licet causent in istis inferioribus aliquam qualitatem, non tamen ab eis patiuntur, cum eorum substantiae non communicent in materia, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys.; et ideo cessat obiectio.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="2.2" id="2.2"></a> <b><a name="2.3" id="2.3">Lectio 3</a></b> <a name="2.3" id="2.3"></a>
    <blockquote>
      <table cellpadding="12">
        <tbody>
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">3
            <td>3
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα τὰ στοιχεῖα, τῶν δὲ τεττάρων ἓξ αἱ συζεύξεις, τὰ δ' ἐναντία οὐ πέφυκε συνδυάζεσθαι (θερμὸν γὰρ καὶ ψυχρὸν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάλιν ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ἀδύνατον), φανερὸν ὅτι τέτταρες ἔσονται αἱ τῶν στοιχείων συζεύξεις, θερμοῦ καὶ ξηροῦ, καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, καὶ (330b.) πάλιν ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ. Καὶ ἠκολούθηκε κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἁπλοῖς φαινομένοις σώμασι, πυρὶ καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι καὶ γῇ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ θερμὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρόν (οἷον ἀτμὶς γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ), τὸ δ' ὕδωρ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διανέμεσθαι τὰς διαφορὰς τοῖς πρώτοις σώμασι, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἶναι κατὰ λόγον. Ἅπαντες γὰρ οἱ τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες οἱ μὲν ἕν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τρία, οἱ δὲ τέτταρα ποιοῦσιν. Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἓν μόνον λέγουσιν, εἶτα πυκνώσει καὶ μανώσει τἆλλα γεννῶσι, τούτοις συμβαίνει δύο ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, τό τε μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν· ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ δημιουργοῦντα, τὸ δ' ἓν ὑπόκειται καθάπερ ὕλη.
            <td>The elementary qualities are four, and any four terms can be combined in six couples. Contraries, however, refuse to be coupled: for it is impossible for the same thing to be hot and cold, or moist and dry. Hence it is evident that the 'couplings' of the elementary qualities will be four: hot with dry and moist with hot, and again cold with dry and cold with moist. And these four couples have attached themselves to the apparently 'simple' bodies (Fire, Air, Water, and Earth) in a manner consonant with theory. For Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist (Air being a sort of aqueous vapour); and Water is cold and moist, while Earth is cold and dry. Thus the differences are reasonably distributed among the primary bodies, and the number of the latter is consonant with theory. For all who make the simple bodies 'elements' postulate either one, or two, or three, or four. Now (i) those who assert there is one only, and then generate everything else by condensation and rarefaction, are in effect making their 'originative sources' two, viz. the rare and the dense, or rather the hot and the cold: for it is these which are the moulding forces, while the 'one' underlies them as a 'matter'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Οἱ δ' εὐθὺς δύο ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ γῆν, τὰ μεταξὺ μίγματα ποιοῦσι τούτων, οἷον ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ οἱ τρία λέγοντες, καθάπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν· τὸ γὰρ μέσον μίγμα ποιεῖ. Καὶ σχεδὸν ταὐτὰ λέγουσιν οἵ τε δύο καὶ οἱ τρία ποιοῦντες· πλὴν οἱ μὲν τέμνουσιν εἰς δύο τὸ μέσον, οἱ δ' ἓν μόνον ποιοῦσιν. Ἔνιοι δ' εὐθὺς τέτταρα λέγουσιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. Συνάγει δὲ καὶ οὗτος εἰς τὰ δύο· τῷ γὰρ πυρὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἀντιτίθησιν. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων ἁπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ μικτόν.
            <td>But (ii) those who postulate two from the start—as Parmenides postulated Fire and Earth—make the intermediates (e.g. Air and Water) blends of these. The same course is followed (iii) by those who advocate three. (We may compare what Plato does in Me Divisions': for he makes 'the middle' a blend.) Indeed, there is practically no difference between those who postulate two and those who postulate three, except that the former split the middle 'element' into two, while the latter treat it as only one. But (iv) some advocate four from the start, e.g. Empedocles: yet he too draws them together so as to reduce them to the two, for he opposes all the others to Fire. In fact, however, fire and air, and each of the bodies we have mentioned, are not simple, but blended.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τὰ δ' ἁπλᾶ τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι ταὐτά, οἷον εἴ τι τῷ πυρὶ ὅμοιον, πυροειδές, οὐ πῦρ, καὶ τὸ τῷ ἀέρι ἀεροειδές· ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἐστιν ὑπερβολὴ θερμότητος, ὥσπερ καὶ κρύσταλλος ψυχρότητος· ἡ γὰρ πῆξις καὶ ἡ ζέσις ὑπερβολαί τινές εἰσιν, ἡ μὲν ψυχρότητος, ἡ δὲ θερμότητος. Εἰ οὖν ὁ κρύσταλλός ἐστι πῆξις ὑγροῦ ψυχροῦ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἔσται ζέσις ξηροῦ θερμοῦ. Διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἐκ κρυστάλλου γίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ πυρός.
            <td>The 'simple' bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not identical with them. Thus the 'simple' body corresponding to fire is 'such-as-fire, not fire: that which corresponds to air is 'such-as-air': and so on with the rest of them. But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of cold. For freezing and boiling are excesses of heat and cold respectively. Assuming, therefore, that ice is a freezing of moist and cold, fire analogously will be a boiling of dry and hot: a fact, by the way, which explains why nothing comes-to-be either out of ice or out of fire.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὄντων δὲ τεττάρων τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων, ἑκάτερα τοῖν δυοῖν ἑκατέρου τῶν τόπων ἐστίν· πῦρ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀὴρ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν ὅρον φερομένου, γῆ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέσον. Καὶ ἄκρα μὲν καὶ εἰλικρινέστατα πῦρ καὶ γῆ, μέσα δὲ καὶ μεμιγμένα μᾶλλον (331a.) ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ. Καὶ ἑκάτερα ἑκατέροις ἐναντία· πυρὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίον ὕδωρ, ἀέρι δὲ γῆ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων παθημάτων συνέστηκεν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς γε τέτταρα ὄντα ἑνὸς ἕκαστόν ἐστι, γῆ μὲν ξηροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχροῦ, ὕδωρ δὲ ψυχροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑγροῦ, ἀὴρ δ' ὑγροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ θερμοῦ, πῦρ δὲ θερμοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ξηροῦ.
            <td>The 'simple' bodies, since they are four, fall into two pairs which belong to the two regions, each to each: for Fire and Air are forms of the body moving towards the 'limit', while Earth and Water are forms of the body which moves towards the 'centre'. Fire and Earth, moreover, are extremes and purest: Water and Air, on the contrary are intermediates and more like blends. And, further, the members of either pair are contrary to those of the other, Water being contrary to Fire and Earth to Air; for the qualities constituting Water and Earth are contrary to those that constitute Fire and Air. Nevertheless, since they are four, each of them is characterized par excellence a single quality: Earth by dry rather than by cold, Water by cold rather than by moist, Air by moist rather than by hot, and Fire by hot rather than by dry.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="2.3" id="2.3">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de principiis elementorum, scilicet de materiali et formali, hic determinat de numero eorum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo determinat de numero eorum; secundo cum in quolibet elemento sint duae qualitates, ostendit in quolibet quae qualitas dominetur in eo, ibi: sed tamen simpliciter quatuor entia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo probat numerum elementorum; secundo confirmat dictum suum per opiniones aliorum, ibi: omnes enim quidem qui simplicia corpora et cetera. Ad evidentiam primae partis sciendum est, quod elementum communiter sumptum potest dici omne quod venit in compositionem alicuius. Est enim elementum ex quo componitur aliquid primo et est in eo, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Secundum hoc ergo sumendo communiter elementum, ipsae primae quatuor qualitates possunt dici elementa, cum ex ipsis, ut dicitur in littera, componantur sex coniugationes. Vel aliter: quia alio modo dicuntur elementa primae propositiones demonstrationis, ex quarum virtute procedunt ceterae demonstrationes, in quas omnes propositiones aliae reducuntur: ad horum ergo similitudinem ipsae primae tangibiles qualitates possunt dici elementa, quia omnes aliae, ut ostensum est, sunt effectus earum, et in eas ceterae reducuntur. Dicit ergo primo philosophus: cum sint quatuor <i>elementa</i>, idest quatuor tangibiles qualitates (et non quatuor simplicia corpora ut quidam exponunt: nondum enim probatus est numerus eorum), quatuor autem qualitatum sint duae coniunctiones, scilicet calidum et frigidum, siccum et humidum, quae sunt duae impossibiles coniugationes, quia impossibile est contraria esse in eodem, manifestum est quod solum reliquae quatuor coniugationes erunt possibiles, scilicet calidum et siccum, calidum et humidum, frigidum et humidum, frigidum et siccum. Et hoc quod dictum est secundum hanc rationem, <i>assecutum est</i>, idest conveniens est, his quae apparent in simplicibus corporibus, scilicet in igne, aere, aqua et terra. Ignis enim est calidus et siccus, et ita constituitur per primam coniugationem; aer calidus et humidus, per secundam; aqua frigida et humida, per tertiam; terra frigida et sicca, per quartam. Et sic primae differentiae qualitatum rationabiliter distribuuntur primis corporibus, scilicet quatuor elementis, et oportet quod multitudo primorum corporum sit secundum praedictam rationem: quia scilicet primae qualitates non possunt nisi quadrupliciter combinari.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: omnes enim quidem etc., confirmat quod dixit per opinionem antiquorum. Duo autem dixit philosophus: primum est quod elementa non sunt plura quam quatuor: secundum est quod ipsa agunt et patiuntur per differentias contrariarum tangibilium qualitatum; in quibus duobus concordat quodammodo cum antiquis. Unde dicit, quod omnes antiqui qui dicunt elementa esse simplicia corpora, conveniunt in hoc quod non excedunt quaternarium numerum; differunt tamen: quia quidam dicunt primum elementum esse tantum unum, quidam dicunt elementa esse duo, quidam tria, quidam quatuor. Ergo in hoc concordat cum antiquis, qui quaternarium numerum non transcendunt. Concordat etiam cum eis in secundo: quia dicunt ipsa elementa, sive unum sive plura, pati per contrarias qualitates. Quicumque autem unum solum dicunt elementum, dixerunt alia generari ex ipso densitate et raritate, quae sunt contrariae qualitates. Isti ergo dixerunt duo principia praeter elementum ipsum, quod dicebant esse quandam mediam naturam corpoream, subtiliorem aere et densiorem igne, ex quo per densitatem et raritatem contingit alia generari, vel per calidum et frigidum, per frigidum quidem condensans, per calidum autem rarefaciens. Hae enim qualitates cum sint contrariae, agunt et patiuntur adinvicem; unum autem, scilicet praedictum elementum, supponitur eis sicut materia. Qui autem duo faciunt, ut Parmenides, qui ponit ignem et terram esse elementa, ponebant etiam inter ea duo media, scilicet aerem et aquam; quae dicebant fieri ex istis duobus per rarum et densum: quia quando rarefit terra generatur aqua, quando autem condensatur ignis generatur aer. Unde iste etiam ponebat ea pati per contrarias qualitates, et in hoc convenit cum philosopho. Similiter autem et qui dicunt tria esse elementa, ponunt duo extrema contraria et unum medium, sicut Plato in suis divisionibus, ubi dividit elementa. Ponit enim unum ex parte formae, et magnum et parvum, quae sunt contraria, ex parte materiae; dicit etiam quoddam medium esse mixtum ex magno et parvo. Fere autem dicunt idem qui ponunt duo principia, et ponentes tria: utrique enim ponunt duo extrema; sed differunt, quia ponentes duo elementa, sicut Parmenides, ponunt duo media, ponentes autem tria ponunt unum medium.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quidam autem et mox etc., ponit specialiter opinionem Empedoclis et eam declarat, dicens quod quidam, sicut Empedocles et eius sequaces, ponunt statim quatuor elementa. Dicit autem <i>mox</i>, quia licet aliqui posuerunt quatuor, non tamen principaliter, sed duo media, sicut aerem et aquam, dicebant ex aliis generari. Ista autem quatuor elementa reducit Empedocles in duo contraria: ex una enim parte ponit ignem, et ex alia parte igni tria alia contraponit. Unde concordat Aristoteles cum Empedocle in duobus, licet non omnino, scilicet in numero elementorum et contrarietate eorum. Ulterius autem incidenter declarat opinionem, dicens quod secundum Empedoclem elementa quae nos sentimus, non sunt pura, sicut ignis quem sentimus non est purus, neque aer nec aliquod aliorum, sed unumquodque est mixtum. Tamen simplicia elementa sunt talia, idest istis quae videmus similia, non tamen eadem. Verbi gratia id quod est simile igni, puta flamma, non est ignis sed ignea: est enim flamma spiritus sicci ardor ut dicitur in I Meteororum; et quod est simile aeri non est aer sed aereum, et similiter de aliis. Dicit etiam Empedocles quod ignis qui circa nos est, est quaedam superabundantia caliditatis, sicut glacies est quaedam superabundantia frigiditatis. Coagulatio enim et arsio sunt superabundantiae quaedam, haec quidem frigiditatis in glacie, haec autem caliditatis in igne circa nos existente. Si igitur glacies est coagulatio humidi et frigidi, et ignis est superabundans arsio calidi et sicci, quia utrumque eorum a temperamento mixtionis recedit. Ideo nihil ex glacie generatur, nec ex igne qui est circa nos, licet utrumque sit mixtum. Secundum autem quosdam aliter inducitur haec littera, ut legatur secundum opinionem Aristotelis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: entibus autem etc., removet quandam dubitationem, quae talis est. Cum enim sint quatuor simplicia corpora ut probatum est, videtur quod oporteat ponere quatuor loci differentias quae ipsis corporibus aptantur. Hanc ergo removet dicens, quod cum sint quatuor simplicia corpora, unumquodque ipsorum est alterius duorum priorum locorum, scilicet loci sursum et loci deorsum: haec enim sunt primae differentiae loci, ut dicitur in II de caelo; et ideo dicitur hic <i>priorum</i> duorum. Ignis enim et aer sunt illius loci qui est ad terminum sursum, terra autem et aqua sunt illius loci qui est deorsum, non pariter, sed extrema sunt magis <i>sincera</i>. Sicut ignis qui est simpliciter levis, ideo simpliciter fertur sursum, terra vero simpliciter deorsum, quia simpliciter gravis. Sed media elementa utroque participant: aqua enim levis est in terra, et gravis est in aere et in igne; cum ergo aqua plus habeat de gravitate quam de levitate, magis communicat cum terra: et ideo utrique datur unus locus; similiter autem de aere et igne. Addit autem ad hoc, quod constituta sunt ex contrariis quatuor passionibus et primis, ex quibus gravitas et levitas causatur et ceterae tangibiles qualitates.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen simpliciter quatuor etc., ostendit quae qualitas in quolibet elemento dominetur, dicens quod elementa cum sint quatuor, et quodlibet habeat duas qualitates, non tamen habet eas aequaliter, sed <i>unumquodque est unius</i>, idest in unoquoque dominatur una, sicut in terra magis dominatur siccitas quam frigiditas, in aqua magis frigiditas quam humiditas, in aere magis humiditas quam caliditas, in igne vero magis dominatur caliditas quam siccitas. Non est autem intelligendum, ut quidam dicunt, quod terra licet sit magis sicca quam frigida, quod propter hoc sit siccior igne, quia littera hoc dicit; ratio enim in contrarium persuadet. Duae enim sunt causae siccitatis: una est frigus condensans et exprimens humidum, et per consequens remanet siccitas, quae non est aliud quam humiditatis privatio; alia causa est caliditas humiditatem consumens. Manifestum autem est, quod motus causat calorem in eo quod potest calefieri: necesse ergo est quod in materia illa maxime profundetur, quae semper est iuxta velocissimum motum; haec autem est materia ignis; unde ignis est calidissimum omnium calidorum, ut dicitur II Metaphys.; potentior autem est ignis caliditas ad consumendum humidum quam terrae frigiditas; et idcirco ignis siccior est quam terra. Ulterius autem cum virtus moventis sit minor in remoto quam in propinquo, minus calefacit motus caeli materiam aeris, immo quasi minime; remanebit ergo humida magis quam calida. Non tamen magis quam aqua: quia in aqua est frigiditas faciens ad se fluere humidum, caliditas autem aeris non facit ad se fluere humidum; et ideo aqua est magis humida quam aer. Sensu enim sensibilia iudicamus: manifestum est autem omnibus habentibus sensum tactus, quod aqua humidior est quam aer. Est tamen et minus frigida quam terra: quod sic patet. Frigiditas enim causatur ex distantia ab orbe, sicut caliditas ex propinquitate: cum ergo inter cetera elementa terra magis distet a caelo, necessario sequitur quod terra frigidissima sit inter omnia elementa.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="2.3" id="2.3"></a> <b><a name="2.4" id="2.4">Lectio 4</a></b> <a name="2.4" id="2.4"></a>
    <blockquote>
      <table cellpadding="12">
        <tbody>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">4
            <td>4
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται πρότερον ὅτι τοῖς ἁπλοῖς σώμασιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἡ γένεσις, ἅμα δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν φαίνεται γινόμενα (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀλλοίωσις· κατὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἁπτῶν πάθη ἀλλοίωσίς ἐστιν), λεκτέον τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολῆς, καὶ πότερον ἅπαν ἐξ ἅπαντος γίνεσθαι δυνατὸν ἢ τὰ μὲν δυνατὸν τὰ δ' ἀδύνατον. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα πέφυκεν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλειν, φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ γένεσις εἰς ἐναντία καὶ ἐξ ἐναντίων, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν πρὸς ἄλληλα διὰ τὸ τὰς διαφορὰς ἐναντίας εἶναι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀμφότεραι ἐναντίαι, οἷον πυρὶ καὶ ὕδατι (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δ' ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν), τοῖς δ' ἡ ἑτέρα μόνον, οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δὲ ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν).
            <td>It has been established before' that the coming-to-be of the 'simple' bodies is reciprocal. At the same time, it is manifest, even on the evidence of perception, that they do come-to-be: for otherwise there would not have been 'alteration, since 'alteration' is change in respect to the qualities of the objects of touch. Consequently, we must explain (i) what is the manner of their reciprocal transformation, and (ii) whether every one of them can come-to-be out of every one-or whether some can do so, but not others. Now it is evident that all of them are by nature such as to change into one another: for coming-to-be is a change into contraries and out of contraries, and the 'elements' all involve a contrariety in their mutual relations because their distinctive qualities are contrary. For in some of them both qualities are contrary—e.g. in Fire and Water, the first of these being dry and hot, and the second moist and cold: while in others one of the qualities (though only one) is contrary—e.g. in Air and Water, the first being moist and hot, and the second moist and cold.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὥστε καθόλου μὲν φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἤδη δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν πῶς· ἅπαντα μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔσται, διοίσει δὲ τῷ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ τῷ ῥᾷον καὶ χαλεπώτερον. Ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἔχει σύμβολα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ταχεῖα τούτων ἡ μετάβασις, ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει, βραδεῖα, διὰ τὸ ῥᾷον εἶναι τὸ ἓν ἢ τὰ πολλὰ μεταβάλλειν, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν ἔσται ἀὴρ θατέρου μεταβάλλοντος (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν θερμὸν καὶ ξηρόν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ὥστε ἂν κρατηθῇ τὸ ξηρὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ἀὴρ ἔσται), πάλιν δὲ ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ, ἐὰν κρατηθῇ τὸ θερμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ὥστε μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ὕδωρ ἔσται). Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐξ ὕδατος γῆ καὶ ἐκ γῆς πῦρ· ἔχει γὰρ ἄμφω πρὸς ἄμφω σύμβολα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὕδωρ ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ὥστε κρατηθέντος τοῦ ὑγροῦ γῆ ἔσται. Καὶ πάλιν ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν πῦρ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμόν, ἡ δὲ (331b.) γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ἐὰν φθαρῇ τὸ ψυχρόν, πῦρ ἔσται ἐκ γῆς. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι κύκλῳ τε ἔσται ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἁπλοῖς σώμασι, καὶ ῥᾷστος οὗτος ὁ τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς διὰ τὸ σύμβολα ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς.
            <td>It is evident, therefore, if we consider them in general, that every one is by nature such as to come-to-be out of every one: and when we come to consider them severally, it is not difficult to see the manner in which their transformation is effected. For, though all will result from all, both the speed and the facility of their conversion will differ in degree. Thus (i) the process of conversion will be quick between those which have interchangeable 'complementary factors', but slow between those which have none. The reason is that it is easier for a single thing to change than for many. Air, e.g. will result from Fire if a single quality changes: for Fire, as we saw, is hot and dry while Air is hot and moist, so that there will be Air if the dry be overcome by the moist. Again, Water will result from Air if the hot be overcome by the cold: for Air, as we saw, is hot and moist while Water is cold and moist, so that, if the hot changes, there will be Water. So too, in the same manner, Earth will result from Water and Fire from Earth, since the two 'elements' in both these couples have interchangeable 'complementary factors'. For Water is moist and cold while Earth is cold and dry—so that, if the moist be overcome, there will be Earth: and again, since Fire is dry and hot while Earth is cold and dry, Fire will result from Earth if the cold pass-away. It is evident, therefore, that the coming-to-be of the 'simple' bodies will be cyclical; and that this cyclical method of transformation is the easiest, because the consecutive 'clements' contain interchangeable 'complementary factors'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐκ πυρὸς δὲ ὕδωρ καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος γῆν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ γῆς ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ ἐνδέχεται μὲν γίνεσθαι, χαλεπώτερον δὲ διὰ τὸ πλειόνων εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ ἔσται ἐξ ὕδατος πῦρ, φθαρῆναι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, καὶ πάλιν εἰ ἐκ γῆς ἀήρ, φθαρῆναι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ, ἀνάγκη ἀμφότερα μεταβάλλειν. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν χρονιωτέρα ἡ γένεσις· ἐὰν δ' ἑκατέρου φθαρῇ θάτερον, ῥᾴων μέν, οὐκ εἰς ἄλληλα δὲ ἡ μετάβασις, ἀλλ' ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν καὶ ὕδατος ἔσται γῆ καὶ ἀήρ, ἐξ ἀέρος δὲ καὶ γῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ. Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ὕδατος φθαρῇ τὸ ψυχρὸν τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν, ἀὴρ ἔσται (λείπεται γὰρ τοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δὲ τὸ ὑγρόν), ὅταν δὲ τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δ' ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρόν, γῆ, διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι τοῦ μὲν τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀέρος φθαρῇ τὸ θερμὸν τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ξηρόν, ὕδωρ ἔσται (λείπεται γὰρ τοῦ μὲν τὸ ὑγρὸν τῆς δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν), ὅταν δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀέρος τὸ ὑγρὸν τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ψυχρόν, πῦρ, διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι τοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τῆς δὲ τὸ ξηρόν, ἅπερ ἦν πυρός.
            <td>On the other hand (ii) the transformation of Fire into Water and of Air into Earth, and again of Water and Earth into Fire and Air respectively, though possible, is more difficult because it involves the change of more qualities. For if Fire is to result from Water, both the cold and the moist must pass-away: and again, both the cold and the dry must pass-away if Air is to result from Earth. So' too, if Water and Earth are to result from Fire and Air respectively—both qualities must change. This second method of coming-to-be, then, takes a longer time. But (iii) if one quality in each of two 'elements' pass-away, the transformation, though easier, is not reciprocal. Still, from Fire plus Water there will result Earth and Air, and from Air plus Earth Fire and Water. For there will be Air, when the cold of the Water and the dry of the Fire have passed-away (since the hot of the latter and the moist of the former are left): whereas, when the hot of the Fire and the moist of the Water have passed-away, there will be Earth, owing to the survival of the dry of the Fire and the cold of the Water. So, too, in the same Way, Fire and Water will result from Air plus Earth. For there will be Water, when the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth have passed-away (since the moist of the former and the cold of the latter are left): whereas, when the moist of the Air and the cold of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, owing to the survival of the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth-qualities essentially constitutive of Fire.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὁμολογουμένη δὲ καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς γένεσις. Μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ πῦρ ἡ φλόξ, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καπνὸς καιόμενος, ὁ δὲ καπνὸς ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται φθαρέντος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ θατέρου τῶν στοιχείων γενέσθαι μετάβασιν εἰς οὐδὲν τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἢ ταὐτὰ ἢ τἀναντία. Ἐξ οὐδετέρων δὲ ἐγχωρεῖ γίνεσθαι σῶμα, οἷον εἰ μὲν τοῦ πυρὸς φθαρείη τὸ ξηρόν, τοῦ δ' ἀέρος τὸ ὑγρόν· λείπεται γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ θερμόν· ἐὰν δ' ἐξ ἑκατέρου τὸ θερμόν, λείπεται τἀναντία, ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς ἐνυπάρχει τὸ μὲν ταὐτὸ τὸ δ' ἐναντίον.
            <td>Moreover, this mode of Fire's coming-to-be is confirmed by perception. For flame is par excellence Fire: but flame is burning smoke, and smoke consists of Air and Earth. No transformation, however, into any of the 'simple' bodies can result from the passing-away of one elementary quality in each of two 'elements' when they are taken in their consecutive order, because either identical or contrary qualities are left in the pair: but no 'simple' body can be formed either out of identical, or out of contrary, qualities. Thus no 'simple' body would result, if the dry of Fire and the moist of Air were to pass-away: for the hot is left in both. On the other hand, if the hot pass-away out both, the contraries—dry and moist—are left. A similar result will occur in all the others too: for all the consecutive 'elements' contain one identical, and one contrary, quality.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὥσθ' ἅμα δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς ἓν μεταβαίνοντα ἑνὸς φθαρέντος γίνεται, τὰ δ' ἐκ δυοῖν εἰς ἓν πλειόνων. Ὅτι (332a.) μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα ἐκ παντὸς γίνεται, καὶ τίνα τρόπον εἰς ἄλληλα μετάβασις γίνεται, εἴρηται. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ ὧδε θεωρήσωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν.
            <td>Hence, too, it clearly follows that, when one of the consecutive 'elements' is transformed into one, the coming-to-be is effected by the passing-away of a single quality: whereas, when two of them are transformed into a third, more than one quality must have passed-away. We have stated that all the 'elements' come-to-be out of any one of them; and we have explained the manner in which their mutual conversion takes place. Let us nevertheless supplement our theory by the following speculations concerning them.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="2.4" id="2.4">
    <p>Postquam philosophus inquisivit numerum elementorum per formalia principia ipsorum, hic determinat de generatione et corruptione adinvicem, et universaliter tam de generatione simplicium quam mixtorum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit de generatione elementorum adinvicem et compositorum ex elementis; secundo de causis generationis et corruptionis, ibi: quia vero sunt quaedam generabilia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo determinat de generatione elementorum adinvicem; secundo de generatione compositorum ex elementis, ibi: de elementis autem ex quibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo determinat de transmutatione mutua elementorum secundum opinionem propriam; secundo reprobat opiniones aliorum, ibi: quoniam autem quia transmutantur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quomodo elementa ex invicem generantur; secundo quod habent unam materiam susceptivam, existentem in potentia, non actu, ibi: sed tamen adhuc et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit quod intendit; secundo prosequitur intentum, ibi: quoniam quidem igitur omnia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia determinatum est hic et in tertio libro de caelo et mundo, quod corpora simplicia, scilicet elementa, adinvicem generantur, et cum hoc etiam ad sensum videmus quod ipsa sunt adinvicem generata: quia nisi ita esset, non esset alteratio inter ea, cum tamen videamus quod alteratio secundum passiones tactus est inter ea, et ipsae passiones inter se praedominantes transmutant substantiam eorum adinvicem: quoniam inquam ita est, dicendum est nunc quis modus adinvicem transmutationis; et dicendum est utrum sit possibile quod quodlibet elementum ex quolibet elemento generetur, vel quod tantum unum generetur ex uno, si impossibile sit generari ex alio.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc., prosequitur intentum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit generationem elementorum in communi; secundo magis in speciali, ostendendo differentiam inter ea quantum ad eorum transmutationem, ibi: iam autem secundum unumquodque et cetera. Primo ostendit quod elementa adinvicem transmutantur, tali ratione. Generatio est ex contrariis et in contraria; omnia elementa habent contrarietatem adinvicem, quia eorum differentiae sunt contrariae ut ostensum est: ergo elementa adinvicem generantur. Maiorem propositionem manifestat inducendo in singulis elementis, dicens quod quaedam elementa secundum ambas differentias contrariantur, sicut ignis et aqua; ignis enim est calidus et siccus, aqua vero frigida et humida: calidum autem et frigidum sunt contraria, et similiter humidum et siccum. Quaedam autem contrariantur solum secundum alteram qualitatem, sicut aer et aqua: quia aer est calidus, et aqua est frigida, sed in humiditate conveniunt. Simile est de terra et igne, et de terra et aqua. Sic ergo concludit quod universaliter manifestum est, quod quodlibet elementum ex quolibet generatur.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: iam autem secundum unumquodque etc., determinat de generatione ipsorum magis in speciali. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quomodo unum elementum generetur ex uno; secundo quomodo unum generetur ex duobus, ibi: si autem uniuscuiusque et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quae sunt quae faciliter et cito adinvicem transmutantur; secundo quae sunt quae tardius et difficulter, ibi: ex igne autem aquam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod licet omnia elementa in hoc conveniant quod quodlibet ex quolibet generatur, differunt in hoc, quod quaedam ipsorum facilius et citius et quaedam tardius et difficilius adinvicem transmutantur. Quaecumque enim habent <i>symbolum</i>, idest convenientiam in aliqua qualitate, citius et facilius transmutantur adinvicem, illa vero quae in nulla qualitate conveniunt, tardius et difficilius. Et ratio huius est, quia cum ea quae habent symbolum transmutantur, non est necesse transmutari nisi tantum alteram qualitatem, quando vero ea quae transmutantur adinvicem in nulla qualitate conveniunt, utramque qualitatem necesse est transmutari: facilius autem est unum trasmutari quam plura. Ulterius autem exemplificat, dicens quod ex igne potest fieri aer solum altero transmutato, scilicet sicco; ignis enim est calidus et siccus, aer autem calidus et humidus: si ergo siccum ignis per dominium humidi corrumpatur, remanet calidum et humidum, et sic erit aer. Item etiam ex aere poterit fieri aqua, si per dominium frigidi caliditas aeris corrumpatur. Eodem modo ex aqua terra, et ex terra ignis: habent enim ambo convenientiam ambobus. Aqua enim est frigida et humida, terra vero frigida et sicca; et ideo <i>dominato humido</i>, idest si humidum aquae corrumpatur per dominium sicci, generabitur terra ex aqua: passive enim legitur ly <i>dominato</i>. Item vero quia ignis est calidus et siccus, terra vero frigida et sicca, si corrumpatur frigiditas terrae, generabitur ignis ex terra. Et ideo concludit manifestum esse quod, cum quodlibet generetur ex quolibet ut ostensum est, quod generatio simplicium corporum erit circularis, et praedictus modus transmutationis est facilis, quia habent symbolum in altera qualitate. Dubitatur autem de hoc quod hic dicit philosophus. Dicit enim quod, cum elementa quae habent symbolum transmutantur, remanet una qualitas, sicut quando ex aere fit aqua, remanet humiditas: et sic videtur quod corrupto subiecto remaneat accidens, quod est impossibile. Ad quod dicendum, quod illud accidens sive illa qualitas non remanet eadem numero, sed eadem specie. Sed adhuc videtur dubium remanere, quia non videtur quod propter hoc talis transmutatio debeat esse facilior: cum oporteat corrumpi ambas qualitates, sicut in transmutatione non habentium symbolum. Ad huius ergo evidentiam considerandum est, quod qualitates elementorum causantur ab ipsis formis substantialibus ipsorum. Illa ergo elementa quae maiorem convenientiam habent in qualitatibus, necessario habent maiorem convenientiam in formis substantialibus, et per consequens in dispositionibus materiae facilius adinvicem transmutantur. Et licet oporteat ambas qualitates corrumpi, tamen quia qualitas symbola minus resistit, immo nullo modo, contraria vero resistit, ideo facilior est transitus.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: ex igne autem aquam etc., ostendit quae sunt illa quae tarde et difficulter adinvicem generentur. Et dicit quod sunt illa quae non habent symbolum, sicut ignis et aqua, terra et aer; et inducit rationem quae patet in littera.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: si autem uniuscuiusque etc., ostendit quomodo unum elementum generetur ex duobus, dicens quod si altera qualitas uniuscuiusque elementorum habentium symbolum corrumpatur, non est adinvicem transmutatio, sed tamen poterit aliquod tertium generari: sicut ex igne et aqua, quae in nulla qualitate conveniunt, poterit generari terra et aer, ex aere et terra ignis et aqua. Quando enim aquae frigiditas corrumpitur et siccitas ignis, sic fiet aer, qui est calidus et humidus: quando vero calidum ignis et humiditas aquae corrumpitur, remanet siccitas ignis et frigiditas aquae, et sic generatur terra frigida et sicca. Similiter ex aere et terra potest generari ignis et aqua: quando enim caliditas aeris et terrae siccitas corrumpitur, remanet humiditas aeris et terrae frigiditas, et sic generatur aqua frigida et humida: quando vero humiditas aeris et terrae frigiditas corrumpitur, remanet caliditas aeris et siccitas terrae, et sic generatur ignis calidus et siccus. Haec autem generatio ignis concessa est ab omnibus: quia ad sensum apparet quod in lignis, in quibus est humiditas aeris, generatur flamma, quae maxime ignis est inter ea quae naturae igneae sunt apud nos. Flamma autem nihil aliud est nisi fumus accensus: fumus autem est ex terra et aere, et humiditas aerea exspirans et secum trahens partes terrestres: propter quod denigrantur ea quae tangit. In hac tamen generatione notandum est, quod semper necesse est vincere alteram activarum qualitatum et alteram passivarum, quia aliter non esset coniunctio possibilis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: in his autem quae per consequentiam etc., ostendit ex quibus duobus elementis non potest generari tertium, dicens quod in his elementis quae sunt <i>per consequentiam</i>, idest quae sunt immediate in loco et habent symbolum, talis generatio esse non potest, scilicet quod ex duobus, altera qualitate in utroque corrupta, tertium generetur. Quia illa quae relinquitur, est aut eadem aut contraria; et si quidem fuerit eadem in utroque, puta caliditas in igne et aere, non generabitur aliquod tertium elementum: quia ex una qualitate non potest constitui elementum; si autem fuerit contraria, puta siccitas ignis et humiditas aeris: cum ista coniugatio sit impossibilis ut supra dictum est, nec tunc poterit generari tertium elementum. Similiter autem est in aliis habentibus symbolum, scilicet in terra et aqua: quia in omnibus talibus quae habent talem coniunctionem in loco, et est inter ea convenientia qualitatis, una qualitas est eadem et altera contraria. Ex dictis igitur manifestum est quod elementa, quae ex uno in unum ex veloci generatione transeunt, generantur una qualitate corrupta; quae autem transeunt ex duobus in unum tertium, illa transeunt duabus qualitatibus corruptis. Ultimo epilogat, et patet in littera. Dubitatur de hoc quod hic dicit philosophus, quod corrupta frigiditate terrae et humiditate aeris fiet ignis; hoc enim non videtur possibile esse: quia nec terrae siccitas nec caliditas aeris videntur ad generationem ignis posse sufficere: ignis enim multo calidior est quam aer et siccior quam terra. Ad hoc autem dicunt quidam quod non intendit philosophus quod ex illis duobus generetur purus ignis, sed aliquid quod maxime participet naturam eius, sicut exemplificat de flamma. Sed hoc stare non potest, quia philosophus loquitur de generatione elementorum, et non mixtorum ex elementis; et praeterea etiam caliditas flammae multo intensior est quam caliditas aeris. Et ideo dicendum quod generatur purus ignis. Et licet illa caliditas non sufficiat, iuvatur tamen et intenditur per virtutem corporis caelestis, et luce solis, et per virtutem aliarum stellarum.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="2.4" id="2.4"></a> <b><a name="">Lectio 5</a></b> <a name=""></a>
    <blockquote>
      <table cellpadding="12">
        <tbody>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">5
            <td>5
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ γάρ ἐστι τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων ὕλη, ὥσπερ καὶ δοκεῖ ἐνίοις, ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι ἓν ἢ δύο εἶναι ταῦτα ἢ πλείω. Ἓν μὲν δὴ πάντα οὐχ οἷόν τε, οἷον ἀέρα πάντα ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ γῆν, εἴπερ ἡ μεταβολὴ εἰς τἀναντία. Εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἀήρ, εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει, ἀλλοίωσις ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐ γένεσις. Ἅμα δ' οὐδ' οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὥστε ὕδωρ εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀέρα ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν. Ἔσται δή τις ἐναντίωσις καὶ διαφορὰ ἧς ἕξει τι θάτερον μόριον, τὸ πῦρ οἷον θερμότητα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔσται τό γε πῦρ ἀὴρ θερμός· ἀλλοίωσίς τε γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. Ἅμα δὲ πάλιν εἰ ἔσται ἐκ πυρὸς ἀήρ, τοῦ θερμοῦ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβάλλοντος ἔσται. Ὑπάρξει ἄρα τῷ ἀέρι τοῦτο, καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἀὴρ ψυχρόν τι. Ὥστε ἀδύνατον τὸ πῦρ ἀέρα θερμὸν εἶναι· ἅμα γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἔσται. Ἄλλο τι ἄρ' ἀμφότερα τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἄλλη τις ὕλη κοινή.
            <td>If Water, Air, and the like are a 'matter' of which the natural bodies consist, as some thinkers in fact believe, these 'clements' must be either one, or two, or more. Now they cannot all of them be one—they cannot, e.g. all be Air or Water or Fire or Earth—because 'Change is into contraries'. For if they all were Air, then (assuming Air to persist) there will be 'alteration' instead of coming-to-be. Besides, nobody supposes a single 'element' to persist, as the basis of all, in such a way that it is Water as well as Air (or any other 'element') at the same time. So there will be a certain contrariety, i.e. a differentiating quality: and the other member of this contrariety, e.g. heat, will belong to some other 'element', e.g. to Fire. But Fire will certainly not be 'hot Air'. For a change of that kind (a) is 'alteration', and (b) is not what is observed. Moreover (c) if Air is again to result out of the Fire, it will do so by the conversion of the hot into its contrary: this contrary, therefore, will belong to Air, and Air will be a cold something: hence it is impossible for Fire to be 'hot Air', since in that case the same thing will be simultaneously hot and cold. Both Fire and Air, therefore, will be something else which is the same; i.e. there will be some 'matter', other than either, common to both.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος περὶ ἁπάντων, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν τούτων ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἄλλο τί γε παρὰ ταῦτα, οἷον μέσον τι ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, ἀέρος μὲν παχύτερον καὶ πυρός, τῶν δὲ λεπτότερον· ἔσται γὰρ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ ἐκεῖνο μετ' ἐναντιότητος· ἀλλὰ στέρησις τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων· ὥστ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μονοῦσθαι ἐκεῖνο οὐδέποτε, ὥσπερ φασί τινες τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ περιέχον. Ὁμοίως ἄρα ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἢ οὐδέν. Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν αἰσθητόν γε πρότερον τούτων, ταῦτα ἂν εἴη πάντα. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἢ ἀεὶ μένοντα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἰς ἄλληλα, ἢ μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ ἢ ἅπαντα, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὔ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων ἔγραψεν. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν μεταβάλλειν ἀνάγκη εἰς ἄλληλα, δέδεικται πρότερον· ὅτι δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ταχέως ἄλλο ἐξ ἄλλου, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἔχοντα σύμβολον θᾶττον γίνεται ἐξ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντα βραδύτερον.
            <td>The same argument applies to all the 'elements', proving that there is no single one of them out of which they all originate. But neither is there, beside these four, some other body from which they originate—a something intermediate, e.g. between Air and Water (coarser than Air, but finer than Water), or between Air and Fire (coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the supposed 'intermediate' will be Air and Fire when a pair of contrasted qualities is added to it: but, since one of every two contrary qualities is a 'privation', the 'intermediate' never can exist—as some thinkers assert the 'Boundless' or the 'Environing' exists—in isolation. It is, therefore, equally and indifferently any one of the 'elements', or else it is nothing. Since, then, there is nothing—at least, nothing perceptible—prior to these, they must be all. That being so, either they must always persist and not be transformable into one another: or they must undergo transformation—either all of them, or some only (as Plato wrote in the Timacus).' Now it has been proved before that they must undergo reciprocal transformation. It has also been proved that the speed with which they come-to-be, one out of another, is not uniform—since the process of reciprocal transformation is relatively quick between the 'elements' with a 'complementary factor', but relatively slow between those which possess no such factor.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἡ ἐναντιότης μία ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν μεταβάλλουσιν, ἀνάγκη δύο εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη τὸ μέσον ἀναίσθητος οὖσα (332b.) καὶ ἀχώριστος. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω ὁρᾶται ὄντα, δύο ἂν εἶεν αἱ ἐλάχισται. Δύο δ' οὐσῶν οὐχ οἷόν τε τρία εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τέσσαρα, ὥσπερ φαίνεται· τοσαῦται γὰρ αἱ συζυγίαι· ἓξ γὰρ οὐσῶν τὰς δύο ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐναντίας εἶναι ἀλλήλαις. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων εἴρηται πρότερον.
            <td>Assuming, then, that the contrariety, in respect to which they are transformed, is one, the elements' will inevitably be two: for it is 'matter' that is the 'mean' between the two contraries, and matter is imperceptible and inseparable from them. Since, however, the 'elements' are seen to be more than two, the contrarieties must at the least be two. But the contrarieties being two, the 'elements' must be four (as they evidently are) and cannot be three: for the couplings' are four, since, though six are possible, the two in which the qualities are contrary to one another cannot occur. These subjects have been discussed before.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="">
    <p>Postquam philosophus de generatione elementorum determinavit, hic ostendit quod subiectum istius transmutationis non est aliquod corpus actu existens, et per consequens quod illud subiectum est materia communis existens in potentia. Circa hoc ergo duo facit: primo ostendit quod subiectum huius transmutationis non potest esse aliquod elementum; secundo quod nec aliquod medium inter elementa, ibi: tamen neque aliud aliquid et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod licet supra dictum sit, quod sit subiectum huius transmutationis et quod elementa adinvicem transmutentur, adhuc tamen inspiciemus si aliquod naturalium corporum, puta elementorum, vel aliquod corpus medium inter ea, est materia talis transmutationis. Quibusdam enim videtur quod sit aqua, quibusdam quod sit aer vel aliquid tale. Sed quod aliquod tale corpus non possit esse materia elementorum, probat tali ratione. Quia aut illud est tantum unum, aut duo, aut plura. Si autem sit unum tantum, tunc omnia erunt unum, scilicet vel aer, vel aqua, vel ignis; sed hoc non est possibile, quia transmutatio est inter contraria. Si enim dicatur quod aer, qui est omnia, permaneat secundum rationem et formam, subiectum salvatur in tota transmutatione: talis autem transmutatio est alteratio et non generatio; ergo non fit generatio elementorum adinvicem: quod est contra supra probata. Simul autem cum praedictis videtur, quod aqua non sit omnino similis aeri, aut aliquod elementum per omnia simile alteri elemento; ergo oportet quod sit aliqua proprietas uniuscuiusque, et aliqua differentia et contrarietas inter ipsa distinguens, et illius contrarietatis unum elementum habebit partem unam, et aliud elementum partem aliam habebit: verbi gratia, si ignis et aer sint contraria secundum calidum et frigidum, ignis habebit caliditatem et aer frigiditatem. Quando ergo fit transmutatio aeris in ignem, si quidem manet aer in tota transmutatione, tunc etiam manet aeris frigiditas: et tamen ex igne in quo transmutatur, inerit ei caliditas; ergo tunc est calidum et frigidum. Et cum sit simplex corpus, est ubique et secundum idem frigiditas et caliditas; ergo contraria erunt in eodem, quod est impossibile.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen neque ignis etc., removet quandam responsionem quae posset dari ad praedicta. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod aer quando fit ignis, non dicitur fieri ignis quia assumit speciem ignis, sed aer est calidus; et similiter quando ex igne fit aer, remanet aer calidus. Sed hoc removet, dicens quod si hoc esset verum, sequeretur idem quod prius, scilicet quod generatio elementi ex elemento esset alteratio: quia aer frigidus et calidus non differunt nisi per accidens, et hoc facit alterationem. Praeterea cum ex igne fit aer vel e converso, si utraque forma inest materiae ignis et aeris, sicut dicit ista opinio, erunt idem calidum et frigidum: et quia transmutatio omnis est inter contraria, ergo aeri inerit calor ignis, et aer de se est aliquid frigidum; ergo calidum et frigidum sunt in eodem simplici: quod est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod aer sit ignis calidus, vel ignis sit aer frigidus. Quod autem hic dicitur quod aer de se est frigidus, dicitur gratia exempli et non secundum rei veritatem. Cum autem ista sint impossibilia, oportet quod ambo elementa, scilicet ignis et aer, habeant aliquod quod sit eis commune, quod essentialiter est in ambobus. Et haec est communis materia quae est in potentia ad utrumque; et eadem ratio est de aliis elementis. Nullum ergo elementum est materia ad alia elementa, sed materia eorum est una, quae est potentia unumquodque.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: tamen neque aliud etc., ostendit quod medium corpus inter ignem et aerem, quod sit grossius igne et subtilius aere, vel etiam medium inter aerem et aquam, quod sit subtilius aqua et grossius aere, non potest esse materia elementorum. Quia si illud medium supponatur quod est medium aeris et ignis, aut illud est cum contrarietate elementi prima, aut sine ea. Si autem est cum contrarietate prima alicuius elementi, ipsum est illud elementum: quia cui convenit propria passio alicuius, illi convenit subiectum illius passionis; et sic non erit medium inter elementa: quod est contra id quod suppositum est. Si autem illud corpus non habet passionem vel proprietatem elementarem, sed est privatum ea: cum privatio cum altero semper sit contrariorum (aliter enim materia elementorum esset a forma separata, quod est impossibile), sequitur quod id medium corpus non sit sine contrarietate; sicut quidam dicunt quod ipsum est quoddam infinitum, non habens qualitatem aliquam et omnia comprehendens. Similis autem ratio est, quodcumque horum mediorum esse materia elementorum ponatur. Ergo aut nihil tale est medium, aut illud est aliquod quatuor elementorum: quod est contra positionem. Si ergo non potest esse aliquod corpus sensibile prius istis quatuor elementis, necesse est ut ipsa quatuor elementa sint principia corporum sensibilium. Commentator autem aliter deducit istam rationem. Dicit enim, quod si ponatur aliquod corpus medium esse materiam elementorum, sequitur idem inconveniens quod contingebat ponentibus unum elementorum aereum esse subiectum. Sequitur enim contraria esse in eodem: quia cum omnis transmutatio sit in contraria et ex contrariis, ut supra dixit philosophus, cum ex tali corpore generatur aer vel aliud elementum, in eodem erunt qualitates ipsius corporis medii, cum ipsum in transmutatione secundum substantiam permaneat, et qualitates aeris generati, quas de necessitate illis oportet esse contrarias. Sequitur etiam secundum eum illud esse ens et non ens: quia cum unum est privatio alterius, et privatio est non ens, secundum unum contrariorum est ens, et secundum aliud est non ens.
    <p>Ultimo autem cum dicit: necesse igitur est etc., recapitulando concludit principale propositum, dicens quod ista corpora aut semper manentia sunt in formis suis et immutabilia invicem, aut transmutantur adinvicem; et si transmutantur, aut omnia transmutantur, aut quaedam sic et quaedam non: sicut Plato scripsit in Timaeo, quod terra propter latitudinem suorum triangulorum non transmutatur. Sed manifestum est quod omnia elementa adinvicem transmutantur; non tamen omnia aeque cito: quia ea quae habent symbolum, citius generantur adinvicem, quae autem non habent, tardius. Si enim in elementis est contrarietas una tantum, necesse est esse duo elementa, quia unum solum non potest esse simul sub duobus contrariis: et materia tunc est medium duorum. Sed quia nos videmus quod elementa sunt plura quam duo, necesse est ad minus sint duae contrarietates. Duabus autem existentibus contrarietatibus impossibile est quod elementa sint tantum tria, sed oportet de necessitate quod sint quatuor. Tot enim contingit fieri utiles coniugationes tangibilium qualitatum, penes quas sumitur numerus elementorum; sunt enim in universo sex coniugationes sed duae sunt impossibiles: ut supra patuit, quia contraria essent in eodem.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name=""></a> <b><a name="2.6" id="2.6">Lectio 6</a></b> <a name="2.6" id="2.6"></a>
    <blockquote>
      <table cellpadding="12">
        <tbody>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅτι δ' ἐπειδὴ μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀδύνατον ἀρχήν τινα εἶναι αὐτῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ ἄκρῳ ἢ μέσῳ, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄκροις οὐκ ἔσται, ὅτι πῦρ ἔσται ἢ γῆ πάντα· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος τῷ φάναι ἐκ πυρὸς ἢ γῆς εἶναι πάντα.
            <td>ut the following arguments will make it clear that, since the 'elements' are transformed into one another, it is impossible for any one of them—whether it be at the end or in the middle—to be an 'originative source' of the rest. There can be no such 'originative element' at the ends: for all of them would then be Fire or Earth, and this theory amounts to the assertion that all things are made of Fire or Earth.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅτι δ' οὐδὲ μέσον, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισιν ἀὴρ μὲν καὶ εἰς πῦρ μεταβάλλειν καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ, ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ εἰς ἀέρα καὶ εἰς γῆν· τὰ δ' ἔσχατα οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλληλα· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ στῆναι καὶ μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον τοῦτο ἰέναι ἐπ' εὐθείας ἐφ' ἑκάτερα.
            <td>Nor can a 'middle-element' be such an originative source'—as some thinkers suppose that Air is transformed both into Fire and into Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while the 'end-elements' are not further transformed into one another. For the process must come to a stop, and cannot continue ad infinitum in a straight line in either direction,
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἄπειροι γὰρ ἐναντιότητες ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔσονται. Γῆ ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὕδωρ ἐφ' ᾧ Υ, ἀὴρ ἐφ' ᾧ Α, πῦρ ἐφ' ᾧ Π. Εἰ δὴ τὸ Α μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ Π καὶ Υ, ἐναντιότης ἔσται τῶν Α Π.
            <td>since otherwise an infinite number of contrarieties would attach to the single 'element'. Let E stand for Earth, W for Water, A for Air, and F for Fire. Then (i) since A is transformed into F and W, there will be a contrariety belonging to A F.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔστω ταῦτα λευκότης καὶ μελανία. Πάλιν εἰ εἰς τὸ Υ τὸ Α, ἔσται ἄλλη· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ Υ καὶ Π. Ἔστω δὲ ξηρότης καὶ ὑγρότης, τὸ μὲν Ξ ξηρότης, τὸ δὲ Υ ὑγρότης.
            <td>Let these contraries be whiteness and blackness. Again (ii) since A is transformed into W, there will be another contrariety: for W is not the same as F. Let this second contrariety be dryness and moistness, D being dryness and M moistness.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν μένει τὸ λευκόν, ὑπάρξει τὸ ὕδωρ ὑγρὸν καὶ λευκόν, εἰ δὲ μή, μέλαν ἔσται τὸ ὕδωρ· εἰς τἀναντία γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ.
            <td>Now if, when A is transformed into W, the 'white' persists, Water will be moist and white: but if it does not persist, Water will be black since change is into contraries. Water, therefore, must be either white or black.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔστω δὴ τὸ πρῶτον. Ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τῷ Π τὸ Ξ ὑπάρξει ἡ ξηρότης. Ἔσται ἄρα καὶ τῷ Π τῷ πυρὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ· ἐναντία γὰρ ὑπάρχει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ τὸ πρῶτον μέλαν ἦν, ἔπειτα δὲ ξηρόν, τὸ δ' ὕδωρ ὑγρόν, ἔπειτα δὲ λευκόν. Φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἔσται ἡ μεταβολή, καὶ ἐπί γε τούτων, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ Γ τῇ γῇ ὑπάρξει τὰ λοιπά, καὶ δύο σύμβολα τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ συνδεδύασταί πως.
            <td>Let it then be the first. On similar grounds, therefore, D (dryness) will also belong to F. Consequently F (Fire) as well as Air will be able to be transformed into Water: for it has qualities contrary to those of Water, since Fire was first taken to be black and then to be dry, while Water was moist and then showed itself white. Thus it is evident that all the 'elements' will be able to be transformed out of one another; and that, in the instances we have taken, E (Earth) also will contain the remaining two 'complementary factors', viz. the black and the moist (for these have not yet been coupled).
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅτι δ' εἰς ἄπειρον οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἰέναι, ὅπερ μελλήσαντες δείξειν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔμπροσθεν ἤλθομεν, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. Εἰ γὰρ πάλιν τὸ πῦρ, ἐφ' ᾧ Π, εἰς ἄλλο μεταβαλεῖ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμψει, οἷον εἰς τὸ Ψ, ἐναντιότης τις τῷ πυρὶ καὶ τῷ Ψ ἄλλη ὑπάρξει τῶν εἰρημένων· οὐδενὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπόκειται τῶν Γ Υ Α Π (333a.) τὸ Ψ. Ἔστω δὴ τῷ μὲν Π τὸ Κ, τῷ δὲ Ψ τὸ Φ. Τὸ δὴ Κ πᾶσιν ὑπάρξει τοῖς Γ Υ Α Π· μεταβάλλουσι γὰρ εἰς ἄλληλα. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν ἔστω μήπω δεδειγμένον· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο δῆλον, ὅτι εἰ πάλιν τὸ Ψ εἰς ἄλλο, ἄλλη ἐναντιότης καὶ τῷ Ψ ὑπάρξει καὶ τῷ πυρὶ τῷ Π. Ὁμοίως δ' ἀεὶ μετὰ τοῦ προστιθεμένου ἐναντιότης τις ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὥστ' εἰ ἄπειρα, καὶ ἐναντιότητες ἄπειροι τῷ ἑνὶ ὑπάρξουσιν. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται οὔτε ὁρίσασθαι οὐδὲν οὔτε γενέσθαι· δεήσει γάρ, εἰ ἄλλο ἔσται ἐξ ἄλλου, τοσαύτας διεξελθεῖν ἐναντιότητας, καὶ ἔτι πλείους, ὥστ' εἰς ἔνια μὲν οὐδέποτ' ἔσται μεταβολή, οἷον εἰ ἄπειρα τὰ μεταξύ· ἀνάγκη δ', εἴπερ ἄπειρα τὰ στοιχεῖα· ἔτι δ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς πῦρ, εἰ ἄπειροι αἱ ἐναντιότητες. Γίνεται δὲ καὶ πάντα ἕν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πάσας ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν κάτω τοῦ Π τὰς τῶν ἄνωθεν, τούτοις δὲ τὰς τῶν κάτωθεν, ὥστε πάντα ἓν ἔσται.
            <td>We have dealt with this last topic before the thesis we set out to prove. That thesis—viz. that the process cannot continue ad infinitum—will be clear from the following considerations. If Fire (which is represented by F) is not to revert, but is to be transformed in turn into some other 'element' (e.g. into Q), a new contrariety, other than those mentioned, will belong to Fire and Q: for it has been assumed that Q is not the same as any of the four, E W A and F. Let K, then, belong to F and Y to Q. Then K will belong to all four, E W A and F: for they are transformed into one another. This last point, however, we may admit, has not yet been proved: but at any rate it is clear that if Q is to be transformed in turn into yet another 'element', yet another contrariety will belong not only to Q but also to F (Fire). And, similarly, every addition of a new 'element' will carry with it the attachment of a new contrariety to the preceding elements'. Consequently, if the 'elements' are infinitely many, there will also belong to the single 'element' an infinite number of contrarieties. But if that be so, it will be impossible to define any 'element': impossible also for any to come-to-be. For if one is to result from another, it will have to pass through such a vast number of contrarieties—and indeed even more than any determinate number. Consequently (i) into some 'elements' transformation will never be effected—viz. if the intermediates are infinite in number, as they must be if the 'elements' are infinitely many: further (ii) there will not even be a transformation of Air into Fire, if the contrarieties are infinitely many: moreover (iii) all the 'elements' become one. For all the contrarieties of the 'elements' above F must belong to those below F, and vice versa: hence they will all be one.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="2.6" id="2.6">
    <p>Postquam philosophus secundum propriam opinionem determinavit de mutua transmutatione elementorum, in parte ista ponit opiniones aliorum et destruit eas. Fuerunt enim circa hoc duae opiniones: quidam enim dixerunt quod non omnia elementa adinvicem transmutantur sed quaedam: verbi gratia, sicut aer mutatur in aquam et ignem, ignis vero non mutatur in aerem et in aquam; aliqui vero non, ut Empedocles et eius sequaces dixerunt elementa esse immutabilia. Primo ergo ponit rationem contra primam; secundo contra secundam, ibi: admirabitur autem et cetera.
    <p>Quia vero prima opinio supponit quoddam elementum medium esse principium in transmutatione aliorum, quod est contra id quod supra probatum est, ideo philosophus breviter adducendo id quod supra dictum est, ostendit quod neque extremum elementum potest esse principium, neque medium elementum potest esse principium. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod non extremum; secundo quod neque medium, ibi: quoniam autem neque medium et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia elementa adinvicem transmutantur, impossibile est aliquod ipsorum esse principium, neque medium neque extremum. Quod extremum elementum non potest esse principium manifestum est ex supra dictis: si enim dicatur quod extrema, sicut ignis aut terra, sunt principia, cum ipsa et in transmutatione permaneant, omnia erunt ignis, quod est manifeste falsum; et eadem ratio est de terra.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem neque medium etc., ostendit quod neque medium elementum potest esse principium, sicut illi dicebant qui ponebant non omnia elementa adinvicem generari. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo praesupponit quoddam medium ad propositum ostendendum; secundo probat propositum, ibi: terra sit g et cetera. Proponit ergo primo quod non solum aer mutaretur in aquam, sed et in ignem, nec aqua solum in aerem, sed et in terram; sed, ut illi dicebant, extrema non amplius mutabantur in medium. Sed oportet in istis transmutationibus esse statum et non ire in infinitum: si enim iretur in infinitum, tunc in uno et eodem essent infinitae contrarietates; et hoc est infra magis manifestum.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: terra sit g etc., probat propositum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit rationem suam; secundo probat quoddam quod supposuerat, scilicet quod in elementis est status in ascendendo, ibi: quoniam autem in infinitum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod si aer mutetur in aquam et in ignem, necessario aer et ignis et aqua poterunt adinvicem transmutari. Sit ergo terra g, et aqua y, aer a, ignis p. Si ergo a, quod est signum aeris, mutatur in duo elementa, scilicet in p et in y, hoc est in ignem et in aquam, oportet quod aer habeat aliquam contrarietatem cum p igne: quia non transmutantur adinvicem nisi contraria. Sit autem haec contrarietas, gratia exempli, albedo et nigredo, ita quod ignis sit corpus nigrum siccum, et aer sit corpus album siccum. Rursus etiam quia a aer, transit in y aquam, oportet esse aliam contrarietatem inter aerem et aquam; et sit haec contrarietas siccitas et humiditas: siccitas significetur per litteram X et conveniat aeri, humiditas significetur per litteram y et conveniat aquae. Ergo aer mutatur in aquam, aqua remaneat alba: quia album aeri et aquae est contingens; erit autem aqua humida et alba. Si autem album non sit contingens utrique, cum aer mutatur in aquam, erit aqua nigra et humida, cum aer supponatur albus et siccus: oportet enim quod omnis mutatio sit inter contraria. In tali ergo mutatione oportet aquam esse albam vel nigram, si aer qui est prior aqua, ponatur esse corpus album: quia si communicant in mera albedine, tunc aqua est alba, si autem non, tunc est nigra. Similiter etiam cum aer mutatur in ignem, ipsi p, hoc est igni, convenit siccitas: conveniunt enim aer et ignis in siccitate; cum ergo ignis sit siccus et niger, et aqua humida et alba, manifestum est quod poterunt adinvicem transmutari, cum sint contraria: ignis enim est niger et siccus, aqua humida et alba. Sic ergo manifestum est quod omnia elementa adinvicem transmutantur, quia et in g, quod significat terram, sunt reliquae duae qualitates, scilicet humidum et nigrum, et duo elementa erunt symbola cum ipsa terra, quae est nigra et humida: communicat enim in nigro cum igne, et in humido cum aqua; haec enim, scilicet humidum et nigrum, nunquam contingunt esse cum qualitatibus aeris, quae sunt album et siccum, et terra cum aere non habet symbolum. Advertendum est quod istae qualitates non sunt propriae elementorum, sed utitur eis Aristoteles gratia exempli: parum enim curavit philosophus de exemplis. Inde dicit Commentator in II de anima: de exemplo autem non intenditur nisi manifestatio, non verificatio. Ex omnibus istis verbis intendit hic philosophus talem rationem. Quaecumque sunt contraria adinvicem, transmutantur; sed omnia elementa sive habeant symbolum sive non, sunt contraria in ambabus vel in altera qualitate; ergo omnia elementa adinvicem transmutantur. Et hoc est contra opinionem dicentium quaedam sed non omnia adinvicem transmutari, ut dictum est, quam philosophus hic destruere intendit.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem in infinitum etc., ostendit quod transmutatio elementorum non procedit in infinitum. Si enim hoc ponatur, sequuntur quatuor inconvenientia. Quorum primum est quod in uno elemento erunt infinitae qualitates. Si enim ignis quod est quartum elementum, mutetur in aliud quod sit X, et non revolvatur, ita scilicet quod non mutetur in ignem, cum omnis mutatio fiat inter contraria, oportet quod inter p et X sit alia contrarietas, diversa a contrarietatibus quatuor elementorum: quia ipsum quintum elementum quod est X, non ponitur esse idem alicui quatuor elementorum. Sed cum omnis contrarietas sit secundum qualitates, oportet quod aliqua qualitas sit in igne secundum quam contrariatur ipsi X: et sit qualitas illa r; et similiter oportet quod in ipso X quinto elemento sit aliqua qualitas illi contraria: et sit illa qualitas f. Illa autem qualitas r non solum erit in ipso igne, sed etiam in omnibus quatuor elementis, quia omnia possunt mutari in ipsum X: omnis enim mutatio est inter contraria; et quodlibet inferiorum elementorum habebit tres qualitates primas. Utrum autem quintum sit elementum nondum est demonstratum. Sed tamen manifestum est quod si rursus illud quintum mutetur in aliud, est etiam alia contrarietas inter quintum et sextum, diversa a contrarietate omnium inferiorum; et sic oportet quod una alia qualitas insit omnibus inferioribus, eadem ratione. Et sic illa quatuor elementa priora habebunt quatuor qualitates primas; et sic addito uno elementorum, adderetur una qualitas et una contrarietas. Quapropter si est sic in corporibus simplicibus elementorum procedere in infinitum, in uno et eodem erunt infinitae contrarietates, et infinitae qualitates: et hoc primum est impossibile. Secundum inconveniens ponit cum dicit: si autem hoc etc., dicens quod si hoc est, scilicet quod sint infinita elementa et infinitae qualitates, non erit definire nec generare. Quia si aliquod debeat mutari in aliud, oportet quod infinitas qualitates pertranseat; sed cum in infinitis infinita sint media, et infinita non sit pertransire ut dicitur in VIII Physic., sequitur quod talia nunquam adinvicem mutabuntur. Tertium inconveniens ponit cum dicit: amplius autem etc., dicens quod etiam proximum elementum non poterit mutari in sibi proximum, sicut ignis nunquam transibit in aerem, nec e converso: quia in quolibet istorum sunt infinitae qualitates, quas impossibile est pertransire. Quartum inconveniens ponit cum dicit: fiunt autem et omnia etc., dicens quod omnia infinita erunt unum. Quia omnes qualitates elementorum quae sunt supra p, quod est ignis, conveniunt etiam inferioribus, et e converso; quorum autem primae qualitates sunt eaedem, et ipsa sunt eadem; ergo omnia infinita erunt unumquodque de inferioribus, ita quod unumquodque erit.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="2.6" id="2.6"></a> <b><a name="2.7" id="2.7">Lectio 7</a></b> <a name="2.7" id="2.7"></a>
    <blockquote>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">6
            <td>6
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Θαυμάσειε δ' ἄν τις τῶν λεγόντων πλείω ἑνὸς τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων ὥστε μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησι, πῶς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς εἶναι συμβλητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα. Καίτοι λέγει οὕτω· "ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα". Εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀνάγκη ταὐτό τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον ἅπασι τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ᾧ μετροῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος κοτύλης εἶεν ἀέρος δέκα· τὸ αὐτό τι ἦν ἄρα ἄμφω, εἰ μετρεῖται τῷ αὐτῷ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτω κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν συμβλητὰ ὡς ποσὸν ἐκ ποσοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅσον δύναται, οἷον εἰ κοτύλη ὕδατος ἴσον δύναται ψύχειν καὶ δέκα ἀέρος, καὶ οὕτως κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν οὐχ ᾗ ποσὸν συμβλητά, ἀλλ' ᾗ δύναταί τι. Εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ μὴ τῷ τοῦ ποσοῦ μέτρῳ συμβάλλεσθαι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ὡς τόδε λευκὸν τόδε θερμόν. Τὸ δ' ὡς τόδε σημαίνει ἐν μὲν ποιῷ τὸ ὅμοιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ τὸ ἴσον. Ἄτοπον δὴ φαίνεται, εἰ τὰ σώματα ἀμετάβλητα ὄντα μὴ ἀναλογίᾳ συμβλητά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μέτρῳ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῷ εἶναι ἴσον θερμὸν ἢ ὅμοιον πυρὸς τοσονδὶ καὶ ἀέρος πολλαπλάσιον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ πλεῖον τῷ ὁμογενὲς εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἕξει τὸν λόγον.
            <td>As for those who agree with Empedocles that the 'elements' of body are more than one, so that they are not transformed into one another—one may well wonder in what sense it is open to them to maintain that the 'elements' are comparable. Yet Empedocles says 'For these are all not only equal...' If it is meant that they are comparable in their amount, all the 'comparables' must possess an identical something whereby they are measured. If, e.g. one pint of Water yields ten of Air, both are measured by the same unit; and therefore both were from the first an identical something. On the other hand, suppose (ii) they are not 'comparable in their amount' in the sense that so-much of the one yields so much of the other, but comparable in 'power of action (a pint of Water, e.g. having a power of cooling equal to that of ten pints of Air); even so, they are 'comparable in their amount', though not qua 'amount' but qua 'so-much power'. There is also (iii) a third possibility. Instead of comparing their powers by the measure of their amount, they might be compared as terms in a 'correspondence': e.g. 'as x is hot, so correspondingly y is white'. But 'correspondence', though it means equality in the quantum, means similarity in a quale. Thus it is manifestly absurd that the 'simple' bodies, though they are not transformable, are comparable not merely as 'corresponding', but by a measure of their powers; i.e. that so-much Fire is comparable with many times-that-amount of Air, as being 'equally' or 'similarly' hot. For the same thing, if it be greater in amount, will, since it belongs to the same kind, have its ratio correspondingly increased.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αὔξησις ἂν εἴη κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλέα, ἀλλ' ἢ (333b.) κατὰ πρόσθεσιν· πυρὶ γὰρ αὔξει τὸ πῦρ· "αὔξει δὲ χθὼν μὲν σφέτερον δέμας, αἰθέρα δ' αἰθήρ". Ταῦτα δὲ προστίθεται· δοκεῖ δ' οὐχ οὕτως αὔξεσθαι τὰ αὐξανόμενα.
            <td>A further objection to the theory of Empedocles is that it makes even growth impossible, unless it be increase by addition. For his Fire increases by Fire: 'And Earth increases its own frame and Ether increases Ether." These, however, are cases of addition: but it is not by addition that growing things are believed to increase.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Πολὺ δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ γενέσεως τῆς κατὰ φύσιν. Τὰ γὰρ γινόμενα φύσει πάντα γίνεται ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης. Τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πυροῦ πυρὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐλαίαν; ἢ καὶ ἐὰν ὡδὶ συντεθῇ ὀστοῦν; οὐ γὰρ ὅπως ἔτυχε συνελθόντων οὐδὲν γίνεται, καθ' ἃ ἐκεῖνός φησιν, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινί. Τί οὖν τούτων αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ γε ἢ γῆ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος· συγκρίσεως γὰρ &lt;�τὸ μέν&gt;, τὸ δὲ διακρίσεως αἴτιον. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου, ἀλλ' οὐ "μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων", ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνός φησιν. Τύχη δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀνομάζεται, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγος· ἔστι γὰρ μιχθῆναι ὡς ἔτυχεν. Τῶν δὴ φύσει ὄντων αἴτιον τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ἑκάστου φύσις αὕτη, περὶ ἧς οὐδὲν λέγει. Οὐδὲν ἄρα περὶ φύσεως λέγει.
            <td>And it is far more difficult for him to account for the coming-to-be which occurs in nature. For the things which come-to-be by natural process all exhibit, in their coming-to-be, a uniformity either absolute or highly regular: while any exceptions any results which are in accordance neither with the invariable nor with the general rule are products of chance and luck. Then what is the cause determining that man comes-to-be from man, that wheat (instead of an olive) comes-to-be from wheat, either invariably or generally? Are we to say 'Bone comes-to-be if the "elements" be put together in such-and such a manner'? For, according to his own estatements, nothing comes-to-be from their 'fortuitous consilience', but only from their 'consilience' in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of this proportional consilience? Presumably not Fire or Earth. But neither is it Love and Strife: for the former is a cause of 'association' only, and the latter only of 'dissociation'. No: the cause in question is the essential nature of each thing—not merely to quote his words) 'a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled'. And chance, not proportion, 'is the name given to these occurrences': for things can be 'mingled' fortuitously. The cause, therefore, of the coming-to-be of the things which owe their existence to nature is that they are in such-and-such a determinate condition: and it is this which constitutes, the 'nature' of each thing—a 'nature' about which he says nothing. What he says, therefore, is no explanation of 'nature'.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ τοῦτο καὶ ἀγαθόν· ὁ δὲ τὴν μίξιν μόνον ἐπαινεῖ. Καίτοι τά γε στοιχεῖα διακρίνει οὐ τὸ νεῖκος, ἀλλ' ἡ φιλία τὰ φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ· θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα.
            <td>Moreover, it is this which is both 'the excellence' of each thing and its 'good': whereas he assigns the whole credit to the 'mingling'. (And yet the 'elements' at all events are 'dissociated' not by Strife, but by Love: since the 'elements' are by nature prior to the Deity, and they too are Deities.)
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔτι δὲ περὶ κινήσεως ἁπλῶς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν διότι ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος κινεῖ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτ' ἦν φιλίᾳ εἶναι τὸ κινήσει τοιᾳδί, νείκει δὲ τὸ τοιᾳδί. Ἔδει οὖν ἢ ὁρίσασθαι ἢ ὑποθέσθαι ἢ ἀποδεῖξαι, ἢ ἀκριβῶς ἢ μαλακῶς, ἢ ἄλλως γέ πως. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ φαίνεται καὶ βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κινούμενα τὰ σώματα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἄνω μὲν οὐ βίᾳ, κάτω δὲ βίᾳ, τῷ δὲ βίᾳ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐναντίον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ βίᾳ, ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖσθαι. Ταύτην οὖν ἡ φιλία κινεῖ; ἢ οὔ; τοὐναντίον γὰρ τὴν γῆν ἄνω καὶ διακρίσει ἔοικεν, καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ νεῖκος αἴτιον τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήεως ἢ ἡ φιλία. Ὥστε καὶ ὅλως παρὰ φύσιν ἡ φιλία ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον. Ἁπλῶς δὲ εἰ μὴ ἡ φιλία ἢ τὸ νεῖκος κινοῖ, αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων οὐδεμία κίνησίς ἐστιν οὐδὲ μονή· ἀλλ' ἄτοπον. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαίνεται κινούμενα· (334a.) διέκρινε μὲν γὰρ τὸ νεῖκος, ἠνέχθη δ' ἄνω ὁ αἰθὴρ οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μέν φησιν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τύχης "οὕτω γὰρ συνέκυρσε θέων τοτέ, πολλάκι δ' ἄλλως" ὁτὲ δέ φησι πεφυκέναι τὸ πῦρ ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ὁ δ' αἰθήρ, φησί, "&lt;�δ' αὖ&gt; μακρῇσι κατὰ χθόνα δύετο ῥίζαις". Ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον ὁμοίως ἔχειν φησὶν ἐπί τε τοῦ νείκους νῦν καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας. Τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ κινοῦν πρῶτον καὶ αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, ἀλλά τινος κινήσεως ταῦτα αἴτια· εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ἐκεῖνο ἀρχή· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ἢ ἕν τι αὐτῶν· αἱ γὰρ ἀλλοιώσεις αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶς ἔσονται, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν εἶναι καὶ πάλιν ἄμουσον, ἢ μνήμη ἢ λήθη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ μὲν πῦρ ἡ ψυχή, τὰ πάθη ὑπάρξει αὐτῇ ὅσα πυρὶ ᾗ πῦρ· εἰ δὲ μικτόν, τὰ σωματικά· τούτων δ' οὐδὲν σωματικόν. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἑτέρας ἔργον ἐστὶ θεωρίας.
            <td>Again, his account of motion is vague. For it is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving, unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. He ought, then, either to have defined or to have postulated these characteristic movements, or to have demonstrated them—whether strictly or laxly or in some other fashion. Moreover, since (a) the 'simple' bodies appear to move 'naturally' as well as by compulsion, i.e. in a manner contrary to nature (fire, e.g. appears to move upwards without compulsion, though it appears to move by compulsion downwards); and since (b) what is 'natural' is contrary to that which is due to compulsion, and movement by compulsion actually occurs; it follows that 'natural movement' can also occur in fact. Is this, then, the movement that Love sets going? No: for, on the contrary, the 'natural movement' moves Earth downwards and resembles 'dissociation', and Strife rather than Love is its cause—so that in general, too, Love rather than Strife would seem to be contrary to nature. And unless Love or Strife is actually setting them in motion, the 'simple' bodies themselves have absolutely no movement or rest. But this is paradoxical: and what is more, they do in fact obviously move. For though Strife 'dissociated', it was not by Strife that the 'Ether' was borne upwards. On the contrary, sometimes he attributes its movement to something like chance ('For thus, as it ran, it happened to meet them then, though often otherwise"), while at other times he says it is the nature of Fire to be borne upwards, but 'the Ether' (to quote his words) 'sank down upon the Earth with long roots'. With such statements, too, he combines the assertion that the Order of the World is the same now, in the reign of Strife, as it was formerly in the reign of Love. What, then, is the 'first mover' of the 'elements'? What causes their motion? Presumably not Love and Strife: on the contrary, these are causes of a particular motion, if at least we assume that 'first mover' to be an originative source'. An additional paradox is that the soul should consist of the 'elements', or that it should be one of them. How are the soul's 'alterations' to take Place? How, e.g. is the change from being musical to being unmusical, or how is memory or forgetting, to occur? For clearly, if the soul be Fire, only such modifications will happen to it as characterize Fire qua Fire: while if it be compounded out of the elements', only the corporeal modifications will occur in it. But the changes we have mentioned are none of them corporeal. The discussion of these difficulties, however, is a task appropriate to a different investigation.
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    </blockquote><a name="2.7" id="2.7">
    <p>Postquam philosophus destruxit unam falsam opinionem de transmutatione elementorum, hic destruit aliam quae fuit opinio Empedoclis, qui dixit elementa nunquam adinvicem transmutari. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit eam; secundo reprobat, ibi: quomodo contingit eis dicere comparabilia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod Empedocles posuit elementa esse plura corpora: non tamen adinvicem transmutantur, ita quod ex aqua fiat aer, et ex aere ignis ut in primo manifestum est. Quapropter admirabitur aliquis ipsum sic dicentem.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quomodo contingit eis etc., reprobat opinionem praedictam. Et primo per Empedoclem; secundo deducendo ad quandam aliam inconvenientiam quae sequitur ad ipsam, ibi: sed neque augmentatio et cetera. Circa primum sciendum est quod Empedocles, licet poneret elementa esse intransmutabilia, posuit tamen ipsa esse adinvicem comparabilia. Ex hoc ergo sumit rationem Aristoteles contra eum, et est ratio talis. Quaecumque sunt comparabilia, sunt transmutabilia; sed elementa sunt comparabilia secundum Empedoclem; ergo sunt transmutabilia. Potest etiam aliter formari et sic. Si elementa sunt intransmutabilia, non sunt comparabilia; sed consequens est falsum secundum Empedoclem, qui dicit ea esse comparabilia: dicebat enim ea esse aequalia; ergo et antecedens est falsum, scilicet ipsa esse intransmutabilia. Circa rationem istam sic procedit. Primo ponit eam per modum quaestionis, dicens quod si elementa sunt intransmutabilia, quomodo contingit quod sint comparabilia. Quasi diceret: nullo modo. Sed tamen Empedocles dicit sic, scilicet quod sunt comparabilia: dicit enim ea esse aequalia.
    <p>Secundo ibi: si ergo secundum quantum etc., probat primam propositionem, scilicet quod si sunt comparabilia, sunt transmutabilia. Et quia comparatio est duplex, scilicet secundum quantitatem et secundum virtutem, primo probat eam, si sunt comparabilia secundum quantitatem; secundo, si sunt comparabilia secundum virtutem, ibi: si autem non sic et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod si elementa comparantur secundum quantitatem, ut si ex uno pugillo aquae fiant decem pugilli aeris, necessario oportet quod unum aliquid sit in eis in quo conveniunt, et in quo mensurantur; in omnibus enim comparabilibus est unum aliquid quo mensurantur: et hoc est illud in quo comparantur. Cum autem ex tanta aqua, puta ex uno pugillo aquae, fiant decem pugilli aeris, oportet unam esse materiam quae sit minoris et maioris quantitatis sub forma aquae et aeris; sed quaecumque communicant in materia, transmutantur adinvicem; ergo elementa sunt transmutabilia.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: si autem non sic etc., probat eam, dato quod elementa compararentur adinvicem secundum qualitatem et virtutem, dicens quod si non sic comparantur adinvicem elementa, scilicet secundum quantitatem, ut quantum fiat ex quanto, sed comparentur secundum quantitatem potentiae vel virtutis, verbi gratia, si ponatur aer esse frigidus, et quaeratur utrum tantum potest infrigidare unus pugillus aquae quantum possunt infrigidare decem pugilli aeris, tunc fiat comparatio secundum quantum virtutis, ut quantum possunt, et non secundum quantitatem dimensionis. Haec autem comparatio potest fieri dupliciter, scilicet secundum similitudinem, et secundum proportionem. Dico autem comparationem fieri secundum similitudinem, quando fit in una qualitate quae est in diversis subiectis: quia similitudo est rerum diversarum eadem qualitas; secundum proportionem autem dicitur fieri, quando fit in oppositis sive diversis qualitatibus, in una habitudine se habentibus ad duo subiecta vel plura. Si ergo fiat comparatio secundum qualitatem, tunc contingit comparare non quantitatis quidem mensuram, sed potius mensuram quae est secundum potentias similium qualitatum, et secundum proportionem diversarum qualitatum, verbi gratia, sicut hoc est calidum ita hoc est album; cum autem hoc dicimus ut hoc, significamus in qualitate quidem simile, et in quantitate aequale. Si igitur fiat comparatio elementorum non secundum proportionem, sed secundum mensuram potentiarum, quae est comparatio in qualitate, sicut in calido aut simili, inconveniens est si haec ponantur immutabilia elementa: verbi gratia si dicatur, quantum est calidus ignis tantum est calidus aer; quia idem plus calidum cum sit <i>homogeneos</i>, idest unius generis est minus calido (secundum quod ea quae habent eandem materiam dicuntur esse unius generis, et habent se sicut materia ad subiectum), et habebit rationem talem, sicut comparabile in quanto: quae est ratio univoca; ergo et materia est una; quorum autem materia est una, sunt adinvicem transmutabilia. Falsum est ergo quod dicit Empedocles, quod elementa non transmutantur adinvicem. Si quis ergo diligenter advertat, tota virtus istorum verborum est in hoc, quod ea quae comparantur, sive primo modo sive secundo, habent eandem materiam; et talia necessario sunt mutabilia ut dictum est. Sed videtur quod istud quod dicit philosophus sit falsum. Constat enim quod quantitas terrae et aliorum elementorum est comparabilis quantitati stellarum, et tamen non est eadem materia utrorumque, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys. Praeterea dubitatur de alio: non enim omnia comparabilia adinvicem secundum potentiam vel virtutem, communicant in materia. Ignis enim et sol sunt comparabiles in calefactione secundum magis et minus, et tamen non communicant in materia, ut dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum est secundum quosdam, quod non loquitur hic philosophus de quantitate secundum extensionem, sed de quantitate secundum substantiam. Et hoc significat cum dixit, decem pugillos aeris esse aequales uni pugillo aquae: sunt enim aequales in materia, quia tantum ibi est de materia quantum hic; unde cum communicent in materia, necessario adinvicem transmutatur. Talis autem comparatio non est inter elementa et caelestia corpora. Vel dicendum quod haec comparatio est secundum rarum et densum: nam per hoc variata materia, elementa ad se invicem transmutantur. Et vocatur haec comparatio secundum quantitatem: quia rarum et densum non addunt super partes materiae qualitatem quae essentialiter sit qualitas, sed potius situm in partibus materiae, ad distensionem per maiorem et minorem quantitatem. Ad secundum vero dicendum, quod intelligit philosophus de his quae comparantur secundum qualitatem vel virtutem univoce acceptam in utroque: talis autem non est virtus calefactiva solis et ignis; et ideo cessat obiectio.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed neque augmentatio etc., reprobat praedictam opinionem, deducendo ad alia inconvenientia; et sunt duo. Primum est quod haec opinio tollit augmentum. Hoc sic ostendit: quia si elementa non transmutantur, tunc oportet quod unum addatur alteri, sicut lapis lapidi; hoc autem est quaedam accumulatio, et non est augmentum, neque secundum eos neque secundum nos: quia oportet quod id per quod augmentum fit, transmutetur in augmentatum; neque etiam secundum eum qui dixit, quod illud quod augetur, augetur solum a suo simili, scilicet ignis augetur igne, et unumquodque quod augetur, augetur per aliquod sui generis, sicut aether augetur aethere: talis autem congregatio est eorundem manentium in forma. Res autem non sic videntur augeri, ut supra in primo ostensum est.
    <p>Secundum inconveniens ponit ibi: multum autem difficilius etc., et est quod haec opinio tollit generationem, dicens quod multum est difficilius tradere aliquid de generatione secundum naturam, si elementa non transmutantur adinvicem. Cum enim ea quae generantur secundum naturam, generentur eodem modo semper aut frequenter, ea autem quae praeter multum et semper fiunt et raro, fiunt ab eventu et fortuna, non potest reddi causa quare semper ex homine generetur homo, et quare semper ex frumento generetur frumentum et non oliva: semper enim generatum est in forma generantis, nisi peccatum naturae propter defectum fiat. Si autem sit ut dicit Empedocles, scilicet quod elementa non sint transmutabilia, aequaliter potest generari ex homine asinus et homo: quia utrumque eorum non est nisi congregatio elementorum, et homo generans non habens formam, non inducit formam in generato, nec convenit cum eo in forma. Aut si os et caro ita componantur, scilicet per quandam accumulationem elementorum convenientium sicut ille dicit, tunc nihil generatur, sed in his quae generantur est solum ratio vel relatio aliqua, non quidem relatio mixtorum, sed compositorum. Quae igitur est causa istorum, quod ex homine generetur homo semper aut frequenter, et similiter ex frumento frumentum, et non oliva? Istorum enim causa non potest esse ignis aut terra: quia ista sunt contraria in qualibet compositione. Similiter nec lis nec amicitia, quas Empedocles posuit esse duo principia mobilia, possunt esse causa horum. Amicitia enim non est causa nisi congregationis, lis autem solum est causa segregationis; sed neutrum horum est forma rei, quae facit hominem esse hominem, et carnem esse carnem: forma enim est substantia uniuscuiusque; et ideo non solum in re est mixtio, idest compositio congregatorum et separatio eorum, sicut dicit Empedocles, sed etiam est forma. In tali ergo congregatione et segregatione narratur ab Empedocle fortuna, et non ratio quae est sumpta a forma. Dicit enim quod mixtio fit ut contingit, idest a casu et fortuna, cum tamen natura quae est forma, sit causa entium: quare ita se habet, quod ab homine semper vel frequenter generatur homo. Sed de hac forma vel natura nihil dicit Empedocles, cum tamen ipsa natura, quae dicitur forma, sit bonum et optimum uniuscuiusque rei, bonum quidem in se, et optimum in ordine universi. Laudat autem Empedocles solum mixtionem, quae in rei veritate non est mixtio sed solum quaedam compositio: quia quod elementa segregentur a composito in quo sunt salvata, hoc non facit lis sed amicitia, quae vult ea congregare ad homogenea. Et haec elementa dicit Empedocles esse priora <i>Deo</i>, idest caelo: quia etiam caelum dicebat ex elementis componi.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: amplius autem de motu etc., hic destruit opinionem Empedoclis de principiis moventibus per tres rationes. Quarum primam ponit, dicens quod Empedocles locutus fuit insufficienter de motu. Non enim sufficit simpliciter dicere quod amicitia et lis sunt principia moventia, nisi forte <i>esse</i> ipsius amicitiae, idest de natura sua, habet ut causet motum talem: sed quia haec non est certa, oportebat quod hoc determinaret, aut certitudinaliter per causam propriam, aut molliter, sicut per causam non convertibilem, sive remotam, aut aliter qualiter, sicut per probabiles rationes, vel per inductionem, vel exemplum; sed Empedocles nihil horum facit, et ideo simpliciter et insufficienter dixit. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius autem quoniam etc., et est talis. Corpora naturalia moventur violenter et praeter naturam, et moventur secundum naturam: verbi gratia, ignis movetur sursum non violentia sed natura, deorsum autem violenter; quod autem est violenter, est contrarium ei quod est secundum naturam; videmus autem corpora moveri per violentiam; ergo moventur secundum naturam: contraria enim habent fieri circa idem. Quaeramus ergo ab Empedocle, utrum motus amicitiae sit naturalis vel violentus. Terram enim moveri superius sicut et ignem inferius, est contra naturam: hoc autem quod est contra naturam, assimilatur cuidam segregationi; tamen sic elementa congregantur: quia nisi ignis descendat et terra ascendat, non congregabuntur elementa. Cum ergo congregare sit effectus amicitiae secundum Empedoclem, motus amicitiae est violentus et segregationi similis, et lis magis est causa motus naturalis quam amicitia: quod est impossibile secundum eum. Et ideo impossibile est ponere amicitiam et litem esse principia moventia. Si autem haec non sunt principia moventia, cum non sint alia principia secundum Empedoclem, nullus est motus naturalium corporum, nec aliqua quies: habitus enim et privatio habent fieri circa idem; hoc autem est manifeste falsum.
    <p>Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: amplius autem et videntur etc., per quam ostendit philosophus quod Empedocles sibi ipsi contradicit, et peccat etiam dicens naturalia fieri a casu et a fortuna. Contradicit autem sibi ipsi in hoc, quod cum poneret tantum duo principia moventia, scilicet litem et amicitiam, posuit tamen aliquem motum esse a casu et a fortuna: unde dicendo esse tantum duo principia moventia, dicit ea esse causam omnis motus, dicendo autem aliquem motum esse a casu et a fortuna, dicit illa principia non esse causam omnis motus. Dicit enim quod, quando aliquod compositum corrumpitur, tunc segregantur elementa quae erant in eo, per litem, et movetur ignis sursum ut a lite: sed quandoque a fortuna, quia sic casus constituit tunc cursum ignis, sive aetheris (aethera enim dicebat Empedocles esse ex igne claro). Non autem semper sursum movetur aether, sed multoties aliter: quia dixit aliquando a fortuna, sicut dictum est, ignem ferri sursum; aliquando autem ingrediebatur ad <i>radices</i>, idest ad cavernas, terrae, sicut apparet in montibus ardentibus. In hoc ergo peccat Empedocles, quod naturam casui et fortunae subiacere dicebat. Simul autem cum dictis impossibile dicit, quod mundus similiter se habet nunc in tempore litis, quando de confuso et permixto egressa sunt omnia, sicut prius se habuit in amicitia; quia sicut ignis quandoque a fortuna ascendit et quandoque descendit, ita fecit in confuso: per casum enim tunc ascendit, et per casum descendit. Cum autem casus et fortuna sint causae per accidens, reducuntur ad per se. Quid est ergo quod primo per se movet, et per se est causa motus? Oportet enim causam per se esse prius quam causam per accidens. Amicitia enim et lis non est causa motus simpliciter, sed solum cuiusdam motus, scilicet congregationis et segregationis: si tamen est ita sicut dicit Empedocles, quod amicitia vel lis est prius movens.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: inconveniens autem etc., reprobat opinionem Empedoclis in hoc quod dicebat animam componi ex elementis, per duas rationes. Quarum primam ponit, dicens quod inconveniens est dicere quod anima sit ex elementis omnibus, vel ex aliquibus, vel ex aliquo eorum: quia si anima esset elementum aliquod, puta ignis, ut quidam dixerunt, vel esset ex elementis ut dixerunt alii, tunc <i>alterationes animae quomodo erunt</i>, idest quomodo posset alterari anima propriis alterationibus? Quasi dicat: nullo modo. Verbi gratia, si anima est elementum vel ex elementis, quomodo anima habebit habitum musicae: et rursus quomodo mutabitur de musica in privationem musicae, ita quod sit sine musica? Nec etiam poterit immutari de memoria in oblivionem, vel e converso; sed potius si anima est ignis, quaecumque sunt passiones secundum quod ignis, inerunt animae: quod est impossibile.
    <p>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: si autem miscibile etc., quae talis est. Si non sunt miscibilia nisi corpora, ut in primo dictum est, et animarum nulla est corporalis, constat quod anima non est elementum, nec mixta ex elementis. Sed de his determinare est opus alterius contemplationis, quia pertinet ad librum de anima.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="2.7" id="2.7"></a> <b><a name="2.8" id="2.8">Lectio 8</a></b> <a name="2.8" id="2.8"></a>
    <blockquote>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">7
            <td>7
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Περὶ δὲ τῶν στοιχείων ἐξ ὧν τὰ σώματα συνέστηκεν, ὅσοις μὲν δοκεῖ τι εἶναι κοινὸν ἢ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀνάγκη εἰ θάτερον τούτων, καὶ θάτερον συμβαίνειν· ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ποιοῦσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν μηδ' ὡς ἐξ ἑκάστου, πλὴν ὡς ἐκ τοίχου πλίνθους, ἄτοπον πῶς ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔσονται σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν. Ἔχει δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀπορίαν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἀλλήλων γεννῶσιν, τίνα τρόπον γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῶν ἕτερόν τι παρ' αὐτά. Λέγω δ' οἷον ἔστιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ καὶ ἐκ τούτου γίνεσθαι πῦρ· ἔστι γάρ τι κοινὸν ὑποκείμενον.
            <td>Let us return to the 'elements' of which bodies are composed. The theories that 'there is something common to all the "elements"', and that they are reciprocally transformed', are so related that those who accept either are bound to accept the other as well. Those, on the other hand, who do not make their coming-to-be reciprocal—who refuse to suppose that any one of the 'elements' comes-to-be out of any other taken singly, except in the sense in which bricks come-to-be out of a wall—are faced with a paradox. How, on their theory, are flesh and bones or any of the other compounds to result from the 'elements' taken together? Indeed, the point we have raised constitutes a problem even for those who generate the 'elements' out of one another. In what manner does anything other than, and beside, the 'elements' come-to-be out of them? Let me illustrate my meaning. Water can come-to-be out of Fire and Fire out of Water; for their substratum is something common to them both.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ σὰρξ ἐξ αὐτῶν γίνεται καὶ μυελός· ταῦτα δὴ γίνεται πῶς; ἐκείνοις τε γὰρ τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τίς ἔσται τρόπος; ἀνάγκη γὰρ σύνθεσιν εἶναι καθάπερ ἐξ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων τοῖχος· καὶ τὸ μίγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ σωζομένων μὲν ἔσται τῶν στοιχείων, κατὰ μικρὰ δὲ παρ' ἄλληλα συγκειμένων. Οὕτω δὴ σὰρξ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. Συμβαίνει δὴ μὴ ἐξ ὁτουοῦν μέρους σαρκὸς γίνεσθαι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ὥσπερ ἐκ κηροῦ γένοιτ' ἂν ἐκ μὲν τουδὶ τοῦ μέρους σφαῖρα, πυραμὶς δ' ἐξ ἄλλου τινός· ἀλλ' ἐνεδέχετό γε ἐξ ἑκατέρου ἑκάτερον γενέσθαι. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τοῦτον γίνεται τὸν τρόπον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐξ ὁτουοῦν ἄμφω· τοῖς δ' ἐκείνως λέγουσιν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ τοίχου λίθος καὶ πλίνθος, (334b.) ἑκάτερον ἐξ ἄλλου τόπου καὶ μέρους. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ποιοῦσι μίαν αὐτῶν ὕλην ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν, πῶς ἔσται τι ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, οἷον ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ ἢ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς. Εἰ ἐστιν ἡ σὰρξ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν καὶ μηδέτερον ἐκείνων, μηδ' αὖ σύνθεσις σωζομένων, τί λείπεται πλὴν τὴν ὕλην εἶναι τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνων; ἡ γὰρ θατέρου φθορὰ ἢ θάτερον ποεῖ ἢ τὴν ὕλην.
            <td>But flesh too, presumably, and marrow come-to-be out of them. How, then, do such things come-to-be? For (a) how is the manner of their coming-to-be to be conceived by those who maintain a theory like that of Empedocles? They must conceive it as composition—just as a wall comes-to-be out of bricks and stones: and the 'Mixture', of which they speak, will be composed of the 'elements', these being preserved in it unaltered but with their small particles juxtaposed each to each. That will be the manner, presumably, in which flesh and every other compound results from the 'elements'. Consequently, it follows that Fire and Water do not come-to-be 'out of any and every part of flesh'. For instance, although a sphere might come-to-be out of this part of a lump of wax and a pyramid out of some other part, it was nevertheless possible for either figure to have come-to-be out of either part indifferently: that is the manner of coming-to-be when 'both Fire and Water come-to-be out of any and every part of flesh'. Those, however, who maintain the theory in question, are not at liberty to conceive that 'both come-to-be out of flesh' in that manner, but only as a stone and a brick 'both come-to-be out of a wall'—viz. each out of a different place or part. Similarly (b) even for those who postulate a single matter of their 'elements' there is a certain difficulty in explaining how anything is to result from two of them taken together—e.g. from 'cold' and hot', or from Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and is neither of them, nor again is a 'composition' of them in which they are preserved unaltered, what alternative is left except to identify the resultant of the two 'elements' with their matter? For the passing-away of either 'element' produces either the other or the matter.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ὅταν μὲν ἁπλῶς ᾖ θάτερον ἐντελεχείᾳ, δυνάμει θάτερον ἔσται· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παντελῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς μὲν θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ὡς δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν διὰ τὸ μιγνύμενα φθείρειν τὰς ὑπεροχὰς ἀλλήλων, τότε οὔθ' ἡ ὕλη ἔσται οὔτε ἐκείνων τῶν ἐναντίων ἑκάτερον ἐντελεχείᾳ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ τοὐναντίον, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον διπλασίως θερμὸν δυνάμει ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ τριπλασίως, ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον.
            <td>Perhaps we may suggest the following solution. (i) There are differences of degree in hot and cold. Although, therefore, when either is fully real without qualification, the other will exist potentially; yet, when neither exists in the full completeness of its being, but both by combining destroy one another's excesses so that there exist instead a hot which (for a 'hot') is cold and a cold which (for a 'cold') is hot; then what results from these two contraries will be neither their matter, nor either of them existing in its full reality without qualification. There will result instead an 'intermediate': and this 'intermediate', according as it is potentially more hot than cold or vice versa, will possess a power-of-heating that is double or triple its power-of-cooling, or otherwise related thereto in some similar ratio.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔσται δὴ μιχθέντων τἆλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ἐκείνων δυνάμει πως ὄντων, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον· καὶ ἔστιν οὕτω μὲν μίξις, ἐκείνως δὲ ὕλη τὸ γινόμενον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πάσχει τἀναντία κατὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις διορισμόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ θερμὸν δυνάμει ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ψυχρὸν δυνάμει θερμόν, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ ἰσάζῃ, μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων. Καὶ πρῶτον οὕτω τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὲ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γινομένου ψυχροῦ, τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέτερον, τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιοῦσι σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τἆλλα.
            <td>Thus all the other bodies will result from the contraries, or rather from the 'elements', in so far as these have been 'combined': while the elements' will result from the contraries, in so far as these 'exist potentially' in a special sense—not as matter 'exists potentially', but in the sense explained above. And when a thing comes-to-be in this manner, the process is cobination'; whereas what comes-to-be in the other manner is matter. Moreover (ii) contraries also 'suffer action', in accordance with the disjunctively-articulated definition established in the early part of this work.' For the actually-hot is potentially-cold and the actually cold potentially-hot; so that hot and cold, unless they are equally balanced, are transformed into one another (and all the other contraries behave in a similar way). It is thus, then, that in the first place the 'elements' are transformed; and that (in the second place) out of the 'elements' there come-to-be flesh and bones and the like—the hot becoming cold and the cold becoming hot when they have been brought to the 'mean'. For at the 'mean' is neither hot nor cold. The 'mean', however, is of considerable extent and not indivisible. Similarly, it is qua reduced to a 'mean' condition that the dry and the moist, as well as the contraries we have used as examples, produce flesh and bone and the remaining compounds.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">8
            <td>8
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ μικτὰ σώματα, ὅσα περὶ τὸν τοῦ μέσου τόπον ἐστίν, ἐξ ἁπάντων σύγκειται τῶν ἁπλῶν. Γῆ μὲν γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει πᾶσι διὰ τὸ ἕκαστον εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ πλεῖστον ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ τόπῳ, ὕδωρ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεῖν μὲν ὁρίζεσθαι τὸ σύνθετον, μόνον δ' εἶναι τῶν ἁπλῶν εὐόριστον τὸ (335a.) ὕδωρ, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγροῦ μὴ δύνασθαι συμμένειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ συνέχον· εἰ γὰρ ἐξαιρεθείη τελέως ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸ ὑγρόν, διαπίπτοι ἄν. Γῆ μὲν οὖν καὶ ὕδωρ διὰ ταύτας ἐνυπάρχει τὰς αἰτίας, ἀὴρ δὲ καὶ πῦρ, ὅτι ἐναντία ἐστὶ γῇ καὶ ὕδατι· γῆ μὲν γὰρ ἀέρι, ὕδωρ δὲ πυρὶ ἐναντίον ἐστίν, ὡς ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίαν εἶναι. Ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ γενέσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσίν, ἐνυπάρχει δὲ θάτερα ἄκρα τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνάγκη καὶ θάτερον ἐνυπάρχειν, ὥστ' ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ συνθέτῳ πάντα τὰ ἁπλᾶ ἐνέσται. Μαρτυρεῖν δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ τροφὴ ἑκάστων· ἅπαντα μὲν γὰρ τρέφεται τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὧνπέρ ἐστιν, ἅπαντα δὲ πλείοσι τρέφεται. Καὶ γὰρ ἅπερ ἂν δόξειεν ἑνὶ μόνῳ τρέφεσθαι, τῷ ὕδατι τὰ φυτά, πλείοσι τρέφεται· μέμικται γὰρ τῷ ὕδατι γῆ· διὸ καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ πειρῶνται μίξαντες ἄρδειν.
            <td>All the compound bodies—all of which exist in the region belonging to the central body—are composed of all the 'simple' bodies. For they all contain Earth because every 'simple' body is to be found specially and most abundantly in its own place. And they all contain Water because (a) the compound must possess a definite outline and Water, alone of the 'simple' bodies, is readily adaptable in shape: moreover (b) Earth has no power of cohesion without the moist. On the contrary, the moist is what holds it together; for it would fall to pieces if the moist were eliminated from it completely. They contain Earth and Water, then, for the reasons we have given: and they contain Air and Fire, because these are contrary to Earth and Water (Earth being contrary to Air and Water to Fire, in so far as one Substance can be 'contrary' to another). Now all compounds presuppose in their coming-to-be constituents which are contrary to one another: and in all compounds there is contained one set of the contrasted extremes. Hence the other set must be contained in them also, so that every compound will include all the 'simple' bodies. Additional evidence seems to be furnished by the food each compound takes. For all of them are fed by substances which are the same as their constituents, and all of them are fed by more substances than one. Indeed, even the plants, though it might be thought they are fed by one substance only, viz. by Water, are fed by more than one: for Earth has been mixed with the Water. That is why farmers too endeavour to mix before watering.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν τροφὴ τῆς ὕλης, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον συνειλημμένον τῇ ὕλῃ ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, εὔλογον ἤδη τὸ μόνον τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων τρέφεσθαι τὸ πῦρ ἁπάντων ἐξ ἀλλήλων γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πρότεροι λέγουσιν· μόνον γάρ ἐστι καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ εἴδους τὸ πῦρ διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ὅρον. Ἕκαστον δὲ πέφυκεν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν φέρεσθαι· ἡ δὲ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἁπάντων ἐν τοῖς ὅροις. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα τὰ σώματα ἐξ ἁπάντων συνέστηκε τῶν ἁπλῶν, εἴρηται.
            <td>Although food is akin to the matter, that which is fed is the 'figure'—i.e. the 'form' taken along with the matter. This fact enables us to understand why, whereas all the 'simple' bodies come-to-be out of one another, Fire is the only one of them which (as our predecessors also assert) 'is fed'. For Fire alone—or more than all the rest—is akin to the 'form' because it tends by nature to be borne towards the limit. Now each of them naturally tends to be borne towards its own place; but the 'figure'—i.e. the 'form'—Of them all is at the limits. Thus we have explained that all the compound bodies are composed of all the 'simple' bodies.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="2.8" id="2.8">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de generatione elementorum, hic determinat de generatione compositorum ex elementis. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo determinat de generatione compositorum ex elementis; secundo ostendit quod ad generationem mixti omnia elementa concurrunt, ibi: omnia autem mixta corpora et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo arguit ad ostendendum quis non possit esse verus modus generationis mixtorum; secundo determinat veritatem, ibi: quapropter quoniam et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod sicut supra patuit, duplex est opinio de elementis. Quaedam est vera, scilicet quod elementa ex quibus sunt corpora constituta, habent aliquid commune quod est una materia. Similiter necesse est dicere, quod si elementa transmutantur adinvicem, necesse est quod habeant unam communem materiam: quae dicitur una ab unitate potentiae quae est in ea, et est potentia ad formam, cum semper habeat potentiam ad omnes formas elementorum; et necesse est ipsam compleri per successionem motus in omnes formas: et sic necesse est quod de una forma ad aliam transmutetur; et hanc opinionem primo ponit. Secunda opinio fuit Empedoclis, qui dixit elementa esse intransmutabilia, et hanc innuit ibi: quicumque enim et cetera. Et dividitur in quatuor partes. In prima ostendit, quod secundum opinionem Empedoclis non potest dari verus modus generationis mixtorum, dicens quod quidam sunt qui dicunt elementa non adinvicem generari; illi etiam non dicunt quod unumquodque elementum fiat ex qualibet parte corporis mixti, sed dicunt quod elementa fiunt ex corpore, sicut lapides et lateres ex pariete. Sed hoc est inconveniens: non enim possunt dicere quomodo ex elementis sic compositis, non vere mixtis, sint carnes et ossa et unumquodque aliorum corporum mixtorum; si enim componantur et congregentur elementa in unum remanentibus formis et operibus suis, sic ignis in una parte compositi erit adurens et aqua fluens, terra incontinua, aer exspirans; similiter ignis non ligatus evolabit sursum, terra autem descendet deorsum, et sic nunquam constabit ut faciat ossa et carnes et huiusmodi.
    <p>Secundo ibi: habet autem quod dicitur quaestionem etc., ostendit quod etiam secundum primam opinionem est dubium, quomodo ex elementis generentur composita, dicens quod licet prima opinio sit vera, quae dicit elementa in alterutrum transmutari, tamen secundum ipsam est dubium quomodo ex elementis potest generari aliquid praeter ipsa. Elementa enim adinvicem generantur, sicut aqua ex igne, et ex aqua ignis, et similiter est de aliis: et hoc ideo, quia habent unum commune subiectum ut dictum est; sed etiam ex eis generatur caro et medulla, et alia mixta corpora: sed quomodo fiat horum generatio, adhuc est dubium.
    <p>Tertio ibi: illis quidem enim etc., redit iterum super secundam quaestionem, ut melius ostendat quomodo ex ipsa non potest dari verus modus generationis, dicens quod illi qui dicunt sicut Empedocles dicit, non possunt assignare modum quomodo corpora mixta componantur ex elementis. Necesse est enim secundum eos quod compositio elementorum sit quaedam mixtura talis, qualis est mixtura lapidis in pariete. Dicunt enim quod elementa salvantur in mixto secundum formas substantiales et actus suos, et talis compositio est secundum partes minimas; quod est inconveniens quia quod uni est mixtum, puta male videnti qui non discernit inter partem et partem, alteri, scilicet bene videnti, non esset mixtum: et sic idem esset mixtum et non mixtum. Adhuc etiam sequitur aliud inconveniens; quia secundum istos non ex quacumque parte carnis generabitur quodlibet elementum, sed ex una parte unum et ex alia parte aliud, sicut si ex una parte cerae fiat sphaera, ex alia parte fiat figura pyramidalis. Hoc autem patet esse falsum per ea quae dicta sunt supra, capitulo de mixtione. Sed sicut in unaquaque parte cerae potest quaelibet figura formari, ita ex qualibet parte mixti per resolutionem potest quodlibet elementum generari. Haec ergo ambo elementa, scilicet ignis et terra, et etiam alia, generantur ex qualibet carne, idest ex qualibet parte carnis. Sed illi qui dicunt sicut Empedocles, scilicet elementa esse intransmutabilia, non possunt hoc dicere; sed sicut ex diversis partibus et locis ipsius parietis tolluntur diversi lapides, ita ex diversis partibus et locis ipsius mixti diversa elementa oportet eos dicere generari, ita quod ignis ab uno loco et parte, et aer ex alia.
    <p>Quarto ibi: similiter autem et facientibus etc., opponit contra primam opinionem, dicens quod etiam ponentibus elementa habere unam materiam et esse transmutabilia sequuntur inconvenientia, si dicatur aliquid generari ex elementis. Habet enim quaestionem et dubium, quomodo generabitur aliquid ex ambobus, sicut ex calido et frigido, aut igne et aqua. Si enim caro est ex ambobus, et neutrum eorum est ipsa caro, nec etiam salvantur ipsa elementa, quia aliter non esset mixtio, nihil relinquitur nisi materia: quod est impossibile. Si autem remaneat alterum, et alterum corrumpatur, tunc est corruptio unius et generatio alterius: quia corrupto uno, aut generatur alterum, aut remanet pura materia. Quomodo ergo fiat ex eis generatio dubium est.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quapropter quoniam etc., determinat veritatem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit modum generationis in universali; secundo magis in speciali, contrahendo ipsum ad mixtionem elementorum in constitutione compositi, ibi: quoniam autem patiuntur et cetera. Primo ergo, relicta secunda opinione tanquam falsa et impossibili, et supposita prima, ponit verum modum generationis corporum mixtorum. Ad cuius evidentiam praemittit duo. Quorum primum est quod differentiae elementorum sunt contrariae, scilicet calidum et frigidum, et huiusmodi, et suscipiunt magis et minus. Secundum est quod, quando alterum elementum fuerit simpliciter actu, et alterum simpliciter in potentia fuerit, tunc non potest esse mixtio; quando vero unum non est omnino actu, nec per excessum praedominatur alteri elemento, tunc generabitur quoddam medium, quod nec est simpliciter calidum, nec simpliciter frigidum, sed quodammodo naturam participans utriusque. Et hoc ideo, quia quando elementa miscentur, intentiones sive formae corrumpuntur et remanent in virtute: et tunc illud medium generatum non est sic in potentia sicut materia, nec simpliciter alterum elementorum, sed medium inter ea. Quod quidem medium diversificatur secundum quod diversificantur virtutes miscibilium. Si enim potentia ignis excedat virtutem aquae, medium generatum est magis calidum quam frigidum, et sic secundum proportionem virtutis unius elementi ad virtutem alterius: ut si in duplo sive in triplo excedit caliditas frigiditatem, et medium dupliciter est calidius et tripliciter. Secundum ergo hunc modum erunt mixta ex contrariis elementis et per compositionem vel mixtionem, et elementa erunt ex illis mixtis per resolutionem: ipsa enim mixta sunt potentia quatuor elementa, non quidem sicut materia, sed sicut dictum est.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem patiuntur etc., contrahit modum qui dictus est universaliter, ad propositum, dicens quod quia omnia contraria patiuntur adinvicem, sicut dictum est prius in capitulo de actione, quia quod est actu calidum, est potentia frigidum, et e converso: si ipsa elementa non adaequantur potentiis suis, sed unum omnino alteri praedominatur, tunc transmutantur adinvicem, et non fit mixtio, sed corruptio debilioris et generatio sive augmentum praedominantis. Et quod dictum est de calido et frigido, intelligendum est similiter in aliis contrariis, scilicet sicco et humido. Sed elementa prius se invicem transmutantur in generatione, postea vero, adaequatis potentiis eorum secundum quandam proportionem, generatur quoddam medium, sicut carnes et ossa et huiusmodi talia, calido quidem secundum aliquid infrigidato, et frigido secundum aliquid calefacto: quia in mixto materia uniuscuiusque contrarii partem capit alterius quando veniunt ad medium: medium enim est contrarii. Medium autem illud non est unius proportionis tantum, scilicet quod semper sit per aequalem contrariorum participationem, neque est indivisibile, idest non est uno modo tantum, sed diversis modis secundum diversitatem proportionis contrariorum: et sic est medium inter calidum et frigidum secundum multiplicem proportionem ipsorum. Ita etiam intelligendum inter humidum et siccum, quae secundum mediorum diversitatem quandam in alia proportione convenientia faciunt carnem, et in alia proportione faciunt os, et in alia faciunt alia, quorum complexiones variantur; sicut est homo, cuius complexio maxime vicina est temperamento, et leo qui est calidae complexionis, et asinus qui est frigidae complexionis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: omnia autem mixta corpora etc., ostendit quod in quolibet mixto sunt omnia elementa. Et primo per causam; secundo per effectum, ibi: testificari autem videtur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quod in quolibet mixto est terra et aqua; secundo quod ignis et aer, ibi: aer autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod omnia corpora mixta, quaecumque sunt circa medium quod est terra, necessario sunt composita ex omnibus simplicibus corporibus, quae sunt quatuor elementa. Et quod in omni corpore mixto sit terra, sic ostendit. Locus et locatum secundum Commentatorem aut sunt eiusdem naturae, aut praedominatur natura loci in locato; sed omnia mixta naturaliter quiescunt in terra sicut in loco; ergo oportet quod in quolibet mixto sit terra, et non solum quod sit, sed ut praedominetur in ipso. Quod autem aqua sit in quolibet mixto probat ex hoc, quia terra pura non habet continuationem, nec in ipsa aliqua figura posset consistere; partes autem cuiuslibet mixti oportet esse terminatas: sola autem aqua, ut supra dictum est, est bene terminabilis. Et ipsa terra propter naturale siccum quod est in ea, nullatenus commoratur sine humido, quod est in causa continente: unde humidum, quod est in ea, continet ipsam; si autem ex ipsa humidum totaliter auferatur, statim decidet et convertetur in pulverem. Terra ergo et aqua propter dictas causas sunt in corporibus mixtis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: aer autem et ignis etc., primo probat quod in quolibet elemento est aer et ignis, tali ratione. Terra et aqua alterantur in mixto; cum autem unumquodque miscibilium alteretur a suo contrario, oportet aerem et ignem esse in composito: nam aer contrariatur terrae, et ignis aquae. Dico autem elementum esse contrarium elemento, prout ratione qualitatum contingit substantiam esse contrariam substantiae. Quoniam igitur generationes sunt ex contrariis, et in mixtis sunt extrema contrariorum, scilicet frigidum siccum quod est terra, et frigidum humidum quod est aqua, necesse est reliqua inesse, scilicet calidum cum sicco et calidum cum humido, quae sunt ignis et aer. Quapropter in omni composito sunt omnia simplicia corpora.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: testificari autem videtur etc., probat idem per effectum. Et dividitur in partem principalem et incidentalem; pars incidentalis incipit ibi: quoniam autem est nutrimentum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod omnia mixta componantur ex quatuor elementis, <i>testificari</i> et approbare videtur nutrimentum uniuscuiusque. Nam unumquodque nutritur ex eis ex quibus est; sed omnia quidem nutriuntur ex multis elementis; ergo ex eisdem quatuor elementis omnia mixta consistunt. Maioris propositionis ratio potest esse, quia nutrimentum transmutatur in naturam nutriti: non autem posset transmutari nisi haberet eandem materiam. Minorem vero probat sumendo argumentum a minori. Minus enim videtur quod plantae quae sunt magis terrestres, nutriantur ex pluribus, quam alia nutrita; sed istae licet videantur solum nutriri ex aqua, nutriuntur tamen ex omnibus; ergo multo magis alia. Quod autem plantae nutriantur ex omnibus ex hoc videtur. Manifestum est enim, quod nutriuntur ex terra et aqua, ex agricultura: rustici enim colentes plantas miscent terram cum aqua ad nutrimentum plantarum; si autem inest terra et aqua, necesse est esse alia duo extrema, scilicet aerem et ignem, eadem ratione qua supra.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem est nutrimentum etc., ostendit incidenter quod inter simplicia corpora solus ignis nutritur (non tamen proprie, quia sola vegetabilia proprie nutriuntur), dicens quod quia nutrimentum est sicut materiale respectu nutriti, quia in suam naturam convertitur, ut dictum est in capitulo de augmento, ipsum autem nutribile est sicut forma et species coniuncta materiae, rationabile est ut solus ignis inter simplicia corpora nutriatur, eo quod inter omnia elementa quae adinvicem generantur, ignis est magis formalis. Quod patet ex hoc quod ipse naturaliter fertur sursum ad <i>terminum</i>, idest ad circumferentiam orbis, qui maxime formalis est inter omnia corpora. Unumquodque enim natum est ferri ad sui ipsius generationem, quae est connaturalis ei; forma autem et species omnium rerum inferiorum, praeter hominem, est in terminis omnium: quia superiora ad inferiora se habent, sicut forma ad materiam; cum ergo ignis tangat orbem lunae, constat quod ipse sit connaturalis orbi in formalitate. Ultimo recapitulat, et est planum.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="2.8" id="2.8"></a> <b><a name="2.9" id="2.9">Lectio 9</a></b> <a name="2.9" id="2.9"></a>
    <blockquote>
      <table cellpadding="12">
        <tbody>
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">9
            <td>9
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτά, καὶ ἡ γένεσις τυγχάνει οὖσα ἐν τῷ περὶ τὸ μέσον τόπῳ, λεκτέον περὶ πάσης γενέσεως ὁμοίως πόσαι τε καὶ τίνες αὐτῆς ἀρχαί· ῥᾷον γὰρ οὕτω τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον θεωρήσομεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν καθόλου λάβωμεν πρῶτον. Εἰσὶν οὖν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἴσαι καὶ τῷ γένει αἱ αὐταὶ αἵπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀιδίοις τε καὶ πρώτοις· ἡ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ὕλη, ἡ δ' ὡς μορφή. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν τρίτην ἔτι προσυπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἱκαναὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαι αἱ δύο, καθάπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις. Ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλη τοῖς γενητοῖς ἐστιν αἴτιον τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν, οἷον τὰ ἀίδια, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἔστιν. Τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατον (335b.) εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἄλλως ἔχειν. Ἔνια δὲ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι δυνατά, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτόν· ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι τοῦτο, ποτὲ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὥστ' ἀνάγκη γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν περὶ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Διὸ καὶ ὡς μὲν ὕλη τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αἴτιον τοῖς γενητοῖς, ὡς δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας.
            <td>Since some things are such as to come-to-be and pass-away, and since coming-to-be in fact occurs in the region about the centre, we must explain the number and the nature of the 'originative sources' of all coming-to-be alike: for a grasp of the true theory of any universal facilitates the understanding of its specific forms. The 'originative sources', then, of the things which come-to-be are equal in number to, and identical in kind with, those in the sphere of the eternal and primary things. For there is one in the sense of 'matter', and a second in the sense of 'form': and, in addition, the third 'originative source' must be present as well. For the two first are not sufficient to bring things into being, any more than they are adequate to account for the primary things. Now cause, in the sense of material origin, for the things which are such as to come-to-be is 'that which can be-and-not-be': and this is identical with 'that which can come-to-be-and-pass-away', since the latter, while it is at one time, at another time is not. (For whereas some things are of necessity, viz. the eternal things, others of necessity are not. And of these two sets of things, since they cannot diverge from the necessity of their nature, it is impossible for the first not to he and impossible for the second to he. Other things, however, can both be and not he.) Hence coming-to-be and passing-away must occur within the field of 'that which can be-and not-be'. This, therefore, is cause in the sense of material origin for the things which are such as to come-to-be; while cause, in the sense of their 'end', is their 'figure' or 'form'—and that is the formula expressing the essential nature of each of them.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Δεῖ δὲ προσεῖναι καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἣν ἅπαντες μὲν ὀνειρώττουσι, λέγει δ' οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἱκανὴν ᾠήθησαν αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἴδη τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἕκαστον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, γίνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μετάληψιν καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποβολήν, ὥστ' εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, τὰ εἴδη οἴεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἴτια εἶναι καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Οἱ δ' αὐτὴν τὴν ὕλην· ἀπὸ ταύτης γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν. Οὐδέτεροι δὲ λέγουσι καλῶς.
            <td>But the third 'originative source' must be present as well—the cause vaguely dreamed of by all our predecessors, definitely stated by none of them. On the contrary (a) some amongst them thought the nature of 'the Forms' was adequate to account for coming-to-be. Thus Socrates in the Phaedo first blames everybody else for having given no explanation; and then lays it down; that 'some things are Forms, others Participants in the Forms', and that 'while a thing is said to "be" in virtue of the Form, it is said to "come-to-be" qua sharing in," to "pass-away" qua "losing," the 'Form'. Hence he thinks that 'assuming the truth of these theses, the Forms must be causes both of coming-to-be and of passing-away'. On the other hand (b) there were others who thought 'the matter' was adequate by itself to account for coming-to-be, since 'the movement originates from the matter'. Neither of these theories, however, is sound.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτια τὰ εἴδη, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ γεννᾷ συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δ' οὔ, ὄντων καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀεὶ καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν; ἔτι δ' ἐπ' ἐνίων θεωροῦμεν ἄλλο τὸ αἴτιον ὄν· ὑγίειαν γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἐπιστήμην ὁ ἐπιστήμων, οὔσης καὶ ὑγιείας αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ δύναμιν πραττομένων. Εἰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην τις φήσειε γεννᾶν διὰ τὴν κίνησιν, φυσικώτερον μὲν ἂν λέγοι τῶν οὕτω λεγόντων· τὸ γὰρ ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ τὸ μετασχηματίζον αἰτιώτερόν τε τοῦ γεννᾶν, καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν εἰώθαμεν τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς φύσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὃ ἂν ᾖ κινητικόν.
            <td>For (a) if the Forms are causes, why is their generating activity intermittent instead of perpetual and continuous—since there always are Participants as well as Forms? Besides, in some instances we see that the cause is other than the Form. For it is the doctor who implants health and the man of science who implants science, although 'Health itself' and 'Science itself' are as well as the Participants: and the same principle applies to everything else that is produced in accordance with an art. On the other hand (b) to say that 'matter generates owing to its movement' would be, no doubt, more scientific than to make such statements as are made by the thinkers we have been criticizing. For what 'alters' and transfigures plays a greater part in bringing, things into being; and we are everywhere accustomed, in the products of nature and of art alike, to look upon that which can initiate movement as the producing cause.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ὕλης τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τέχνῃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει γινομένων· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὸ ὕδωρ ζῷον ἐξ αὑτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον κλίνην, ἀλλ' ἡ τέχνη. Ὥστε καὶ οὗτοι διὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς, καὶ ὅτι παραλείπουσι τὴν κυριωτέραν αἰτίαν· ἐξαιροῦσι γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὴν μορφήν.
            <td>Nevertheless this second theory is not right either. For, to begin with, it is characteristic of matter to suffer action, i.e. to be moved: but to move, i.e. to act, belongs to a different 'power'. This is obvious both in the things that come-to-be by art and in those that come-to-be by nature. Water does not of itself produce out of itself an animal: and it is the art, not the wood, that makes a bed. Nor is this their only error. They make a second mistake in omitting the more controlling cause: for they eliminate the essential nature, i.e. the 'form'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">(336a.) Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδιδόασι τοῖς σώμασι, δι' ἃς γεννῶσι, λίαν ὀργανικῶς, ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰτίαν. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφυκεν, ὥς φασι, τὸ μὲν θερμὸν διακρίνειν τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν συνιστάναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκ τούτων λέγουσι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα τἆλλα γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι· φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ κινούμενον καὶ πάσχον. Ἔτι δὲ παραπλήσιον ποιοῦσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις τῷ πρίονι καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀργάνων ἀπονέμοι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πρίονος ὄντος διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ξέοντος λεαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Ὥστ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ πῶς κινεῖ οὐχ ὁρῶσιν, ὅτι χεῖρον ἢ τὰ ὄργανα.
            <td>And what is more, since they remove the formal cause, they invest the forces they assign to the 'simple' bodies—the forces which enable these bodies to bring things into being—with too instrumental a character. For 'since' (as they say) 'it is the nature of the hot to dissociate, of the cold to bring together, and of each remaining contrary either to act or to suffer action', it is out of such materials and by their agency (so they maintain) that everything else comes-to-be and passes-away. Yet (a) it is evident that even Fire is itself moved, i.e. suffers action. Moreover (b) their procedure is virtually the same as if one were to treat the saw (and the various instruments of carpentry) as 'the cause' of the things that come-to-be: for the wood must be divided if a man saws, must become smooth if he planes, and so on with the remaining tools. Hence, however true it may be that Fire is active, i.e. sets things moving, there is a further point they fail to observe—viz. that Fire is inferior to the tools or instruments in the manner in which it sets things moving.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="2.9" id="2.9">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de generatione et corruptione tam simplicium quam compositorum ex simplicibus, hic determinat de causis, sive de principiis generationis et corruptionis elementorum et mixtorum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo dat intentionem; secundo prosequitur intentum, ibi: sunt enim et numero et cetera. Dicit ergo primo: cum sint quaedam generabilia et corruptibilia, et generatio et corruptio sit in eis quae sunt circa medium locum, dicendum est simpliciter et universaliter de generatione, quot et quae sint eorum principia. Facilius enim in libris particularibus inspiciemus causas principiorum generationum, quando causas universales generationis acceperimus; cursus enim ab universalibus ad particularia est maior et universalior via in natura.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sunt enim et numero aequalia etc., prosequitur intentum. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ponit opinionem suam de principiis; secundo opiniones aliorum, ibi: sed hi quidem sufficientem etc.; tertio inquirit specialiter et sufficienter de principio movente, ibi: nobis autem et cetera. Ad evidentiam eorum quae hic dicuntur notandum est, quod omnium corporum quaedam sunt principia extrinseca et quaedam intrinseca. Principia extrinseca sunt agentia, sive moventia. Et ista se habent in quodam ordine: quia quaedam sunt proxima, et quaedam remota sive prima. Et prima quidem principia sunt substantiae separatae, quarum suprema est Deus: et ista sunt eadem omnium corporalium; et propter hoc dixit philosophus quod corruptibilium et sempiternorum sunt eadem principia numero. Proxima vero non sunt eadem: quia principia corporum caelestium sunt substantiae separatae, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys., sed proxima principia corruptibilium sunt ipsa corpora caelestia, ut dicit philosophus I Meteororum, et Commentator. Intrinseca vero principia sunt materia et forma; et ista non sunt eadem numero corruptibilium et incorruptibilium, sed sunt eadem secundum analogiam: quia nec materia nec forma corrumpitur per se sed solum per accidens, ut philosophus dicit in I Physic. Et ideo dicit philosophus quod principia corruptibilium et incorruptibilium sunt eadem principia <i>genere</i>, idest analogia sive proportione. Hoc ergo praemisso procedit in proposito, dicens quod principiorum rerum generabilium et corruptibilium aliud est materia, aliud est forma. Oportet autem adesse tertium: quia sicut in sempiternis non sufficiunt duo ad motum, sed oportet adesse movens, ita nec in generabilibus sufficiunt ad generationem duo, sed oportet adesse tertium, quod est efficiens. Materia vero cum sit ens in potentia, est causa quare ista inferiora possunt esse et non esse; forma vero est causa esse tantum. Sed efficiens movet materiam, ut transmutetur de potentia ad actum. Ad declarationem autem dictorum ponit quandam divisionem, dicens quod quaedam sunt de necessitate in esse: sicut sunt aeterna, ut corpora caelestia, quae in sua substantia et in suis motibus sunt necessaria, et similiter substantiae separatae; et his opponuntur impossibilia ad esse. Quaedam vero sunt possibilia esse et non esse: et ista sunt generabilia et corruptibilia, quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt. Et ideo necessarium est quod generatio et corruptio sint circa corpora talia, quae possint esse et non esse. Illud autem ex quo talis potentia ad esse et non esse in eis est, materia dicitur. Sed causa finalis in physicis, quae est cuius gratia movens movet, est forma et species: haec enim est finis motus et intentionis naturalis agentis; et haec est ratio definitiva uniuscuiusque substantiae. Sed sicut dictum est, cum his duobus oportet esse tertium principium quod est efficiens, quod omnes antiqui somniaverunt, sed nullus de ipso aliquid veritatis dixit expresse.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed hi quidem sufficientem etc., ponit opiniones aliorum de principiis. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit eas; secundo improbat eas, ibi: neutri autem et cetera. Fuerunt autem duae opiniones. Quarum ponit primam, dicens quod quidam somniaverunt <i>naturam specierum</i>, idest ipsas species separatas quas Plato appellavit ideas, esse sufficientem causam ad hoc quod res generentur, quemadmodum Plato in Phaedone, ubi inducit Socratem ad confirmationem suae opinionis: unde dicit quod ibi Socrates increpat alios, tanquam dicentes nihil. Et supponit quod entium quaedam sunt substantiae separatae, quaedam vero participantia specierum sicut materiae, et quod unumquodque compositum dicitur esse actu secundum speciem, generari autem secundum illius speciei susceptionem, et dicitur corrumpi secundum illius speciei abiectionem. Dixit enim species rerum esse aeternas, quae sunt quasi quaedam sigilla impressa rebus generabilibus: et cum sigillatur materia, quod fit per illarum participationem, tunc res generantur, et cum eiicitur forma sigilli, manet quidem perpetua, sed destruitur individuum per eiectionem talis formae. Quapropter si ista est idearum natura, ut ipse Socrates et Plato existimant, necesse est ipsas species esse causas generationis et corruptionis: per praesentiam quidem generationis, per absentiam vero corruptionis.
    <p>Secundam opinionem ponit ibi: hi autem etc., dicens quod alii non dixerunt primum movens esse extrinsecum, sicut Plato, sed dixerunt principium transmutationis materiae esse ipsam materiam, et ipsum motum rerum esse ab hac, idest ab ipsa materia, disposita et informata qualitatibus primis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: neutri autem etc., reprobat praedictas opiniones: et primo primam; secundo secundam, ibi: si autem materiam et cetera. Primam reprobat duabus rationibus: quarum primam ponit, dicens quod neutra opinio bona est; quia species separatae non sunt causae sufficientes generationis cum materia: quia si sunt sufficientes, quare non semper continue generantur res, et non quandoque sic, et quandoque non? Non enim est maior ratio, quare in uno tempore species generentur quam in alio, cum ipsae species et <i>participantia</i>, idest materiae, quae innatae sunt suscipere illas species, semper et eodem modo se habeant. Potest autem sic ratio formari, idest: idem manens idem semper natum est facere idem; sed species vel ideae semper manent eadem et eodem modo; ergo semper deberent generare; sed hoc est falsum quod semper generent: quia quaedam quandoque sunt et quandoque non; ergo illae non sunt causae generationis et corruptionis.
    <p>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius autem in quibusdam etc., dicens quod nos videmus ad sensum in quibusdam, sicut in artificialibus, quod necessarium est esse aliquod primum movens praeter species. Medicus enim facit sanitatem, et similiter doctor facit doctrinam, cum tamen praeter illos ipsa sanitas et doctrina sint species, et anima discentis et complexio corporis sint participantia ipsarum specierum; et similiter est in aliis secundum <i>potentiam</i>, idest secundum artem operantis (dicuntur enim artes et scientiae potentiae, ut dicitur IX Metaphys., quia per artem homo operatur, et per scientiam considerat). Cum ergo ars imitetur naturam, et in arte inveniamus hanc tertiam causam: ergo in natura est tertia causa, scilicet movens, praeter materiam et formam.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: si autem materiam etc., reprobat secundam opinionem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo comparat eam primae opinioni; secundo destruit eam, ibi: sed tamen nec hi et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, si aliquis dicat quod materia praedicto modo disposita, generet propter motum quem ipsa movet, magis dicit secundum naturam, quam illi qui dicunt speciem separatam generare. Quia id quod alterat et transformat, magis est causa generationis in physicis: materia autem, secundum quod dicunt, sic informata ut dictum est, alterat et transformat; et nos etiam consueti sumus dicere in artibus et in natura, quod hoc est efficiens quodcumque est transmutans et alterans.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen nec hi etc., reprobat istam opinionem per tres rationes; quarum prima talis est. Causa materialis cum efficiente nunquam incidunt in idem numero; sed materiae est pati et moveri: facere autem et movere est alterius potentiae, quia potentiae activae, quae est in agente; sequitur ergo quod materia non potest esse movens vel efficiens: alias enim potentia activa et passiva essent idem. Et hoc manifestat in naturalibus et artificialibus. Et primo in naturalibus; aqua enim, quae secundum quod dicit Thales est materia omnium, ut habetur I Metaphys., non facit ex seipsa animal, nec aliquid aliud. Similiter nec lignum quod est materia lecti aut scamni, sed artifex per artem quam habet in mente. Ex his ergo patet quod isti non recte dixerunt.
    <p>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et quoniam etc., dicens quod tales non recte dicunt; quod patet et alia ratione: quia scilicet derelinquunt principalem causam: auferunt enim formam et quod quid est uniuscuiusque rei. Et hoc patet per supra dicta: quia dictum est quod ipsi auferunt causam moventem; qua sublata (cum materia quae est in potentia, non possit se movere ad actum) necessario aufertur etiam forma.
    <p>Sed adhuc manifestat hoc idem per aliud quod ipsi dicunt, ibi: amplius autem etc., dicens quod isti attribuunt corporali materiae potentias passivarum qualitatum, et per illas potentias valde <i>organice</i>, idest tanquam per organa et instrumenta, dicunt quod materia generat, aliam auferentes causam quae est secundum speciem, idest secundum causam formalem, per quam unumquodque collocatur in specie, ut dicitur II Physic. Dicunt enim quod calidum quod est in materia, innatum est segregare, frigidum autem natum est congregare: segregat enim calidum et dissolvit, frigidum autem congregat et inspissat, miscet et confundit. Et quia res omnes constituuntur mixtura quadam et distinctione, ideo dicebant quod ex his duobus omnia alia agunt et patiuntur, et omnia ex eis generantur et corrumpuntur: intantum etiam quod ignis, qui est formalissimus et maxime activus, aliquando motus a frigido hoc modo instrumentaliter patitur; et non dixerunt aliquam causam efficientem vel formalem.
    <p>Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: amplius vero simile etc.; quae talis est. Dictum est quod materia generat per potentias passivarum qualitatum tanquam per organa, sive instrumenta; sed hoc dicere idem est ac si diceretur, quod serra et unumquodque instrumentorum sit causa eorum quae generantur. Cum ergo hoc sit falsum: quia semper oportet lignum dividi aliquo movente serram ad secandum, et lignum coaequari aliquo homine incidente et movente dolabram, et similiter est in aliis instrumentis; falsum est quod materia mediantibus principiis talium qualitatum se moveat ad generationem. Et ideo oportet quod aliquid moveat et dirigat qualitates elementares ad species elementorum producendas. Et hoc est motus caeli, ut infra patebit. Quocirca et si ignis maxime aliquid faciat et moveat, tamen isti non vident quomodo moveat: quia multo deterius movet quam organum; quia sicut dictum est, organum dirigitur ab artifice ad actum talem vel talem, qui inducit formam operis artis, sed ignis corrumpit complexiones: et hoc est multo peius quam actio organi, ordinata ab eo quod movet organum.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="2.9" id="2.9"></a> <b><a name="2.10" id="2.10">Lectio 10</a></b> <a name="2.10" id="2.10"></a>
    <blockquote>
      <table cellpadding="12">
        <tbody>
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">10
            <td>10
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἡμῖν δὲ καθόλου τε πρότερον εἴρηται περὶ τῶν αἰτίων, καὶ νῦν διώρισται περί τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς.
            <td>As to our own theory—we have given a general account of the causes in an earlier work,' we have now explained and distinguished the 'matter' and the 'form'.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν φορὰν κίνησις δέδεικται ὅτι ἀίδιος, ἀνάγκη τούτων ὄντων καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι συνεχῶς· ἡ γὰρ φορὰ ποιήσει τὴν γένεσιν ἐνδελεχῶς διὰ τὸ προσάγειν καὶ ἀπάγειν τὸ γεννητικόν. Ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ πρότερον καλῶς εἴρηται, τὸ πρώτην τῶν μεταβολῶν τὴν φορὰν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν γένεσιν εἰπεῖν· πολὺ γὰρ εὐλογώτερον τὸ ὂν τῷ μὴ ὄντι γενέσεως αἴτιον εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι. Τὸ μὲν οὖν φερόμενον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν· διὸ καὶ ἡ φορὰ προτέρα τῆς γενέσεως. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται καὶ δέδεικται συνεχὴς οὖσα τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, φαμὲν δ' αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν φορὰν τοῦ γίνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι μιᾶς μὲν οὔσης τῆς φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι ἄμφω διὰ τὸ ἐναντία εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πέφυκε ποιεῖν. Ὥστε ἤτοι γένεσις ἀεὶ ἔσται ἢ φθορά. Δεῖ &lt;�δὴ&gt; πλείους εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις καὶ ἐναντίας, ἢ τῇ φορᾷ ἢ τῇ ἀνωμαλίᾳ· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία αἴτια· διὸ καὶ οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φορὰ αἰτία ἐστὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλον· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεχές ἐστι καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι δύο κινήσεις· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἴ γε ἀεὶ ἔσται συνεχὴς γένεσις καὶ (336b.) φθορά, ἀεὶ μέν τι κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιλείπωσιν αὗται αἱ μεταβολαί, δύο δ', ὅπως μὴ θάτερον συμβαίνῃ μόνον.
            <td>Further, since the change which is motion has been proved' to be eternal, the continuity of the occurrence of coming-to-be follows necessarily from what we have established: for the eternal motion, by causing 'the generator' to approach and retire, will produce coming-to-be uninterruptedly. At the same time it is clear that we were right when, in an earlier work,' we called motion (not coming-to-be) 'the primary form of change'. For it is far more reasonable that what is should cause the coming-to-be of what is not, than that what is not should cause the being of what is. Now that which is being moved is, but that which is coming-to-be is not: hence, also, motion is prior to coming-to-be. We have assumed, and have proved, that coming-to-be and passing-away happen to things continuously; and we assert that motion causes coming-to-be. That being so, it is evident that, if the motion be single, both processes cannot occur since they are contrary to one another: for it is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition, always produces the same effect, so that, from a single motion, either coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. The movements must, on the contrary, be more than one, and they must be contrasted with one another either by the sense of their motion or by its irregularity: for contrary effects demand contraries as their causes. This explains why it is not the primary motion that causes coming-to-be and passing-away, but the motion along the inclined circle: for this motion not only possesses the necessary continuity, but includes a duality of movements as well. For if coming-to-be and passing-away are always to be continuous, there must be some body always being moved (in order that these changes may not fail) and moved with a duality of movements (in order that both changes, not one only, may result).
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τῆς μὲν οὖν συνεχείας ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φορὰ αἰτία, τοῦ δὲ προσιέναι καὶ ἀπιέναι ἡ ἔγκλισις· συμβαίνει γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν πόρρω γίνεσθαι ὁτὲ δ' ἐγγύς. Ἀνίσου δὲ τοῦ διαστήματος ὄντος ἀνώμαλος ἔσται ἡ κίνησις· ὥστ' εἰ τῷ προσιέναι καὶ ἐγγὺς εἶναι γεννᾷ, τῷ ἀπιέναι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ πόρρω γίνεσθαι φθείρει, καὶ εἰ τῷ πολλάκις προσελθεῖν γεννᾷ, καὶ τῷ πολλάκις ἀπελθεῖν φθείρει· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία αἴτια. Καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν. Διὸ καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ οἱ βίοι ἑκάστων ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσι καὶ τούτῳ διορίζονται· πάντων γάρ ἐστι τάξις, καὶ πᾶς βίος καὶ χρόνος μετρεῖται περιόδῳ, πλὴν οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ πάντες, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐλάττονι οἱ δὲ πλείονι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐνιαυτός, τοῖς δὲ μείζων, τοῖς δὲ ἐλάττων ἡ περίοδός ἐστι τὸ μέτρον.
            <td>Now the continuity of this movement is caused by the motion of the whole: but the approaching and retreating of the moving body are caused by the inclination. For the consequence of the inclination is that the body becomes alternately remote and near; and since its distance is thus unequal, its movement will be irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching and by its proximity, it—this very same body—destroys by retreating and becoming remote: and if it generates by many successive approaches, it also destroys by many successive retirements. For contrary effects demand contraries as their causes; and the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy equal periods of time. Hence, too, the times—i.e. the lives—of the several kinds of living things have a number by which they are distinguished: for there is an Order controlling all things, and every time (i.e. every life) is measured by a period. Not all of them, however, are measured by the same period, but some by a smaller and others by a greater one: for to some of them the period, which is their measure, is a year, while to some it is longer and to others shorter.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν λόγοις· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι προσιόντος μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἀπιόντος δὲ φθίσις, καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἑκάτερον· ἴσος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ τῆς γενέσεως τῆς κατὰ φύσιν.
            <td>And there are facts of observation in manifest agreement with our theories. Thus we see that coming-to-be occurs as the sun approaches and decay as it retreats; and we see that the two processes occupy equal times. For the durations of the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be are equal.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ἐλάττονι φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα σύγκρασιν· ἀνωμάλου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς ὕλης καὶ οὐ πανταχοῦ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀνωμάλους εἶναι καὶ τὰς μὲν θάττους τὰς δὲ βραδυτέρας, ὥστε συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν τούτων γένεσιν ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι φθοράν.
            <td>Nevertheless it often happens that things pass-away in too short a time. This is due to the 'intermingling' by which the things that come-to-be and pass-away are implicated with one another. For their matter is 'irregular', i.e. is not everywhere the same: hence the processes by which they come-to-be must be 'irregular' too, i.e. some too quick and others too slow. Consequently the phenomenon in question occurs, because the 'irregular' coming-to-be of these things is the passing-away of other things.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀεὶ δ', ὥσπερ εἴρηται, συνεχὴς ἔσται ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορά, καὶ οὐδέποτε ὑπολείψει δι' ἣν εἴπομεν αἰτίαν. Τοῦτο δ' εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὀρέγεσθαί φαμεν τὴν φύσιν, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναι (τὸ δ' εἶναι ποσαχῶς λέγομεν ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται), τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον ἐν ἅπασιν ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ πόρρω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι, τῷ λειπομένῳ τρόπῳ συνεπλήρωσε τὸ ὅλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχῆ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα συνείροιτο τὸ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐγγύτατα εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας τὸ γίνεσθαι ἀεὶ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν. Τούτου δ' αἴτιον, ὥσπερ (337a.) εἴρηται πολλάκις, ἡ κύκλῳ φορά· μόνη γὰρ συνεχής. Διὸ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, οἷον τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα, μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ φοράν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ γένηται καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος πῦρ καὶ πάλιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ, κύκλῳ φαμὲν περιεληλυθέναι τὴν γένεσιν διὰ τὸ πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν. Ὥστε καὶ ἡ εὐθεῖα φορὰ μιμουμένη τὴν κύκλῳ συνεχής ἐστιν.
            <td>Coming-to-be and passing-away will, as we have said, always be continuous, and will never fail owing to the cause we stated. And this continuity has a sufficient reason on our theory. For in all things, as we affirm, Nature always strives after 'the better'. Now 'being' (we have explained elsewhere the exact variety of meanings we recognize in this term) is better than 'not-being': but not all things can possess 'being', since they are too far removed from the 'originative source. 'God therefore adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, because that 'coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually' is the closest approximation to eternal being. The cause of this perpetuity of coming-to-be, as we have often said, is circular motion: for that is the only motion which is continuous. That, too, is why all the other things—the things, I mean, which are reciprocally transformed in virtue of their 'passions' and their 'powers of action' e.g. the 'simple' bodies imitate circular motion. For when Water is transformed into Air, Air into Fire, and the Fire back into Water, we say the coming-to-be 'has completed the circle', because it reverts again to the beginning. Hence it is by imitating circular motion that rectilinear motion too is continuous.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅ τινες ἀποροῦσιν, διὰ τί ἑκάστου τῶν σωμάτων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν φερομένου χώραν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ οὐ διεστᾶσι τὰ σώματα. Αἴτιον γὰρ τούτου ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς ἄλληλα μετάβασις· εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἔμενεν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ χώρᾳ καὶ μὴ μετέβαλλεν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλησίον, ἤδη ἂν διεστήκεσαν.
            <td>These considerations serve at the same time to explain what is to some people a baffling problem—viz. why the 'simple' bodies, since each them is travelling towards its own place, have not become dissevered from one another in the infinite lapse of time. The reason is their reciprocal transformation. For, had each of them persisted in its own place instead of being transformed by its neighbour, they would have got dissevered long ago.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Μεταβάλλει μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν φορὰν διπλῆν οὖσαν· διὰ δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μένειν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ χώρᾳ τεταγμένῃ.
            <td>They are transformed, however, owing to the motion with its dual character: and because they are transformed, none of them is able to persist in any place allotted to it by the Order.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Διότι μὲν οὖν ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, καὶ τί τὸ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτόν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι τὸ κινοῦν εἰ κίνησις ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν ἑτέροις, καὶ εἰ ἀεί, ὅτι ἀεί τι δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ εἰ συνεχής, ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, καὶ εἰ πλείους εἶεν αἱ κύκλῳ κινήσεις, πλείους μέν, πάσας δέ πως εἶναι ταύτας ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχήν· συνεχοῦς δ' ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ἀνάγκη τὴν κίνησιν συνεχῆ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἀδύνατον χρόνον χωρὶς κινήσεως εἶναι· συνεχοῦς ἄρα τινὸς ἀριθμὸς ὁ χρόνος, τῆς κύκλῳ ἄρα, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγοις διωρίσθη. Συνεχὴς δ' ἡ κίνησις πότερον τῷ τὸ κινούμενον συνεχὲς εἶναι ἢ τῷ τὸ ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται, οἷον τὸν τόπον λέγω ἢ τὸ πάθος; δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τῷ τὸ κινούμενον· πῶς γὰρ τὸ πάθος συνεχὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ τὸ πρᾶγμα ᾧ συμβέβηκε συνεχὲς εἶναι; εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν ᾧ, μόνῳ τοῦτο τῷ τόπῳ ὑπάρχει· μέγεθος γάρ τι ἔχει, τούτου δὲ τὸ κύκλῳ μόνον συνεχές, ὥστε αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀεὶ συνεχές. Τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶν ὃ ποιεῖ συνεχῆ κίνησιν, τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα φερόμενον· ἡ δὲ κίνησις τὸν χρόνον.
            <td>It is clear from what has been said (i) that coming-to-be and passing-away actually occur, (ii) what causes them, and (iii) what subject undergoes them. But (a) if there is to be movement (as we have explained elsewhere, in an earlier work') there must be something which initiates it; if there is to be movement always, there must always be something which initiates it; if the movement is to be continuous, what initiates it must be single, unmoved, ungenerated, and incapable of 'alteration'; and if the circular movements are more than one, their initiating causes must all of them, in spite of their plurality, be in some way subordinated to a single 'originative source'. Further (b) since time is continuous, movement must be continuous, inasmuch as there can be no time without movement. Time, therefore, is a 'number' of some continuous movement—a 'number', therefore, of the circular movement, as was established in the discussions at the beginning. But (c) is movement continuous because of the continuity of that which is moved, or because that in which the movement occurs (I mean, e.g. the place or the quality) is continuous? The answer must clearly be 'because that which is moved is continuous'. (For how can the quality be continuous except in virtue of the continuity of the thing to which it belongs? But if the continuity of 'that in which' contributes to make the movement continuous, this is true only of 'the place in which'; for that has 'magnitude' in a sense.) But (d) amongst continuous bodies which are moved, only that which is moved in a circle is 'continuous' in such a way that it preserves its continuity with itself throughout the movement. The conclusion therefore is that this is what produces continuous movement, viz. the body which is being moved in a circle; and its movement makes time continuous.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="2.10" id="2.10">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de principiis generationis universaliter secundum opinionem suam, et reprobavit etiam opiniones aliorum de principio movente, hic specialiter inquirit de ipso. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo determinat de ipso; secundo circa determinata movet quasdam quaestiones, ibi: quoniam autem in continue et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo dicit quid est principium movens ad generationem; secundo probat quoddam quod supposuerat, ibi: quoniam autem necesse et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quod movens ad generationem est motus circuli caelestis, ex quo etiam probat continuitatem generationis et corruptionis; secundo ostendit idem ex parte finis, ibi: semper vero ut dictum est et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo dicit quod movens ad generationem est motus circuli caelestis; secundo ostendit quis sit ille motus, ibi: quoniam autem suppositum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit; secundo probat, ibi: simul autem manifestum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod nobis volentibus universalem causam efficientem perpetuae generationis manifestare, supponenda sunt ea quae dicta sunt universaliter de causis in II Physic., et ea quae dicta sunt de <i>allatione</i>, qui est motus circuli caelestis: demonstratum est enim in VIII Physic., quod ipsa <i>allatio</i>, idest loci mutatio, est motus perpetuus. His autem sic se habentibus, necesse est generationem continue esse: materia enim continue passibilis est, et qualitates elementorum continue agunt et patiuntur adinvicem; allatio autem ideo facit generationem, quia adducit et abducit generans, scilicet solem, qui est causa omnis generationis et corruptionis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: simul autem etc., probat quod dixit per duas rationes. Quarum primam ponit, dicens quod sicut bene dictum est in prioribus, idest in VIII Physic., <i>allatio</i>, idest loci mutatio, est prima omnium mutationum; sed illud quod est prius est causa posterioris, et non e converso; ergo.
    <p>Secundam rationem ponit ibi: multum enim rationabilius etc.; quae talis est. Multum rationabilius est quod id, quod est semper et perpetuum et perfectum in esse, sit causa non entis, quam e converso; cum igitur illud quod fertur localiter sit ens, quod autem generatur non sit, quia si esset non generaretur: ergo allatio est prius generatione, et non e converso, et per consequens est causa generationis. Hoc autem est intelligendum, quia in uno et eodem generabili prius est generatio quam loci mutatio.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem suppositum etc., ostendit quae circulatio sit causa generationis et corruptionis, quia scilicet motus circuli obliqui, qui dicitur zodiacus, et non motus primi mobilis. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo probat hoc per rationem; secundo per ea quae sunt sensui manifesta, ibi: apparent autem et cetera. Prima in duas: primo ponit rationem; secundo infert quoddam corollarium, ibi: ideoque et tempus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia suppositum est et determinatum supra in primo libro, quod generatio est continua et semper, nos etiam dicimus quod motus corporis caelestis est causa continuae generationis. Cum autem generatio et corruptio sint contraria, non contingit fieri ambo, scilicet generationem et corruptionem, si sit tantum una allatio, sive unus motus localis; quia idem manens idem et semper similiter se habens, semper natum est facere idem, et non contraria: si ergo esset tantum una loci mutatio, esset tantum generatio vel tantum corruptio. Cum ergo non sit tantum alterum, ut patet ad sensum, oportet esse multos contrarios motus altero duorum modorum: scilicet aut allatione, idest quod unus sit contrarius alteri: quod non potest esse in motu circuli, ut probatum est in I de caelo; vel inaequalitate, idest quod sit unus et idem motus, sed inaequaliter se habeat ad ipsa generabilia secundum diversas circuli partes, qui ex una circuli parte causet unum, et ex alia parte causet aliud. Contrariorum enim effectuum, cuiusmodi sunt generatio et corruptio, oportet esse contrarias causas. Cum autem motus primi orbis, qui dicitur motus diurnus, semper uniformiter se habeat super circulos aeque distantes a circulo aequinoctiali, non potest esse causa generationis et corruptionis. Sed motus circuli obliqui, qui dicitur zodiacus, est causa sufficiens utriusque, propter motum accessionis et recessionis solis in eo. In hac loci mutatione est continuitas generationis et corruptionis; ergo necesse est quod, si generatio et corruptio debeant esse perpetuae, quod aliquid semper et continue moveat, ut non deficiant mutationes istae: deficiente enim causa, necesse est et effectum deficere. Secundum autem duo duos oportet motus esse, scilicet secundum accessum et recessum, ut non contingat solum generatio aut solum corruptio. Causa ergo continuitatis est motus totius orbis. Causa vero praesentiae et absentiae est inclinatio et elevatio ipsius zodiaci: quando enim inclinatur a circulo aequinoctiali ex una parte, elevatur ex alia, et ideo contingit quod ipsum generans quandoque est prope locum generationis, et quandoque longe. Quando vero distantia generationis non fuerit aequalis, necesse est motum esse inaequalem: et ideo, sicut in adveniendo et in prope esse generat rem, ita in recedendo et in longe esse corrumpit idipsum. Et si multoties in adveniendo secundum unam medietatem circuli generat, multoties recedendo secundum aliam medietatem corrumpit: contrariorum enim contrariae sunt causae. Considerandum est autem, quod motus unius medietatis circuli non est contrarius motui alterius medietatis per se, sed secundum respectum radii ad locum generationis: quia cum recedit, respicit obliquiori radio, et tunc dominatur frigus mortificans. Ratione ergo radii dicitur esse in obliquo circulo contrarietas motus, vel ratione accessus et recessus. Ex hoc autem concludit quod tempus generationis est aequale tempori corruptionis, et e converso: quia sol ascendendo per sex signa generat, et per sex signa descendendo corrumpit.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: ideoque et tempus etc., concludit quoddam corollarium, dicens quod quia generatio et corruptio inferiorum causatur a superiori motu circuli obliqui, ideo omne tempus quod est in re temporali, et omnis vita uniuscuiusque vivi, habet numerum determinatum ex circulo caelesti. Ex ipso enim consideratur quantum se extendit virtus generantis, sicut patet ex scientia astronomica. Omnium enim inferiorum rerum ordo dependet ex ordine superiorum, et omne tempus et omnis vita periodo mensuratur (est autem periodus modulatio circuli, dicta a peri, quod est circum, et odos, modulatio). Sed tamen non omnia mensurantur eadem periodo, sed quaedam habent maiorem et quaedam minorem. Quorundam enim periodus est unus annus: sunt enim quaedam animalia quae non vivunt nisi per annum; quorundam vero minor et quorundam maior, secundum quod magis vel minus sunt susceptibilia et receptibilia virtutis sibi infusae a caelesti corpore.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: apparent autem etc., ostendit idem ad sensum, dicens quod ea quae dicta sunt, vera apparent etiam ad sensum. Videmus enim ad oculum quod sole adveniente ad punctum arietis, quando directe locum nostrum tangit, incipit esse generatio terrae nascentibus, recedente autem sole a principio librae, incipit rerum deminutio et corruptio. Et utrumque fit in aequali tempore: quia tantum est tempus generationis secundum naturam, quantum est tempus corruptionis, quia tantus est ascensus solis quantus est descensus, ut dictum est. Si autem contingat aliquando corrumpi aliquam rem in minori tempore, hoc est antequam vis generationis caelestis secundum rationem periodi recedat, hoc est per accidens: quia <i>propter confusionem adinvicem</i>, idest propter confusionem quatuor elementorum, quae sunt materia cuiuslibet generati, ut supra ostensum est: vel propter confusionem solis cum aliis planetis contrarium effectum habentibus. Prima tamen expositio magis est secundum litteram: quia enim materia inaequaliter se habet, et non receptibilis virtutis caelestis, et non eodem modo se habet in periodo, necesse est generationes et corruptiones inaequales esse; et ideo erunt quaedam citiores, et quaedam tardiores. Et idcirco accidit propter generationem aliis generari corruptionem, et e converso: quia corruptio unius est generatio alterius, et e converso. Ad evidentiam autem eorum quae hic dicuntur, duo sunt consideranda: primum est, quid appellet philosophus generans: secundum est, quid faciat periodum. Circa primum notandum est, quod cum superiora agant in ista inferiora per motum et lucem ut, ut habetur in I Meteororum, illi maxime attribuenda est virtus generandi, quod maxime lucet, et quod, lucem suam omnibus tribuens, ipsam a nullo participat. Huiusmodi autem est sol. Unde ibidem dicitur, quod licet per motum stellarum causetur calor, maxime tamen per motum illius sphaerae cui sol existit infixus; quia sicut dicitur in I Meteororum, ad causandum calorem in istis inferioribus duo requiruntur, scilicet propinquitas et velocitas mobilis, quae duo sufficienter sunt in sole, in ceteris vero stellis deficit alterum: quia in his quae sunt supra solem, licet sit sufficiens velocitas, deficit tamen propinquitas, in his vero quae sunt infra solem, licet sit propinquitas, deficit sufficiens velocitas. Verumtamen non solum sol est causa generationis sed etiam alii planetae: nisi forte pro tanto dicatur, quia solus sol lucens lumine proprio, omnes alios planetas illuminat: sicut maxime apparet in luna. Recipitur tamen lux eius diversimode in diversis, et non omnino secundum eandem virtutem quae est in sole: quia unumquodque quod est in alio, est in eo per modum recipientis, et non omnino per modum recepti. Circa vero secundum sciendum est quod non solum accessus vel recessus periodum facit: quia aliter in hieme nullum animal nasceretur, sed potius quodlibet moreretur, et nullius vita deberet extendi ultra annum: quod est manifeste falsum. Sed periodum facit relatio ascendentis signi super horizontem, ad omnia signa circuli cum suis stellis et planetis in hora generationis rei inferioris, quae causatur a circulo caelesti. Hoc enim modo mensura quorundam est annus, et quorundam plus vel minus, secundum effectus signorum, et fortitudines stellarum quae sitae sunt in signis. Et hoc modo verum est quod aequale est tempus generationis et corruptionis: quia a primo signo ascendente in hora rei computatur profectus rei usque ad septimum signum eiusdem circuli, et a signo septimo usque in primum computatur defectus. Et ideo in astrologia septimum signum vocatur domus mortis, et ascendens vocatur domus vitae. Et ideo generatio rei vocatur profectus usque ad statum: post statum usque ad declinationem et a declinatione usque ad mortem vocatur periodus corruptionis; quae aequalia sunt secundum naturam: quia a primo usque ad septimum tantum est, quantum est a septimo usque ad primum, per aliam et aliam partem circuli mensurando. Et ideo si periodus profectus hominis sunt triginta quinque vel quadraginta anni, ut dictum est a medicis, periodus defectus tantundem erit: ita quod aetas hominis erit septuaginta aut octoginta annorum. Potest tamen hoc impediri per accidens, ut per cibum malum, vel per mortem violentam, vel alio quocumque modo. Et hoc vocat Aristoteles materiae inaequalitatem: quia scilicet per accidentia multa aliter disponitur quam moveatur a circulo. Et ideo diversimode moriuntur homines citius et tardius quam per naturam mortales sint; et similiter alia animalia. Et hoc modo aetates sunt omnium rerum: quia planetae in circulo periodali positi quando sunt fortiores, dant plures annos vitae, et quando sunt debiliores, dant pauciores. Hoc etiam modo innotescit, quod qui sciret virtutes signorum et stellarum in ipsis positarum dum nascitur res aliqua, cognosceret quantum est de influentia caelesti, et posset pronosticari de tota vita rei generatae; licet hoc necessitatem non poneret, ut dictum est, quia potest impediri per accidens.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: semper vero ut dictum est etc., ponit continuitatem generationis ex parte finis: et hoc primo; secundo ex determinatis solvit quandam quaestionem antiquorum, ibi: simul autem manifestum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod generatio et corruptio semper erunt, ut dictum est, solum per continuum motum, qui est causa efficiens continuitatis eius ut diximus; sed hoc rationabiliter contingit etiam ratione finis. Natura enim semper desiderat quod melius est; melius autem est esse quam non esse; cum ergo naturale desiderium non possit esse frustra, oportet quod res naturales habeant semper esse. Hoc autem est esse divinum: quod impossibile est existere in omnibus, quia quaedam sunt quae longe distant a primo principio, sicut sunt res materiales generabiles et corruptibiles, et ista sunt quae modicum participant de esse divino; et ideo alio modo complevit Deus materiae desiderium, perpetuando scilicet eius esse per continuam generationem. Hoc enim modo continuatur esse, quia scilicet contingit semper fieri generationem <i>proxime</i> substantiae, scilicet semper contingit generari substantiam eiusdem speciei cum generante. Non enim generans generat sibi idem numero, sed idem specie, ut infra dicetur. Sic igitur continua est generatio ratione finis. Quae autem sit causa efficiens dictum est multoties: quia motus circularis caelestis corporis: iste enim est solus continuus et perpetuus, ut probatum est in VIII Physic. Ideo autem alia quae adinvicem transmutantur per passiones et potentias suas, cuiusmodi sunt simplicia corpora quatuor elementorum, sequuntur quodammodo circularem motum, dum adinvicem circulariter transmutantur. Quando enim ex aqua generatur aer, et ex aere ignis, et iterum ex igne aqua, tunc dicimus quod sit generatio circularis; et ideo <i>recta allatio</i>, idest motus rectus, qui est in elementis, consequens eam quae est in circuitu, est continua: quia sole recedente convertuntur elementa superiora in inferiora, accedente vero convertuntur inferiora in superiora, et sic faciunt circuitum perpetuum secundum naturam.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: simul autem manifestum etc., ex determinatis solvit quandam quaestionem, dicens quod his determinatis simul manifestum est quod quidam quaerunt, scilicet quare elementa iam infinito tempore transacto non distant abinvicem, separata et ordinata in propriis locis, cum unumquodque moveatur ad suam regionem. Causa enim huius est mutua transmutatio eorum, quia unumquodque mutatur in quodlibet, ut supra ostensum est: si enim unumquodque maneret in sua propria regione, et non transmutaretur ab alio elemento quod est iuxta ipsum, iam diu destitissent abinvicem, vel etiam defecissent ab actione et passione; sed sicut dictum est, transmutantur adinvicem secundum generationem et corruptionem propter motum continuum obliqui circuli, qui diversificatur nobis per accessum et recessum. Quia autem sic adinvicem transmutantur, nullum eorum manet ordinate in suo loco, sed quantum unum accipit de natura propinqui, tantum etiam accipit de loco eius et permiscetur ei. Unde terra et aqua vaporantia tendunt ad locum aeris, et permiscentur cum eo; et similiter quando ignis et aer frigore inspissantur, vadunt ad locum terrae et aquae, et permiscentur cum eis. Et ideo elementa non sunt ubique pura, sed in partibus in quibus se contingunt, sunt permixta. Quod autem dictum est de transmutatione elementorum, intelligendum est secundum partem, et non totum: aliter enim destrueretur mundus. Ultimo epilogat quae dicta sunt, et est planum in littera.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem necesse est esse aliquid movens etc., probat quoddam quod supposuerat. Dixerat enim supra quod continuitas generationis est ex continuitate motus: sed quia in isto libro non probaverat motum esse continuum et sempiternum, ideo primo ostendit motus continuitatem; secundo dicit unde talis motus continuitatem habeat, ibi: continuus autem motus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut dictum est in VIII Physic. et in XII Metaphys., quod si est motus, oportet quod sit movens, et si semper est motus, oportet semper esse movens, et si semper et continue movens movet, oportet quod sit unum tantum, immobile secundum locum et inalterabile et ingenerabile. Dictum est autem quod si sint multi circulares motus, oportet esse multos motores; ita tamen quod omnes sint aequaliter ordinati sub uno universitatis principio, quod movet primum motum, sicut demonstratum est in XII primae philosophiae. Quod autem motus sit continuus probatur ex tempore, quod est secundum naturam continuum, et non deficiens. Impossibile enim est quod tempus sit sine motu, sicut impossibile est quod passio sit sine proprio subiecto: est enim tempus numerus alicuius continui motus; est ergo numerus motus circularis: quia sicut determinatum est <i>in his quae a principio</i>, idest in VIII Physic., nullus motus potest esse continuus et perpetuus nisi solus circularis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: continuus autem motus etc., inquirit unde motus habeat continuitatem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo movet quaestionem; secundo solvit, ibi: manifestum itaque quia eo et cetera. Quaerit ergo, cum motus sit continuus, habetne continuitatem propter hoc quod mobile sit continuum, vel propter locum in quo est motus, vel propter passionem ad quam est motus?
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: manifestum itaque etc., respondet, dicens manifestum esse quod motus caelestis est continuus, quia id quod movetur est continuum, et non quia locus in quo est motus: quia primus orbis non est in loco nisi per accidens: quia scilicet relationem continentis ad contentum habet ad locum: et ideo non est continuus ab eo in quo movet. Motus enim in genere non habet continuitatem ab eo in quo movetur: quia aliquando est motus continuus in passione, quae non est continua nisi per accidens, quia id cui accidit est continuum. Si autem aliquis motus sit continuus ab eo in quo movetur, hoc habebit solus motus localis: quia locus habet quandam magnitudinem et continuitatem. Sed nec omnis motus localis, sed solus circularis; quia quod movetur circulariter, est idem semper et seipso continuum: et ideo facit motum sempiternum et continuum; motus autem sempiternus facit tempus sempiternum.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="2.10" id="2.10"></a> <b><a name="2.11" id="2.11">Lectio 11</a></b> <a name="2.11" id="2.11"></a>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">11
            <td>11
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς συνεχῶς κινουμένοις κατὰ γένεσιν ἢ ἀλλοίωσιν ἢ ὅλως μεταβολὴν ὁρῶμεν τὸ ἐφεξῆς ὂν καὶ (337b.) γινόμενον τόδε μετὰ τόδε ὥστε μὴ διαλείπειν, σκεπτέον πότερον ἔστι τι ὃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἔνια, δῆλον, καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἕτερον διὰ τοῦτο· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔσται, δεῖ τοῦτο εἶναί ποτε ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἐστίν· ὃ δὲ νῦν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι μέλλει, οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ γενέσθαι· μέλλων γὰρ ἂν βαδίζειν τις οὐκ ἂν βαδίσειεν. Ὅλως δ', ἐπεὶ ἐνδέχεται ἔνια τῶν ὄντων καὶ μὴ εἶναι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ γινόμενα οὕτως ἕξει, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτ' ἔσται.
            <td>Wherever there is continuity in any process (coming-to-be or 'alteration' or any kind of change whatever) we observe consecutiveness', i.e. this coming-to-be after that without any interval. Hence we must investigate whether, amongst the consecutive members, there is any whose future being is necessary; or whether, on the contrary, every one of them may fail to come-to-be. For that some of them may fail to occur, is clear. (a) We need only appeal to the distinction between the statements 'x will be' and 'x is about to which depends upon this fact. For if it be true to say of x that it 'will be', it must at some time be true to say of it that 'it is': whereas, though it be true to say of x now that 'it is about to occur', it is quite possible for it not to come-to-be-thus a man might not walk, though he is now 'about to' walk. And (b) since (to appeal to a general principle) amongst the things which 'are' some are capable also of 'not-being', it is clear that the same ambiguous character will attach to them no less when they are coming-to-be: in other words, their coming-to-be will not be necessary.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Πότερον οὖν ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἔνια ἀναγκαῖον ἁπλῶς γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὰ μὲν ἀδύνατα μὴ εἶναι τὰ δὲ δυνατά, οὕτως καὶ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν; οἷον τροπὰς ἆρα ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι;
            <td>Then are all the things that come-to-be of this contingent character? Or, on the contrary, is it absolutely necessary for some of them to come-to-be? Is there, in fact, a distinction in the field of 'coming-to-be' corresponding to the distinction, within the field of 'being', between things that cannot possibly 'not-be' and things that can 'not-be'? For instance, is it necessary that solstices shall come-to-be, i.e. impossible that they should fail to be able to occur?
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ δὴ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔσται, οἷον εἰ οἰκία, θεμέλιον, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πηλόν, ἆρ' οὖν καὶ εἰ θεμέλιος γέγονεν, ἀνάγκη οἰκίαν γενέσθαι; ἢ οὐκέτι, εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖνο ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι ἁπλῶς· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀνάγκη καὶ θεμελίου γενομένου γενέσθαι οἰκίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρότερον ἔχον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον, ὥστ' εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται, ἀνάγκη ἐκεῖνο πρότερον. Εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη· καὶ εἰ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τοίνυν ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὑπέκειτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐσόμενον. Ἐν οἷς ἄρα τὸ ὕστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν τούτοις ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ προτέρου γενομένου ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὕστερον.
            <td>Assuming that the antecedent must have come-to-be if the consequent is to be (e.g. that foundations must have come-to-be if there is to be a house: clay, if there are to be foundations), is the converse also true? If foundations have come-to-be, must a house come-to-be? The answer seems to be that the necessary nexus no longer holds, unless it is 'necessary' for the consequent (as well as for the antecedent) to come-to-be-'necessary' absolutely. If that be the case, however, 'a house must come-to-be if foundations have come-to-be', as well as vice versa. For the antecedent was assumed to be so related to the consequent that, if the latter is to be, the antecedent must have come-to-be before it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the consequent should come-to-be, the antecedent also must have come-to-be: and if the antecedent has come-to-be, then the consequent also must come-to-be-not, however, because of the antecedent, but because the future being of the consequent was assumed as necessary. Hence, in any sequence, when the being of the consequent is necessary, the nexus is reciprocal—in other words, when the antecedent has come-to-be the consequent must always come-to-be too.
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    </blockquote><a name="2.11" id="2.11">
    <p>Postquam philosophus determinavit de principiis generationis et corruptionis, et continuitatis earum, in parte ista movet quaestionem quandam quae potest oriri ex praedictis. Cum enim dictum sit quod motus circularis sit causa generationis et corruptionis, et perpetuitatis sive continuitatis earum, et ostensum sit quod iste motus sit ex necessitate continuus et sempiternus, non est ostensum quod effectus eius debeat esse necessarius. Et ideo hic quaerit philosophus, utrum omnia quae generantur ex necessitate generentur. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo movet quaestionem; secundo ostendit quomodo fit generatio infinita, ibi: si quidem igitur in infinitum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo movet quaestionem et breviter solvit; secundo repetit ut eam melius declaret, ibi: <i>utrum igitur omnia talia</i> et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo movet quaestionem; secundo solvit, ibi: quoniam quidem enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia nos videmus in omnibus continue motis, sive secundum generationem sive secundum alterationem sive universaliter secundum omnem transmutationem moveantur, quod post transmutationem est ens, et videmus quod unum generatur post aliud, et non deficit, videndum est utrum aliquid ex necessitate generetur, vel nihil, sed omnia contingit esse generata et non generata.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem enim etc., ponit solutionem: et primo ponit eam; secundo probat, ibi: universaliter autem quoniam contingit et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod manifestum est in quibusdam, quod mox ut erunt, quaedam alia generantur ex necessitate et propter illa: sicut si terra madescit, necesse est terram vaporare, et ex vapore nubem generari, et ex nube pluviam, et ex pluvia terram madefieri, et ex illa necesse est iterum exire vaporem, et sic in infinitum; cum enim de aliqua re in sua causa efficiente et materiali determinata, verum est dicere nunc quoniam erit, oportet illam aliquando existere: sicut patet in praedictis exemplis. Aliquid tamen futurum esse non habens causam determinatam nihil prohibet contingere non esse: verbi gratia, verum est nunc dicere de aliquo quod ipse est futurus incedere, potest tamen impediri propositum eius, et ita non incedet.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: universaliter autem etc., probat praedictam solutionem; et est ratio sua talis. Sicut est in entis divisione, ita universaliter est in generatione; sed in entibus ita est, quod quaedam sunt contingentia esse et non esse, et quaedam non contingunt non esse, sed sunt ex necessitate; ergo ita est in generatione, quia quaedam ex necessitate generabuntur, et quaedam contingit generari.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: utrum igitur omnia talia etc., repetit praedictam quaestionem, ut melius eam declaret. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit eam; secundo solvit eam, ibi: aut non adhuc et cetera. Quaerit ergo primo utrum omnia quae generantur, sint talia quod ex necessitate generentur, aut non sunt talia omnia, sed aliqua contingenter, et quaedam necessario, ita scilicet quod sit sicut in rebus, quod quaedam sunt contingentia et possibilia non esse, et quaedam necesse est simpliciter esse quae impossibile est non esse: an ita est circa generationem, quod quaedam necessario generentur quibusdam generatis, et quaedam possibile non generari generatis illis. Verbi gratia, si est necesse fieri <i>conversiones</i>, idest cum videamus quod universaliter, generato posteriori, necesse sit generatum prius esse, an necesse sit e converso, scilicet generato priore necesse sit generari posterius. Verbi gratia, nos videmus quod si domus est generata, necesse est fundamentum esse generatum, et si fundamentum est generatum, necesse est prius generatum fuisse lutum; quaeramus ergo utrum convertatur, quod si fundamentum est generatum, quod etiam domus sit generata, vel non convertatur.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: aut non etc., solvit propositam quaestionem, dicens quod non est necesse conversionem fieri, ita quod uno generato generetur aliud et e converso, ex necessitate, nisi generato priori simpliciter necesse sit generari posterius. Si autem ita fuerit in domo et fundamento, quod scilicet generata domo necesse sit necessitate absoluta generari fundamentum, tunc etiam necesse est fundamento generato generari domum. Sic enim ostensum est supra, quod prius hoc modo se habet ad posterius, scilicet quod uno generato generatur aliud et e converso: quia si posterius est generatum, necesse est generari prius, et e converso, et si posterius necessario generatur, necesse est generari prius, et convertitur; quia si illud quod est prius, generatum est, puta fundamentum, necesse est generari quod est posterius, puta domum. Sed si vere loquamur, non propter illud quod domus sit causa generationis fundamenti, sed quoniam subiectum sit ex necessitate futurum, fuit necessitas suppositionis ex hypothesi: quia posito toto, necesse fuit supponi et partem. Et ideo non convertitur. Convertitur autem in omnibus in quibus posterius generatur a priori, sicut ex tota causa materiali tota manente, quodam alio continue accedente et recedente: quia in talibus semper priori generato, necessario generatur posterius, et e converso. Est ergo summa solutionis in hoc, quod quando termini generationis ita se habent, quod uterque sit tota materia alterius et e converso, sicut est in exemplis terrae complutae, vaporis, nubis et pluviae, et similiter in generatione elementorum sub circulo declivi, tunc necesse est quod uno generato generetur aliud, et e converso; et hoc ideo, quia utrumque est prius et posterius respectu alterius. Quando vero unum non est tota materia alterius, sicut fundamentum non est tota materia domus, tunc non est necesse quod priori generato generetur posterius, sicut fundamento generato non est necesse generari domum. Domo tamen generata necesse est generari fundamentum, non quidem necessitate absoluta, sed ex suppositione, dato scilicet quod fundamentum sit pars domus: quia posito tota necesse est poni partem.
    <hr></a>
    <p align="center"><a name="2.11" id="2.11"></a> <b><a name="2.12" id="2.12">Lectio 12</a></b> <a name="2.12" id="2.12"></a>
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω, οὐκ ἔσται ἀνάγκη τὸ ὕστερον τόδε γενέσθαι ἁπλῶς. Ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερον ἔμπροσθεν ἀνάγκη ἔσται, δι' ὃ ἐκεῖνο ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι. Ὥστ' εἰ μή ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἀπείρου, οὐδὲ πρῶτον ἔσται οὐδὲν δι' ὃ ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται γενέσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς πέρας ἔχουσι τοῦτ' ἔσται εἰπεῖν ἀληθῶς, ὅτι ἁπλῶς ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, οἷον οἰκίαν, ὅταν θεμέλιος γένηται· ὅταν γὰρ γένηται, εἰ μὴ ἀεὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, συμβήσεται ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ ἀεὶ εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ γενέσει ἀεὶ εἶναι, εἰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ ἅμα· ὃ γὰρ εἶναι ἀνάγκη (338a.) οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ εἶναι· ὥστ' εἰ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀίδιόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Καὶ εἰ ἡ γένεσις τοίνυν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀίδιος ἡ γένεσις τούτου, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
            <td>Now (i) if the sequence of occurrences is to proceed ad infinitum 'downwards', the coming-to-be of any determinate 'this' amongst the later members of the sequence will not be absolutely, but only conditionally, necessary. For it will always be necessary that some other member shall have come-to-be before 'this' as the presupposed condition of the necessity that 'this' should come-to-be: consequently, since what is 'infinite' has no 'originative source', neither will there be in the infinite sequence any 'primary' member which will make it 'necessary' for the remaining members to come-to-be. Nor again (ii) will it be possible to say with truth, even in regard to the members of a limited sequence, that it is 'absolutely necessary' for any one of them to come-to-be. We cannot truly say, e.g. that 'it is absolutely necessary for a house to come-to-be when foundations have been laid': for (unless it is always necessary for a house to be coming-to-be) we should be faced with the consequence that, when foundations have been laid, a thing, which need not always be, must always be. No: if its coming-to-be is to be 'necessary', it must be 'always' in its coming-to-be. For what is 'of necessity' coincides with what is 'always', since that which 'must be' cannot possibly 'not-be'. Hence a thing is eternal if its 'being' is necessary: and if it is eternal, its 'being' is necessary. And if, therefore, the 'coming-to-be' of a thing is necessary, its 'coming-to-be' is eternal; and if eternal, necessary.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Εἰ ἄρα τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁπλῶς ἡ γένεσις, ἀνάγκη ἀνακυκλεῖν καὶ ἀνακάμπτειν. Ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἤτοι πέρας ἔχειν τὴν γένεσιν ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ μή, ἢ εἰς εὐθὺ ἢ κύκλῳ. Τούτων δ' εἴπερ ἔσται ἀίδιος, οὐκ εἰς εὐθὺ οἷόν τε διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς εἶναι ἀρχὴν μήτ' ἂν κάτω, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐσομένων λαμβανομένων, μήτ' ἄνω, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν γενομένων· ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι ἀρχήν, μὴ πεπερασμένης οὔσης, καὶ ἀίδιον εἶναι. Διὸ ἀνάγκη κύκλῳ εἶναι. Ἀντιστρέφειν ἄρα ἀνάγκη ἔσται, οἷον εἰ τοδὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἄρα· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ δὴ συνεχῶς· οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρει λέγειν διὰ δύο ἢ πολλῶν. Ἐν τῇ κύκλῳ ἄρα κινήσει καὶ γενέσει ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁπλῶς· καὶ εἴτε κύκλῳ, ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον γίνεσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ ἀνάγκη, ἡ τούτων γένεσις κύκλῳ.
            <td>It follows that the coming-to-be of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, must be cyclical—i.e. must return upon itself. For coming-to-be must either be limited or not limited: and if not limited, it must be either rectilinear or cyclical. But the first of these last two alternatives is impossible if coming-to-be is to be eternal, because there could not be any 'originative source' whatever in an infinite rectilinear sequence, whether its members be taken 'downwards' (as future events) or 'upwards' (as past events). Yet coming-to-be must have an 'originative source' (if it is to be necessary and therefore eternal), nor can it be eternal if it is limited. Consequently it must be cyclical. Hence the nexus must be reciprocal. By this I mean that the necessary occurrence of 'this' involves the necessary occurrence of its antecedent: and conversely that, given the antecedent, it is also necessary for the consequent to come-to-be. And this reciprocal nexus will hold continuously throughout the sequence: for it makes no difference whether the reciprocal nexus, of which we are speaking, is mediated by two, or by many, members. It is in circular movement, therefore, and in cyclical coming-to-be that the 'absolutely necessary' is to be found. In other words, if the coming-to-be of any things is cyclical, it is 'necessary' that each of them is coming-to-be and has come-to-be: and if the coming-to-be of any things is 'necessary', their coming-to-be is cyclical.
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            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ εὐλόγως, ἐπεὶ ἀίδιος καὶ ἄλλως ἐφάνη ἡ κύκλῳ κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ὅτι ταῦτα ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται καὶ ἔσται, ὅσαι (338b.) ταύτης κινήσεις καὶ ὅσαι διὰ ταύτην· εἰ γὰρ τὸ κύκλῳ κινούμενον ἀεί τι κινεῖ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων κύκλῳ εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν, οἷον τῆς ἄνω φορᾶς οὔσης κύκλῳ ὁ ἥλιος ὡδί, ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτως, αἱ ὧραι διὰ τοῦτο κύκλῳ γίνονται καὶ ἀνακάμπτουσιν, τούτων δ' οὕτω γινομένων πάλιν τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων.
            <td>The result we have reached is logically concordant with the eternity of circular motion, i.e. the eternity of the revolution of the heavens (a fact which approved itself on other and independent evidence),' since precisely those movements which belong to, and depend upon, this eternal revolution 'come-to-be' of necessity, and of necessity 'will be'. For since the revolving body is always setting something else in motion, the movement of the things it moves must also be circular. Thus, from the being of the 'upper revolution' it follows that the sun revolves in this determinate manner; and since the sun revolves thus, the seasons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle, i.e. return upon themselves; and since they come-to-be cyclically, so in their turn do the things whose coming-to-be the seasons initiate.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰ μὲν οὕτω φαίνεται, οἷον ὕδατα καὶ ἀὴρ κύκλῳ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰ μὲν νέφος ἔσται, δεῖ ὗσαι, καὶ εἰ ὕσει γε, δεῖ καὶ νέφος εἶναι, ἄνθρωποι δὲ καὶ ζῷα οὐκ ἀνακάμπτουσιν εἰς αὑτοὺς ὥστε πάλιν γίνεσθαι τὸν αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὁ πατὴρ ἐγένετο, σὲ γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' εἰ σύ, ἐκεῖνον. Εἰς εὐθὺ δὲ ἔοικεν εἶναι αὕτη ἡ γένεσις.
            <td>Then why do some things manifestly come-to-be in this cyclical fashion (as, e.g. showers and air, so that it must rain if there is to be a cloud and, conversely, there must be a cloud if it is to rain), while men and animals do not 'return upon themselves' so that the same individual comes-to-be a second time (for though your coming-to-be presupposes your father's, his coming-to-be does not presuppose yours)? Why, on the contrary, does this coming-to-be seem to constitute a rectilinear sequence?
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως πάλιν αὕτη, πότερον ὁμοίως ἅπαντα ἀνακάμπτει ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀριθμῷ τὰ δὲ εἴδει μόνον.
            <td>In discussing this new problem, we must begin by inquiring whether all things 'return upon themselves' in a uniform manner; or whether, on the contrary, though in some sequences what recurs is numerically the same, in other sequences it is the same only in species.
          <tr style="text-align:justify" valign="top">
            <td style="font-family: palatino">Ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἄφθαρτος ἡ οὐσία ἡ κινουμένη, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ἀριθμῷ ταὐτὰ ἔσται (ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ κινουμένῳ), ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἀλλὰ φθαρτή, ἀνάγκη τῷ εἴδει, ἀριθμῷ δὲ μὴ ἀνακάμπτειν. Διὸ ὕδωρ ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ἀὴρ ἐξ ὕδατος εἴδει ὁ αὐτός, οὐκ ἀριθμῷ. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὧν ἡ οὐσία γίνεται οὖσα τοιαύτη οἵα ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι.
            <td>In consequence of this distinction, it is evident that those things, whose 'substance'—that which is undergoing the process—is imperishable, will be numerically, as well as specifically, the same in their recurrence: for the character of the process is determined by the character of that which undergoes it. Those things, on the other hand, whose 'substance' is perish, able (not imperishable) must 'return upon themselves' in the sense that what recurs, though specifically the same, is not the same numerically. That why, when Water comes-to-be from Air and Air from Water, the Air is the same 'specifically', not 'numerically': and if these too recur numerically the same, at any rate this does not happen with things whose 'substance' comes-to-be—whose 'substance' is such that it is essentially capable of not-being.
      </table>
    </blockquote><a name="2.12" id="2.12">
    <p>In isto loco philosophus ostendit ex praedictis quomodo generatio sit infinita: quia scilicet in circuitu, et non secundum rectum. Et primo hoc facit; secundo movet quasdam quaestiones, ibi: quare ergo haec quidem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo probat quod generatio sit infinita, non secundum rectum sed in circuitu, quasi a divisione; secundo per causam, ibi: et aliter in circuitu et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo probat quod generatio non potest esse infinita secundum rectum; secundo recolligit rationem et ordinat eam, ibi: necesse enim et cetera. Circa primum intendit philosophus talem rationem: si generatio est secundum rectum, non erit ex necessitate et semper; sed generatio est ex necessitate ut ostensum est; ergo non est secundum rectum. In ista ratione sic procedit: primo ponit maiorem; secundo minorem, ibi: sed oportet semper generationem etc.; tertio conclusionem, ibi: si igitur alicuius et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo probat quod generatio non est necessaria in infinitis secundum rectum; secundo in habentibus finem, ibi: at vero neque in finem habentibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit; secundo probat, ibi: semper enim alterum anterius et cetera. Ad evidentiam primae partis sciendum est, quod sicut supra dictum est, in his quae generantur adinvicem semper unum est prius et alterum posterius, et necesse est generato priori generari posterius et e converso in his, in quibus est necessitas absoluta. In his vero in quibus est necessitas ex suppositione, oportet aliquid esse prius et aliquid posterius. Dicit ergo primo, quod si generatio tendit in infinitum, sive superius ad generata sive inferius ad generanda, non est necesse, nec necessitate absoluta nec necessitate ex suppositione, generari <i>hoc eorum quae postea</i>, idest aliquid quod sit de numero eorum quae sunt post. Quod est contra id quod supra est probatum, ubi dictum est quod generato priori necesse est generari posterius.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: semper enim alterum etc., probat propositum, dicens quod in his quorum primo genito necesse est aliud, scilicet posterius, generari quacumque necessitate, semper alterum est ante et aliud post, sicut ante est terra madefacta quam vaporatio: licet etiam in conversione ante sit vaporatio quam terra madefacta, quia utrumque se habet ad utrumque ut prius et posterius; similiter est prius fundamentum quam sit domus. Sed in infinitis nullum est primum, et per consequens nec postremum: ergo non est necesse generari; et ita non est necessaria generatio.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: at vero neque in finem etc., ostendit quod generatio non possit esse infinita etiam in habentibus finem, dicens quod neque est verum dicere in habentibus finem quod necesse sit simpliciter generari. Et est intelligendum quod si non fiat reiteratio: quia si in talibus generatio reiteretur, tunc erit circularis et non solum recta; verbi gratia, non est necesse generari domum, fundamento generato: si enim quando fundamentum est generatum, necesse est semper generari hoc, idest domum, sequeretur quod illud quod contingit non semper esse, semper esset. Cum autem videamus ad sensum quod non semper generatur domus generato fundamento, sequitur quod non sit necesse generato fundamento generari domum.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: sed oportet semper generationem etc., ponit minorem, et probat eam, quia manifesta est per praedicta. Unde dicit quod generatio est semper, quando generatio eius, scilicet posterioris, ex necessitate absoluta est generatio prioris; quod autem est ex necessitate et quod est semper, simul sunt: quia si unum est, et reliquum. Et hoc sic probat: quia illud quod necesse est esse, impossibile est non esse, et quod impossibile est non esse, necesse est semper esse; quocirca si aliquid est ex necessitate, est sempiternum, et e converso, si est sempiternum, est ex necessitate.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: si igitur alicuius etc., concludit quod, si alicuius generatio est ex necessitate simpliciter et non ex suppositione, cum non possit esse secundum rectum ut ostensum est, necesse est quod sit circularis et per reiterationem.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: necesse enim etc., recolligit rationem et ordinat, dicens quod necesse est quod generatio aut habeat finem, aut non. Sed quod non habeat finem supra probatum est, tam ex parte materiae in primo libro, quam ex parte motus et ex parte finis in secundo. Si ergo non habet finem: aut est infinita secundum rectum, aut in circuitu. Sed sicut supra ostensum est, non est possibile quod sit infinita secundum rectum: quia in infinitis non est principium, neque ad inferius, idest ad futura generanda, neque ad superius, idest ad praeterita generata. Cum autem generatio nec habeat principium nec sit finita, necesse est quod sit sempiterna, et per consequens sit in circuitu. Et si est in circuitu, necesse est eam converti ab ultimo in primum. Verbi gratia, si hoc est ex necessitate generatum ab hoc, sicut terra compluta a pluvia, necesse est quod generatum sit illud quod est prius, scilicet pluvia: et si pluvia est generata, necesse est quod prius fuerit aliquid generatum, scilicet nubes: et si nubes, oportet quod prius fuerit vapor: et si vapor, oportet quod prius fuerit terra madefacta; et sic aliquando revertitur in primum. Et sic fit continue: quia nihil differt dicere quod conversio fiat per medium unum vel per duo vel per plura, dummodo ab ultimo redeat in primum. Necessarium ergo simpliciter est, quod unum generetur ab altero in motu et generatione quae est in circuitu; et si aliqua necesse est in circuitu generari, necesse est ista simpliciter generari, et e converso si necesse est aliqua simpliciter generata esse, ista necesse est in circuitu generari. Hoc ergo, scilicet quod generatio sit perpetua, non in rectum sed circulariter, rationabiliter apparuit.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: et aliter in circuitu etc., ostendit hoc idem per causam, dicens quod aliter potest etiam hoc idem demonstrari, scilicet per motum caeli: quia enim ipse est in circuitu, ideo ex necessitate elementa adinvicem generantur. Si enim motus caeli est in circuitu, oportet quod quaecumque sunt passiones huius motus, et quaecumque sunt per hunc motum solum sicut per causam efficientem, quod etiam illa sint. Si enim quod in circuitu movetur movet elementa, necesse est etiam quod motus horum, quae sunt passiones eius, et quod motus eorum quae sufficienter generantur ab hoc, sint etiam ex necessitate: verbi gratia, cum allatio <i>superioris</i>, hoc est circuli declivis, sit in circuitu, necesse est quod moveantur etiam sol et alii planetae. Quia vero hic, idest sol, movetur in circuitu, necesse est etiam horas in circuitu generari et iterari; horis autem in circuitu generatis, necesse est quod omnia quae sunt, sicut a causa efficiente, a motu solis et motu horarum, sint etiam generata ex necessitate in circuitu. Et hae sunt generationes elementorum: quia ex istorum generatione omnia alia generantur, maxime omnia temporalia. Deinde cum dicit: quare ergo etc., movet duas quaestiones; secundam ibi: principium autem intentionis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo movet quaestionem; secundo solvit, ibi: in rectum itaque et cetera. Quaerit ergo primo, quare in quibusdam esse videtur quod in circuitu generantur, verbi gratia aer et aqua et cetera elementa: quia si nubes erit, oportet pluere, et si pluet, oportet nubem esse, et iteratur; in quibusdam vero non est ita: nam homines et animalia non reiterantur: non enim est necesse te generari, si pater tuus est generatus, sed si tu es generatus, necesse est patrem tuum generatum fuisse.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: in rectum itaque etc., solvit dictam quaestionem, dicens quod causa quare animalia non reiterantur, est quia eorum generatio est secundum rectum et non secundum circulum. Nam sicut supra dictum est, ubi uterque terminorum non est tota materia ad alterum, ut uno motore diversimode se habente educatur utrumque de utroque, in his non est generatio circularis; sicut in te et patre tuo: quia pater tuus non est tota materia tua. In elementis vero unum est tota materia ad aliud, et uno motu declivis circuli potest educi unumquodque ab altero; et ideo in eis est generatio circularis.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: principium autem etc., ponit aliam quaestionem: et primo ponit; secundo solvit, ibi: quorum quidem igitur et cetera. Quia enim probatum est quod generatio sit perpetua per reiterationem, posset aliquis credere quod omnia eadem reiterantur; et ideo dicit quod principium intentionis in hac ultima parte est quaerere, utrum omnia similiter reiterantur, aut non, sed haec quidem reiterantur eadem numero, alia vero solum eadem specie. Ex quo enim omnium est generatio secundum materiam, videtur quod omnia eadem secundum numerum debeant iterari.
    <p>Deinde cum dicit: quorum quidem etc., solvit hanc quaestionem, dicens quod ea quorum substantia non corrumpitur in mutatione, manifestum est quod iterantur eadem numero; sicut sol reiteratur in obliquo circulo, quia motus sequitur id quod movetur: quia non est motus nisi existentis in actu, ut ostensum est in V Physic. Ea vero quorum substantia non est incorruptibilis sed est corruptibilis, necesse est iterari eadem specie, et non eadem numero; et ideo aqua quae est ex aere, et aer ex aqua, sunt specie eadem, non eadem numero: corrumpitur enim eorum substantia in tali transmutatione. Sed tamen cum aer sit tota materia aquae, et e converso, talia reiterata magis accedunt ad identitatem materialem quam animalia et homines reiterati: unum enim animal generans, puta bos, non est tota materia generati alterius bovis; et ideo minus accedent ad identitatem numeralem, quam elementa circulari generatione elementorum. Unde, etsi propter hoc concedatur quod elementa aliquo modo reiterentur eadem numero, non tamen conceditur quod propter hoc simpliciter reiterentur eadem numero: quia eorum substantia est talis corruptibilis, qualem non contingit esse eandem in generato et in eo ex quo generatur. Sed videtur in solutionibus istarum duarum quaestionum esse contradictio: nam in prima dicit philosophus quod animalia non reiterantur, in secunda vero dicit quod reiterantur eadem specie. Sed dicendum quod prima dicit, quod animalia non reiterantur eadem numero: et sic concordat cum secunda; vel quod non ex necessitate est in eis reiteratio in generatione, sive secundum numerum sive secundum speciem: et ideo patre tuo generato, non est necesse te generari, sed te generato, necesse est patrem tuum generatum fuisse. Et in hoc non contradicit secundae solutioni, quae dicit quod si iterantur, iterantur eadem specie, non eadem numero.
    <hr>
    <hr></a>
  </blockquote>
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